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HORIZONS

P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H I N I T I A T I V E

North American Linkages Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis

Like Ulysses, who had to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis on the return from Troy to Ithacus, Canada has to steer certain public policies between twin perils, pursuing a balance between the risk of being engulfed by its giant neighbour, as a possible result

of ill-considered integration, and the risk of losing important economic benefits if it steers away from North American integration.

The relations between Canada and the United States are always evolving, and require the constant care of Canadian

policy makers. In recent years, additional layers of complexity have been added to the Canada-US policy environment, making policy research even more essential to the management of our relationship. The North American Linkages projects have been under

NORTH AMERICAN LINKAGES

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>4 North American Integration: Challenges and Potential Policy Responses
André Downs, PRI</p> <p>9 Economic Impacts of Regulatory Convergence Between Canada and the United States
Fidèle Ndayisenga, PRI</p> <p>17 Can Regulatory Collaboration Improve Safety in Health Care?
David Griller, SECOR Consulting</p> <p>23 Moving Toward a Customs Union: A Review of the Evidence
Robert (Bob) Kunimoto, Gary Sawchuk, PRI</p> <p>32 Possible Economic Impacts in Canada of a Canada-US Customs Union
Madanmohan Ghosh, Someshwar Rao, Industry Canada</p> <p>35 Economic Regions in North America
Pierre-Paul Proulx, PRI</p> | <p>42 Canada-US Values: Distinct, Inevitably Carbon Copy, or Narcissism of Small Differences?
Christian Boucher, PRI</p> <p>50 The Regional Dynamics of Province-State Relations
Jean-François Abgrall, PRI</p> <p>55 Economic Integration and Cross-Border Policy Convergence
Gerard W. Boychuk, University of Waterloo
Debora L. VanNijnatten, Wilfrid Laurier University</p> <p>61 The Evolving Industrial Diversity of Canadian Cities
Desmond Beckstead, Mark Brown, Statistics Canada</p> <p>64 How Does International Trade Affect Business Cycle Synchronization in North America?
Shenjie Chen, John M. Curtis, International Trade Canada</p> |
|--|---|

COMMENTARY

- 69 The Border Effect, the Role of the Nation-State, and Canada-US Economic Relations

EYEWITNESS REPORTS

- 73 Expanding Regulatory Co-operation with the United States
- 77 Canadian National Conference and Policy Forum on Drinking Water

DATA AND TOOLS FOR POLICY RESEARCH

- 79 Data Gaps in Service Industries
- 81 Environmental Scan Initiative

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The Policy Research Initiative (PRI) produces *Horizons* as a liaison publication for the federal government policy research community. The primary objective of the PRI is to deepen, collect, and integrate research on crosscutting issues that are highly relevant to the Government of Canada's medium-term policy agenda. *Horizons* highlights the work of policy researchers from across federal departments, and from external experts, on issues that relate closely to PRI horizontal research projects and activities. For more information on the Initiative or to consult previous issues of *Horizons*, please visit <www.policyresearch.gc.ca>.

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INTRODUCTION (CONTINUED)

way for more than a year now, and this issue of *Horizons* presents an opportunity to take stock of progress on some dimensions of the policy dilemmas facing the Government of Canada.

Since the release of the March 2003 discussion paper, *North American Linkages Project: Focusing the Research Agenda*, there has been a flurry of related research activities in the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) and the policy research community. Research findings are accumulating, and a number of activities have been held to review these findings and their policy implications.

In this issue of *Horizons*, the reader will find a series of articles that provide an overview of some of the key results to date and the directions of future research. The lead article by André Downs, Senior Project Director responsible for the North American Linkages projects, presents an overview of the research to date, and discusses some potential implications for policy. In particular, he argues that maximizing economic opportunities and being competitive in the North American economic space may be a necessary condition for success in developing third-country markets.

Enhancing regulatory co-operation with the United States is often put forward as an important step in improving access to the US market, while making more efficient use of Canada's regulatory resources. Fidèle Ndayisenga reviews empirical research on the linkages between regulations and economic performance, and proposes estimates of potential gains from regulatory co-operation between Canada and the United States. David Griller examines potential initiatives

on regulatory co-operation with the United States in the human health field, and Doug Blair reports back on presentations and discussions from a roundtable on Canada-US regulatory co-operation hosted by the PRI and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.

A number of economists have proposed the creation of a customs union between Canada and the United States as the next natural step in the economic integration of the two countries, arguing that the existing rules of origin are a cumbersome and costly barrier to trade. In their article on this subject, Bob Kunimoto and Gary Sawchuk assess the empirical evidence on the restrictive nature of the NAFTA system of rules of origin, and the characteristics and potential gains associated with the creation of a customs union. Madanmohan Ghosh and Someshwar Rao summarize the results from a general equilibrium analysis of the potential economic gains from a customs union, and we report back on the key discussion points from a roundtable on moving toward a customs union with the United States.

Another subject of growing interest is the regional dimension of relations between Canada and the United States. Pierre-Paul Proulx looks at some of the basic determinants of regional recomposition of economic activity. Christian Boucher compares the trends in American and Canadian values during the past two decades, and Jean-François Abgrall presents a typology of cross-border institutional linkages at the sub-national level. Gerry Boychuk and Debora VanNijnatten look at cross-border policy convergence in the areas of social and environmental policies,

and Shenjie Chen shows that regional business cycles in Canada are increasingly synchronized with those of the United States.

Overall, this issue of *Horizons* provides a wide perspective on the policy environment and challenges the Government of Canada is facing in its management of our multi-faceted and challenging relations with the United States.

Jean-Pierre Voyer
Executive Director
Policy Research Initiative

Social Policy and the Life-Course Perspective 2004 Queen's International Institute on Social Policy (QIISP)

August 23-25, 2004

Once again, the Policy Research Initiative is joining the QIISP in the presentation of an annual summer institute, bringing together senior officials and policy-makers to review recent research findings and to discuss major directions in social policy. Organized by the Queen's University School of Policy Study, in partnership with the PRI and Social Development Canada, the primary objective of the QIISP is knowledge transfer. This year's program will emphasize the need to take a life-course perspective in the analysis of social exclusion, work-family balance, and other social policy issues.

PRI-SSHRC Policy Research Roundtables 2004-2005

September-December 2004

How do we ensure that knowledge producers are effectively connecting with those who, in their efforts to promote the well being of Canadians, can make best use of their knowledge?

In an effort to respond positively to this challenge, the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) and the Policy Research Initiative have put together a series of roundtable discussions. Now in its second year, the objective of the series is to improve the quality of knowledge transfer between experts from academia and those responsible for the design and development of federal policies and programs.

The autumn program will include sessions on the social economy, housing policy, the working poor, and others. Relevant information will be posted on the PRI web site as it becomes available. Please refer to <www.policyresearch.gc.ca>.

Exploring New Approaches to Social Policy: Lessons from Research

Policy Research Initiative Conference

December 13-15, 2004

Ottawa, Ontario

The PRI is putting together a major two and a half day conference in December 2004. The subject of the conference is the implications of recent social policy research for understanding the challenges and opportunities that are most likely to affect social policy in the medium term. The conference will build on the interdepartmental research from three PRI social policy projects that are coming to completion in the autumn of 2004.

North American Integration

Challenges and Potential Policy Responses

André Downs
Policy Research Initiative

In March 2003, the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) released a discussion paper entitled *North American Linkages: Focusing the Research Agenda*. The paper proposed four research initiatives to address central policy issues in Canada-US relations and, specifically, to help define and understand the challenges and opportunities associated with evolving North American economic integration.

- Why and how should Canada engage in regulatory co-operation with the United States?
- What are the benefits and costs associated with the elimination of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rules of origin between Canada and the United States?
- What are the potential policy implications of the emergence of cross-border regions?
- How can we enhance labour mobility in a North American context?

During the past year, with the participation of other federal departments and outside researchers, the PRI has conducted research on the first three of these projects. Preliminary research results are being presented and discussed in several forums with the objective of understanding the policy challenges and potential responses for the Government of Canada.

This issue of *Horizons* highlights key preliminary results and provides background information for debating some of the available policy options aimed at enhancing the benefits to Canadians arising from Canada's unique economic relationship with the United States.

Canada-US Regulatory Co-operation

There is an increasing realization that when it comes to Canada-US relations, we need both smart borders and smart regulations.

Over the years, research has shown that differences in regulations can constitute an important barrier to trade and investment, especially for small countries. In particular, extensive empirical research at the OECD has clearly established direct linkages between domestic regulatory frameworks and the economic performance of member countries as it pertains to trade, investment, and productivity. For Canada, with a small economy largely dependent on a single giant neighbouring market, it is important to weigh the benefits and costs of having regulatory differences.

This is recognized within the Government of Canada. Several departments have been involved in international regulatory co-operation initiatives, both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis, with varying degrees of success. The External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulations is expected to make several recommendations regarding the need for the Government of Canada to enhance international regulatory co-operation, particularly between Canada and the United States. Earlier this year, as part of the review of the Medical Devices Program, the Auditor General also recommended increasing reliance on international regulatory co-operation, concluding that "[l]imited financial and human resources and limited progress in advancing international regulatory cooperation prevent Health Canada from delivering the Medical Devices Program as designed" (Health Canada, 2004:2).

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the Policy Research Initiative.

At the PRI, we have approached the issue of regulatory co-operation from three different and complementary perspectives. First, we have reviewed the experience of several bilateral regulatory co-operative arrangements involving different countries, which confirmed that successful international regulatory co-operation:

- is based on a firm economic relationship;
- requires political commitment at the highest level; and
- necessitates time and sustained effort to build the necessary level of knowledge and mutual trust.

Our second step was to review the literature and conduct some empirical research on the potential impact of regulations and regulatory co-operation on economic performance. It became apparent that regulations can have a significant impact on productivity, competitiveness, trade flows, and both foreign and domestic investment. For example, OECD estimates suggest that a reduction in the level of restrictiveness of Canadian regulations to the level of the United States would increase productivity growth by a sizeable amount. This is an important policy consideration in the context of the lagging productivity performance of Canada relative to the United States, and the corresponding growing gap in living standards. (See the article by Ndayisenga in this issue of *Horizons*.)

Third, we are examining specific sectors that could benefit from regulatory co-operation and some initiatives that could be undertaken to move further down the path of co-operation. The area of product approval (i.e., drugs, medical devices, new chemical entities) is one that is regularly put forward as an ideal candidate, but where

little progress has been achieved so far. Recognition of product approvals by US regulatory agencies (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration), unilaterally or under a mutual recognition arrangement, is also identified as an important potential step toward a more efficient regulatory system in Canada.

To date, the research undertaken by the PRI on regulatory co-operation issues suggests that there could be substantial benefits for a small country like Canada, which cannot compete with larger economic entities, such as the United States and the European Union in terms of resources devoted to the regulatory process. Research – and common sense – dictate that Canada should look at ways to leverage the resources dedicated to regulatory decisions in other more resourceful countries, and focus its relatively limited resources on regulatory issues where it can nurture a comparative advantage (e.g., emerging biotechnologies) or where potential risks to Canadians may be greatest, such as blood products, drug consumption patterns, and the production of vaccines. (See the article by Griller in this issue of *Horizons*.)

At the same time, it must be recognized that regulatory co-operation is a complex public policy venture. Some argue that Canada risks losing some of its regulatory sovereignty through deeper co-operation with the United States, while others state that regulatory co-operation is itself the exercise of sovereignty. Nor is it always beneficial to seek co-operative outcomes. If having distinct regulations is conducive to innovation in some cases, or if having more stringent standards provides health and safety benefits for which Canadians are willing to

devote more resources than in other countries, then Canada may want to maintain its regulatory distinctiveness.

Many of these issues were examined at the PRI-SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council) Roundtable on Canada-US Regulatory Co-operation. Several of the presentations focused on the expected benefits from enhanced regulatory co-operation with the United States.

Overall, most observers would agree that, when it comes to regulatory co-operation, each situation must be examined carefully to assess the net benefits from moving along the path of regulatory co-operation. Research would suggest, though, that substantial net benefits for Canadians can be achieved if policy makers do not fall into a trap where insignificant regulatory differences are perceived as essential constituents of the Canadian identity and sovereignty.

Moving Toward a Customs Union

An increasing amount of research is being undertaken in universities and research institutes in North America and elsewhere on the effect of non-tariff barriers on trade flows. As tariff protection receded with several rounds of multilateral trade negotiations and the proliferation of free trade agreements, attention increasingly focused on other barriers to trade, such as quotas, regulatory differences, and rules of origin (ROO), which have been proven to impede trade flows substantially.

The NAFTA ROO ensure that tariff-free treatment applies to all goods that originate or are substantially modified in North America, while enabling NAFTA countries to apply their own tariff rates to products of third-country

origin. Hence, ROO prevent imports from entering the free trade zone through the country with the lowest tariff rates. This requires importers and exporters to substantiate the origin of the traded goods, therefore entailing compliance costs for businesses and administration costs for governments. In addition, ROO generate inefficiencies in the allocation of resources by forcing domestic producers to source more inputs locally instead of in lower-price third markets to meet North American content requirements. For these reasons, ROO are recognized as protectionist measures that reduce the economic benefits of free trade.

As detailed in the Kunimoto and Sawchuk article, NAFTA ROO are the most restrictive in the world, and the related compliance costs to businesses can be quite significant, in particular for small- and medium-size firms that may not have in-house expertise, and often rely on outside firms to ensure compliance to the rules.

The creation of a customs union would require the harmonization (or elimination) of the tariff rates that Canada and the United States impose on third-country imports (i.e., essentially most favoured nation tariffs). This would eliminate the need for these preferential rules of origin since the origin determination would be made when a good first enters the area, making it unnecessary to have additional origin requirements for Canada-US trade.

Tariff harmonization between Canada and the United States would appear quite straightforward in most economic sectors, because tariff rates on third-country imports are already quite similar. However, agriculture and

textiles, where tariff and non-tariff protection are quite high and differ significantly between the two countries, would constitute a challenge, at least until protection is brought down and harmonized under future multilateral trade initiatives. For this reason, some analysts would prefer an incremental, sectoral approach to tariff harmonization. The elimination of rules of origin under such an approach would allow Canada and the United States to “pick the low hanging fruits” and keep the difficult trade-offs for later.

The benefits arising from tariff harmonization and the elimination of rules of origin between Canada and the United States are appealing, with estimates ranging from about one percent of GDP, for tariff harmonization and the elimination of the compliance costs, to more than two percent of GDP when the impact on input mix is taken into account.

However, as noted by participants at the PRI-SSHRC Roundtable on moving toward a customs union, while there are sizeable potential gains associated with the creation of a customs union, one must recognize that the negotiation of a customs union would encounter important difficulties, and that some adjustment costs would have to be incurred. First, as mentioned above, agriculture and textiles may prove difficult to address. Second, under a customs union, Canada and the United States would be required to harmonize their trade policy toward third parties, essentially tariff levels and customs procedures, but also potentially anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Of course, both countries must be prepared to shoulder the costs of implementing specific

measures to accommodate exceptions within the framework of a customs union. In particular, a customs union would require member countries to renegotiate their FTAs to ensure that tariff-free access is extended to the FTA partners of the other party. Third, a customs union would require some form of arrangement to redistribute the duties collected at the perimeter of the customs union and an institutional or governance structure to address potential disputes between the parties.

Finally, by definition, rules of origin provide some protection to domestic producers, and hence create some form of rents and vested private interests. Parties that benefit from these rents would certainly oppose any substantial changes that would jeopardize their privileged position.

Canada, the United States, and Mexico have all recognized that existing NAFTA ROO impose an undue cost to businesses, and have been consulting domestic stakeholders to get their views on tariff harmonization and the elimination of ROO. Whether this recognition and current consultative efforts lead to a major initiative to move toward a customs union remains to be seen.

In the interim, several related policy issues need further research, including the extent to which Canadian exporters use NAFTA status to access the US market, the potential governance structures that could be envisaged under a customs union, the potential impact of relinquishing some trade policy levers, and the potential long-term dynamic effects of eliminating ROO on the performance of the Canadian economy. The PRI and

its research partners are examining these issues to better enlighten the policy debate.

The Emergence of Cross-Border Regions

The Government of Canada has recognized the importance of the linkages between provincial and state governments by announcing the creation of a new secretariat at the embassy in Washington allowing for the co-location of provincial and territorial representatives, by increasingly involving provincial governments in trade discussions, and by asking provincial governments to use their connections south of the border to improve our understanding of the complex American society.

This recognition is in line with observed trends that suggest that Canadian provinces, regions, and municipalities are developing dense and complex economic, political, and institutional linkages with their US counterparts. These linkages are modifying gradually the nature of the Canadian federation, and must be taken into account in the development of national policies.

The PRI has undertaken research to better capture the nature of these cross-border linkages. The research has been articulated around three axes to provide a disaggregated perspective of North American integration: economic, socio-cultural, and institutional.

Under the economic axis, the research aims to assess the impact of North American economic integration on the interdependency of Canadian and US regions, the degree of economic specialization of Canadian regions, and the emergence of leading

domestic and North American industrial clusters. This involves assessing the drivers of territorial recomposition of economic activity in North America, identifying key clusters – domestic and cross-border – and their effect on regional growth, and developing policy proposals to improve regional competitiveness. (See the article by Proulx in this issue of *Horizons*.)

Existing and ongoing research suggest that Canadian regions are increasingly dependent on economic events in the United States, which is not surprising given the sharp increase in the share of provincial GDP represented by exports to the United States. While this phenomenon may have provided opportunities for increased specialization and productivity gains, it also increased the sensitivity of provincial economic cycles to changes in regional US economic conditions, as substantiated in the article by Chen in this issue. This may make the task of designing national economic policies, such as monetary, fiscal, and tax policies, more daunting, because of potential conflicts in terms of the required policy stance, its timing, and its regional impacts. This also has a major impact on regional development policies. Hence, North American integration is adding a layer of complexity to the design of economic policies.

A key question for observers of the North American integration process has been whether economic integration has led to a convergence of values and beliefs between Canadian and American societies. The first phase of our research on this question (summarized by Boucher in this issue of *Horizons*), would suggest that this has not been the case at the national level. Over the past two decades, the values and beliefs of Canadians and

Americans have diverged as least as much as they have converged, depending on the dimension examined. For example, there seems to have been convergence in terms of political values (e.g., confidence in institutions, national pride, priorities), but not in terms of economic, social, and moral values, where the US society appears to be more conservative.

However, these differences in values and beliefs, while statistically different, are largely of a marginal nature given the similarities between the two societies relative to any other comparable pair of countries. In addition, when there is convergence, it is as much American values and beliefs migrating toward Canadian values and beliefs as the other way around, which is an interesting result given the fears that Canadians will increasingly resemble Americans as a result of economic integration.

This is only one dimension of the analysis. In the current phase of the research, the analysis is taking place at the regional level, testing the hypothesis that there is more convergence within cross-border regions than at the national level. This would be consistent with the emergence of regions, economic and otherwise, that straddle the Canada-US border, a phenomenon observed in the European Union. It could also challenge the thesis of unpredictability or the myth of converging values, which assumes that economic integration does not lead to value convergence.

Another PRI research initiative is looking at the institutional arrangements (e.g., agreements, memorandums of understanding, associations) that exist at the sub-federal level between economic, social, and political entities on

both sides of the border (e.g., provincial and state governments, municipalities, private sector). The research, introduced in the article by Abgrall in this issue of *Horizons*, indicates there has been an intensification of these institutional arrangements, particularly between provincial and state governments, and this phenomenon is most prevalent in the economic domain (e.g., transportation, energy, environment), reflecting the increasing trade intensity between Canadian and US regions.

There is no doubt that this trend in sub-federal institutional linkages is having an impact on the policy environment of the Government of Canada. Future research will further examine the potential policy implications of these developments.

A Fourth Option

Readers will be familiar with the recurring debate in Canada regarding whether our policies should be targeted at reinforcing our bilateral relations with the United States (the second option) or whether Canada should put the emphasis on the diversification of its export markets and a more multilateral approach to international issues (the third option). This debate has been a constant in Canadian politics. In the context of the 10th anniversary of NAFTA, and the review of Canada's foreign and defence policies, this debate is at the forefront of the policy agenda.

One premise is that it is not incompatible for Canada to be an active player both on the North American scene and on the international stage. Indeed, to remain a meaningful economic

actor in the current international economic context, Canada must maximize the potential benefits from an integrated North American market. It is illusory to believe that Canada can be competitive in world markets if it cannot maximize its opportunities within the North American market. If Canadian firms and workers are able to hold their ground in markets close to home, then they will be in a position to succeed in international markets.

Hence, one can describe the fourth option as a policy approach that aims at maximizing our access to – and success in – the US market, thus providing the economic foundation to become a competitive force in world markets. This would imply, among other initiatives, doing what is necessary to enhance the role of Canada as a gateway to the vast US market.

Taking some steps to implement fully or to move gradually toward a customs union would be a move in this direction as it would eliminate one of the remaining obstacles to trade between Canada and the United States, and would enhance significantly the attractiveness of Canada as a gateway to the US market. Looking at ways to reduce regulatory differences between Canada and the United States would also provide impetus to this initiative. Leveraging the vastly larger US regulatory resources and better co-ordinating regulatory approaches between the two countries would go a long way in making Canadian firms more competitive in the US market, a prerequisite to international competitiveness, and in making Canada more attractive to foreign investors.

A better understanding of the increasing role of sub-federal institutions and linkages will also support the objective of maximizing the benefits to Canadians of North American integration. Given the rising complexity and richness of Canada-US relations, there is ample space for different levels of actors and institutions to ensure a smooth functioning of the relationship. However, while the Government of Canada cannot initiate and monitor the numerous levels of interaction between the sub-federal actors, it can provide a guiding framework and logistical support, while tapping the potential offered by these linkages to better understand and influence the US policy process.

The policy initiatives being examined by the PRI do not constitute a sufficient condition to maximize the benefits from North American integration, but they are a necessary condition. Steps toward a customs union, enhanced regulatory co-operation and an increasing role for sub-national institutions must be part of a coherent policy stance that will include other comprehensive initiatives to address issues regarding defence, security, energy, and the environment. Research to date would suggest that this can be achieved without eroding essential Canadian values.

During the next months, the research undertaken by the PRI will help policy makers identify some potential initiatives that will maintain and enhance Canada's competitive position in North America and the world.

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Economic Impacts of Regulatory Convergence Between Canada and the United States

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Introduction

As generally defined, public regulations are interventions into the decision making of consumers and producers to correct some type of market failure, and as a consequence, to improve resource allocation and better social welfare. Regulations are a key tool of economic and social governance. Indeed, in its review of regulatory reform in Canada, the OECD noted that the quality of Canada's regulatory governance and its continued efforts to improve its regulations are almost certainly key contributors to Canada's success in terms of both economic performance and the achievement of its social goals. The importance of a nation's regulations to the well-being of its citizens is beyond debate.

However, bad regulations do occur. They result from unnecessary regulations, use of regulations as technical barriers to trade, lack of co-ordination of regulations among important economic partners, poor implementing mechanisms of good regulations, or more stringent regulations than are needed to achieve the regulatory objectives. They alter the incentives structure in the economy in a perverse manner, with a consequent welfare loss.

Concerns about the economic effects of regulations have been prominent on the government regulatory agenda for some time. In 1992, as part of its Prosperity Agenda aimed at ensuring Canada's competitiveness in the global market place, the Canadian government undertook a comprehensive regulatory review. The review was driven by, among other things, the concern that regulations were imposing unnecessary costs on business and consumers, thus impeding

competitiveness. In 1994, the government argued, in its *Jobs and Growth Agenda*, that too many regulations were developed with little consideration for their impact on competitiveness and were weighing on Canada's productivity.

In recent years, the persistence of productivity and income gaps between Canada and the United States raised the issue of whether part of these gaps could be attributed to more restrictive regulations in Canada. This partly originates from research showing that regulations contributed significantly to the productivity slowdown in the United States in the 1970s. Recent research also points to strong, almost always negative, links between economic performance and the burden of the regulations. Furthermore, evidence from cross-country studies suggests that country differences in regulatory regimes partly explain international differences in economic performance.

Canada's proximity and extensive trade links to the world's largest economic power, the United States, have made Canada a forerunner in the development and management of regulations in a globalized world. These factors have influenced recent developments in the Canadian regulatory system, including a Canada-US regulatory rapprochement and co-operation in various economic sectors (Center for Trade Policy and Law, 2004). To the extent that regulations have an impact on a country's international competitiveness through productivity, investment, or research and development, it is the efficiency and efficacy of its regulatory regime, relative to its major trading partners, that matters most. In the case of Canada, a persistent gap in the burden of regulations relative to

TABLE 1

The Evolution of Canada's Regulatory Policies

Date	Objective	Focus of Reform	Mechanisms
1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure social regulations were justified given all impacts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ex ante assessment of social regulations given all impacts Private sector involvement in development of social regulations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Socio-economic impact analysis for major health, safety, and fairness regulations required in 13 designated departments
1983	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase public involvement in the consultative process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide early notice of proposed changes in regulatory activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulatory agenda published twice a year
1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fairness and efficiency Regulating smarter Reduce regulations where warranted 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aspects of the rule-making process (e.g., public consultation, early notice and political control of regulatory decisions) Federal-provincial regulatory co-operation Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of existing regulatory programs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ten guiding principles Citizens Code of Regulatory Fairness Appointment of a minister responsible for regulatory affairs and a secretariat Regulatory Plan Prepublication of draft regulations RIAs Systematic review of regulatory programs over a seven-year recurrent cycle
1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Greatest net benefit to Canadians Innovation and flexibility Cost effectiveness National single market Competitiveness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> System-wide issues, such as compliance and competitiveness Alternatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government of Canada Regulatory Policy approved by Cabinet, under authority of the <i>Financial Administration Act</i>
1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Responsive Regulation</i> to make the regulatory system more flexible, accountable and responsive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meet regulatory requirements Increase administrative responsiveness Equivalency and operational agreements with other levels of government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risk management framework Change to the federal Regulatory Plan to include information on costs and benefits
1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Greatest net benefit to Canadians Reducing regulatory burden on small business 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Oversight Consultation/working in partnership with stakeholders Compliance and enforcement policies Alternative compliance Inter-governmental co-ordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulatory Process Management Standards
1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Demonstrates links between policies (including regulations) and actual outcomes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance assessment of regulations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Under the <i>Improved Reporting to Parliament Project</i>, requirement for two annual departmental reports: plans and priorities, and performance reports, both tabled in Parliament
1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve the regulatory management system and raise compliance by departments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consolidate regulatory policy, process, and decision-making responsibilities with a single Cabinet committee Consolidate support for these responsibilities with a single central agency Explicitly link the regulatory policy to other Cabinet directives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regulatory policy transferred from the Treasury Board Secretariat to the Cabinet Special Committee of Council (SCC) Establishment of the Regulatory Affairs Division in the Privy Council to support regulatory processes, and the regulatory policy, and brief the SCC

Date	Objective cont'd	Focus of Reform cont'd	Mechanisms cont'd
2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Results for Canadians</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduce a management approach, focusing on citizens, clear set of values, achievement of results, responsible spending 	Promotion of core initiatives: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizen-centred service delivery • Government of Canada Online • Modern comptrollership • Improved reporting to Parliament • Program integrity • Developing an exemplary workplace
2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smart Regulations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a regulatory strategy designed for the 21st century • Identify priority sectors and areas requiring regulatory review and provide an external perspective on current issues identified by departments and stakeholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Five principles: effectiveness, flexibility, transparency, accountability, co-operation

Note: An explicit regulatory policy was issued in 1986, and revised in 1992, 1995, and 1999. The other two policies, *Responsive Regulation* in 1993 and *Results for Canadians* in 1997, were not designated regulatory policies, but had just as profound an effect on the government's approach to regulation making.

Sources: OECD/PUMA and updated by the Policy Research Initiative (PRI).

the United States will result in the erosion of Canada's competitiveness in the US market.

In this paper we first use a recently developed OECD database on regulatory indicators to assess the extent of regulatory convergence in the burden of regulations between Canada and the United States.¹

Then, combining Canadian and US data on the relative burden of regulations and econometric estimates of the impact of regulations on key economic variables, we evaluate the benefits of regulatory convergence between Canada and the United States.


The results show that no convergence in the economic restrictiveness of regulations has taken place between Canada and the United States during the period for which data are available. As well, we find that the benefits of regulatory convergence between Canada and the United States are positive and significant.

Trends in Economic Restrictiveness of Regulations in Canada and the United States

The result of Canada's regulatory reforms for more than 25 years has been an end to regulatory inflation. Over this period, the number of provincial regulations in force has substantially declined and, in the last 10 years, the number of federal regulations has stabilized. The overall decline in the total number of regulations has also been accompanied by substantive changes in the design, objectives, and management of the regulatory process, with an increasing focus on flexibility, accountability, regulatory outcomes, and economic effects (Table 1).

In addition, while the level of absolute aggregate regulatory costs to consumers, producers, and governments (Mihlar, 1996) has increased, its rate of growth has declined, and its share

of gross domestic product (GDP) has not varied significantly.² Indeed, based on one particular estimation method, it has stayed in the 12% to 13% range for an extended period, and has even declined from 1980s levels (when it had reached its highest point). However, in an increasingly integrated world economy, it is the relative burdens of the regulations across competing economies that are most relevant. At this point, it is worth noting that it is reasonable to assume that high-income OECD countries have similar demands for public goods and services produced by regulations. In other words, high-income OECD countries are more or less seeking similar regulatory outcomes. If that is the case, differences in regulatory restrictiveness merely mean that countries are achieving their regulatory objectives with different regulatory instruments and cost levels. Large differences between these countries in the costs and burden of regulation may reflect

FIGURE 1**Overall Regulatory Restrictiveness Index:
Canada-US 1975-1998**

Source: Computed based on OECD Regulations database.

differences in the efficiency of the respective regulatory regimes.

A number of OECD studies demonstrate that, compared to many other OECD economies, Canada's regulatory regime is internationally competitive. However, there are various types of regulations (legal framework regulations, economic, social, and administrative regulations), each achieving different objectives and imposing different constraints on the economy. A comparison of regulatory regimes must account for this diversity, and find a metric that meaningfully measures the level of restrictiveness the regulations individually impose on the economy, and aggregate them into an overall economic burden index.

The OECD has developed such a regulatory index,³ and has used it to study the economic impacts of regulations in the various OECD member countries, as well as to compare regulations across various national jurisdictions (Nicoletti et al., 2003). In this article, the index is used to compare the burdens the regulatory regimes of Canada and the United States impose on the respective economies.

The OECD index focuses on state controls and barriers to entry as the two categories of regulations likely to have a significant impact on governance, market competition, and international competitiveness. The regulations are aggregated into an economy-wide indicator of regulatory restrictiveness.

The aggregate restrictiveness index that measures the extent to which regulations are a burden to the economy confirms what the regulatory trends already suggested. During the 1975 to 1998 period, for which comparable data are available, both Canada and the United States reformed their regulatory regimes. The outcome (Figure 1) was a continuous decline in the weights of the regulations on both economies. Regulations in place in the 1990s were far less constraining for both economies.

However, it is apparent that, throughout the period of analysis, Canada's regulatory regime, even with reform, has been more constraining on the economy than that of the United States. The gap, which was highest in the early 1980s, had narrowed in the mid and late '80s, but has exhibited an increase since 1991. Figure 1 begs an important research question: If the Canadian index value equalled that of the United States (total convergence), how much higher or how much faster would Canada's productivity grow, and how much more capital, labour, and intermediate inputs would be used?

Canada's regulatory competitiveness with most OECD countries does not extend to foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations. Even though the restrictiveness of the regulatory regime has been declining over time, Canada lags both the OECD average and the United States, and this is the case both in the aggregate and in all the various sectors.

Benefits of Regulatory Convergence Between Canada and the United States


Using the average OECD estimate of the impact of regulations on the investment rate (investment/capital stock), we have calculated that, if Canada had had the same degree of regulatory restrictiveness as the United States from 1976 to 1998, there would have been an average increase in investment of about US\$1 billion per year. If Canada's regulatory regime had changed at the same pace as that of the United States, total investment in the Canadian economy would have been higher by about US\$400 million per year, on average. In other words, Canada would have had an average of 30% more investment per year than what it actually had over the period.

Using the same types of calculations, we estimate that the R&D share of the GDP would have been 6% higher had there been a total regulatory convergence between Canada and the United States (Ndayisenga and Downs, 2004). This amounts to more than \$367 million extra R&D per year, on average. Furthermore, our estimates suggest the gap in the OECD regulatory index for Canada and the United States explains about 17% of the gap in the R&D intensity between the two countries.

What Can Be Learned?


The literature review and Canada-specific estimates on the economic effects of regulations contain a number of useful lessons (see the accompanying review). First, the bulk of the evidence shows a statistically significant relationship between regulations, productivity, investment, research and development, and exports. Second, there are clear economic benefits

FIGURE 2
FDI Restrictions Over Time



Source: Golub (2003).

FIGURE 3
FDI Restrictions by Sector:
Average of 1980, 1990, 2000



Source: Golub (2003).

to regulatory convergence between Canada and the United States. Third, there is an important regulatory data gap, which hampers research on the impact of regulations on economic

performance. Yet, this type of data will become increasingly important to inform the policy process and evaluate regulatory outcomes for at least three reasons.

First, with increased incomes and the emergence of novel industries, comes more demand for regulations (health, safety, environment). Second, with the elimination of tariffs as protectionist instruments, countries are likely to resort to less transparent measures,

such as regulations, to shield themselves against international competition. Finally, increased competition in international markets and for foreign direct investment demands that Canada's regulations take into account the regulatory frameworks of its main

trading partners, particularly those of the United States. Fourth, for a trading country such as Canada, it is the efficiency and the efficacy of its regulatory regime relative to its major trading partners that matter most.

Regulation and Economic Performance

A Review of the Literature

As the assessment of benefits of convergence is based on the significance of the links between regulations and various indicators of economic performance, the following is a brief review of the empirical results in this area. This review is restricted to studies that deal with OECD countries.

Caution must be exercised in the interpretation of the effects of regulations on economic performance for at least two reasons. First, an important question is the lack of full accounting of the outputs of regulations, such as better health and safety, better business practices, and a cleaner environment, despite the fact that businesses and governments incur costs in producing these public goods. Under these conditions, the regulatory impacts on productivity and GDP will be biased downward as the same number or fewer outputs appears to be produced with more inputs after regulations are imposed. Second, econometric studies that purport to measure the aggregate impact of regulations on economic performance face a significant data hurdle, as there generally is no overall time series summary measure of the restrictiveness that regulations impose on economic activities.

Regulations and Productivity

Historically, there has been strong interest in the impact of regulatory regimes on productivity. The productivity slowdown in the United States in the 1970s corresponded with an increase in regulatory activity. The wave of environmental and health and safety regulations in that period gave rise to a number of studies assessing their effects on productivity.

As a general statement, there is substantial variation in the magnitude and significance of productivity effects of regulations by industrial sector, by type of regulation, and by the variables used to quantify regulations (number of regulations, regulatory expenditure, size of regulatory staff, etc.). However, overall, the bulk of the studies points to a significant negative impact of regulations on productivity and productivity growth.⁴

Research results from recent studies using better data and a broader country coverage are consistent with this conclusion. For example, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) concluded that economy wide-market regulations that curb competition and private governance have a negative impact on productivity by slowing down the technological

catch-up. That is, regulations tend to decrease the firm's adoption rate of best practice technologies from frontier countries. Stephano and Tressel (2002) identified significant negative indirect productivity effects when regulations are modelled to interact with a technology gap variable. They concluded that strict regulations have a particularly detrimental effect the further the country is from the technology frontier. In essence, regulations reduce the scope for knowledge spillovers by reducing the entry of new firms or the incentive to innovate faced by incumbent firms.

Regulations and Investment

There are at least three channels through which market regulations affect investments. First, regulations may explicitly mandate the use of certain technologies. Second, entry barriers resulting from regulations may affect the markup of prices over marginal cost, thereby determining the number of firms and the amount of investment in the given sector. Third, regulations and associated compliance costs may affect the cost of adjusting capital stock, therefore impeding further investments. In addition, rate of return regulations change the relative

prices between capital and labour, and can result in substitution between these factors of production. In particular, a cap on the rate of return to capital will lead to an increase in capital stocks to maximize the basis from which compensation to capital will be calculated. Eliminating the rate of return will decrease new investments. Deregulation of public enterprises may also lead to decreased investments, because of changes from bureaucratic incentives to market-driven incentives and the shift from a mixed political-economic and public-private operating environment to a purely economic and private environment. Thus, the impact of regulatory policy on investment is an empirical question.

In a study of the links between investment and regulation, Alesina et al. (2003) concluded that tight regulation of product markets in OECD countries has had a large negative impact on investments. Ownership restrictions do not have as important an effect as entry barriers. They found no statistically significant relationship between investments and public ownership regulations. Entry barrier regulations have the most significant effect. In addition, the study also showed that the increase in investment decreases as restrictiveness is reduced further (i.e., there is decreasing returns to deregulation).

Nicholetti et al. (2003) studied the impact of product market regulations on trade in goods and services as well as foreign direct investments. They found that product regulation that curbs competition has a negative and significant impact on foreign direct investments. They posited that what matters most in the case of bilateral foreign direct investment outflows is

not so much the regulations in the host or home country. Rather, it is the ratio of the regulatory indicators in the two countries. The policy implication is that, to attract investment, it is not enough for a host country to have good regulations. They must be better (i.e., less restrictive) than those in the home country.

Their conclusion is that aligning regulations on those of the most liberal OECD countries would increase OECD-wide inward foreign direct investments by more than 10%. They also concluded that a general convergence of regulations in the OECD toward the most liberal would increase exports by over 10%. The gains would be even more significant in the services sector as it is estimated that the volume of trade would increase by about 30% with liberalized regulations.

Regulations and Innovation

Studies of the impacts of economic, administrative, and social regulations on innovation are limited and mixed. In a cross-country study of the impacts of economic and employment regulations, Bassanini and Ernst (2002), using the ratio of business R&D to output as a measure of innovation, concluded that there is an unambiguous negative relationship between innovation and trade-restricting economic regulations. Furthermore, they provided some evidence that strict labour market regulations could decrease R&D spending in high technology industries. On the other hand, strong protection of intellectual property rights tends to be positively associated with R&D intensity.

Koch et al. (2003) evaluated the impact of regulatory policies on innovation in OECD countries.

They estimated that regulations are responsible for about one third of the gap in the R&D intensity between Canada and the United States.

Regulation and Trade

There is also evidence that, in the case of trading countries like Canada, regulatory reform enhances the benefits of trade liberalization. In their recent study, Bolaky and Freund (2004) found that the effect of increased trade on growth is absent in highly regulated countries. Excessive regulations restrict growth, because resources are prevented from moving into the most productive sectors and to the most efficient firms within sectors. In addition, in highly regulated economies, increased trade is more likely to occur in the wrong goods, that is, goods without comparative advantage.

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Notes

- 1 This article is derived from a larger research paper. In the study, two regulatory regimes are said to converge when they impose a similar economic burden on the respective economies. That is, they equally restrict economic activity in the countries or regions of interest.
- 2 Expenditures include administrative cost, compliance cost, and cost of political activity related to regulations.
- 3 To construct the index, each regulation is assigned a number between 1 and 6 where higher numbers are assigned to more restrictive regulations. The aggregate index is a weighted average of the individual regulatory indices. The weights are derived using factor analysis and are proportional to the contribution of a given regulation to the overall variance in the data.
- 4 A detailed literature review on the economic effects of regulations can be found in Ndayisenga and Downs (2004).

Expert Workshop on Measuring Social Capital for Public Policy

PRI-SSHRC Policy Research Roundtable Event

June 8, 2004

This workshop brought together experts to examine different empirical strategies and measurement tools used in social capital research. Emphasis was placed on the measurability of the resources produced by social networks as core constituent elements of social capital. The workshop drew on the knowledge of Canadian researchers as well as measurement specialists from abroad to identify essential elements of a "toolbox" for analyzing social capital for purposes of developing and assessing government programs and policies.

For more information on this event, please contact Catherine Demers at 613.943.1997 or by email at c.demers@prs-srp.gc.ca.

Economic Instruments for Freshwater Management in Canada

PRI Symposium

June 14-15, 2004

This invitational symposium brought together international and Canadian experts to examine the benefits and drawbacks of increasing the use of economic instruments to manage and conserve freshwater resources in Canada. Topics covered included: review of best practices in Canada and other countries; using market forces to allocate water resources; disincentives to the use of market-based instruments; and, ensuring the complementarity of market and other policy instruments to better conserve freshwater resources.

For more information on this symposium, please contact Ian Campbell at 613.992.3704 or by email at i.campbell@prs-srp.gc.ca.

North America Integration: The Emergence of Cross-Border Regions

PRI-SSHRC Policy Research Roundtable

June 21-22, 2004

This invitational roundtable brought together international and Canadian experts to examine the sub-national dimensions of Canada-US economic integration. Topics covered included: the territorial recomposition of economic activities and the emergence of cross-border regionalism, the institutional dynamics of province/state relationships, and the reconfiguration of the value and cultural space in a decade of growing interdependence. A special emphasis was put on the policy implications for the Government of Canada.

For more information on this roundtable, please contact André Downs at 613.995.3655 or by email at a.downs@prs-srp.gc.ca.

Can Regulatory Collaboration Improve Safety in Health Care?

David Griller
SECOR Consulting

In recent years, the regulatory review of new pharmaceutical products in Canada has been the focus of considerable controversy. Health Canada has been criticized by industry for its slowness when compared with the US Federal Drug Administration (FDA). However, it has only about one tenth of the resources of the US regulator.


Recently, Health Canada formally agreed to begin sharing data and findings with the FDA. With this development in mind, we should ask a few key questions.

- Does slowness in the regulatory review of drugs really impact the health of Canadian citizens?

- Will we be safer or less safe if Health Canada collaborates with the FDA in the review of pharmaceutical products?
- If we have limited resources for regulation, where should they be focused?
- To what extent could we benefit from reciprocal recognition of regulatory decisions between the United States and Canada, and is this a realistic goal?

This paper attempts to provide some answers to these questions, and to explore how risky or safe collaboration with the United States might be.

GRAPH 1



The time taken for new medicines to be available to patients between 1999 - 2001 varies across the major markets. New medicines are available to patients residing in the US before other major markets, and patients in Japan have to wait twice as long on average as those in the US.

Source: CMR International

David Griller
is a Senior Partner
at SECOR Consulting.

Does Regulation Work as It Should?

Health Canada's Performance

Health Canada is responsible for assessing the safety, efficacy, and quality of new drugs developed by pharmaceutical companies. These new chemical entities (NCEs) can only be sold in Canada once regulatory review has been completed. Technical experts within Health Canada examine data collected by pharmaceutical companies in pre-clinical and clinical trials. They also review the chemistry and manufacturing processes used to make the product.¹

Health Canada has typically been slower in reviewing drugs than the United States and other countries where regulatory standards are high (Anderson et al., 2002). Slowness has raised the ire of pharmaceutical companies since delays mean lost sales. Industry's position is easy to understand. Canada represents around two percent of the market for pharmaceutical products. Since a popular new drug can easily have global sales of US\$1 billion, delay in approving a drug by Health Canada can cost the company concerned C\$75,000 per day in lost sales.

Productivity in Drug Review

The accuracy of the data on drug reviews has been debated in the literature. The international comparisons cited above were used in a report prepared for Health Canada in 2003 (Carruthers, 2003). Rawson and Kaitin independently analyzed the Canadian situation and reached similar conclusions.

Although Health Canada has been criticized for its performance compared to the United States, it has apparently been quite productive if one compares the number of approvals made per employee per year (Rx&D, 2003). The result is surprising since the FDA has been praised for its management approaches, and Americans are generally as productive as Canadians.

The FDA deploys 10 times more people in drug review than does Health Canada. We are being unrealistic if we believe the same quality of review can be carried out here.

The difference is almost certainly due to the fact that the depth of reviews carried out in the United States is much more profound than those carried out elsewhere.² The FDA dedicates more effort to each review; reviewers take the raw data amassed in clinical trials and reanalyze them. In Canada and elsewhere, reviewers are more likely to work with the pharmaceutical firm's statistical analyses and summary data.

The FDA deploys 10 times more people in drug review than does Health Canada. We are being unrealistic if we believe the same quality of review can be carried out here. The difference raises three issues.

- Does a less profound review impact safety?
- Could and should we work with the FDA to share its expertise?
- What benefits and risks would accrue to Canada through collaboration?

Could a Less Profound Review Impact Safety?

The less profound review in Canada is unlikely to have a major impact on safety. Modern standards for pre-clinical development and the early stages of clinical development are such that unsafe drugs are screened out relatively early in the process and never make it into full clinical trials.

Those few drugs that enter clinical trials and are found to have severe adverse side effects in cohorts of patients are typically withdrawn by sponsoring companies. Apart from ethical issues, the threat of litigation in the United States is a powerful disincentive for firms to pursue relatively unsafe products. Finally, adverse side effects affecting extremely small percentages of patients are generally only discovered once a drug has been released into the market and given to very large numbers of patients. At this time, post-market surveillance tends to be going on internationally, and mechanisms for sharing data on adverse reactions are already in place.

Canadians are, in a vicarious way, protected by the slowness of Health Canada regulators since deficiencies in safety are likely to have been identified by the FDA and publicized before Canadian reviews are complete. From time to time, Canadian regulators do identify problems that escape

the attention of the FDA. These tend to be reported anecdotally to argue in favour of an independent Health Canada review. However, they can equally be used to support the case for collaboration.

The strength of the FDA type of review that digs deeply into raw clinical data is likely to impact efficacy (i.e., deciding whether the drug does what it is really supposed to do) rather than safety. Indeed, the FDA is so stringent on this score that its approach has recently been criticized in the editorial columns of *The Wall Street Journal* (2004). The Agency was actually censured for not approving an anti-cancer drug, Provenge, when retrospective analysis of clinical data showed it worked on a subset of the target population.


If Canada were to collaborate with the FDA, the gains would likely accrue most in the evaluation of the efficacy of pharmaceutical products, although some minor gains would probably be made in the assessment of safety and quality.

On What Basis Could We Work with the FDA?

The FDA has already demonstrated a willingness to work with Canada (HC, 2003). Canadian regulators are highly regarded for their professional expertise and commitment. In addition, some joint drug reviews have already been carried out as demonstration projects. Collaboration makes sense, because it can be based on mutual respect for technical expertise. Moreover, our regulatory system effectively constitutes a trade barrier to innovative drug firms, the majority of which are now located in the United States.³

GRAPH 2

"Productivity" In Drug Approvals



Collaboration would help to remove this barrier by shortening drug review times and would, therefore, be advantageous to the United States.

The work each set of regulators might do in a collaborative environment could be based on what we know of current competencies. Canadian regulators are highly respected for their expertise in chemistry and manufacturing. The FDA would likely be willing to accept Canadian contributions or even leadership on the quality assessment of pharmaceutical products, extending some practices that have already been initiated.

In contrast, the FDA seems to be most competent at assessing safety and efficacy. In a collaborative environment, however, sub-components of these assessments are likely to be carved out and partitioned between the two agencies when highly specialized expertise (e.g., in a specific disease state) is required.

Work sharing does not imply mutual recognition of decisions, which requires agreements at the political level. However, in a collaborative

working environment, both agencies are very likely to draw the same conclusions from their data analyses.

Comparison with the European Union

In the European Union, a collaborative system has been developed through the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMA). The Agency has established review standards and procedures for participating countries. New drug submissions are handed to two member states that independently carry out reviews and report their findings to the Agency. The results come back to a committee of the EMA for review and a decision. This is a somewhat different model to that proposed here, but it does show that collaboration between regulatory agencies is a reasonable goal.

Therapeutics Access Strategy

Regulatory collaboration with the United States has been on the drawing board for a long time.⁴ However, progress seems to be at hand. A memorandum of understanding with the FDA has been signed. In addition, Health Canada has developed the

Therapeutics Access Strategy, and has received \$190 million over five years to help modify the drug approval system. How the funds will be used and what resources will be deployed for collaboration remains to be seen (HC, 2003b).

What Benefits and Risks Would Accrue to Canadians?

Three clear benefits would accrue to Canadians from collaboration with the United States:

- speedier access to beneficial drugs;
- deeper review and analysis of a manufacturer's clinical trial data leading to a better understanding of drug efficacy and safety; and
- enhanced deployment of resources within Health Canada.

Better Access

Gaining speedier access to beneficial drugs, especially those that target life-threatening diseases would be an important step forward. Such drugs are normally given priority review in Canada and the United States. Nevertheless, the median time for priority review in Canada since 1996 has been 304 days for 43 drugs approved; in the United States, 70 drugs were reviewed with a median time of 184 days (Rawson, 2003). For patients suffering from AIDS or cancer, these differences can be very important. Mechanisms do exist for obtaining drugs under emergency release, but the attendant paperwork consumes time and energy, and the process does not provide treating physicians with the same levels of confidence as regulatory approval.

Deeper Review

Sharing with the United States would deepen our appreciation of safety and efficacy, specialties of the FDA.

Equally, the United States would benefit from Canadian expertise, especially in the areas of chemistry and manufacturing, where Canadian competency is high.

Enhanced Use of Resources

Collaboration would allow Health Canada to reallocate some resources to those products that are specific to the Canadian market, and to place more emphasis on looking at the optimum use of approved drugs. With extra capacity, Health Canada would be able to do more in developing strategy, and implementing new approaches in those areas of public health that are underserved, such as appropriate drug utilization, best medical practices, and clinical outcomes.

Gearing up to collaborate is fundamentally a management problem associated with aligning Canadian and US procedures and defining protocols for working together. The costs must surely be greatly outweighed by the benefits. Health Canada has the resources to support its Therapeutics Access Strategy and has made an agreement with the FDA. It should move forward quickly to consolidate the relationship.

Where Should Resources Be Focused?

Public expectations for the safety of pharmaceutical products are rightly very high. However, pharmaceutical products have, by and large, been very safe. Two factors have been at play.

- Methods and protocols for establishing safety, efficacy, and quality have been carefully developed over the years, and are shared internationally.

- The products themselves are widely used in many countries, so regulatory review and product monitoring are quite extensive.

In Canada, we need to be more concerned about products destined specifically for the Canadian market. As far as possible, we should free resources for oversight in this area by sharing the workload on products that are sold internationally.

Canadian-specific products are typically prepared elsewhere in batches destined for Canada or are indigenous to Canada. They include, for example:

- vaccines;
- pharmaceutical products derived from blood;
- body parts for transplantation;
- sperm; and
- biologics (drugs typically made in fermentation processes where the efficacy and safety of the product is highly dependent on manufacturing conditions).

Blood-Derived Products

Blood-derived products illustrate the importance of regulatory vigilance in Canada-specific products.

Problems with the regulation of blood-derived products led to a major public health crisis in the late 1980s that has repercussions to this day. In a crisis of this kind, managers responsible for regulation and oversight as well as operations are working in extremely difficult conditions, trying to control situations in the light of uncertain knowledge. Decisions have to be taken quickly, and have a major impact on outcomes. This contrasts with the review of most pharmaceutical products where systems and procedures are relatively well understood.

Blood illustrates the huge impacts on public health that can occur in areas where science may be poorly understood, and where products are specific to Canada. We, therefore, ought to concentrate our resources in these areas and to share work in regulatory situations where evaluation of products is routine and highly standardized.

Gearing up to collaborate is fundamentally a management problem associated with aligning Canadian and US procedures and defining protocols for working together. The costs must surely be greatly outweighed by the benefits.

Health Outcomes Research

Health outcomes research is an area where modest investments yield important returns in risk reduction and health care improvement.

North American studies have demonstrated that non-compliance with a therapeutic regime and inadequate prescriptions are the main causes of emergency visits (Leboux, 2002).

There is a need for more effort in research and education in the use of pharmaceutical products after they are released onto the market. Health Canada is sponsoring this kind of research, and should be actively involved in organizing strategy and structuring its conduct through international collaboration.

Evolution in the Pharmaceutical Sector

The changing face of the pharmaceutical industry will raise new challenges for regulatory agencies. Establishing best practices, benchmarks, and standards with industry in anticipation of

future trends will be very important. We would all be better served if this were done through international collaboration.

The pharmaceutical sector has hit something of a crisis in the past few years. Discovering drugs for difficult diseases, such as Alzheimer's, cancer, and neurological and autoimmune disorders, has proved very difficult. Drug

pipelines based on small molecules have been drying up, leading to a wave of mergers between multinational pharmaceutical firms.

To redress the business problem, large pharmaceutical firms have been making alliances with smaller biotech companies. As a consequence, many drugs in the development pipeline are complex *biological* molecules where the quality and efficacy of the drug are highly dependent on the manufacturing process. Patents are beginning to expire on some of these molecules, and generic drug manufacturers are looking at them with interest. This trend is likely to require considerable regulatory vigilance on ongoing manufacturing. Here again, efficiencies could be achieved through extended collaboration between agencies.

Pharmaceutical manufacturers are also being pressed to establish cost-benefit profiles before their products become eligible for reimbursement. We can, therefore, expect to see combinations of drugs and diagnostic devices entering the regulatory process. Many of

these will be based on genomic profiling of patients. Assessment of efficacy will become more complex and will require more work.

To squeeze more value out of patent protection and improve patient compliance, pharmaceutical firms will increasingly combine two old drugs in a single package. This will raise new regulatory issues on how to circumscribe target populations.

Gene therapy will constitute a new approach to treatment. Delivery of therapies may require novel delivery systems that can release or express DNA or RNA sequences. Establishing guidelines for the regulation of these procedures will be a major technical challenge. Clearly, pooling the brainpower of researchers and regulators from several jurisdictions probably offers the best hope for building a satisfactory regulatory system.

The FDA is already addressing a number of these emerging technological areas through research and workshops. Greater collaboration on emerging issues would clearly be worthwhile (FDA, 2003).

Overall, the pharmaceutical sector may not be sustainable in the current small molecule model. New drugs, based on molecular biology and traditional organic chemistry, have been the main blockbusters of the last two decades, but this stream is drying up. Drug discovery is becoming a longer and more expensive procedure. In addition, generic substitution at the end of a patent lifetime is easily accomplished. Given this situation, innovative drug firms are likely to look increasingly at situations protected by multiple inventions (e.g., drug and delivery or diagnostic system), and by complex manufacturing systems that

cannot easily be emulated by generic drug manufacturers. All these factors will create challenges for regulators that should be addressed internationally, because the products are used around the world.

Conclusion

With its small population, Canada cannot afford to support regulatory agencies as large as those in the United States and Europe. It must therefore use its limited resources as wisely as possible.

In the pharmaceutical area, small molecule drugs tend to be used internationally and are widely reviewed for their safety, efficacy, and quality by using standard, well-established procedures. Canada ought, therefore, to align itself with a highly respected regulator, such as the FDA, to share work and findings for these highly structured reviews.

Moreover, we should be placing more collaborative effort into outcomes research to ensure that drugs are properly used once they have been released onto the market, since numerous problems typically arise from over or under-medication of pharmaceutical products that are highly beneficial when used properly.

Canada should redeploy valuable resources to areas where products are specific to the Canadian market, such as blood-derived products, body parts, vaccines, and other biologics. Recent history has shown that these products can pose major threats to the health of Canadians that probably go beyond risks inherent in small-molecule pharmaceuticals.

Moreover, Canada needs the resources to anticipate regulatory challenges associated with changing technology in the pharmaceutical industry and changes in social conditions.

Given all these demands on Health Canada, the national regulator, we ought to share regulatory work and foresight wherever possible with trusted partners so we ensure appropriate coverage for managing Canada-specific challenges.

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Notes

- 1 Members of the public often believe that regulatory agencies actually test the drugs themselves. This is not the case. Companies are responsible for integrating and analyzing test data collected by medical centres that conduct clinical trials. Agencies do, however, test the potency of products such as vaccines, which can vary between manufacturing batches.
- 2 Data on human resources and information on analytical approaches taken from Rawson (2002).
- 3 In addition to regulatory delays in drug approval, manufacturers are further hampered in accessing Canadian markets by provinces, which take a year or more before listing products for reimbursement on provincial formularies. Moreover, Canada does not provide patent term restoration, nor does it protect the innovator's intellectual property to the same extent as other countries. These impediments are among the reasons why R&D investments in Canada by multinational drug firms are below international averages. See SECOR (2003).
- 4 In a report to Treasury Board in 1990 that was shared with Health Canada, SECOR proposed a Canada-US work-sharing mechanism as a means of improving efficiency in the regulation of pharmaceutical products.

Moving Toward a Customs Union

A Review of the Evidence

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Introduction

Much of the discussion about enhanced Canada-US economic integration, although extremely informative, has often been characterized by a lack of relevant empirical evidence. For example, proponents of further economic integration often stress the administrative and compliance cost savings and efficiency gains associated with the elimination of rules of origin (ROO), regulatory differences, and other barriers to trade. But, little empirical evidence is brought forward.

This article is an abridgment of a paper presented at the PRI-SSHRC Roundtable of March 26, 2004. It reviews the available empirical evidence associated with two issues that will be key to any future discussions on the relative merits of a Canada-US customs union: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ROO and differences in Canadian and US tariffs.

NAFTA ROO

Are NAFTA ROO Too Costly?

Rules of origin are used to prevent imports from third countries from taking advantage of the concessions made between member countries of

a preferential trade agreement. The ROO determine the country of origin of a specific product, and the conditions under which the product qualifies for preferential treatment.

Governments incur administrative costs in implementing, administering, and monitoring ROO. Importers, exporters, and producers incur compliance costs to meet ROO requirements. The compliance costs include the paperwork associated with filling out forms to satisfy customs requirements, and the business costs associated with determining, meeting, and proving origin. These, in turn, may involve special computer systems and programs, the cost of maintaining records, additional broker fees, and additional accounting and audit costs.

In addition to compliance costs, businesses will incur production costs, or economic costs, when they change production methods or input mixes solely to meet ROO requirements.

Krueger reported that "Canadian producers have on occasion chosen to pay the relevant duties rather than incur the cost of proving origin" (1995: 15). This tendency was recently confirmed in discussions with Canadian exporters and importers. They

We will continue to identify existing impediments to trade and investment and work to eliminate them. Last October, at the NAFTA Commission meeting in Montréal, we agreed on further improvements, including:

- further liberalizing the NAFTA rules of origin;
- greatly reducing transaction costs; and
- studying the potential of tariff harmonization.

The Honourable Jim Peterson
Minister of International Trade

Speech to the Canadian Chamber of Commerce
February 16, 2004

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report that it is particularly the case when small shipments, small firms, or exporters with limited knowledge of NAFTA are involved. In addition, when it is difficult for firms to get a sufficient number of certificates of origin from suppliers, it is more likely they would choose to pay the most favoured nation (MFN) duty than try to claim NAFTA status.

For US imports from Mexico, Cadot et al. (2002) calculated the NAFTA ROO compliance costs to business at 1.9% in 2000. Similarly, Carrère and de Melo (2003), using 2001 data on US imports from Mexico, arrived at a compliance cost of 1.7% of Mexican exports.

Although these estimates suggest that the costs within the context of Canadian-US trade could also be significant, precise empirical evidence is lacking. However, one can assume that the stricter and more demanding the rules of origin are, the higher the economic and compliance costs will be to businesses.

Are NAFTA ROO Too Restrictive?

Estevadeordal (2000) developed an index of the restrictiveness of different international ROO systems. The index can be interpreted as an indicator of how demanding a given ROO system is for an exporter. His index ranges from 1 (least restrictive) to 7 (most restrictive), and he found that NAFTA ROO are very restrictive – with an average index value of 5.1, compared to 4.5 for Pan-European ROO, and 4.2 for the European Fair Trade Association-Mexico ROO.

The Australia Productivity Commission (2003), which further refined the ROO restrictiveness index, concluded that NAFTA ROO are by far the most restrictive (see Figure 1).

Rules of origin, which vary across products and agreements, add considerably to the complexity and add costs of participating in and administering trade agreements. The burden of such costs falls particularly heavily on small and medium-size firms...

Brenton (2003).

The restrictive nature of ROO varies considerably from one sector to another. For NAFTA and many other free trade agreements, restrictive ROO are found in more politically sensitive sectors, such as textiles and clothing, the automotive sector, and agriculture (Estevadeordal, 2000).

Do Importers Use NAFTA?


Restrictive and costly NAFTA ROO create an incentive to use the MFN tariff rates rather than the NAFTA tariff to avoid the compliance costs. As such, restrictive ROO result in lower

utilization rates of the preferential tariff and reduced benefits resulting from the free trade agreement.

A NAFTA utilization rate is the percent of imports that qualify for NAFTA treatment entering into a member country under the NAFTA preferential tariff rather than the MFN or some other tariff. Examining data on imports from Canada to the United States, Estevadeordal and Suominen (2004) demonstrated that NAFTA utilization rates declined with the introduction of NAFTA in those sectors

FIGURE 1

Restrictiveness Index of Selective Trade Agreements



Source: Australia Productivity Commission (2003).

with more stringent ROO. This would suggest that there is an inverse relationship between utilization rates and the level of restrictiveness.

Moreover, there are large intersectoral differences in NAFTA utilization rates, which are high for US imports from Canada in fats and oils (98%), textiles and apparels (95%) and plastics (93%) and extremely low for jewellery (15%), wood products (17%) and pulp and paper (26%). These differences may reflect the restrictiveness of specific ROO, intersectoral differences in MFN versus NAFTA tariff rates, sectoral variations in the ability of producers to qualify for NAFTA status, and the degree of trade friction within the sector.

There are also large Canadian-US differences in NAFTA utilization: in the 20 sectors compared, six show an inter-country difference of less than 10 percentage points, six have a difference of 10 to 20 points, and eight post an inter-country difference that is greater than 20 points.

The reasons for these differences have not yet been assessed, but the PRI is undertaking comprehensive analyses using disaggregated data on Canada-US NAFTA utilization rates to attempt to answer this question.

What Are the Economic Effects of NAFTA ROO?

There are several drawbacks to restrictive ROO. First, to the extent that ROO hinder trade, the welfare gains associated with a free trade zone are not realized. Second, and perhaps more important, NAFTA ROO can create a bias toward investment in the United States, since multinational firms seeking larger markets have an incentive to minimize uncertainty and costs that

TABLE 1
NAFTA vs MFN Tariffs

	Year	Average Applied Tariff		Duty-Free Tariff Lines (% of total)	
		NAFTA	MFN	NAFTA	MFN
Canada	2000	0.5	4.4	93	49
United States	2000	0.3	4.6	95	35

Source: WTO World Trade Report 2003, Table IB 13.

hinder trade within the FTA. This may contribute to Canada’s decline in the share of North American bound foreign direct investment.

Third, restrictive ROO can create incentives for producers to use member country inputs to satisfy ROO requirements rather than third country inputs even though they may be less costly. This distortion of the sourcing and purchasing decision causes policy-induced allocation inefficiency.

What do the quantitative studies reveal about these economic costs of NAFTA ROO? Appiah (1999) estimated the economic welfare costs of NAFTA ROO at 1.5 to 2.3% of GDP in his intermediate case.¹ The author found the more restrictive the ROO, the greater the cost in terms of foregone GDP. Using a model of Mexican exports, Cadot et al. (2002) examined a hypothetical NAFTA without ROO, and estimated that the elimination of ROO would increase Mexican exports to the United States by 17.8%.

Ghosh and Rao (2004) found that eliminating NAFTA ROO between Canada and the United States would increase Canada’s GDP by 1.0%, the US GDP by 0.1%, Canadian exports to the United States by 19.2%, and US

exports to Canada by 22.7%. (A summary of Ghosh and Rao’s study is featured elsewhere in this issue of *Horizons*.)

Overall Assessment of NAFTA ROO

Available empirical evidence suggests that NAFTA ROO result in large and unexpected economic costs that reduce the expected net benefits from trade. Research, to date, indicates NAFTA ROO are relatively costly and restrictive, utilization rates of NAFTA preferences are less than expected, and the economic costs of NAFTA ROO appear to be significant.

A Canada-US Customs Union

At its core, the creation of a customs union would require the negotiation and implementation of a common external tariff (CET) on third country imports. Other key components include harmonized external trade policies, a revenue sharing agreement for the customs duties collected at the external border, compatible customs procedures, and a supportive governance structure.

Are Canada-US MFN/NTR Tariff Rates Close?

The complexity of the negotiation and implementation of a CET depends on the extent of inter-country differences

TABLE 2**Applied Tariffs by WTO Category and HS Section, 2002**

Total	Tariff Lines ¹	Canada ²	United States ³	Difference
	8,364	6.8	5.1	1.7
WTO CATEGORIES				
Agriculture	1,263	21.7	9.8	11.9
WTO Non-agriculture	7,086	4.2	4.2	0
HS SECTION				
01 Live animals and products	274	55.6	11.4	44.2
02 Vegetable products	438	4.5	4.0	0.5
03 Fats and oils	62	9.3	3.9	5.4
04 Prepared foods, etc.	498	18.3	13.2	5.1
05 Minerals	174	1.1	0.7	0.4
06 Chemicals and products	1,102	3.2	3.9	-0.7
07 Plastics and rubber	370	4.2	3.7	0.5
08 Hides and skins	227	3.2	4.3	-1.1
09 Wood and articles	113	2.6	2.2	0.4
10 Pulp, paper, etc.	194	0.6	0.5	0.1
11 Textile and articles	1,421	9.8	9.6	0.2
12 Footwear, headgear	104	11.6	13.5	-1.9
13 Articles of stone	185	3.4	5.1	-1.7
14 Precious stones, etc.	65	2.3	3.0	-0.7
15 Base metals and products	893	2.2	2.3	-0.1
16 Machinery	1,423	2.0	1.6	0.4
17 Transport equipment	238	5.2	2.6	2.6
18 Precision equipment	345	1.9	3.1	-1.2
19 Arms and munitions	32	3.9	1.5	2.4
20 Misc. manufactures	197	5.2	3.2	2.0
21 Works of art, etc.	9	1.4	0	1.4

Notes:

1 Number of Canadian tariff lines.

2 WTO (2003) Trade Policy Report Canada.

3 WTO (2004) Trade Policy Report United States.

in external tariffs, and the preferential trade agreements that member countries have with third countries. With a Canada-US CET, there would be no need to use NAFTA ROO on bilateral trade. Duties would be collected on third country imports based on the common tariffs, and collected revenues would be allocated between Canada and the United States according to a revenue-sharing agreement.

Based on 2000 data (Table 1), Canada's average MFN tariff of 4.4% is already close to the US average MFN/NTR (normal trade relations) rate of 4.6%.² Moreover, 49% of Canada's MFN tariff lines (i.e., traded items) are duty-free, compared to 35% of the US MFN/NTR tariff lines. Average tariff rates under NAFTA are very low in both countries, leading to a large NAFTA preference ratio (i.e., the MFN rate less the NAFTA rate).

Analysis of 2002 tariff data categorized by Harmonized System (HS) sections (see Table 2) shows that Canada-US differences in MFN/NTR tariffs tend to be relatively small. With Canada reporting an average applied tariff of 6.8% and the United States 5.1%, there is a difference of only 1.7 percentage points. However, this difference is mainly due to high tariffs for agricultural imports into Canada. The category of WTO non-agriculture, representing 85% of Canadian tariff lines, shows no difference in the average applied tariff between Canada and the United States with both reporting an average tariff of 4.2%.

Of the 17 non-agriculture sections, nine (representing 81% of non-agriculture Canadian tariff lines and 68% of all Canadian tariff lines), exhibit a Canada-US difference of less than one percentage point.

This suggests there are several sectors where Canadian and US MFN/NTR rates are sufficiently close to harmonize tariffs and eliminate ROO with minimal disruption.

NAFTA already has the equivalent of a sectoral customs union in computers and computer peripherals, where, in one of the most unique features of NAFTA, the three countries eliminated or gradually harmonized their respective tariffs. Once within the NAFTA territory, these articles can move among Canada, Mexico, and the United States without further duty payment.

The Economic Benefits from Moving Toward a CET

Since Canadian and US tariff rates are already generally low and similar, the economic gains flowing from the adoption of a CET are much smaller than those associated with the elimination of the NAFTA ROO. For example, Ghosh and Rao (2004) examined the impact of a Canada-US customs union and found that the economic gains accruing to Canada as a result of tariff harmonization only were merely 0.1% of GDP.³ The United States would experience even smaller gains.

Overall, the combined gain to Canada from the implementation of the CET and the elimination of ROO between Canada and the United States could reach about 1.1% of GDP or about \$12 billion, based on the 2002 GDP. This would be a permanent annual gain. The combined economic benefit to the United States would be equivalent to a 0.12% increase in GDP or \$US13.5 billion, based on the 2002 US GDP.

Concluding Remarks

The issues surrounding the creation of a Canada-US customs union, either on an economy-wide or sectoral basis, are technical and complex, but the benefits could be substantial. Initial analysis of some of these issues suggests the following.

- NAFTA ROO are highly restrictive compared to other ROO worldwide, and impose significant compliance costs on firms engaged in intra-NAFTA trade.
- The elimination or reduction of the costs associated with the NAFTA ROO would provide significant economic benefits.
- The relatively small differences in the external tariffs suggest the implementation of a CET would be associated with relatively small adjustment costs and small positive benefits. However, sensitive sectors, such as automotives, agriculture, and textiles, may warrant special consideration.

Research exploring these issues, as outlined in the original PRI workplan (PRI, 2003), is continuing.

What Did The Experts Say?

On March 26, 2004, over 30 academics and government officials met in Ottawa to discuss some of the key issues associated with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rules of origin (ROO) and external tariffs involving Canada and the United States. This roundtable was part PRI-SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council) roundtable series, the objective of which is the exchange of information between experts from academia and those responsible for the development and design of federal policies and programs.

The Roundtable began with four short presentations that provided useful background material.⁴ The floor was then turned over to the invited experts and government officials. A wide-ranging discussion ensued, out of which there was considerable consensus. Three issues stood out.

Difficulties with a Customs Union in the Current Environment

It was generally accepted, at least for the time being, that a full Canada-US customs union and CET would be difficult to implement in the current environment, for both economic and political reasons.

The audience understood there is an “opportunity cost” to pursuing a customs union with the United States, at the expense of focusing on other public policy problems. Several felt

the benefits of a customs union, as estimated from the general equilibrium model of Industry Canada, while significant, were nevertheless sufficiently small to warrant some caution when assessing the policy options available to reduce trade friction between the two countries. (See also the article by Ghosh and Rao in this issue of *Horizons*.)

Professor John Whalley of the University of Western Ontario and Dr. John Helliwell of the Bank of Canada were both surprised that these general equilibrium findings were even as high as they were. Richard Lipsey of Simon Fraser University pointed out that the Treaty of Rome (which led to the creation of the European Economic Community, and subsequently to the European Union) also had small numbers. The lesson is that aggregate general equilibrium models almost always observe small welfare changes from policy changes. Many participants agreed that the identification of larger, dynamic benefits lies in the research of the micro details. They suggested that future research should be in the direction of more disaggregated analysis, whenever possible.

John Helliwell further elaborated on the opportunity cost of pursuing a customs union relationship with the United States. He noted that the US economy is shrinking relative to the world economy. Better, in his mind, to focus on building stronger relationships and linkages with other faster-growing countries, such as China. However, Bill Robson of the C.D. Howe Institute, while agreeing that Canada should pursue opportunities wherever they are, nevertheless argued that Canada has been benefiting from

a strong trade relationship with the United States. He pointed out that the sectors that benefited the most from this relationship were those in which the most liberalization occurred, and it is these benefits that we would like to generalize to all sectors through a deeper relationship with the United States.

A key problem identified by many participants that reduces the likelihood of a bilateral customs union arrangement with the United States in the short

Participants viewed changing NAFTA ROO as a much more do-able endeavour in the short term. Basically, ROO are a hassle for firms, and any impediment that hinders the ability of exporters to take advantage of opportunities invokes welfare costs.

term is the perceived lack of interest on the part of the United States as it focuses on other domestic and international policy issues. For example, Franco Raynald of the NAFTA Secretariat related how Canada may be the best trading partner of 39 of the US states, but this still translates to a very small proportion of US GDP. Because of this and other events, a Canada-US customs union is not top-of-mind for US decision makers. And if there was a United States interest, it is expected that Mexico would insist in being part of the process. Mr. Raynald further suggested that the United States would not be attracted to any discussion that does not bear on its current topics of the day, which includes homeland security and the war on terrorism.

However, Professor Lorraine Eden of Texas A&M University did point out a caveat. The front door to further discussion about alternative arrange-

ments with the United States should not be viewed as completely closed. Should Chile or another country be willing to come into NAFTA, this would provide an opportunity to revisit ways to harmonize tariffs and ROO, and move further in the direction of a customs union with the United States.

Finally, several participants commented on the potential loss of control over some trade policy levers that would accompany the creation of a

customs union. The maintenance of a CET would require Canada and the United States to harmonize the trade policy stance toward third countries. This would require both countries to offer a common front in multilateral discussions. For example, Canada's current position on Cuba, and past relations with China, are areas that could have been constrained by a harmonized trade policy with the United States.

How About Sectoral Arrangements?

Despite the considerable challenges to a full Canada-US customs union, there was wide consensus that Canada could still pursue special arrangements at the sectoral level. Danielle Goldfarb of the C.D. Howe Institute suggested that Canada could build on special arrangements in the computer peripherals sector, which would provide a precedent for sector harmonization elsewhere.

She further suggested that there are a number of candidate sectors where NAFTA and most favoured nation rates are low or close. This would require more analytical work on sectoral options. She recommended Rolf Mirus' research as a good start.

David Sheehan of the Canada Border Services Agency acknowledged there are advantages to getting rid of ROO wherever possible. Energies and resources tend to be devoted where duties are high, because of the related incentives to circumvent ROO, but as more tariffs come down, and ROO are eliminated, more resources could be applied to the remaining more difficult sectors, like apparel, textiles, and clothing. Benoit Robidoux of the Department of Finance reminded people that consideration would still be necessary as to the sequencing of sectors, since harmonization arrangements in one could have impacts on others. Individual sectors draw inputs from other sectors while at the same time providing inputs to these and other sectors. We need to know how these other sectors will be affected.

André Downs of the PRI added a cautionary note: There are implications to picking the "low hanging fruit" of the more easily harmonized sectors. We will be left facing the difficult ones, and Canada's ability to address these will then be limited. An alternative, and potentially more promising option, is to pursue all sectors at the same time, which would allow some potential trade-offs. Others suggested that the incremental approach will still free up resources that could be used to help address issues in these difficult sectors (e.g., agriculture, textiles, clothing), which in any case

may not represent promising candidates until progress in reducing protection is achieved within the WTO and other forums.

Lorraine Eden also highlighted that as new preferential trade agreements are signed, and the worldwide system of regional arrangements becomes more complicated, it is more difficult to harmonize the ROO of two countries. Therefore, if worth pursuing, it is desirable to move forward sooner rather than later.

NAFTA ROO – Time for Change

With respect to ROO, participants were virtually unanimous. They viewed changing NAFTA ROO as a much more do-able endeavour in the short term. Basically, ROO are a hassle for firms, and any impediment that hinders the ability of exporters to take advantage of opportunities invokes welfare costs. It was felt that Canada should strive to make NAFTA ROO more lenient.

And indeed, the Government of Canada has already begun the process. The departments of Finance and Foreign Affairs have been actively engaged in a consultation process regarding NAFTA ROO. In December 2003, they invited interested Canadians to a consultation regarding both the harmonization of most favoured nation tariffs with the United States and Mexico and the liberalization of NAFTA ROO. Industry input is essential before policy advice on such technical issues goes forward. The United States has also received submissions, and Mexico will soon finalize its consultations. The three countries have agreed to meet in

Washington to develop some recommendations with a target date of January 1, 2005 for a new more liberalized NAFTA ROO.

That having been said, there are still challenges. For instance, it was pointed out by Daniel Schwanen of the Institute for Research on Public Policy that there have been protectionist and other reasons for ROO that reflect the bargaining power of particular interests when NAFTA was negotiated. John Whalley reiterated that ROO are little understood. They are highly product-specific, and reflect a negotiation process responsive to commercial concerns. As Schwanen warned, we must be watchful that other protectionist barriers do not replace ROO.

In addition to protectionist sentiment, John Helliwell outlined how there is a home bias of firms, so we should not have unrealistic hopes that eliminating ROO will suddenly result in more investment by US firms in Canada. The border will remain, and home bias will continue to influence the location of new ventures. Still, if ROO are streamlined or eliminated, Helliwell suggested that it would generate growth in both bilateral and international trade.

There were various times during the Roundtable when the participants focused on the low NAFTA utilization rates. Of course, the restrictiveness of NAFTA ROO is one reason. Falling most favoured nation rates, which reduce the importance of a NAFTA preference are another. As well, a number of participants commented on how it must be difficult and costly for firms to use NAFTA for complex

product mixes. For these products, it would be tough to account for the origin of parts and intermediate inputs. Continued globalization will only make these difficulties worse. The problems facing small- and medium-size firms would be even greater. As Lorraine Eden pointed out, these and other costs, such as those related to compliance and information costs, always hit smaller firms harder.

The Question of Governance

In addition to the above three issues, several others bear mention. Professor Bill Dymond of Carleton University

John Curtis of International Trade Canada also pointed out that ROO do not capture services, and outside of trade policies, there are issues related to the exchange rate and investment that are also important concerns.

Closing Remarks and the Way Forward

In the context of the PRI's North American Linkages project, the Roundtable was very useful.

Pursuing a full customs union with the United States may not be considered by some to be a realistic option

identify new candidates for ROO harmonization. As pointed out by Benoit Robidoux, a better understanding of sectoral links will help in considering how ROO harmonization in one sector may affect others. Of high importance is the impact of ROO on intermediate inputs and regional content and trade deflection. Such research would also be useful for understanding the sectoral and regional impacts of NAFTA.

As well, the Roundtable helped to identify some emerging issues and future challenges. Along these lines, further analytical research should focus on why NAFTA utilization is so low. Special emphasis should be placed on addressing the issue of small- and medium-size firms and the additional challenges they face in taking advantage of NAFTA. Such research should examine the impact of NAFTA in the framework of business and investment decisions.

While the jury is still out on the feasibility of a full customs union, it was pointed out that with any further expansion of NAFTA or development of any new regional trading arrangement including Canada and the United States, there would be opportunities to revisit many of these same issues. Governance issues will likely figure prominently in discussion for any NAFTA-plus arrangement, and the development of informal institutions will play a role in defining the ultimate arrangement. Consequently, research should continue on the rise in importance of informal links and institutions, and the role they play in the integration process between Canada and the United States.

Further analytical research should focus on why NAFTA utilization is so low. Special emphasis should be placed on the additional challenges faced by small- and medium-size firms in taking advantage of NAFTA.

suggested that research be conducted on governance issues. He sees merit in finding ways to resolve problems without resorting to formal treaties, whether it is a customs union or another NAFTA-plus arrangement. He directed attention to what has happened within the European Union, where informal institutions have built up over a number of years.

At times, the audience was reminded that there are many other issues of significance that impinge on cross-border relations, such as differences in regulations and standards, and obstacles to labour mobility. For this reason, John Whalley suggested that discussions with the US should go beyond negotiations on CET and ROO and encompass other trade obstacles.

at this stage, but all agree that efforts have to be deployed to reduce the restrictive and costly impact of ROO on bilateral Canada-US trade.

However, some comments from the Roundtable also suggest that future research should be targeted to better understand NAFTA ROO. This includes Danielle Goldfarb's suggestion of more detailed and disaggregated analytical research of a sectoral nature, given the importance of the sectoral option when it comes to harmonizing tariffs and liberalizing NAFTA ROO. Along these lines, Lorraine Eden suggested surveying the computer peripheral industry about corporate satisfaction with the harmonized rules in that sector. She suggested a follow-up survey for other industries to help

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Notes

- 1 Appiah models NAFTA ROO as a change in the tariff classification and as regional value content. The change in tariff classification is approximated by the percentage increase in value added per unit of foreign inputs to achieve the tariff classification change. His intermediate case simulates a change in tariff classification (tariff shift) equal to 30 percent in value added per unit cost of foreign input.
 - 2 In that it offers the MFN tariff to all countries in the world (except the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Libya), Canada uses to the MFN tariff more as a base or non-preferential rate. The United States, in 1998, renamed MFN to normal trade relations (NTR) since most nations have this trade status with the United States.
 - 3 Brown et al. (2003) and Appiah (1999) found that the aggregate benefits and the distributional effects from adopting a CET depend on how the CET is calculated. Although the results of these two studies are informative, the inclusion of a third country (Mexico) provides an unreliable guide as to the likely economic effects arising from a Canada-US customs union.
 - 4 The following four papers, which were presented at the Roundtable, are available on request from the PRI. Please contact Bob Kunimoto at 613.943.2401 or b.kunimoto@prs-srp.gc.ca.
- Esteveordal, Antoni and Kati Suominen. 2004. *Rules of Origin: A World Map and Trade Effects*.
- Ghosh, Madanmohan, and Someshwar Rao. 2004. *Economic Impacts of a Possible Canada-U.S. Customs Union: Simulation Results from a Dynamic CGE Model*.
- Kunimoto, Bob and Gary Sawchuk. 2004. *Moving Toward a Customs Union: Perspectives and Evidence*.
- Mirus, Rolf and Katrin Hoffman. 2004. *Estimating Potential Savings from Streamlining Tariffs Among NAFTA Partners: An Alberta Perspective*.

Thinking North America

At the 15th anniversary of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and the 10th Anniversary of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) convened, in October 2003, its second Ann of the State symposium. The theme of the symposium was "Thinking North America: Prospects and Pathways." The outcomes of this event are being published in eight folios to be released between March and October 2004. The folios will be released individually, but together form a collection that explores a wide range of North American issues.

Folios released to date include:

- Fry, Earl. 2004. "The Role of Subnational Governments in North American Integration." IRPP, March 18.
- Hart, Michael. 2004. "A New Americanization with the United States: The Trade and Economic Dimension." IRPP, March 17.
- Schwab, Daniel. 2004. "Deepen Browder: A Roadmap for a Treaty of North America." IRPP, April 20.

For further information, please visit the IRPP web site at <www.irpp.org>.

Possible Economic Impacts in Canada of a Canada-US Customs Union

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There has been a great deal of public discussion and debate in Canada about Canada-US economic relations. A number of policy analysts and commentators have put forward various proposals to broaden and deepen the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These include harmonization of border measures and procedures with regard to customs, refugees, and immigration; increased co-operation in countering terrorist threats; mutual recognition by Canada and the United States of each other's regulatory procedures and practices; free movement of labour between the two countries; replacement of anti-dumping and countervailing duties in the two countries by a common competition law; a monetary union or common currency; harmonization of Canadian and US tariffs against non-NAFTA countries (common external tariffs); and the elimination of the rules of origin provisions of NAFTA.

But, to date, there is not much analysis of the economic impact of these NAFTA-deepening proposals. The objective of this article is to analyze the general equilibrium economic impacts of a customs union between Canada and the United States on the Canadian economy, using a multi-country/region and multi-industry dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.²

The model is calibrated to the benchmark Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) data in 1997 (GTAP, 2001). The GTAP data are available for 65 countries/regions, disaggregated by 54 industrial sectors. Nevertheless, to keep the simulation results to a more manageable level, we aggregated the GTAP data into seven regions/

countries and eight major industries. The seven regions/countries are Canada, the United States, Mexico, Mercosur, the rest of Latin America, Europe, and the rest of the world.³ The eight major industries are agriculture, food processing, resource-intensive industries, textiles, manufacturing, automotive, machinery and electronics, and services.

The model we use assumes full employment. In addition, labour supply is exogenous and does not respond to changes in real wages. This means that total employment at the economy level does not deviate from the base case level in the simulations, but capital accumulation is endogenous in the model. In addition, the industrial structure of employment and capital responds to changes in economic variables in the simulations.

Monetary variables do not play a role in the model. Consequently, CGE models are not able to handle cyclical impacts on product and labour markets. Nevertheless, CGE models do a good job of capturing the influence of trade and tax policies on the re-allocation of capital and labour inputs among industries. Thus, CGE models are capable of capturing adequately the aggregate efficiency gain from the re-allocation of labour and capital inputs among industries.

The Design of Simulations

Formation of a customs union or a free trade area is allowed as an exception to the basic principle of non-discrimination in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) under article XXIV. A customs union is a group of countries that eliminate all tariffs on trade among themselves, but maintain common external tariffs on trade

with countries outside the union (thus technically violating the most favoured nation principle). Historically, the exception was designed, in part, to accommodate the formation of the European Economic Community in 1958, and it was based on the understanding that although these are discriminatory associations, they may not pursue policies that increase the level of discrimination practised by these countries beyond that which existed prior to the formation of the preferential arrangements; and that preference has to cover "substantially all trade" between the participants.⁴

For simulating the economic impacts of a Canada-US customs union, we first analyze the impact of common external tariffs (CET) by Canada and the United States against non-NAFTA member countries, and elimination of all the remaining tariffs between Canada and the United States. We have two alternate scenarios on common external tariffs. In the first scenario, the minimum US and Canadian non-NAFTA tariff rate in each major industry is adopted as the common external tariff rate. In the second scenario, US non-NAFTA tariff rates are used as the common external tariff rates by the two countries vis-à-vis non-NAFTA member countries.

In a third scenario, we simulate the impacts of the elimination of the rules of origin (ROO) provisions of NAFTA for importing into Canada and the United States from non-NAFTA countries. The rules of origin provisions specify the condition under which such privilege is granted.⁵ Under NAFTA, an importer must submit to the customs authorities a NAFTA certificate of origin to be eligible for the preferential tariff rates. Virtually all products that qualify under ROO face

zero duties when traded between the United States and Canada, and pay low or zero tariffs when traded between the United States and Mexico. If a product does not qualify for NAFTA tariff preferences, then that product is usually subject to the most favoured nation tariff rate.

The economic justification for ROO is that they are needed to prevent trade deflection and protect domestic industries from non-member countries. However, ROO provisions will divert trade from non-NAFTA member countries to NAFTA countries, leading to a misallocation of productive resources in NAFTA member countries. For example, the tariff preferences in favour of NAFTA countries might distort the input choices of firms from a low cost non-NAFTA source to a high-cost NAFTA source, leading to production inefficiencies. In addition to the allocative inefficiencies, these trade restrictions also impose a significant cost of paper work on importers and exporters. Administering ROO requirements also involves costs to the governments.

The compliance costs of ROO in EFTA are estimated to be between 1.4 and 5.7% of the value of export transactions (Goldfarb, 2003). If these rates are applied to Canada's exports to the United States, Canada could benefit by \$4 billion to \$18 billion annually by eliminating the NAFTA ROO. Appiah (1999) estimated that the welfare cost of the ROO under NAFTA for Canada ranges from 0.3 to 3.0% of gross domestic product (GDP) depending on the structure of the model used.

The model we use is capable of capturing the allocative inefficiencies resulting from the trade diversion effects of the tariff preferences. In an effort to

capture the gains from the reduction of paperwork to Canadian and US importers, in the shocked scenario, we reduce the most favoured nation rates to the NAFTA rates in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The rationale for this assumption is the observation made by many analysts that most importers and exporters simply pay the differential tariff rather than go through the paperwork. We, however, recognize that our assumption of uniformly lowering the most favoured nation rates to the NAFTA rates might overestimate the gains from the elimination of the ROO provisions. Therefore, the simulated gains and inter-industry shifts in employment and capital could be considered as the upper bound estimates. We do not model explicitly the production efficiencies from the removal of distortions in the input choices of firms, because of the lack of detailed micro data on imports from NAFTA and non-NAFTA member countries.

In the fourth and fifth simulations, we combine the third scenario, the elimination of the ROO provisions, with the two scenarios on common external tariffs.

Simulation Results

Economic Impact of Common External Tariffs

The reduction in tariff rates reduces prices of imports, and stimulates trade flows and consumption in Canada and the United States. They in turn induce inter-industry shifts in capital and labour inputs, leading to improvements in allocative efficiencies and real GDP.

The macro impacts are very similar in the two CET simulations, because the average tariff reduction is more or less

identical in the two scenarios: -0.91 and -0.87 percentage points, respectively. Trade flows increase by between four and five percent in the two scenarios. Prices of consumer goods decline by about one percent, leading to a 0.1% increase in real consumer spending. Overall GDP or value added increases slightly, between 0.07 and 0.09%. Not surprisingly, the economic gains from common external tariffs to the United States are much smaller than to Canada, because the reduction in the average tariff rate is only between 0.08 and 0.23 percentage points. In addition, trade plays a much smaller role in the US economy than in Canada.

Elimination of the Rules-of-Origin Provisions of NAFTA

As discussed earlier, the elimination of ROO under NAFTA is implemented by equating most favoured nation tariff rates to the NAFTA rates. This implies an average tariff reduction of 2.11 percentage points in Canada, 0.6 percentage points in the United States and 5.72 percentage points in Mexico. Consequently, the gains from the elimination of ROO are considerably larger than the gains from common external tariffs to Canada and the United States. Canada's trade flows increase by about 13%, leading to a one percent gain in real GDP or value added. The US GDP increases by over 0.1%. On the other hand, Mexico's GDP increases by over five percent with the elimination of ROO.

Customs Union

This scenario combines common external tariffs with the elimination of ROO. The simulation results suggest that a customs union between Canada and the United States will increase

Canada's real GDP by 1.1% compared to 0.1% in the United States and over five percent in Mexico. As expected, domestic supply of Canadian consumption declines, because of increased import penetration, as US exports to Canada increase by over 25% and Mexico's exports to Canada increase by over 40% in the two simulations. On the other hand, Canadian exports to the US also increase by over 25%.

The impacts by industries reflect mostly the changes in industry exports and imports. In the two customs union simulations, value added increases in all Canadian industries, except food. The big increase in food imports is responsible for the decline in the value added of the food industry in Canada. On the other hand, the big beneficiaries are the automotive and technology-intensive manufacturing industries. In the United States, value added in agriculture and the automotive industry declines, while the manufacturing and service sectors gain. Textiles, and the automotive and technology-intensive industries would be the big beneficiaries in Mexico. Industry shifts in employment in the simulations respond to changes in value added as well as changes in real wages. In Canada, employment will increase significantly in the automotive and technology sectors.

In short, our findings imply that common external tariffs and the elimination of ROO will deepen the economic linkages between the three NAFTA countries and will be beneficial for all of them. The simulation results are fairly robust with respect to the values of the key parameters of the model.

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Notes

- 1 This article is an abridged version of "Economic Impacts of a Possible Canada-U.S. Customs Union: Simulation Results from a Dynamic CGE Model" (forthcoming). The authors thank Renée St-Jacques, Chief Economist at Industry Canada, for providing useful comments on an earlier draft.
- 2 The model we use is an extended version of the Lavoie et al. (2001) prototype model.
- 3 MERCOSUR in our case includes Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. (Paraguay is not included as data on this economy is not available in the database.)
- 4 This article is a major exception to GATT's grandfathering most favoured nation principle and the principal article dealing with customs unions and free trade agreements.
- 5 For a good overview of ROO and its implications for regional integration, see Brenton and Manchin (2003).

Economic Regions in North America

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Introduction

The federal government, provinces, and regional and metropolitan governments need to identify the specializations of metropolitan regions in a Canadian, North American, and global context. To adapt successfully to the ongoing process of economic integration, they need to understand in more depth the factors driving metropolitan regional growth, and to develop policy initiatives aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of Canadian regions. As part of its North American Linkages project, the PRI is carrying out a research program on economic regions that should help governments achieve these goals.

This article reviews recent theoretical developments and empirical results that explain the growing importance of the agglomeration of economic activities in local-regional-metropolitan clusters, cross-border clusters (states and provinces in close geographic proximity), and trans-border clusters (located at a distance from one another, but linked economically). Data on population, employment, gross domestic product (GDP), and personal income are presented to describe major features of the territorial recomposition of economic activity in North America. Our research program is far from complete and our purpose, at this stage, is simply to provide a preview of the issues and hypotheses that are guiding the research.

The Growing Importance of Local, Cross-Border, and Trans-Border Clusters

Rising interest in economic regions is the result of theoretical developments and recently acquired data demonstrating that well-functioning economic regions have positive general effects on growth and productivity. Improving the performance of different economic regions in the increasingly integrated North American economy should help to improve the performance of Canadian provinces specifically, and of Canada in North America and the world generally.

Three interrelated major factors driving the integration process are particularly relevant to understanding the growing importance of clusters, defined as geographic concentrations of final products industries, their supply chains, other sectors that share technological or human capital affinities, and various supporting institutions (e.g., universities, research and development facilities, and venture capitalists).¹

The first of these factors is the increase in the importance of general urbanization and specific industrial localization economies in an economic context that demands heightened innovation, sharing of information, knowledge, and high technology. Geographic proximity is of increasing importance in technological innovation. Recent analysis of historical patent citation data indicates that investors use domestic knowledge more than foreign knowledge, and knowledge from

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the metropolitan area more than knowledge from outside (Sonn and Storper, 2003).

Integration gives rise to competition in local markets between the same or similar products from different places. To cope, firms must innovate faster. According to Sonn and Storper, as the flow of information accelerates, codifi-

Although counterintuitive, quantitative analysis has indicated that reductions in the cost of the transmission of information, which helps in the location of lower value-added activities offshore, have also increased the importance of face to face interaction in cities and regions, the third fundamental factor we underline.

The joint participation of Canadian and American firms in the same cross-border or trans-border cluster can result in improved performance for both Canadian and American firms vis-à-vis offshore firms. This can be seen as a new element of a potential fourth trade option for Canada.

cation and standardization of knowledge become difficult, and firms cope by building stable bridges with other nearby firms so as not to miss out on valuable information.

Maskell and Lorenzen (2003) argued that clusters are markets where commodities, services, and knowledge are traded among the insiders without restricting their abilities to interact with suppliers and customers residing elsewhere. Clusters reduce the barriers to acquiring and using knowledge produced or used locally, or imported from cluster firms located elsewhere. New firms setting up in clusters can, to some extent, skip the process of gathering knowledge about the business environment they face outside the cluster.

A second factor that makes the performance of regions and their cluster specializations of growing importance as a policy objective is the increasing tendency of firms to reorganize and locate different parts of their activities (e.g., production, finance, marketing) in different regions specializing in these different activities.

However, firms in clusters enjoy positive externalities that are both local and non-local. Some firms are part of North American or even global clusters. The largest firms in local clusters also act as network structures between regional nodes. Hence, our interest and distinction in this project between cross-border clusters (firms and institutions located in metro areas of provinces and states that are close to one another) and trans-border clusters (firms at a distance from one another, but linked by technological systems and value chains).

The improvement in the competitiveness of clusters in certain Canadian regions could come at the expense of those in the United States and offshore. This is not, however, a zero-sum game. The joint participation of Canadian and American firms in the same cross-border or trans-border cluster can result in improved performance for both Canadian and American firms vis-à-vis offshore firms. This can be seen as a new element of a potential fourth trade option for Canada (i.e., diversification through cluster-based North American integration).

Selected Features of North American Integration and Regionalization

Examination of data on population, employment, personal income, and trade flows at the macro region, state and province, and metropolitan levels indicates the territorial recomposition of economic activity is a continuing phenomenon. Preliminary analysis suggests a decline of the Northeast and Great Lakes regions (with some exceptions at the metropolitan level), a phenomenon related to the dissipation of the US manufacturing belt, and growing metropolization.

Demographic Trends in Canada and the United States

Between 1950 and 1996, the percentage of the total US metropolitan population in the Northeast region declined from 34% to 20%, and in the Midwest from 29% to 24%. The South saw its share increase from 23% to 33%, and the West from 14% to 23% (Pack, 2002).

A recent study of US urban decline and growth between 1950 and 2000 by Rappaport (2003) confirmed that population shifted regionally from the Northeast and Midwest to the South and West, and from large cities to suburbs, though at a much slower rate during the 1980s and 1990s than earlier. He also documented the fact that within each region some metro regions grew much more rapidly than others. Cities that declined continuously tended to be in the Northeast and Midwest, while cities that grew continuously tended to be in the South and West, which also experienced below average loss of population to suburbs and above average metropolitan area growth. Cities that reversed population declines were scattered throughout the country.²

The following data on growth in population between 1980 and 2002 are drawn from Poitras and Sawchuk (2003). While the average annual national growth rates of population were similar – 1.13% in Canada and 1.10% in the United States – significant regional differences existed.

Provincial average annual growth rates of population were as follows during the 1980-2002 period.

Provincial Average Annual Growth Rates of Population, 1980-2002

Atlantic	0.23%
Quebec	0.62%
Ontario	1.47%
Prairies	0.35%
Alberta	1.61%
British Columbia	1.89%
Territories	1.60%

Regional average annual growth rates of population were as follows in the United States during the same period.

Regional Average Annual Growth Rates of Population, United States, 1980-2002

Northeast	0.62%
Mideast	0.49%
Great Lakes	0.42%
Plains	0.57%
Southeast	1.38%
Southwest	1.96%
Rocky Mountain	1.74%
Far West	1.85%

During the most recent decade (i.e., between 1990 and 2001), the following North American macro regions experienced the most rapid increases in total population.

Increase of Population in Selected Macro Regions of North America, 1990-2001

Rocky Mountain	29.1%
Southwest	25.8%
British Columbia	24.6%
Southeast	18.2%
Far West	18.3%
Ontario	15.5%
Prairies	12.2%
Plains	9.5%
Great Lakes	9.0%

Source: PRI North American Data Bank.

Several points are worth highlighting from the above tables.

- British Columbia and Ontario are part of the group of rapidly growing macro regions.
- Certain regions (i.e., Rocky Mountain and British Columbia) grew at a rate similar to that of the Southwest, which is generally believed to be the emerging leading economic region in North America.
- The Southeast region surpassed Ontario. This observation prompts us to question whether Ontario is beginning to feel the effects of the disappearance of the US manufacturing belt (see below).

A variety of factors may explain these trends, among them lower wages and land prices in the South, technological

changes, the development of air conditioning, the aging of the population, import penetration, the national highway system, water projects, economic development policies, and the relative performance of clusters in different regions. We are testing this hypothesis as part of our project.

Regional Changes in Total Employment: Macro Regions, States, and Provinces

Total employment increased as follows between 1990 and 2001 in selected macro and metro regions.

Increase in Employment in Selected Jurisdictions, 1990-2001

Southwest	43.09%
Rocky Mountain	42.97%
Southeast	25.10%
British Columbia	24.89%
Far West	20.01%
Plains	19.96%
Prairies	18.42%
Great Lakes	16.04%
Ontario	14.89%
Quebec	10.06%
Atlantic Provinces	8.96%
Mideast	8.93%

Source: PRI North American Data Bank.

Given that the top five macro regions are the same in both cases, there exists an obvious positive correlation between population growth rates and employment growth rates as seen in the above tables. Ontario being sixth place in terms of population growth, and ninth in terms of

employment, indicates that the effects of North American integration may be beginning to affect it negatively, as it has the Great Lakes region, which was ninth in terms of both population and employment growth.

Growth in Real GDP in US Macro Regions, States, and Metro Areas Between 1989 and 2001³

Between 1989 and 2001, real GDP in the United States increased by 3.0% annually on average.⁴

The Rocky Mountain sub-region was the fastest growing (5.0%). It includes Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. The Great Lakes sub-region grew at a lower rate than the national average (2.7%), and the Northeast region was the slowest growing macro region (2.3%).

Data on growth in GDP by metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and central metropolitan statistical area (CMSA) between 1997 and 2002 indicate that the fastest growth rates (i.e., between 35% and 42%) were observed in Austin, Denver, Houston, and San Diego, all metro areas located in the Southwest of the United States.

Lower growth rates of GDP, in the 17% to 20% range, were recorded for cities located to the north near the Canadian border (i.e., Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, and Rochester).

The movement of the auto industry south and the localization of new high tech electronic activities in the south explain some of the territorial recomposition of economic activity. Of particular interest to the Government of Canada is determining if the performance of the Southwest, generally more dynamic than that observed in the Northeast and Midwest, will nega-

tively impact Canadian provinces and metro regions in the context of a more closely integrated North America.

Growth in Personal Income by Metro Region in the United States, 1990-2001

Data on personal income growth by metro region between 1990 and 2001 indicate that all metro areas in the top 10 were located in the Southwest United States.

Except for Honolulu, which is last in the ranked list of MSAs and CMSAs we are examining, US metro regions located near the Canadian border were at the bottom of the distribution of metro areas by rank in terms of growth in personal income between 1990 and 2001. These data are compatible with the movement southwest of the manufacturing belt.

In the 1970s and 1980s, average metropolitan area per capita income growth was as follows: all 250 MSAs 14% and 19%, Northeast MSAs 5% and 32%, Midwest MSAs 13% and 15%, South MSAs 18% and 19%, and West MSAs 15% and 17% (Pack, 2002). Note the high rate of increase in the Northeast MSAs.

Analysis of data on personal income per person for the 1990s indicates the presence among the top 10 of Boston in fifth place with an increase of 69%, Minneapolis in seventh place with an increase of 67%, and Seattle in ninth place with an increase of 65%. These results indicate that describing the process of territorial recomposition as a single movement toward the southwest is not sufficient. One hypothesis we are testing is that clusters are responsible for these results.

Note however that Boston, Minneapolis, and Seattle are not at the top of the distribution in terms of GDP growth and personal income growth. Data indicate the increase in total population in these three metro areas between 1990 and 2001 was relatively low, at 18.6%, 20.7%, and 7.6% respectively versus 55% in Austin, 51% in Phoenix, and 43% in Atlanta and Raleigh. Reasonable short-term performance in per capita terms may be masking medium- and longer-term problems for these areas.

The role and importance of local and regional factors in economic growth is also indicated by data on increases in average remuneration by employee between 1990 and 2001. The presence of Seattle (third) and Boston (fifth) in the ranking of metro areas by average remuneration indicates the influence of metro-based innovation and information technology as determinants of economic development.

Dispersion of the US Manufacturing Belt Toward the South and West, and to Non-Metro Areas

Preliminary analysis confirms the results obtained by Holmes and Stevens (2003) to the effect that the US manufacturing belt has dispersed toward southern, western, and non-urban locations in the United States (2003).

The movement of some of the auto industry (some of it to the Southwest United States and the Mexican *maquiladoras*, and now offshore to China) demonstrates a pattern that may affect other Canadian industries and clusters. The PRI project is aimed at the identification of Canadian clusters and sub-clusters that are competitive enough to develop and thrive

north of the border given the integration process. We are also interested in describing and understanding the changes in the origins of exports and imports as the border effect diminishes (Brown, 2003).

Further integration may make for growing complementarities between north-south and interprovincial trade, and may make it possible for certain metropolitan regions (e.g., Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Halifax) to develop as multimodal transshipment points for North American and off-shore trade.

Metropolization and Interregional-International Trade

A growing percentage of the gross national product (GNP) is originating in metro regions (metropolization). As a consequence, we are witnessing an increase in interregional-international trade.

Population and employment have increased more rapidly in Canadian metropolitan regions, whereas regions located more than an hour's drive from Canada's urban agglomerations of more than 500,000 people are in demographic decline (Polèse, 2003). This is a result of the growing importance of information and knowledge in our economies, the importance of agglomeration economies that accompany clusters (particularly in services), the importance of proximity in manufacturing of high tech and medium tech products, and limitations on the exploitation of primary resources.

The Effects of Clusters on Economic Performance

Recent studies are beginning to document, in empirically acceptable ways, the effects of clusters on the level and

Development of A North American Data Bank

An initial task undertaken in our project involves the development of a data bank to describe the regional dimensions of the integration process in Canada and the United States. We are assembling harmonized and compatible data at four levels of aggregation:

- Canada and the United States;
- macro regions (i.e., groups of provinces and eight or nine regions in the United States depending on the source, Census or Bureau of Economic Analysis);
- states and provinces; and
- CMSAs and MSAs in the United States, and CMAs (25/27) in Canada.

The variables being studied are demographic data, standard labour force and macro-economic variables, employment, wages, number of establishments, clusters, location quotients, specialization indexes, and location in North America.

Our data bank will also allow us to estimate empirically the determinants of innovation and productivity in metro regions. One hypothesis we will test is whether the extent and location of cluster development helps explain some of the Canada-US productivity gap.

The data bank will also allow monitoring of the evolution of regional economies in a North American context, and the assessment of the impacts of policy initiatives.

Statistics Canada and Industry Canada are among the departments that have joined the PRI in this effort to develop a data bank that will be available to all federal government departments.

growth of salaries, innovation, productivity, and export performance of metropolitan regions.

In a recent paper on the economic performance of regions and clusters, Michael Porter (2003) presented the following results of multiple regression analysis.

- About 30% of the regional variation in wages is accounted for by variations in patenting activity (basically an urban activity).

- Traded services industries have 20% higher average wages than traded goods industries.
- Average local wages are correlated to average traded wages (R^2 of 0.69%).
- State economies were, on average, more concentrated in specific traded clusters in 2000 than in 1990, a confirmation that specialization is a growing phenomenon in North America.

- Average wages and patenting are positively and significantly related to the share of traded employment in a region that is in strong clusters (R^2 of 0.377%).

A recent study of 14 high tech metropolitan areas in the United States indicated that they specialize in few products and technologies (Cortwright and Mayer, 2001). Examination of employment concentration, location quotients, patent activity, and venture capital flows demonstrates that specialization is the major pattern found in the more dynamic metro areas.

These observations and conclusions underlie the policy prescription we are testing econometrically to the effect that specialization is essential to the competitiveness of Canadian regions in a more and more integrated North American and hemispheric economy.

A New Role for Policy

Positioning Canada's metropolitan regions and provinces to compete effectively in North America, the western hemisphere, and the world will presumably involve new policy initiatives in a variety of areas.

That federal, provincial, and regional-metropolitan government policies influence the development of urban regions in numerous interrelated ways is obvious from a cursory examination of Figure 1.

Industry sector policies, infrastructure, education, and innovation policies, in addition to intergovernmental relations, should be re-examined in light of the cluster specializations developed in Canadian regions.

National, state and provincial, regional and local governments are changing their approaches to economic develop-

ment. There is growing attention to continental factors, micro-economic determinants of growth, innovation, regional productive systems and clusters, and the accessibility and availability of technology. Also of great importance are the skills of the labour force, the availability of domestic capital and foreign direct investments, advanced multimodal infrastructures, quality of life considerations that attract and keep highly qualified human resources, social capital, and social and environmental questions. Our research aims to provide information on many of these variables, and to test their contribution to metropolitan growth and competitiveness. The PRI project on economic regions should, as a consequence, contribute to policy proposals aimed at improving economic development at the metropolitan, provincial, and national levels.

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
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FIGURE 1

Components of a Productive System



Source: Adapted from the work of Michael Porter and other American and European sources.

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Notes

- 1 At this stage in our research project, we are concentrating on local-regional-metropolitan clusters, and analyzing data for established political and administrative units (i.e., provinces, states, and metropolitan regions). Economic regions most likely do not coincide with administrative and political units; hence, our interest in work that deals with the identification of economic regions (e.g., Fezer and Sweeney, 2002).
- 2 The following Northeast and Midwest cities reversed declines: Providence, Boston, Jersey City, Worcester, St. Paul, New York City, Minneapolis, Chicago, and Kansas City.
- 3 This section draws upon DFAIT (2003).
- 4 US Bureau of Labor Statistics data on real GDP, 1996 = 100. The concept excludes remuneration of military and public personnel stationed outside the United States.

Canada-US Values Distinct, Inevitably Carbon Copy, or Narcissism of Small Differences?

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It is the natural tendency for...similar groups of people to exaggerate otherwise superficially minor differences. The more alike the groups, the more they will seek ways to differentiate from each other.... Uniting against others is normal human behaviour." (Sigmund Freud on the Narcissism of Small Differences, 1930).

Canada-US comparisons are always subject to vigorous debate among public policy researchers and practitioners. The extent of similarities and differences in values and belief systems, and their evolution over time, are both important and timely for policy development on the 10th anniversary of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). We have heard both arguments: the thesis of inevitability – Canada's values are converging toward US values with growing economic integration with its southern neighbour (Inglehart et al., 1996; Simpson, 2000; Pastor, 2001) – and the thesis of unpredictability or myth of converging values (Lipset, 1990; Adams, 1997, 2003a,b). And most social disciplines have their own explanations for the trajectory that Canadian and American values have taken over the past two decades. But are there real differences between these two theses? Or is it merely semantic?

Most analysts would agree that in a global context, Canada has more in common with the United States than with the other G-8 countries. Nonetheless, whether values and beliefs in Canada and the United States are becoming more similar has profound policy implications for Canada. The main objective of this article is to look at the common and strikingly different characteristics of

both societies using values and the belief system of the general public as the main analytical tool, and assess the trajectory over the rapid economic integration of the past two decades.

Perspectives on Canada-US Value Changes

Perhaps the "policy" argument has been the most used in past decades to highlight divergence or convergence of values between both nations. The adoption of the *Official Languages Act* in 1969, followed by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and the *Canadian Multicultural Act* in 1985, was frequently used to highlight the differences between the countries. On the other hand, the introduction of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* in 1981 was used to emphasize the Americanization of Canada, because it limits the power of the state and increases the legal protection of individual rights. More recently, gun controls, the decriminalization of marijuana, same-sex marriages, the Kyoto Protocol, and the war in Iraq are all examples of distinct Canadian fingerprints. The pollster Frank Graves (2003) made the hypothesis that "the new North American trajectory may have been altered following distinct national decisions of North American countries on issues such as Kyoto ratification and the war in Iraq," but concluded after computing his polling evidence that "major (recent) policy disagreements did not have lasting or significant damage to intra-country attitudes."

Others used the "historical" argument to claim that both countries are different. Lipset (1990) argued that Canadian-American value differences

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are attributable to variations in founding circumstances and contrasting historical experiences. Pollster Michael Adams' line of reasoning goes in the same direction. He claimed in his most recent book (2003) that Canada and the United States are "fundamentally different" and "always have been," and argued that the two countries "were separated at birth, organized and governed differently." He suggested that the principles of both constitutions and of nation building diverge from the original intent. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are the centre of the American constitutional tradition, while peace, order, and good government were the principle elements of the constitutional framework in Canada. He argued that Canada was built by compromise while the United States by conquest. Canada had rebellions, the United States a civil war, dividing even today the North from the South. In Prime Minister Mackenzie King's words, "if some countries have too much history, Canada has too much geography. Unlike the United States, it finds little to celebrate: no revolution, no declaration of independence, no civil war to free the slaves."²

The "structural" argument was also made to support the claim of divergence. According to Horowitz (1973), the variations in the prevailing value systems of the two countries may have more to do with their basic structural differences. Canada, he argued, was a case of "lagged development and has been slower to give up the values and lifestyles characteristic of a less industrialized, more agrarian society." This line of reasoning implies that if Canada and the United States become

structurally more similar, their values should converge too. There is important evidence of structural convergence between both countries over the past two decades. Consider the domains of post-secondary graduates, women's presence on the labour market, population ageing, and computer and Internet access. Others, like Lipset (1990), argued that structural

The geographic immensity, the relatively low population density, and less abundant resources made Canada much more dependent on government involvement in the economy to provide services for which private capital or a profitable market have not been available.

factors such as ecology, demography, and economy, have had a tremendous impact on the development of values and attitudes toward government on both sides of the border. The geographic immensity, the relatively low population density, and less abundant resources made Canada much more dependent on government involvement in the economy to provide services for which private capital or a profitable market have not been available. In the United States, less emphasis was put on government involvement in terms of economic intervention and protection against a powerful neighbour. There are even some economic historians who advance a theory called the "Laurentian" thesis, which includes the assumption that Canada could not have survived as a separate country without state intervention and economic links to Europe.

The "interdependence" argument works at multiple levels, but it is defined largely in economic terms

and favours the thesis of value convergence. The two countries have the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world (Fry, 2003); each is the other's most important source of imports and exports, and trade volume has increased threefold over the past decade, and six fold over the past two decades (DFAIT, 2003). The massive volume of American and Canadian

investments in each other's country is also well documented. Canada-US trade grew much faster than inter-provincial trade in the 1980s and 1990s (Coulombe, 2003), although Canada's regional economies have relied more and more on inter-provincial exports as a key source of economic growth since 2000 (SC, 2004). More than two thirds of US merchandise trade with Canada is intra-firm (DFAIT, 2003). Another key trend has been the increased use of imports from each other as inputs into exports to each other (Schwanen, 2003). Canada receives the largest share of its foreign patents from American investors, and the United States receives the largest share of foreign patents from Canadians. (However, each has been falling over time.) In addition to these commercial linkages, Canada is the first source of foreign tourists for the United States, and the United States is the first source of foreign tourists for Canada (Fry, 2003).

TABLE 1

		# of Items	Leader of Change*	
			1990	2000
I Economic dimension:				
1	Economic outlook (Better off in 1/5 years)	2	NA	NA
2	Support for free markets (% support free market)	4	NA	Can
3	Job attribute: self-actualization (% mention 5)	5	Can	Can
4	Job attribute: Comfort (% mention 5)	5	Can	US
5	Quality to teach to kids: thriftiness (% important)	1	US	US
6	Support for meritocracy (% support)	1	US	US
7	Control over destiny (% control)	1	US	US
II Political dimension:				
8	Interest in politics (% very/somewhat)	1	Can	Can
9	Confidence in government institutions (% confidence)	4	Can	US
10	Confidence in non-government institutions (% confidence)	4	US	Can
11	National pride (% proud)	1	Can	Can
12	Fight for country (% yes)	1	US	Can
13	Cosmopolitanism (% local)	1	Can	US
14	Protest behaviour (% protest)	5	Can	US
15	Post-modern orientations (% post-modern orientation)	6	Can**	Can
16	Environmental ethics (% high environmental ethics)	3	NA	US
III Social dimension:				
17	Situational intolerance: social (% intolerant)	5	US	US
18	Situational intolerance: racial (% intolerant)	2	US	Can
19	Civil permissiveness (% 1 or more behaviours is justified)	4	US	Can
20	Subjective well-being (% well)	1	Can	US
21	Egalitarian spousal relationship (% agree)	3	Can	
22	Quality to teach to kids: care for others (% important)	2	Can	Can
23	Trust in Americans (Canada)/trust in Canadians (United States)	1	NA	US
IV Moral dimension:				
24	Moral permissiveness (% justifiable)	6	Can	Can
25	Quality to teach to kids: religious (% important)	1	US	US
26	Quality to teach to kids: secular (% important)	3	US	US
27	Subjective religiosity (% believe in god)	1	Can	US
28	Church attendance (% once a week and more)	1	US	Can

A full definition of these measures is available on request.

* "Leader of change test" was computed as follows for 1990 and 2000. If, for example, between 1981 and 1990 Canadian values approached American 1981 levels, American values were deemed to have led the values of their northern neighbours. But, if between 1981 and 1990 American values approached Canadian 1981 levels, Canadian values were deemed to have led the values of their southern neighbours.

** Nevitte (1996).

Interdependence arguments can also be extended to the geographical proximity of the United States to Canada. As Krugman (1991) pointed out, “Canada is essentially closer to the United States than it is to itself.” Harris and Schmitt (2001) noted that many provinces are “closer to northern US states than distant Canadian provinces.” Infrastructure between both countries also forms one immense and interconnected network; rail, electricity, gas pipelines, and the St. Lawrence Seaway are increasingly organized on north-south continental lines (Fried, 2003). At yet another level of integration, Canada and the United States share strategic interests in the defence of the continent.

Finally, the “cultural” argument refers to the wide spectrum of American cultural products, and the volume of cross-border media and communications transactions between the countries. The defenders of this argument are of the view that the cultural differences are lessening as Canadian culture is attacked by the US mass media. About 80% of the Canadian population has access to all the major American television networks. However, review of the sparse empirical literature on the effect of American media on Canadian values reveals no conclusive relationship (Surlin, 1995). American media would impact on Canadian’s cognition (e.g., knowledge of US public affairs), but is inconclusive concerning American media effects on attitudes, values, beliefs, and norms.

Data and Methods

There is no consensus on the best way to determine the shape and substance of public values. Both qualitative and quantitative methods (e.g., review

of laws, regulations, constitutions, policies adopted by governments, institutional arrangements, and broad measures such as crime rate and level of unionization, and public opinion surveys) have been used in the past. The approach that appears to be the most objective, comparable across time and nations, and broadest in scope comes from survey questionnaires. This paper relied mainly on the three waves of the World Value Survey (WVS) (1981, 1990, and 2000) for which a Canada-US value assessment for all three waves has never been conducted.

Building on previous research on general public values, a framework was developed to analyze, in a thorough manner, both societies, since the implementation of the Canada-US

Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The initial task was to reduce the number of data elements under investigation and pay attention to a core set of indicators. Three necessary steps were required. First, about 300 individual survey items were winnowed down to 86, using three criteria:

- a time-series benchmark (Are there at least two points in time?);
- Canada-US benchmark (Was the same question asked both in Canada and in the United States?); and
- significance (Does the addition of this item broaden the research scope?).

The second step grouped these survey items into 28 measures using a combination of methods including

FIGURE 1

A Shift Toward Post-Modern/Secular Values, the Largest Change Characterizing Both Societies Between 1981 and 2000




FIGURE 2

Canada-US Difference per Domains



multivariate and bivariate techniques. The third step summarized the 28 measures into four broad dimensions (i.e., economic, political, social, and moral). Table 1 presents the 28 measures and four dimensions.

Analysis

Our findings can be summarized as follows:

1. Canada and the United States have substantially changed over the past two decades. In some cases, significant and mostly unheard movements in value research were observed. The changes that took place are very coherent. They generally support the post-modern thesis that Canada and the United States became much more progressive and secular regarding some aspects of economic, social, political, and

moral issues. Figure 1 summarizes a few selected survey items where important changes occurred in both countries between 1981 and 2000, and Figure 2 presents more aggregate figures for each societal domain.

2. The value differences between Canada and the United States are small. Differences, observed across a range of indicators, are often a matter of degrees rather than direction, except for religious and moral issues, where larger gaps are found. This first set of findings goes in the expected direction. After all, Canada and the United States share a unique relationship both economically and socially. Nevitte (1996) argued that in a global perspective, Canada and the United States have very similar values and have more in common than any

other nations in the world. The differences between Canadian and US values may be more technical than substantial.

3. The trajectory of the value changes is more complex. Based on the “interdependence” and “structural” analysis, and the claims made by some of the pioneers on Canada-US value research (Nevitte, Inglehart, and Basanez),³ one would have expected to observe a convergence of values between both countries over the past two decades. This is not happening. Overall, our analysis suggests that Canadian and American values did not converge to a common denominator between 1981 and 2000, and the cumulative evidence suggests that both societies are growing apart. First, Adam’s analysis (2003) using a different set of values and methodologies concluded that Canadians were distinct from the United States on 73% of 56 values; with 43% of these values, the differences grew between 1992 and 2000. Subsequent tests provide very similar results. (Of the 86 values reviewed between 1990 and 2000, 47% grew apart.) Second, Nevitte (1996) found that values between both countries were shifting more or less in tandem for the 1981-90 WVS data.⁴ This pattern was confirmed in our paper during this same period with the same dataset, but with different value measures. For the paper that is the source of this article, the same “tandem” test for 1990 and 2000 revealed that, in a majority of cases, the trajectories of values between both countries were moving in different directions (only

in 11 of 26 cases was the trajectory the same), offering additional evidence of divergence.

It is important to stress that these differences in trajectories are happening in core topics: support for meritocracy, interest in politics, and protest behaviour. Cosmopolitanism and civil permissiveness decreased in Canada and increased

convergence and divergence is small. Figure 2 summarizes the Canada-US differences for each key domain. It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from these movements.

5. One line of reasoning appears clearer. The earlier assumption that “the US only shows Canada the image of her own future”

Baker (2000) found that Americanization is occurring internationally largely at the superficial level of Coca-Cola and Big Macs. As they put it, “industrializing societies in general are not becoming like the US [for] its people hold much more traditional values and beliefs than those in any other equally prosperous society.”

Conclusion

This article suggests that Canadian and American values have changed significantly over the past two decades, with gaps between both societies remaining important in several areas. Lipset may have been right once again when he claimed in the late 1980s that the FTA would not Americanize Canadians. More recently, Adams (2004) concluded that “the adoption of NAFTA in 1994 had no obvious effect on social values north of the border.” Ashford and Timms (1992) came to a similar conclusion analyzing the values in Europe from 1981 to 1990. According to those authors, “national culture and opinion in Europe remain robustly diverse in spite of the increasingly close political and economic ties which bind EEC member countries.” The research discussed in this article suggests that a similar phenomenon is taking place in North America.

Still, beyond the theses of distinct societies or inevitable carbon copies, the question remains as to whether Canadians are slipping too easily into a narcissism of small differences (i.e., believing that our identity depends on the extent of differences between Canada and the United States, rather than on the similarities and shared values).

Our analysis suggests that Canadian and American values did not converge to a common denominator between 1981 and 2000, and the cumulative evidence suggests that both societies are growing apart.

in the United States, while fight for country and secularism increased in Canada and decreased in the United States between 1990 and 2000.

4. The divergence trends in Canada and the United States are not happening across the board, and the line dividing convergence from divergence is small over the past two decades, especially for the political and social dimensions. The moral dimension experienced a strong divergence between 1981 and 1990, and a strong convergence between 1990 and 2000, with a net divergence gap between 1981 and 2000. With the economic dimension, there was a weak trend toward convergence between 1981 and 1990, and a strong trend toward divergence between 1990 and 2000, with a net effect toward divergence between 1981 and 2000. For the political and social dimensions, two conclusions emerge. First, the demarcation between

(Horowitz, 1973) seems implausible in light of these data.⁵ The overall pattern is one in which the two countries influence each other on core value domains. What is the evidence of the “cultural lag” hypothesis? Overall, Table 1 suggests that both societies generally lead on values that are nationally recognized. Canadians consistently led in 1990 and 2000 on government post-modern orientations, on collectivism (teach kids the need to care for others), moral permissiveness, job attribute (self-actualization), but also on national pride and interest in politics. The United States consistently led in 1990 and 2000 on support for meritocracy, control over destiny, religiosity (i.e., as a quality to teach to children), social situational intolerance, but also on thriftiness and secularism. Other researchers came up with similar conclusions regarding the thesis of global Americanization. Inglehart and

What Did The Experts Say?

Yves Poisson, Public Policy Forum

Deepening North American economic integration is possible while maintaining national, political, social, and cultural autonomy. This was the main consensus at the Public Policy Forum's second Rethinking North American Integration conference. The conference focused on the results of a survey conducted by EKOS Research Associates on values and attitudes toward North American integration, conducted in Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Expert speakers from the three countries commented on the results and shared their insights into the course of North American integration.

That economic integration in North America is increasing dramatically has been well known for some time. This integration has not led to the development of a continental identity or political integration in the European Union style. On the contrary, the EKOS research data presented at this conference indicate that national identities remain primary among Canadians, Mexicans, and Americans. Moreover, political autonomy, indicated in Canada by different policies on everything from Iraq to marijuana, has not had a large impact on American public opinion of Canada, and may even have helped it. In other words, Canada and Mexico need not become Americanized politically and culturally to enjoy the benefits of an integrated North American economy.

This phenomenon can be clearly seen in Canadian attitudes regarding North American integration. Although fears of Americanization remain, Canadians are increasingly comfortable with the discussion concerning economic integration, which is seen as separate from political and cultural issues. At the same time, while Canadians, Americans, and Mexicans understand that it is essential to maintain efficient movement of goods and people through the borders, they are increas-

Although fears of Americanization remain, Canadians are increasingly comfortable with the discussion concerning economic integration, which is seen as separate from political and cultural issues.

ingly sceptical about the practicality, and the benefit of getting rid of these borders, physically and politically.

The general consensus among conference participants was that these and other factors, including the political situation in the United States, make it unlikely that further changes of the magnitude of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would happen anytime soon. Instead, incremental change, building on the new confidence and benefits of NAFTA for all three countries, can be used to increase integration. Looking at ways of improving its dispute resolution mechanisms, extending it to previously excluded areas, and increasing the effectiveness of its environmental controls were all seen as possible steps in the medium term.

One of the most promising areas for further integration is environmental policy, where Canadians, Americans,

and Mexicans want increased harmonization leading to a "race for the top" within North America. This is especially true for water, toxins, and air pollution, with climate change being more controversial. It is interesting to note that the EKOS research indicates that a majority in each country indicated they would like to see an integrated North American policy relating to environmental quality – the only issue for which this is the case. Also important is the role of

environmental issues within trade negotiations. Participants spoke, in particular, about NAFTA's Commission for Environmental Cooperation and the need for increased resources to fulfill its mandate.

The other area seen as desirable was the Canada-Mexico relationship within the North American context. Many participants emphasized the advantages of strengthening this aspect of the North American relationship. Both Canada and Mexico must work to improve their image within the United States and their capacity to lobby for their interests within the US political system. It would be to Canada's advantage for the United States to better understand the complex Canadian-American relationship, which implies an investment on our part. Moreover, the importance of shaping issues in terms of domestic

American interests and gaining allies within the United States who share one's interests, was understood to be vital to the success of any such campaign. Also important is the ability of Canada and Mexico to work together to increase their negotiating power relative to the United States. For this to be a success, real progress must be made to strengthen the Canada-Mexico component of the North American relationship. This would not only involve increasing knowledge of each other, but also a strengthened economic and political relationship.

For more information on this conference, visit the Public Policy Forum web site at <www.ppforum.ca>.

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Notes

- 1 This article is excerpted from a larger paper. The full version is available on request by email to c.boucher@prs-srp.gc.ca
- 2 Speech to the House of Commons, Ottawa, June 18, 1936.
- 3 They concluded that the basic values of all Canadian and American societies are converging and becoming more alike as time goes by.
- 4 Nevitte (1996) found that between 1981 and 1990 the directions of change between both countries were the same on 22 of the 25 dimensions presented.
- 5 Jeffrey Simpson (2000) claimed that both countries are "becoming more alike" and "this drawing together does not arise because Americans are changing... Canadians are the ones...who are becoming more American," but not the other way around.

The Regional Dynamics of Province-State Relations

Canada and the United States

Jean-François Abgrall
Policy Research Initiative

Canadian provinces and US states have had bilateral relations for a long time. Yet, these relations are now so frequent and so diverse that, more than ever, they have become an essential part of the relationship between Canada and the United States. New memoranda of understanding, compacts, and agreements continuously confirm and add to the vitality of these relations.

Not only is the universe of province-state relations expanding rapidly, but their complexity is also increasing. Better understanding this dynamic and its implications has become an urgent necessity for the two federal governments, particularly the Government of Canada. To appraise the consequences of expanding province-state relations, it is necessary to evaluate the extent of the transformations taking place. But first, we need to start with a thorough description of the actual situation.

The overall objective of the ongoing PRI study is to formulate policy recommendations for the Government of Canada based on the implications of province-state relationships.¹ The thrust of this article is more modest. Its chief aim is to give an overview of the web of relationships among provinces and states. Then we consider some lessons that can be drawn, at this point, from contemporary province-state relations. As well, some hypotheses related to policy implications and recommendations are proposed, but these are simply a glimpse at what seems to be taking shape in the distance. These latter considerations constitute two shorter sections at the end.

Global Para-Diplomacy

Global para-diplomacy refers to links between provincial governments and foreign central or state governments "for the purpose of influencing general trade, investment, and other policies and actions" (Duchacek, 1990:18). Canadian provinces have been involved in global para-diplomacy for a long time, and not simply with the United States. Many provinces have relationships with political entities in Europe, Asia, Africa, and so forth. Yet, in recent years, provincial priorities have definitely focused on relationships with Canada's southern neighbour.

As part of global para-diplomacy, trade missions and official visits are commonplace. The Atlantic Provinces joined forces with the Government of Canada in Team Canada Atlantic. Premier Klein and Premier Campbell undertook a joint mission in Texas and California in late 2003. Once elected, Premier Charest and Premier McGuinty's first initiatives abroad were to meet officials in New York.

More recently, official visits have taken another dimension, as some premiers have not limited their contacts to state officials. Both, Premier Klein and Premier Hamm have paid separate visits to Vice-President Cheney. However, some premiers have expressed reservations about this type of initiative (Dunfield, 2003:1).

Provincial missions abroad have also become part of the diplomatic landscape. Quebec has seven such offices in the United States; Alberta has one, in Portland, Oregon, and it plans to open another one soon in Washington, DC. Premier McGuinty announced his intention to reopen

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some offices for Ontario. Missions and official visits in Canada are also common from US states. Over 10 states have offices in Canada.

Membership in US organizations is another frequent form of co-operation. The Council of State Governments, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the National Governors Association and their regional branches have granted memberships – full, associate, or affiliate – to the governments of the provinces, to their legislative assembly, and to the premiers. Conversely, membership of US states in Canadian organizations does not seem to exist. This points to an asymmetry that is one of the striking aspects of province-state relations.

From all indications, it appears the number of provincial global para-diplomacy relationships with the United States has grown regularly in recent years. The new element here is the direct exchange between some premiers and officials of the US government. Yet, as a whole, the developments of the last decades are a sign of greater co-operation between provinces and states.

We now turn to a more innovative aspect of province-state relationships: trans-border para-diplomacy.

Trans-Border Para-Diplomacy

Trans-border para-diplomacy refers to links between neighbouring provinces and states. Recently, it is in this area that the intensity of activities has been the highest, and is where initiatives are the most innovative, signalling, perhaps, the emergence of cross-border regions.

Two reasons for this could be the fragmentation of international relations leading to the multiplication

of “trans-governmental relations,” that is, “direct interactions between agencies (governmental sub-units) of different governments” (Keohane and Nye, 1976:4), and a restructuring of these relations around regional priorities.

The Fragmentation of International Relations

The emphasis on economic issues, the focus on trade liberalization, and the ensuing opening of borders to goods, services, persons, and ideas have made international relations a continuation

relations, of a wider phenomenon associated with modernity in general. “[A]s social relations become laterally stretched and as part of the same process, we see the strengthening of pressure for local autonomy and regional cultural identity” (Giddens, 1990:65).

Trade agreements between Canada and the United States, and later with Mexico, as well as the negotiations leading to and following the creation of the World Trade Organization,

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of the domestic functions of the central governments in a number of sectors, such as energy, transportation, and agriculture, but also in the environment, culture, and even public administration. Today, branches and departments of central governments have their own international links. For the same reasons, international relations have become more and more important for the sub-federal governments, given their responsibilities in most of these areas.

The same underlying causes (i.e., emphasis on economics, trade liberalization, and so forth) have led the provinces to pay greater attention to their partners throughout the world and, singularly, to their neighbouring partners. This is not specific to the relations between Canada and the United States; it is happening in Europe as well. In fact, it is an illustration, in the realm of international

illustrate and have contributed to the fragmentation of international relations. Sectoral issues were often so complex that they required special negotiations by experts, and they often led to specific agreements or treatments, on services, in agriculture, on the environment, on culture, and so forth. In addition, these negotiations also called for continuous consultations after agreements were signed. Given the shared jurisdictions, the provinces were drawn into the negotiations, and they remained involved in their implementation.

As an example, in agriculture, the States-Provinces Agricultural Accord was established in 1984. When Mexico joined, it became the Tri-National Agricultural Accord. At its annual meetings, representatives of the Canadian provinces, and US and Mexican states discuss the challenges faced by their respective agricultural sectors.

Three bilateral working groups (Canada-United States, Canada-Mexico, United States-Mexico) have been organized. Between Canada and the United States, questions such as animal health affecting trade, agricultural biotechnology, and certification issues are discussed. In addition, Canadian provinces also work closely with, and in some cases are members of, the US National Association of State Departments of Agriculture.

The Development of Trans-Border Para-Diplomacy

As the fragmentation of international relations takes place, and as provinces are more and more involved internationally on sectoral issues, another dynamic is emerging. Neighbouring provinces and states become increasingly aware of the benefits of regional co-operation, thus contributing to a new dimension of Canada-US relations.

Usually, this co-operation applies to the same range of sectors, regardless of the regions. Not surprisingly, it extends mostly in the areas under provincial or shared jurisdiction, or at least of shared interest, such as trade, agriculture, transportation, energy, tourism, technology in general, the environment and, of course, border issues. It may take the form of new organizations, or it may instill new life or provide new mandates to existing ones. But, most importantly, there does not seem to be any set pattern, and the organizational responses vary considerably depending on the circumstances. The same types of organizations can be found in different regions, but each region has its own mix of co-existing organizations.

More and more provinces have signed memoranda of understanding with

neighbouring states: Alberta with Montana (1985), Manitoba with Minnesota (1988), British Columbia with Washington State (1992), Ontario with New York (2001) and with Michigan (2002), Quebec with New York (2002). Earlier, these understandings were likely specific, on the environment for instance but, recently, have tended to become more encompassing, mostly calling for general economic co-operation.

As the fragmentation of international relations takes place, and as provinces are more and more involved internationally on sectoral issues, another dynamic is emerging, that of regional co-operation.

At the same time, in some areas, cross-border co-operation appears to transcend the usual bounds of para-diplomacy, suggesting the emergence of cross-border regions.

One striking example is the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). The PNWER is the most recent, but also the most sophisticated regional organization of its sort in North America. Its members are British Columbia, Alberta, Yukon, and the states of Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. It is the only organization established specifically for regional co-operation on that scale.

The PNWER's structure is elaborate. It has an executive committee, a delegate council and a private sector council, working groups, and a secretariat. One striking characteristic of the PNWER is its representation, balanced between public and private sectors, Canadian and US members, members of the legislatures and members of the executives, and majority and minority (opposition parties in Canada).

The resolutions passed by the PNWER are clearly marked by regional priorities, whether it is on energy, agriculture, or the environment. Despite that strong focus, the PNWER has not been overly critical of the federal governments. At most, we find a resolution in 2003 urging the US government to remove the embargo on Canadian beef. Yet, it is undeniable that a regional solidarity is manifesting itself. A case in point is the support given

by four US states in the PNWER for Vancouver's bid for the Winter Olympic Games, which drew criticism from *The New York Times* (2003).

The next region offering a parallel is the East. The Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG/ECP) goes back 30 years to 1973. It is a much lighter institution. It has a twin secretariat, staffed on the United States side by the secretariat of the Governor's Conference, and on the Canadian side, it is under the responsibility of the secretariat of the Council of Atlantic Premiers. The NEG/ECP Conference also relies on working groups or committees, such as the Northeast International Committee on Energy, or the International Northeast Biotechnology Corridor.

At the 2000 meeting in Halifax, the Conference entered a new phase with the establishment of the Standing Committee on Trade and Globalization that works on transportation and border issues, and encourages trade promotion among its members. That

meeting also marked the first time the business sector held a forum in parallel with the Conference meeting.

The NEG/ECP has been a useful club where neighbours have had opportunities to discuss issues of common interest. But, it has been much more than that. On many issues, it has sponsored influential studies. In recent years, much work has been done on environmental issues. The Working Group on Global Mercury Assessment presented a report that led to a letter from the Conference to the United Nations Environment Programme sharing its findings and recommendations. Over the years, the Conference has submitted a number of resolutions to the federal governments. It urged repeal of Section 110 of the US *Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act* of 1996 that imposed new controls on foreigners on entry and exit at the US border. On the subject of acid rain, the conference also passed a resolution calling on “the US EPA to reconsider its revision [of the rules governing New Source Review under the Clean Air Act] and recommit to protecting the public health of all citizens” (NEG/ECP, 2003:1).

For all its initiatives, the Conference is not the rallying point that PNWER has become in the West. While cross-border co-operation is also increasing in the East, it does not display the same dynamic of the emergence of a cross-border region. But it is still more than what can be found in other regions along the border.

Still, cross-border co-operation is on the rise everywhere. In the Great Lakes region, Ontario and Quebec are associate members of the Council of Great Lakes Governors and of the Great Lakes Commission (although neither

organization has championed cross-regional co-operation much beyond concern for the environment). There are other regional initiatives like the International Association of Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Mayors that has its secretariat in Québec City, or the memoranda of understanding between Ontario and New York and Michigan. But so far, the region does not appear clearly as a working concept except, of course, for the Great Lakes system, which could become one major, but only one, dimension of a regional entity.

In the Prairies, regionalization is still in its infancy. There is co-operation between Manitoba and its neighbours on the management of the Red River Basin, for instance. That province also has a memorandum of understanding with Minnesota, and Saskatchewan has one with Montana, but this does not yet translate into a regional dynamic, despite the efforts of a few, mostly US, non-governmental organizations that try to promote the concept of Northern Great Plains. However, the lack of organizational structure did not prevent Manitoba from participating in a joint mission with US states in Northern Europe on the subject of energy diversification. On that occasion, Manitoba signed a memorandum of understanding with Iceland, and the ambassadors from Canada and the United States were present at the ceremony.

Lessons From Cross-Border Co-operation

The first overwhelming observation is almost tautological: the cross-border organizations’ priorities are in the regional dimensions of areas where provinces and states have jurisdictions (exclusive or shared). As organizations,

they rarely venture into issues that lack this characteristic. We only know of one example to the contrary, when the NEG/ECP passed a resolution on China on humanitarian grounds, related to the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

The situation is more complex when it comes to areas where the provinces and states have jurisdiction, but where the issues transcend the region (e.g., energy or the environment). For example, the PNWER has decided to study some technical aspects of the Kyoto Protocol. However, in areas of shared jurisdiction or shared interests, the organizations have usually worked closely with federal authorities, which is often the case in agriculture, transportation, border security, or the environment. That collaboration does not preclude regional lobbying, which is one *raison d’être* of these organizations. Yet there is always the possibility that regional viewpoints will trump national priorities, as in the case of acid rain with the NEG/ECP.

Second, provinces and states learn from one another. Recently, at a PNWER meeting, representatives of US states passed a resolution calling for better briefing from their federal government on questions of trade negotiations. They encouraged “State Legislators to review Alberta’s International Trade Agreement Implementation Act to determine if it might be applicable in US jurisdictions” (PNWER, 2003:1).

Third, this cross-border co-operation always strives to improve relations between neighbours. Exchange of information is one avenue to that end. But more and more mechanisms have been established to avoid and resolve eventual disputes. The NEG/ECP has

established such a mechanism; the PNWER is implementing its own; and the Alberta-Montana memorandum of understanding contains one. This does not always prevent disputes, even local ones, as when Abbotsford, British Columbia, was able to prevent the building of power lines that Suma, Washington, was requesting. In that example at least, the decision of a higher jurisdiction – the National Energy Board – made the difference (Hume, 2004:1).

concerned by this new regional and cross-border phenomenon.

The two trends that we identified – fragmentation of international relations along sectoral lines and regional restructuring – cannot be ignored. They are now an integral part of Canada-US relations, and they do not show any sign of abating.

As far as regional cross-border co-operation is concerned, it seems to benefit local actors through better

Cross-border co-operation is on the rise everywhere.

Fourth, co-operation between cross-border partners can lead to common initiatives toward third parties (e.g., the mission Manitoba shared with US states in Europe). However, so far, there have not been that many examples of such joint initiatives. The support by US states of Vancouver's Olympic candidacy is of that nature, and so are a few initiatives, especially in tourism for instance, intended to market New England and the Maritimes in Europe, or the Northwest region in Europe and Asia.

Policy Implications for the Government of Canada

This presentation of a new dynamic in relations between Canada and the United States is, given the complexity of the phenomenon, necessarily brief. It is risky at this stage to draw definite conclusions. Yet, we can share some preliminary propositions, subject to further testing.

In particular, we can start addressing the all-important question of whether the Government of Canada should be

understanding and the pooling of common interests. In that way, it is positive for all as it furthers global co-operation between Canada and the United States.

Until now, regional organizations have been largely respectful of their jurisdictional limitations, and they have usually acted as regional relays of national policies. Hence, they should be seen as opportunities in the overall relationship with the United States.

In North America as in Europe, cross-border co-operation is "highly context-sensitive, conditioned by degrees of regional self-awareness, local identities [and] ideological discourses" (Scott, 1999:606), but these are all normal ingredients in a federation. Cross-border co-operation adds a new context to federal-provincial relations, but the heart of the matter remains the same. Not all regions or provinces engage in cross-border co-operation in the same way or to the same extent, and the Government of Canada should integrate these differences in its approach to Canada-US relations.

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Note

- 1 This article is derived from a continuing study. The first part of the analysis, mostly structural, is completed. The conclusions of the present article are based on that work. The next part of the analysis, more functional, will shed more light, from a different angle, on these regional dynamics. Part one of the study, *A Typology of the Canada/US Relationships*, is available on request.

Economic Integration and Cross-Border Policy Convergence Social and Environmental Policy in Canadian Provinces and American States

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There is now increasing scepticism among observers that deepening continental economic integration is generating policy convergence between Canada and the United States (Hoberg, 2002). Yet, there are several reasons to suspect that cross-border policy convergence would emerge earlier and more forcefully at the provincial rather than at the national or federal level. In fact, examining patterns of cross-border policy similarity and difference between Canadian provinces and American states – especially in the social and environmental policy fields – may well be a better test of the linkage between economic integration and policy convergence than national-level comparisons.

Our research examines the hypothesis that policy convergence over time will be greater among specific pairs of tightly linked American states and Canadian provinces than is evident in national-level comparisons. We have developed a methodology for identifying these tightly linked pairs, based on various measures of geographical proximity and state-province economic integration. We focus on specific aspects of social policy (levels of social protection and income redistribution) and environmental policy (pollution abatement and control) as these are fields where there has been considerable concern regarding the convergent effects of continental economic integration.

We have found that, in the areas of income redistribution and social protection, as well as expenditures on environmental protection, national patterns of convergence and divergence are not fundamentally challenged by sub-national patterns. At

the same time, patterns of similarity and difference over time for various subsets of matching state and province pairs generally differ in degree, if not in direction, from national-level patterns. However, after 1995, there are some indications of a pattern that fits with the contention that convergence may be occurring at the state-province level, which is not evident in national-level patterns.

Sub-National Governments, Continental Economic Integration, and Policy Convergence

While national-level studies are important in terms of furthering our understanding of the relationship between economic integration and domestic policy autonomy, it also is critical to examine this relationship at the sub-national level. This is one of the crucial implications of the decentralizing tendencies associated with globalization. As economic power shifts upward, sub-national governments and regions within countries may find it advantageous in terms of their distinctive economic requirements to “leapfrog their national governments and tie themselves to overarching structures” (Courchene, 1998: 272-273). In the likely situation that some sub-national governments are more economically integrated into international markets than others, these governments may demand more policy-making room to respond to integrating effects and trends. This line of reasoning implies that the policy independence of sub-national units, such as Canadian provinces and American states, will continue to grow as globalization and economic integration proceed.

Indeed, provinces already control some of the most important policy levers for adjusting to increasing economic integration and competitive pressures. Decentralization of the Canadian federation, driven in part by the politics of Quebec nationalism as well as the dynamics of economic integration and globalization described above, have reinforced provincial policy dominance. Second, provinces have distinct economic structures and trading patterns requiring unique policy adjustment, and provincial governments are, arguably, more sensitive than the federal government to the pressures generated by cross-border economic integration and competition. Thus, according to Courchene (1998: 289-291), provinces will increasingly tailor their public policies to the patterns prevailing in the states with which they are integrating and/or competing.

Moreover, regions of Canada are economically integrating not with some amorphous mass called the United States but, rather, with particular American regions and states. Thus, it is crucial to recognize the significance of the American states in various fields of public policy, and the degree to which this significance has been increasing over time. The states have become increasingly important actors in terms of public policy provision, both as a result of the “devolution revolution” and the fact that the 1990s were good years for state coffers. State governments had the resources to improve their policy capacity, take on new responsibilities, and, in many cases, innovate. Thus, examining cross-border policy similarity and difference at the sub-national level may well be a better test of the linkage between

economic integration and policy convergence than national-level comparisons.

Convergent effects of cross-border economic integration at the sub-national level, to the extent that they exist, should be evident in social and environmental policy. First, both ought to be particularly sensitive indicators of Canada-US policy convergence since they are seen to be key elements in determining competitive advantage.

Regions of Canada are economically integrating not with some amorphous mass called the United States but, rather, with particular American regions and states.

Second, social policy and environmental policy have become standard focuses in national-level analyses, and they are obvious candidates for an alternative approach complementing these national-level analyses. Finally, these two areas have been central to those concerned about the convergent effects of economic integration.

Identifying Cross-Border, State-Province Pairs

Identifying which pairs or sub-groups of states and provinces to examine for policy convergence depends on the suspected causes of convergence. If the suspected cause is cultural interpenetration or cross-border spillovers (as in the case of trans-jurisdictional pollution), considering neighbouring states and provinces may be most appropriate. If economic integration is the suspected cause of policy convergence, examination of provinces paired with those states with which they have the strongest economic ties (e.g., highest levels of trade) may be best. If policy

adjustment in reaction to direct competition is suspected, policy comparisons between provinces and their top competitor states might be considered. As outlined below, the criteria determining the province-state pairs to be compared include the following.

- **Geographic Proximity:** *Contiguous Provinces/States* match provinces and states that share a physical border and/or direct travel routes, and generates 16 cross-border

pairs, while *Nearby Provinces/States* matches provinces with states that are nearer than the nearest Canadian province, which generates an additional 20 state-province pairs. Our *Proximity Index*, which incorporates both distance and population size (population/distance²), is used to include state-province pairs, which have a higher than the average proximity index (average of the top-five proximity index pairs for each of the 10 provinces) and generates 14 pairs – four of which are not captured in either of the two other criteria outlined above.

- **Economic Integration/Competition:** *Economic Integration* matches states and provinces based on an index of provincial merchandise trade to individual American states, measured as a proportion of provincial GDP, and includes the top ranking state for each province, as well as second ranking states in those cases where it is above the overall average for top ranking states. *Competition* matches provinces to those

states viewed as top competitors in attracting trade and capital investment.² *Benchmarking* matches provinces with those jurisdictions used as primary benchmarks against which they position themselves in a competitive economic market.

Combining these criteria for pairing states and provinces generates 49 state-province pairs (out of a possible 500 pairs) based on pairing the Canadian provinces with a total of 21 different states (See Table A). Each set of state-province pairs thus generated may be compared to each other, to pairings of all states and provinces, and to pairings of Canadian provinces to see if cross-border similarity is higher among any of these subsets and whether convergence within any is more marked.

Empirical Comparisons

Social Protection and Income Redistribution

Our comparisons examine differences and similarities in the net impact of both taxes and transfers on the income distribution by focusing on share gains (the difference in the proportion of final income going to a particular income group after taxes and transfers in comparison with that group's share of market income before

TABLE A:

Summary of Province-State Pairs

Newfoundland and Labrador				
Maine		•		•
Massachusetts		•		•
New York			•	•
Prince Edward Island				
Maine		•		•
Massachusetts		•		•
New York			•	•
New Jersey				•
Nova Scotia				
Maine	•	•		•
Massachusetts		•		•
Vermont		•	•	•
New York				•
North Carolina			•	
New Brunswick				
Maine	•	•		•
Massachusetts		•	•	•
Vermont		•		•
New York		•		•
Pennsylvania				•
Québec				
Maine	•	•		•
Massachusetts		•	•	•
New Hampshire	•	•		•
Vermont	•	•	•	•
New York	•	•	•	•
Pennsylvania		•		•
Ontario				
Michigan	•	•	•	•
Ohio		•	•	•
Pennsylvania		•	•	•
Vermont		•		•
New York	•		•	•
Minnesota	•			•
Illinois				•
Indiana				•
Manitoba				
Minnesota	•	•		•
Montana		•		•
North Dakota	•	•		•
South Dakota		•		•
Saskatchewan				
Minnesota		•		•
Montana	•	•		•
North Dakota	•	•		•
Illinois			•	•
Wisconsin				•
Alberta				
Montana	•	•		•
Oregon		•		•
Washington		•		•
New York			•	
British Columbia				
Idaho	•	•		•
Montana		•		•
Oregon		•	•	•
Washington	•	•	•	•
California				•

Economic Integration/Competition

- Economic Integration
- Competition
- Benchmarking

Geographical Proximity

- Contiguous Provinces/States
- Nearby Provinces/States
- Proximity Index

FIGURE 1

Average Difference in Income Share Gains for those in the Bottom Half of the Income Distribution, Between Various Matched Pairs of Provinces and States



taxes and transfers) for the bottom half of the income distribution, the bottom quintile, and the top quintile.


An examination of the average difference in share gains between matching pairs of all provinces, contiguous provinces, and all states matched with all provinces presents an overall picture of cross-provincial convergence. This is in comparison with continuing distinctiveness between states and provinces in the share gains of the bottom half of the income distribution and the top quintile (See Figure 1).

An examination of average difference in share gains for the bottom half of the income distribution between variously matched pairs of states and provinces reveals an overall pattern of slightly increasing differences over the entire period. A stark exception is *Contiguous States and Provinces*, where there is a striking pattern of convergence from 1980 to 1990, which reversed slightly in the 1990s. While the distinction between our measures of geographic proximity and economic integration/competition was not clear in 1980, the differences between matching pairs are consistently lower for our measures of geographic proximity than for our measures of economic integration/competition after 1990. A similar pattern is evident for comparisons examining the share gains of the bottom quintile.

A different pattern is evident for differences in the share reduction of the top quintile. Here, the overall pattern between state-province pairs is convergence (See Figure 2). While the degree of convergence over time and levels of difference at any given point in time vary among our various sets of matching pairs, there are no clear differences

FIGURE 2

Average Difference in Income Share Gains for those in the Top Quintile of the Income Distribution, Between Various Matched Pairs of Provinces and States




between geographically based pairs and those based on indicators of economic integration/competition. In contrast to patterns for the bottom half, by 2000, the two most similar sets of matched pairs were those based on *Economic Integration* and on our *Proximity Index* (taking into account both distance and population). Here too, the general pattern of convergence was more marked after 1995.

The evidence for these income categories generally seems to run contrary to the expected pattern generated by Courchene's analysis, by which differences between provinces should increase, while cross-border jurisdictions should become increasingly similar. Rather, the picture that emerges is a mirror image – cross-border differences have generally increased, while differences among provinces have generally decreased. There is somewhat more support for the expected pattern generated by Courchene's analysis after 1995. Differences among contiguous provinces began to grow rather than decline, as had been the pattern since 1980, although convergence among all provinces is still the pattern. Second, convergence in share reductions for the top quintile among state-province pairs became more marked after 1995.

Distinct patterns among the different income categories are precisely what one might expect if convergence is based on mobility between jurisdictions. For the top quintile (the group that is also likely to be the most mobile across jurisdictions), there is convergence both across provinces and across states and provinces after 1990. For the bottom half of the income distribution, where cross-border mobility is much more limited (both in comparison

FIGURE 3

Average Difference in Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditures, Between Various Matched Pairs of Provinces and States



to the cross-border mobility of the top quintile and in comparison to the cross-provincial mobility of the bottom half), there is a pattern of cross-provincial convergence and cross-border divergence.

Environmental Policy

Measurement of the effects of government intervention in environmental protection is notoriously difficult. Environmental outcome measures do not present a ready-made counterfactual (as in the case of income redistribution) by which one can clearly identify what the situation would have been in the absence of government intervention. Absolute outcome measures (such as air quality) are complicated by factors, such as geography, industrial concentration, and climate conditions, and are contaminated by factors, such as cross-border flows of pollutants. At the same time, output measures (expenditure, level of

enforcement, stringency of regulations) may be misleading, as they do not necessarily translate into higher levels of environmental protection. Recognizing these serious measurement challenges, comparing public expenditures on pollution abatement and control (PACE) provides some indication of the commitment of various jurisdictions to undertake environmental protection.

An examination of average differences in PACE between variously matched provinces and provinces/provinces reveals an initial pattern of divergence followed by convergence through the 1990s (see Figure 3). Most significantly, this figure illustrates that provinces are, on average, no more similar to each other as a group, or even to their neighbouring provinces, than they are in general to American states as a group. While this snapshot is in keeping with expectations generated by

Courchene's analysis, the dynamic aspect of this pattern is one of generalized convergence both among states and provinces, as well as among provinces themselves.

Examining our different sets of matching state-province pairs, all the pairings follow a similar pattern. With the exception of benchmark pairings, the differences between matching state-province pairs are consistently lower when paired according to geographic proximity than when paired according to our measures of Economic Integration/Competition. By 2000, average differences among Contiguous Province/State pairs (36.0%), as well as *Nearby Provinces/States* (37.5%), were significantly lower than the average differences among *All Provinces* (43.5%). They were even lower than the average differences among pairs of contiguous provinces (48.9%). In comparison, state-province pairs based on *Economic Integration* (52.4%), and those based on *Competition* (52.8%), are the least similar of any set of province or state-province pairs. These patterns seem to cast doubt on the argument that increased trade is the primary factor driving convergence.

Observations

Our initial research has attempted to gauge the degree to which analysis of cross-border patterns of policy convergence can provide leverage on the question of whether increasing economic integration leads to policy convergence. In the areas we have empirically examined, we make the following observations. First, national patterns of convergence and divergence do not appear to be fundamentally challenged by sub-national

patterns. However, there are interesting sub-national patterns that differ in degree, if not in direction, from national-level patterns, and we expect that these differences, when more fully described, should help provide increased analytical leverage on broader questions regarding convergence. Moreover, there is some evidence after 1995 supporting the contention that convergence may be occurring among sub-national, cross-border jurisdictions that is not as evident in national-level analyses. One example is share gains for the top quintile among proximate states and provinces (including distance and population size), as well as for high trading pairs after 1995. Similarly, in the 1990s, convergence among states and provinces in PACE is more marked among contiguous state-province pairs than among all states and provinces taken together.

This analysis suggests that extending our investigation to include additional indicators and aspects of policy outputs is necessary to see if similar patterns to those described above still hold. In addition, developing more detailed comparisons between specific cross-border matching pairs (e.g., British Columbia-Washington, Ontario-Michigan) would be useful. Finally, a more rigorous program of comparing and contrasting matching pairs with different characteristics (e.g., proximity, trade interdependence, etc.) is necessary to help untangle the causal relationships between factors, such as economic integration and policy convergence. Such investigation promises to enrich significantly the existing national-level studies examining cross-border policy influences.

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Notes

- 1 This research program has been funded by a Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada Standard Grant. The authors would like to thank Matt Walcott for his invaluable research assistance.
- 2 Provinces may also undertake policy adjustment in reaction to competitive pressures from American states in the absence of high levels of merchandise trade between the two jurisdictions. In order to get a sense of these competitive pressures, we undertook a written/telephone survey of officials dealing with economic development and chambers of commerce and/or business development councils in the ten provincial governments asking them to identify the American states relative to Canadian provinces which they view as their top competitors both in terms of trade and capital investment. In addition, we asked interviewees which states and/or provinces they used as primary benchmarks as another way of getting at which jurisdictions provinces were looking at as they positioned themselves in the economic environment.

The Evolving Industrial Diversity of Canadian Cities, 1992 to 2002

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Introduction

The study¹ from which this article is derived describes the industrial diversity of Canadian cities.² It asks how Canadian cities compare to each other in terms of their levels of diversity and how these levels evolved from 1992 to 2002. This is a period that covers a time of significant structural change in the Canadian economy – driven in part by trade liberalization, continental economic integration, and technological change – that may have impacted the industrial diversity of Canadian cities.

There are two primary reasons why policy makers see diversity as a positive characteristic of urban economies (Quigley, 1998). The first is that diverse economies are thought to be stable economies (Baldwin and Brown, 2003). One-industry towns are vulnerable to a downturn in their key industry, which can lead to high levels of unemployment and the out-migration of workers. Places with a wide spectrum of industries are better able to weather a slump in any one of their industries, because workers are more likely to find jobs quickly in other sectors. The second reason is that diverse economies are thought to be more dynamic. Diverse cities are places where new ideas are formed and most easily transferred across industries; this, in turn, promotes higher levels of growth (Jacobs, 1969; Glaeser et al., 1992; Glaeser 2000; Duranton, 2001).

Throughout this study, diversity is measured using an index that takes into account the number of industries in a city and how employment is shared across them. The larger the number of industries found in a city and/or the more even the distribution of employment across its industries,

the higher the index. For ease of exposition, the diversity of each city is measured relative to Toronto, whose diversity level is indexed to 100.

Diversity Across Canadian Cities

There is a high degree of variation in the level of diversity across Canada's urban regions. This is evident in Figure 1, which plots the level of diversity for each urban area against its population level. In 2002, Montréal was Canada's most diversified urban region with a diversity index value of 108. Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg follow closely behind Montréal. The least diverse (most specialized) urban centre was Kitimat, which was approximately one eighth as diverse as Montréal.

The wide variation in diversity levels across cities is not random. As Figure 1 illustrates, there is a strong positive relationship between diversity and population size. The places with the smallest populations tend to have the most specialized (or least diverse) economies. On the other hand, large urban centres have the most diverse economies.

Arguably, two factors link population size and diversity. First, population growth is driven, in part, by the addition of new industries and the jobs they bring. Second, as the population of a city increases, so does its local market allowing the city to support a wider variety of industries. Increased diversity is both a cause and an effect of rising population levels.

Figure 1 also shows us that the relationship between population and diversity is non-linear. For small urban centres (a population between 10,000

FIGURE 1

Industrial Diversity as a Function of Population, 2002




^aToronto 2002 = 100.

Source: Special Tabulation, Business Register and the Census, 1996.

FIGURE 2

Average Industrial Diversity by City Size, 1992 and 2002



and 100,000), an increase in population has a very strong positive effect on diversity. For larger urban centres, the relationship between diversity and size is much weaker.

The relatively weak relationship between population size and diversity for large cities likely results from fewer opportunities to add new industries. An increasing population in small cities results in the attraction of many new industries to serve the local market. But for larger centres, industries that rely on local markets to survive are already represented. The industries that are left are those found in relatively few places. These industries are more rare, because they require specific factor endowments (e.g., fish processing), or have strong scale economies (e.g., aircraft manufacturing), or rely on strong agglomeration economies (e.g., financial services). Consequently, there is relatively little opportunity to diversify the economies of large urban areas.

Diversity Over Time

In addition to affecting the levels of industrial diversity, city size is also related to changes in diversity over time (see Figure 2). Large cities classified as having a population greater than 500,000, tended to become less diverse (more specialized) through the 1990s and early 2000s.³ On the other hand, small (10,000 to 99,000 population) and medium (100,000 to 499,000 population) cities became more diversified over the same period (see Figure 2). Although these changes are relatively small, reflecting the slow pace of urban structural change, they do point to the dispersion of industries toward smaller urban centres.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to test hypotheses as to the sources of these trends in diversification. However, it is possible to place them in the context of two of the structural forces driving change within the Canadian economy over the past decade: trade liberalization and technological change. Theoretically, increased trade should result in less diverse urban economies as they specialize in industries that have a comparative advantage in world markets. The increasing specialization of large cities is consistent with the effects of trade liberalization, but the increasing diversity of small- and medium-size cities is not. The latter trend, however, may be the result of falling transportation and communication costs driven by investments in new information and communication technology. These falling costs may have created an incentive for industry to locate in smaller cities and rural areas to take advantage of lower wages (Kilkenny, 1998).

Conclusion

The level of diversity across Canada's urban landscape varies widely. This suggests the economic stability of urban economies and their potential for growth may vary as well.

The analysis also demonstrates that diversity levels are related closely to the population of an urban area. The smallest urban areas are the least diverse, and the largest urban areas are the most diverse. But very high levels of diversity are not limited to cities whose populations are counted in

the millions. Cities with populations around 100,000 often have levels of diversity similar to those found in much larger urban centres.

Over the study period, Canada's economy has become more integrated into world markets and has undergone significant technological change associated with the information technology revolution. Integration into world markets is associated with a decrease in the diversity of large Canadian cities, while the growing dispersion of economic activity toward medium-size and smaller urban centres may be driven by the implementation of new technologies that have reduced transportation and communication costs.

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Notes

- 1 A longer version of this paper that provides a more detailed analysis of the diversity of Canadian cities and a description of the data and methods used is available from Statistics Canada. (Beckstead, D. and M. Brown. 2003. *From Labrador City to Toronto: The Industrial Diversity of Canadian Cities, 1992-2002*. Insights on the Canadian Economy 11-624-MIE2003003. Analytical Studies Branch, Statistics Canada.
- 2 Cities are defined as census metropolitan areas (CMAs) and census agglomerations (CAs).
- 3 This difference is, however, not statistically significant. Nevertheless, this finding is consistent with the declining diversity of manufacturing in the cores of larger cities (greater than one million) over a much longer period.

How Does International Trade Affect Business Cycle Synchronization in North America?

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This article investigates whether increased regional trade between the two countries has led to a pronounced increase in the correlation of simultaneity of economic activity between Canada and the United States.

Since the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) came into effect in 1989, the Canadian economy has become more integrated into the US economy. A few numbers put this into perspective. Canada's trade in goods and services with the United States doubled as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP), from an average of 30% in the 1970s to more than 60% in the late 1990s, with much of the rise coming after the FTA in 1989. At the regional level, all Canadian provinces dramatically expanded their exports bound for the United States. Exports to the United States as a percent of GDP doubled from 18.6% to 37.6% between 1989 and 2002, while east-west or interprovincial exports fell from 22.5% of GDP to 19.7%. Closer economic ties between Canada and the United States have raised the question of whether the increased economic integration between the two countries has led to greater synchronization of business cycles or greater co-movement of GDP between the two countries.

The notion of business cycles becoming increasingly synchronized across countries has important implications for the making of national economic policies ranging from broader trade and macro-economic policy coordination to establishing a new trade or monetary arrangement. Indeed, business cycle synchronization is an important element of the optimal currency area (OCA) literature, playing a critical role in determining the cost of

putting institutional limits on an independent monetary policy. As such, analysis of this issue has received much attention in recent years, because of its high relevance to the European Economic and Monetary Union and to ongoing North American economic integration.

Have the Correlations Changed?

Business cycle synchronization across countries refers to the timing and magnitude of major changes in economic activities appearing increasingly similar. There are two main approaches to measure the synchronization of business cycles (IMF, 2001, 2002). One is the concordance correlation, which calculates the number of periods during which national cycles are in the same phase. The other is the output correlation that measures the similarities in the timing and magnitude of output changes. According to the latter measure, national business cycles are synchronized, if they are positively and significantly correlated with each other. The higher the positive correlations, the more synchronized are the cycles. The output correlation has been the most frequently used measure, and will be the main instrument used in this article.

Figure 1 shows the changes in Canadian and US real GDP from 1950 to 1999.² The GDP figures are "de-trended" to focus on business cycle fluctuations. A quick visual examination of this graph demonstrates that, from the 1950s to the 1970s, the changes in Canadian real GDP consistently lagged behind those of the United States by one year. The delayed response of the Canadian economy to changes in economic activity south of the border implied that Canadian

policy makers did not have to react to or anticipate policy changes in the United States immediately; they could maintain their policy course until the US business cycles started to affect the Canadian economy a year later. From 1980 onward, however, a new trend emerged that saw the timing of business cycles between the two countries become increasingly similar; the Canadian economy fluctuated almost concurrently with that of the United States, though the magnitude of such changes in the two countries remained substantially different. To measure this observation, we constructed a concordance index over two sub-periods: before 1980 and after 1980.³ Our calculations showed that the number of years during which Canada and the United States were in the same phase of business cycles, as a fraction of the total number of years, increased from 0.8 from 1951 to 1979, to 0.85 from 1980 to 1999.

Figure 2 introduces the second measure of business cycle synchronization – the correlation coefficients between changes in the US real GDP and that of Canada over the two sub-periods. Real GDP data are calculated using the two different price indexes: the chained-price and constant-price indexes. In both cases, the results support the conclusion of a secular increase in business cycle synchronization between the two countries during the last half century. During the first sub-period (1950 to 1979), the estimated correlation coefficients were 0.586 for the chained-price data and 0.699 for the constant-price data. However, the correlations were considerably higher in the second sub-period (1980 to 1999), rising to 0.873 and 0.856, respectively.

FIGURE 1

Growth of Canadian and US GDP




FIGURE 2

Correlation of Changes in Real GDP Between Canada and the United States, 1950 to 1999



As noted above, increased economic integration between Canada and the United States has an important regional dimension, reflecting the rapid expansion of Canada-US regional (province-state) trade. Complicating this matter is the decline in the relative importance of the traditional east-west trading relationship or interprovincial trade relative to north-south trade. To understand the full implications of this change to business cycle synchronization, we have to resort to the provincial data displayed in Table 1, which reports the correlations in changes in real regional GDP among Canadian and United States regions. Several trends stand out, and each is discussed below.

First, between Canadian regions, Ontario's economic activities were highly correlated with its neighbour province, Quebec, with the estimated correlation coefficient equal to 0.926, the highest level of correlations among all Canadian regions. But, as one moves west along the east-west axis, weaker correlations were detected. For instance, the estimated correlation

coefficient between Ontario and the Prairies was reduced to 0.48, and that between Ontario and British Columbia was 0.512. It is interesting to note that Quebec maintained reasonably high levels of correlations with all Canadian regions (all above 0.5).

A drastically different picture emerged with the correlations between the regions located at the two extremes of Canada's geo-economic space: the Atlantic and Prairie regions, and the Atlantic region and British Columbia. The estimated correlation coefficients for these two pairs of regions came to -0.085 and 0.074, respectively. Such low levels of correlations – almost like two completely detached economies – was a surprising fact, given that there existed a single monetary policy imposed on all Canadian regions, as well as free labour mobility between regions. These factors allowed for alleviation of differences in regional business cycles, in addition to the numerous social, economic, and infrastructure policy initiatives in place to promote Canada's social and economic unity.

Second, between Canadian and US regions, both Ontario and Quebec reported higher levels of correlations with all US regions than with the rest of Canada, except between these two regions themselves, and between Ontario and the Atlantic region. As expected, changes in economic activities in the Atlantic region were more correlated with that in the US Northeast than with that in many parts of Canada, including Quebec. Similarly, business cycles in the Canadian Prairie region were more likely aligned with those in the US Midwest and South than with the rest of Canada. The exception was British Columbia. It had relatively weak correlations with all US regions (coefficients in the range between 0.359 and 0.48, with the US Midwest showing a marginally higher coefficient), while it maintained relatively high correlations with other Canadian regions, particularly with the Prairies and Quebec. British Columbia's extensive links to other Pacific Rim regions might be a major factor responsible for this trend.

TABLE 1:

Correlations of Change in Real GDP Between Canadian and US Regions, 1981 to 1999⁴

		CANADIAN REGIONS					US REGIONS			
		Atlantic	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	BC & North	Midwest	Northeast	Northwest	South
CANADIAN REGIONS	Atlantic	1								
	Quebec	0.539	1							
	Ontario	0.698	0.926	1						
	Prairies	-0.085	0.530	0.480	1					
	BC & North	0.074	0.642	0.512	0.640	1				
US REGIONS	Midwest	0.274	0.736	0.771	0.630	0.486	1			
	Northeast	0.597	0.691	0.753	0.288	0.359	0.648	1		
	Northwest	0.460	0.725	0.764	0.475	0.459	0.645	0.737	1	
	South	0.262	0.670	0.725	0.649	0.451	0.843	0.638	0.787	1

TABLE 2

Average Correlations of Change in Real GDP Between Canadian and US Regions, 1981 to 1999⁵

	HP-Filter	Differencing	Linear Time Trend
Amongst Canadian regions	0.565	0.496	0.471
Amongst US regions	0.739	0.716	0.681
Between Canadian and US regions	0.650	0.561	0.596

Third, on average, the US regions appeared more correlated to each other than did Canadian regions to them, while Canadian regions were more correlated with the US regions than between themselves. These results are consistent with all calculations based on three different “de-trend” methods (see Table 2).

The results reported above seem at odds with the recent empirical findings in the “border-effects” literature, which claim that after correcting for population sizes and distances, Canada’s internal (interprovincial) trade is many times larger than its cross-border trade (i.e., Canada’s national economy is more integrated than are the several regional cross-border economies). The border effect between Canada and the United States has been substantially reduced following the FTA, but has remained significant. Accordingly, national policies aimed at promoting a nation’s own cultural identity, values, institutions, and rules are bound to create a “home bias,” which is expected to lead to a lower level of international trade than otherwise would be the case.

Our understanding of this issue is that the border effect does exist and is significant. That said, we have learned from the above analysis that, in terms

of dynamism and correlation of changes in business cycles, the Canadian economy has increasingly integrated itself into the US economy. The question of which factors might be expected to increase the synchronization of business cycles between the two countries is the subject of the next section.

Why Has the Situation Changed?

Fluctuations in growth in any economy may arise, because of shocks to economic growth due to changes in factors such as economic policy, business investment spending, consumption and savings decisions, as well as productivity of labour and capital. Shocks can be transmitted to other countries through various economic and structural linkages, such as international trade and investment, financial markets, and technological spillover as conventionally understood, or through various policy and institutional linkages, such as labour mobility, a common approach to monetary policy, and exchange rate policy co-ordination. In other words, business cycle synchronization could be a consequence of intentional application of the optimal currency area criterion by countries.

By way of illustration, some countries tend to link their currencies deliberately to those of their most important trading partners to capture gains associated with greater exchange rate stability. Similarly, a common approach to monetary policy by monetary authorities could also have a positive impact on correlations of business cycles. This finding motivated Frankel and Rose (1998) to state that countries that are *ex ante* poor candidates to enter a monetary union could satisfy the criteria *ex post*, because entry to the currency union per se may provide an additional impulse for trade expansion. This, in turn, may result in higher business cycle correlations.

The standard argument about why a rise in international trade would increase the correlation in economic activities between countries is straightforward: the expansion of international trade increases the magnitude of the transmission of shocks between countries. In reality, the impact of trade integration on business cycle correlations could go either way. On the one hand, openness to trade could lead to increasing specialization in production following each country’s comparative advantage relative to its trading partners, leading to inter-industry trade. If different types of production are subject to different kinds of shocks, higher trade integration by bringing about deeper specialization could lead to decreasing business cycle correlations (Krugman, 1993). On the other hand, if patterns of specialization in production and trade occur mainly within the industries subject to common shocks, specialization could have a synchronizing effect on the business cycles. In particular, production fragmentation and

resulting intensive “back-and-forth” intra-industry trade could significantly increase the similarity in the timing of business cycles between countries.

Empirical Estimation

The principal challenge to the empirical investigation of the effect of trade integration on business cycle synchronization is to isolate the effect of trade integration from that of other transmissions in shaping business cycle synchronization between countries.

In one of the most significant papers in their area in recent years, Frankel and Rose (1998) offered evidence that in the period from 1959 to 1993, OECD countries with closer trade links tended to have more tightly correlated business cycles.⁶ Their regression results show that increasing trade intensity by one standard deviation increases the bilateral business cycle correlation by 0.13.

The paper from which the present article is derived attempts to refine Frankel and Rose’s approach by using Canadian and US regional data, and by including intra-industry trade data in the regression analysis. The advantages of our refinements and adaptations are twofold.

- The regional data offer a better isolation of the effect of trade integration, because they focus exclusively on the structural aspect of transmissions (as opposed to also having to consider, e.g., policy differences between countries as in Frankel and Rose).
- The inclusion of intra-industry trade data provides a unique environment to test whether the changes in the structure of trade – rising

intra-industry trade between Canada and the United States – has been the key factor responsible for the increasing synchronization of business cycles between the two countries.⁷

Our estimates are broadly consistent with, and close to, those found in Frankel and Rose. Increased trade integration between regions is estimated to have significant and positive effects on the synchronization of regional business cycles between Canadian and US regions. This is because trade between Canadian and US regions is, in large part, dominated by the effects of intra-industry trade, which makes the regions more interdependent.

Conclusion

Despite the adaptations that we made, our results suggest that Frankel and Rose’s general conclusions hold. Increasing trade intensity between Canada and the United States has resulted in a greater synchronization of business cycles between the two countries.

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Notes

- 1 The views in this paper are those of the authors and are not to be attributed to International Trade Canada or the Government of Canada.

- 2 The GDP figures are expressed in local currency, and constant 1997 or chained-prices. The GDP numbers are transformed in the following way: first, we take natural logarithms of GDP so the resulting variable can be interpreted as a growth rate. Second, we de-trend the variable using the well-known Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter (using the traditional smoothing parameter of 1,600).
- 3 The concordance index calculates the number of periods during which national cycles are in the same phase as a fraction of the total number of periods in the sample. If two cycles are perfectly synchronized, in the sense of being in the same state, the concordance correlation coefficient is 1. If the two cycles are uncorrelated, the correlation is 0.
- 4 The GDP figures in this table are de-trended by using the HP-filter.
- 5 We employ three different procedures. We de-trend the variables: by using the HP filter, by calculating the first-difference of the variables, multiplying by 100, and by examining the residual from a regression of the variable on a linear time trend.
- 6 Frankel and Rose used both ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV), but advocated the IV approach, on the premise that a common approach to monetary policy or the fixed exchange rate might cause a spurious correlation between trade integration and business cycle synchronization. They used the distance and adjacency and language dummies as instruments, based on the success of these variables in explaining trade and the presumption that they are exogenously determined and otherwise unrelated to business cycles.
- 7 The authors use instrumental variables to estimate the coefficients of trade intensity (as do Frankel and Rose). Three exogenous variables are selected: distances, regional populations, and tariff reductions between Canada and the United States.

Globalization and Well-Being: The Border Effect, the Role of the Nation-State, and Canada-US Economic Relations

John Helliwell
(UBC Press, 2002)

Commentary by
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Introduction

There is an ongoing debate in the Canadian policy community about the importance of the Canada-US border as a barrier to trade and other economic transactions, and the extent to which the "border effect" could shield the policy process in Canada from global and North American developments.

The publication of *Globalization and Well-Being* by John Helliwell, which won the 2002-03 Donner Prize for best book in Canadian public policy, is a key contribution to this debate. Simply put, Helliwell advances the following explanation for the border effect, and the corresponding shielding effect on domestic policy making.

- The case for national autonomy in the face of globalization has been underestimated, with geography and borders mattering far more than is generally assumed.
- It is cheaper and easier to operate within networks of shared norms and trust, and the density of such networks declines with distance, especially as one crosses national borders; hence, differences in network densities might explain differences in trade and other economic transactions across borders.
- Individual well-being is driven far less by material wealth than prevailing rhetoric and some policy directions would suggest; health and education, for example, have stronger direct and indirect effects on well-being, and also generate strong positive externalities.
- Retaining and advancing domestically determined policy, particularly social policy, remains feasible

given the continuing large degree of separateness of the economies and societies of countries.

- The importance of the social and institutional fabric of a society provides much more scope to policy makers to develop policies based primarily on domestic preferences and less on pressures arising from the international and, for Canada, North American environments.

The richness of Helliwell's contribution, which links trade, values, social capital, economic development, and well-being, is a tribute to the knowledge and intellectual capacity of the author, particularly given the complexity of these issues.

However, it can be argued that, given the uncertainty regarding the measure, evolution, and sheltering role of the border effect, Canadian policy makers cannot assume that the border effect allows Canadian governments to promote policies that reflect strictly domestic values and preferences, without judicious consideration of international, particularly North American, developments.

The Origins of the Border Effect

To shed some light on this critical policy debate, it is essential to examine the theoretical underpinnings and empirical evidence supporting the concept of border effect.

A basic tenet in international economics is that distance and size matter in shaping the volume of bilateral trade between nations. Similar to the gravity equation used in physics, the gravity model assumes that trade flows are largely determined

by physical distance and economic size. Size is represented by real gross domestic product (GDP), and distance captures transaction costs, particularly transportation costs.

A seminal finding by John McCallum (1995) is that, in addition to the impact of distance, national borders reduce trade by more than what would have been expected on the basis of tariff protection and other formal trade barriers. McCallum examined interprovincial and province-state trade, and the magnitude of the border effect with the United States, and concluded that trade between two provinces was more than 20 times more intense than trade between a province and a state. In other words, given bilateral distance and the relative size of regions, intra-national trade was more than 20 times more intense than international trade.

The release of this paper created a shock wave in the economic research community, since it was widely expected that the extent of economic linkages between Canada and the United States would be much higher in light of the low formal trade barriers, the significant reduction in transportation and communication costs, and the intensity of economic and social networks linking the two countries. The border effect was considered a challenge to conventional economic wisdom.

Explaining this paradox remains an important component of the research agenda as the estimated border effects in the literature represent a direct challenge to the widespread view about the level of economic integration between trading nations, more specifically, between Canada and the United States.

Revisiting the Border Effect

Several studies inspired by McCallum's work replicated the exercise for other countries and other periods, for example, Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1998). In some cases, the effect was found to be surprisingly large.

However, research refinements and the use of post-Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and post-North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) data, which were not available at the time of McCallum's initial research, revealed a rapid decline in the estimates of border effect.

Refining McCallum's methodology and using the new data, Helliwell estimated that the rapid increase in north-south trade observed after the implementation of the FTA reduced the border effect from 17 in 1981 to about 12 in 1996, with most of the decrease occurring prior to 1994. Helliwell also estimated the border effect for service industries to be a lot higher than for goods with a ratio ranging from 29 to 42 for the 1988 to 1996 period.

Several broad answers have since been suggested outside the context of the gravity models to explain the persistence of the border effect. One explanation is that economists have consistently underestimated the role of less quantifiable cross-border costs, such as currency risks and non-tariff barriers. They may have also ignored important social factors, such as historical ties, social and cultural affinities, and common languages as additional explanations to the gravity-adjusted bilateral trade patterns. This is essentially the hypothesis put forward by Helliwell.

A second explanation is firm location: even when border-related trade costs are small, firms will choose to avoid them altogether by locating within the same national boundaries as the bulk of their customers and suppliers, therefore reducing the need for cross-border trade. This latter explanation is particularly important for the Canada-US relationship given the relative size difference between the two countries and the importance of scale economies.

Research using more sophisticated gravity models and newly available data on interstate and province-state trade has also shed new light on the border effect puzzle. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) derived a border effect equation from a theoretical model of multilateral trade and demonstrated that the simpler, non-theoretical approach used by McCallum and others is biased. Their comparable estimate of the border effect was 10.7.

Anderson and van Wincoop's key explanation was that the US economy is much larger and more diversified than the Canadian economy, and US states have more trade opportunities than Canadian provinces. This implies that modest trade barriers between the two countries generate a substantial border effect for Canadian provinces, but have limited impact on the trade opportunities faced by US states. Anderson and van Wincoop referred to this phenomenon as multilateral resistance.

In addition to non-tariff barriers, social factors, size effects, and multilateral resistance, Coulombe (2002) showed that geography and economic density are also essential to understand the border effect. Canadian provinces are, on average, further from their poten-

tial trading partners than US states, and their potential trading partners have less economic density. In that sense, borders do matter, but it seems much more for a small country – from an economic standpoint – than for a big one.

Promising directions for research point to the influence of industrial and spatial structure in North American regional trade, in particular the level of specialization of Canadian regional economies and the role of industrial clusters. Brown (2003) and Coulombe (2003) have already introduced such determinant factors by showing that international trade of Canadian regional economies appears to complement interprovincial trade, rather than substitute for it as was commonly believed.

As Coulombe (2003:13) pointed out, “the expansion of north-south trade increased the degree of specialization of Canadian regional economies. Given the core-periphery structure of the Canadian economy, this might stimulate trade between the periphery and the core provinces, especially for intermediate goods and primary products.”

The academic debate generated by McCallum and Helliwell on the border effect has helped demystify the dynamics of cross-border trade between Canada and the United States. But the debate also shows that while the gravity model is appealing for its simplicity, it has its limits, and further research is required to guide the policy process.

Policy Ramifications

The border effect debate has implications that go far beyond the purely academic dimension. For policy

prescription, the existence of a border effect can be interpreted in two ways. First, the border effect can be viewed as a shield that provides Canada with some policy discretion. Using McCallum and Helliwell’s results, some have downplayed the importance of securing North American economic linkages, and perhaps have become complacent about some policy challenges. As Helliwell wrote in *Globalization and Well-Being* (2003:19): “The McCallum result suggests strongly that national economies have a much tighter internal structure than was previously thought and, hence, that the extent of globalization is much less than is commonly supposed”.

At the same time, however, the persistence of the border effect suggests that Canada can generate further trade and economic gains by reducing the remaining resistance to Canada-US bilateral trade and economic linkages. Indeed, one can argue that there are still some substantial gains to be harvested from the elimination of the remaining trade barriers. A key argument here is that estimates of the border effect for US interstate trade and for the internal trade of the European Union are much lower (i.e., about 1.6), suggesting that the Canada-US border effect could fall substantially. Indeed, Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) estimated that the elimination of the remaining trade barriers between Canada and the United States could increase Canada-US trade by 44%. Coulombe (2002), extrapolating from their analysis, showed that eliminating trade barriers between Canada and the United States could generate a 25% increase in Canada-US cross-border trade.

This prognostic is supported by both the brief survey of research presented above and the evolving nature of the North American economic space, which indicate that:

- estimates of the border effect can be very sensitive to basic assumptions, estimation methods, and the benchmark used; and
- the border effect is still significant, but has declined substantially with trade liberalization measures such as the FTA and NAFTA.

There is widespread agreement that several factors, such as the absence of a single currency, the existence of non-tariff barriers, the role of local networks, shared values and identity, and social capital, support the maintenance of a border effect. However, the remaining uncertainty regarding the size, future direction, and the regional differences of the border effect warrants further research.

Implications for Canada’s Economic and Trade Policies

In *Globalization and Well-Being*, Helliwell argues that Canada should rely primarily on a multilateral trade approach, while reducing Canada’s reliance on its bilateral linkages with the United States. His reasoning is largely based on the assumption that any intensification of the Canada-US economic relationship would jeopardize Canada’s ability to pursue independent economic and social policies, and on the assumption that stronger economic growth is projected outside the North American continent.

However, the evolution of the Canada-US economic relationship over the past 15 years does not support this contention. Canada has been able to continue to provide education, health,

and social policies that are tailored on domestic preferences. The experience of the European Union is also proof that countries can maintain independent social policies even as economic integration proceeds. Hence, the concern that Canada will lose its policy independence should economic integration with the United States proceed further is not supported by evidence. In most cases, policy convergence is due to the existence of similar social trends and pressures bearing on public policies (e.g., aging, innovation, and taxes).¹ If anything, the design and delivery of social policies seem to have diverged under NAFTA, and the same is true of many areas of social policy in the European Union.

In addition, while it is expected that economic growth will be faster in some regions of the world than in the United States in forthcoming decades, because of an upward convergence phenomenon, the United States will remain the most convenient and attractive market for Canadian business to target. As such, it is crucial to maximize the fluidity of Canada's economic linkages with the United States through policy initiatives that will reduce remaining obstacles to trade and investment, including regulatory differences, rules of origin, and impediments to factor mobility.

It needs not be an either/or choice. Canada should seek advantageous trading opportunities by adopting a multi-pronged strategy aimed at maximizing economic opportunities with both the United States and the rest of the world. In recent years, the US economy has been the engine of growth of the world economy and Canada, because of its proximity, historical linkages, and increasing

openness, has witnessed unprecedented growth in its trade with the United States. Should economic growth outside North America be more robust in the future, a similar pattern would emerge as Canadian firms capitalize on strong economic growth abroad. Moreover, Canadian firms should use their access to the North American market as an opportunity to become more competitive and as a springboard to third country markets. Hence, Canada should adopt policy options that will keep opportunities on both fronts – United States and abroad – open.

Most of us agree with the thrust of Helliwell's argument that the economic separation of nation-states, as evidenced by the border effect, will continue to allow governments to develop education, health, social, and other policies that reflect, and should reflect, primarily domestic preferences. At the same time, however, it is important for governments to pursue policy initiatives that create trade and economic opportunities, which in turn contribute to the well-being of the general populace.

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Note

- 1 This was a key conclusion at a workshop organized by Industry Canada and Human Resources Development Canada, Social and Labour Aspects of North American Linkages, held in Montréal on November 20-22, 2002.

Expanding Regulatory Co-operation with the United States

A PRI-SSHRC Policy Research Roundtable

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Policy Research Initiative.

It has long been recognized that there is merit in expanding regulatory co-operation with our largest trading partner, the United States. This is evidenced, in part, by the government's policies on regulation making, as well as the numerous agreements on regulatory co-operation and the vast network of informal collaboration between regulators in our two nations.

However, there is also mounting evidence that, to date, Canada-US regulatory co-operation has not been maximized, the costs of regulatory differences with the United States can be substantial, and the benefits for Canada of maintaining a separate regulatory system are, in some cases, questionable.

On February 13, 2004, the Policy Research Initiative (PRI) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) co-hosted a policy research roundtable to discuss the issue of enhanced regulatory co-operation between Canada and the United States. The roundtable brought together academic experts, government officials and stakeholders to share their research, insights, and suggestions.

The Policy Context

The roundtable began with a presentation on the underlying policy context for regulatory co-operation by Munir Sheikh, Associate Deputy Minister of Finance.

The Canadian policy for making regulations is already well articulated.¹ The overall objective is to maximize the well-being of Canadians, based on economic, social, and security objectives, while effectively managing the socio-economic trade-offs that can emerge. Sheikh argued that the development of the best possible regulations must

remain the goal and, in some cases, co-operation with US regulators can play an important role in achieving this goal. He used a number of examples to illustrate his points.

In the area of drug approvals, where access to safe, effective drugs is a common objective, Sheikh noted that Canada is slower than the United States in drug approvals, and is subject to a "small country" disadvantage (i.e., Canada must deal with essentially the same number of drug submissions as the United States, but with only one tenth of the regulatory resources). Therefore, Canada simply cannot afford a totally independent function, and must develop a highly efficient system.

Conversely, Sheikh pointed out that in the financial sector and business start-ups, Canada's regulatory approaches are more efficient than in the United States. In these instances, harmonization is not really an option worth pursuing.

Sheikh suggested that one model of "smart regulation" would involve benchmarking against US regulations as a starting point, and diverge when it is in Canada's interest to do so. Information about effectiveness of regulations should also be collected, coupled with international efforts to harmonize data requirements, application formats, risk assessment, and decision-making processes.

Why Focus on Regulatory Co-operation with the United States?

John Noble, Carleton University, presented the reasons why he felt Canada should focus its international regulatory cooperation efforts on the United States.² Noble noted that there is a

strong precedent for the expansion of Canada-US regulatory co-operation by highlighting that both Canadian government officials and private firms have developed vast networks with their US counterparts. These relationships form the foundation for further co-operation, as they ensure that Canadian interests are reflected in US choices, and that US priorities and decisions are factored into Canadian preferences.

In addition, there is already a high level of convergence between the goals and objectives of both regulatory systems. What requires attention is less a question of fundamental principles and design, and more a question of the details and approaches to implementation. Many of the regulatory reforms required to eliminate the minor differences between Canadian and American regulations could be done on a purely unilateral basis.

Noble closed his presentation by highlighting the need for strong political commitment to make further progress. He suggested that a new round of trade talks focusing on the ways in which NAFTA can be improved might be the only way to ensure that both countries focus the necessary attention on regulation and furthering regulatory co-operation.

What Is the Role of Regulatory Co-operation in Improving Productivity, Innovation, and R&D Investment?

The next presentation helped to frame the discussion within the broader context of how regulatory co-operation and co-ordinated approaches can help productivity, R&D, and innovation. John de la Mothe, University of Ottawa, put forth the idea that

knowledge is an international activity. There is no sovereignty over knowledge; it flows freely across borders, regardless of geo-political boundaries.

De la Mothe's comments echoed John Noble's, stating that much of the co-ordination of ideas and co-operation between regulators is taking place on an informal plane, well below the radar of the federal government. De la Mothe argued that virtual levers are the new drivers for institutional co-operation, and that it is the role of the federal government to foster their creation.

According to de la Mothe, the relationship between innovation clusters and regulations is an area that needs to be much better understood. Canada must turn its focus to finding a better Canadian regulatory approach, representative of all interests involved. At present, the Canadian system is burdensome, and he concluded that there is no concrete proof that it provides any better protection than that of the United States.

Potential Gains, Challenges, and Opportunities

The regulatory regime is not a static entity, commented André Downs of the Policy Research Initiative. Downs noted that Canada's domestic regulatory reforms were ongoing, and that progress over the past 25 years has led to a much less restrictive environment. However, while Canada's regulatory system appears competitive on an international level, we fare poorly in a North American context. Our regulatory system is much more restrictive on our economy than the US system.

He further noted that although the level of restrictiveness of Canadian regulations regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) has declined over

time, it is still much higher than both the OECD average and the US level. In comparison with the United States, Canadian FDI-related regulations are more restrictive in all economic sectors, particularly in the areas of transportation, electricity, financial services, and telecommunications.

Downs highlighted that this is an important consideration, because empirical studies generally demonstrate a statistically significant relationship between regulations, productivity, investment, R&D, and exports. This has been demonstrated in research done by the OECD, which illustrates that convergence of regulations in the OECD could increase goods and services exports by approximately 10 and 30%, respectively, and FDI by 10%. Additionally, tight regulations of product markets negatively affect both domestic investment and FDI, and also reduce the speed of technological catch-up. Drawing a parallel with John de la Mothe's presentation, Downs highlighted that restrictive regulations have a negative impact on productivity and growth.

He also noted that OECD estimates suggest that elimination of the existing regulatory gap between Canada and the United States could increase total factor productivity (TFP) growth by about 0.22 percentage points. This is quite substantial when one considers that TFP growth in the 1990s was less than one percent.³

Canada-US Regulatory Co-operation: Approaches and Examples

Doug Blair, also of the PRI, built on the points presented by André Downs. He highlighted that there are many types of benefits to be gained through expanded regulatory co-operation, and

that harmonization is not necessarily the ultimate goal. In some cases, unilateral action by Canadian regulators to make their approaches more compatible with the United States may be the best option. What is important, argued Blair, is selecting the appropriate mix of policy tools to allow Canada to leverage US regulatory resources to our own advantage.⁴

The PRI's research into regulatory co-operation showed there are a broad range of instruments in the regulatory co-operation toolbox, from the basic sharing of information to recognition of equivalence and harmonization. Blair drew three conclusions from the PRI's research into international experiences: regulatory co-operation usually results from pressures for economic integration, regulatory co-operation takes time, and political commitment is required to ensure that it is carried through.

Blair then posed the question whether more can be done within the context of North American integration to reduce costs by expanding regulatory co-operation with the United States. He gave a number of examples of where such co-operation has or could increase net benefits to Canadians by reducing compliance costs while maintaining regulatory protections.

The PRI's research suggests that it is common practice for Canadian regulators to speak to their American counterparts on a daily basis. Such interactions have led to a growth in knowledge and understanding of each other's regulatory systems, and a general increase in mutual confidence. Blair concluded that after years of confidence building, regulators should be well positioned to take more concrete steps toward co-ordination with the United States.

Can Regulatory Collaboration Improve Safety in Health Care?

According to David Griller, SECOR Consulting, Health Canada has typically been slower in reviewing drugs than the United States and other countries where regulatory standards are high. The United States manages to conduct its review in a much more profound and timely manner than elsewhere due to the sheer amount of resources invested.

Griller suggested that Canada is being unrealistic if it thinks it can carry out the same quality and number of reviews. However, he does believe collaboration between the two countries is possible, as long as any arrangement is built on the mutual respect of the competencies of both partners.⁵

Griller concluded by noting that collaboration with the Federal Drug Administration makes sense. He noted that it could lead to more expedient reviews of a higher quality, while freeing valuable health resources in Canada to focus on areas of highest risk. He argued that the logic for such a move was sound, but wondered how long it would take to see concrete action on this front.

Regulatory Co-operation: An Ongoing Debate

The presentations were followed by discussion of the issues by federal regulators, academics, and industry representatives.

John Arseneau, Environment Canada, pointed out that the primary goal of environmental regulations is to protect the environment, although economic efficiency and societal values are taken into account in the regulatory process. Regulators have a responsibility and

accountability to the public for delivering, first and foremost, on their primary mandates.

While regulatory co-operation with the United States for many environmental issues has proved to be very advantageous, in the area of new substances, progress is more difficult, because of a lack of transparency within the US approach. Arseneau explained that these difficulties stem from the fact that the US regime for new chemicals is about 30 years old, and so lags behind other jurisdictions with respect to information sharing (among regulatory agencies) and documentation. The Canadian government and the US Environmental Protection Agency, along with industry from both countries, have a co-operative mechanism in place to promote and facilitate regulatory convergence. Environment Canada is also leading work at the OECD to overcome these obstacles on a larger scale.

Judith Lockett, Health Canada, provided a brief update to the group about regulatory co-operation efforts in her department. In particular, Lockett mentioned that the Health Products and Food Branch signed a memorandum of understanding with the US Food and Drug Administration in November 2003 on the sharing and exchange of information on therapeutic products. The work done via this memorandum will inform decision-making authorities and promote closer co-operation on matters of mutual interest.

Some participants noted that the discussion about departmental progress and future plans for regulatory co-operation echoed similar policy discussions taking place over the past 10 years. There was a sense that little real progress had been made.

Richard Paton, Canadian Chemical Producers Association, expressed a degree of frustration when stating that Canadian regulators do not take into account the realities of the markets they are regulating. He argued that companies are choosing not to come to Canada due, in part, to regulatory costs and burdens. What concerned him most was his impression that no one within government cared enough to try and change the regulatory system and reconcile some of the inherent barriers. His core message was that economic and competitiveness issues must be given prominence in discussions about regulation, and that regulators recognize these issues in their policy decisions.

The discussion paper presented by David Griller raised many questions similar to the arguments put forth by Paton, and this line of thinking was reinforced by Bruce Valiant of Organon Canada Ltd. Valiant argued that denying access for Canadians to a drug deemed safe by the Federal Drug Administration as well as millions of Americans is denying Canadians their basic human rights.

However, despite the frustrations expressed at the system, past and present, there was a clear sign that new ideas and approaches are being considered. The PRI will be conducting further research on these issues in an effort to provide better quantification of costs and benefits of regulatory convergence. An interim report of these findings is expected by June 2004.

Notes

- 1 See *Government of Canada Guide to Making Federal Acts and Regulations*, available at <www.pco-bcp.gc.ca>.
- 2 Noble presented highlights from a paper prepared with Michael Hart, entitled "Smart Borders Require Smart Regulations: The Impact of Regulatory Differences on Trade and Investment between Canada and the United States." This research focuses on the identification of regulatory areas where small differences in standards or approval processes impose significant processing delays and/or cost burdens on Canadian businesses selling goods into the US market, and which could impact business decisions on locating foreign direct investment in North America.
- 3 A more detailed discussion of PRI research in this area can be found in E. Ndayisenga's "Economic Impacts of Regulatory Convergence Between Canada and the United States" in this issue of *Horizons*.
- 4 Blair, Doug. 2004. "Canada-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation: Approaches and Examples: Background Paper for a Presentation to the PRI-SSHRC Policy Research Roundtable February 13, 2004." Available on request from the PRI. Contact Doug Blair at 613.947.3912 or d.blair@prs-srp.gc.ca.
- 5 A more detailed discussion of these issues can be found in D. Griller's "Can Regulatory Collaboration Improve Safety in Health Care?" in this issue of *Horizons*.

NAFTA: A Ten-Year Appraisal

NAFTA entered into force in 1994 after much debate about the potential merits and costs. To provide a factual basis for this ongoing debate, Hufbauer and Schott provide an evaluation of NAFTA's performance, comparing actual experience with both the objectives of the agreement's supporters and the charges of its critics. The authors examine the economic performance of NAFTA, the dispute settlement provisions, NAFTA and the environment, labour cooperation, the energy market and the North American auto market. In addition the authors examine future challenges and opportunities in the trade and investment relationships among the three partner countries, and the broader implications for new trade initiatives throughout the hemisphere.

For further information please visit the Institute for International Economics web site at <<http://www.iie.com/>>.

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, and Jeffrey J. Schott. 2004. *NAFTA: A Ten-Year Appraisal*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics (forthcoming).

Canadian National Conference and Policy Forum on Drinking Water

April 3-6, 2004
Calgary, Alberta

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Most Canadians have clean safe drinking water delivered to their homes through an invisible network of pipes. Boil-water advisories happen, but almost always in other communities. The memory of Walkerton is fading, and once again, most Canadians take their drinking water more or less for granted.

Not so the people charged with supplying it.

The Canadian National Conference and Policy Forum on Drinking Water met in Calgary, Alberta, to discuss various issues around drinking water. Presentations exposed some major undercurrents in current drinking water policy thinking in Canada.

One major undercurrent was the sense that some provincial regulators may have gone overboard since Walkerton, imposing extensive and onerous new regulations on utilities. The Walkerton crisis (in which seven people died from contaminated municipal water in 2000) was not due to inadequate regulation, but rather a failure to observe and enforce existing regulations. Even more importantly, it was due to a lack of training of the personnel operating the municipal water treatment plant. They did not know how to respond appropriately to test results that strayed from what they were used to seeing. The more useful "fix" that many participants felt we need is better integration of the water system – protection of water quality from source to tap.

The imposition of new regulation and reporting requirements on utilities, which are often stretching their resources to fulfill existing obligations, may in fact jeopardize public health

by distracting utilities from the main task of ensuring the water is safe. Whether one buys into this argument, clearly, any new regulation should be evaluated for its cost as well as its benefit.

Another major undercurrent was the sense that drinking water guidelines have become excessively focused on trace chemicals of an unknown, but likely insignificant health risk. *Giardia*, *Cryptosporidium*, and *E. coli*¹ are the real major health threats in Canada's drinking water. Many of the chemical threats, such as heavy metals, pesticides, or endocrine disrupting chemicals, pose what are, in fact, negligible lifetime exposure risks at the levels in which they are found in most Canadian raw water. And yet, utilities in some provinces are required to measure and report on an ever-increasing list of chemicals, which may or may not be present in their systems.

Another theme was the funding of utilities, which is often seen as inadequate. There was general agreement that consumers should be charged the full cost of supplying their water. This would not only better fund the utilities, it would also encourage consumers to reduce their water usage, saving the need to expand many water treatment plants during a time of fiscal restraint.

Even more generous funding, however, is not likely to solve another serious issue entirely: the shortage of highly qualified personnel to operate and maintain water treatment facilities, particularly in remote communities. As with many Canadian industries, utilities in Canada are facing a wave of retirements. The need for trained operators is acute.

Perhaps the most intriguing theme to emerge was that of risk assessment and risk communication. Many attendees questioned the usefulness of emphasizing the measurement and removal of trace chemicals from water. The public has come to perceive disinfectant by-products (organic compounds formed during the treatment process, often containing chlorine) as posing a serious health threat, when in fact, concentrations of these products in drinking water mean lifetime exposure risks are less than the risk of being killed by lightning. There was a general agreement that while Canadians should not take clean and safe drinking water for granted, they should also not be made to worry unduly about insignificant risks.

The matter of risk assessment and communication naturally leads to a discussion of how to make decisions in the face of uncertainty. The case of the town of Erickson, British Columbia, was much discussed. Erickson refused to have chlorine added to its drinking water, fearing the chlorination by-products might cause cancer – as Health Canada data suggest could happen. However, the town's water supply was contaminated with *Giardia*, and occasionally with *E. coli*, and while long-time residents had developed immunity to the local strains, visitors to the community routinely became ill. While an agreement was eventually reached (a more expensive ultraviolet treatment of the water, with only trace amounts of chlorine added to keep bacteria from growing in the distribution system), the dispute arguably rests on the public's lack of understanding of the relative probabilities of illness or death from *Giardia* compared to the risks from chlorination by-products.

This case illustrates the perils of the precautionary principle, which is often invoked in the world of sustainable development: that action should not await scientific certainty when there is a risk of harm. Science can inform of known and possible but uncertain risks, but cannot decide for us. While the Province of British Columbia invoked the scientific certainty that people in Erickson would get sick if the water continued to be untreated, the people of Erickson invoked the precautionary principle with regards to the long-term health risks of chlorination by-products. In the tug-of-war between the known and the unknown risks, both sides preferred the devil they knew – they just knew different devils.

Note

- 1 *Cryptosporidium* is a chlorine-resistant protozoan, which occurs in human and bovine feces. It may therefore occur in most populated regions of Canada. It causes potentially severe diarrhea, and is among the major health threats in Canadian water. (*Cryptosporidium* was the cause of the outbreak in North Battleford in 2001.) *Giardia* (beaver fever) is also a diarrhea-causing protozoan, and occurs in human and animal feces. It can occur anywhere in Canada. *E. coli* is a bacterium, which occurs mainly in human and cattle feces. Many strains of *E. coli* are benign or even beneficial, but the strain *E. coli* O157:H7 (hamburger disease) can be lethal, as it was in Walkerton.

Social Capital and Immigrant Integration

Scheduled for distribution in July of 2004, the *Journal of International Migration and Integration* is pleased to announce a special issue entitled *The Role of Social Capital in Immigrant Integration*. The publication endeavours to further the understanding of social capital, both as a theoretical concept and as a policy tool, especially as it is applied to immigrants and minorities. The application of the study of social capital in this way arises from the need to improve social integration and labour market outcomes for these groups. The idea of using social capital as a policy tool to better the condition of marginalized groups is certainly appealing, but the state of knowledge at the present time is still too imprecise to warrant its use by policy-makers in bold social engineering efforts.

To order a copy of this special issue, please contact JIMI's editorial office by email at jimil@ualberta.ca or by telephone at 780.492.0635. Visit JIMI online at jiml.metropolis.net.

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Data Gaps in Service Industries

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Introduction

Service industries account for about two thirds of gross domestic product (GDP) and close to three quarters of total employment in the Canadian economy, and their importance is growing. Information and communication technology (ICT)-intensive and knowledge-based industries are increasingly service industries. And service exports are about 13% of Canada's total exports of goods and services. For a variety of reasons, data on service industries are limited in scope and not as reliable as that on goods-producing industries. Moreover, service industries have received far less attention than manufacturing and other goods-producing industries in data development and policy research. As a result, important data gaps have developed, undermining our ability to understand the performance of the Canadian economy and the dynamics of North American economic integration. For the development of sound policies that can improve the living standards and quality of life of Canadians, it is essential to have comprehensive and timely data on service industries.

Data Gaps in Services Output and Prices

Service industries presenting data gap problems can be grouped into two broad categories. One category comprises industries that present conceptual problems of output measurement and for which real output is often estimated by using input measures, such as employment or hours of work. As a result, productivity growth in these industries is, in essence, assumed away. The other category regroups industries where conceptual problems are not a

serious impediment to data development, but where more resources need to be devoted to improving timeliness and coverage. Priority should be given to developing reliable data on output and prices in areas where methodological problems are not pervasive, while also pursuing methodological work in concert with other statistical agencies and international organizations such as the OECD. In line with this objective, Statistics Canada is preparing new data sets, including greater industry detail on wholesale and retail trade services to be released in June 2004.

Our recommendations for service data development are the following.

- Develop output and price data on finance, insurance, real estate, professional, scientific, and technical services, which contribute more than one third of value added in the services sector. Statistics Canada's plan to develop price indexes for business services will be a useful addition in this direction.
- Develop data on investment, technology adoption, innovation, capital stock, and labour force skills for ICT-producing industries, as well as for major ICT-using industries, such as finance, insurance, wholesale and retail trade, and professional, scientific, and technical services. These data are essential for understanding the productivity and innovative performance of service industries.

Data Gaps in Services Trade

Unlike for goods, trade data on services are based on sample surveys of companies, supplemented with customs record information. The data set published in the Balance of International Payments provides information

on transportation, commercial, government, and travel services. About 30 categories of commercial services are available, with a regional breakdown. This commodity-based information is then used to produce total exports and imports for 27 North

Having to rely on surveys for services trade, rather than customs data which track goods, Statistics Canada is faced with constraints related to confidentiality as well as the response burden for business. Consequently, it is expected that less detail will be pub-

for cross-border trade to the extent that it does not breach confidentiality agreements.

- Expand the sample of the survey on international transactions in services and maintain a frequency that allows quality longitudinal analysis.
- Provide information on characteristics of enterprises involved in exports and imports of services.
- Improve the comparability of Canadian trade in services data with that of other countries by using the recommended international naming convention and concepts.

As we move more and more to a service economy, sound and effective policy development is hampered by the lack of comprehensive and accurate data on service industries in general and services trade in particular.

American Industry Classification System (NAICS)-based service industries, which are reported in the input-output (I-O) tables. In the I-O data set, however, there is no country ventilation. For analytical purposes, the information lost in the process is significant.

Other data problems arise, because of the way services are traded, and keeping track of the developments in that area is crucial. For instance, services have become more tradable with the advent of e-commerce. But so far, we lack information on the services being offered via e-commerce.

licly available by industry and country for services trade than for merchandise trade. That said, much improvement is not only feasible but imperative, in particular in light of the growing importance of trade in services.

Our recommendations to advance the development of service trade data include the following.

- Develop data sets linking service industries (NAICS) with trading partners (countries where possible).
- Increase the level of detail in commodity and industry (NAICS) data

Conclusion

To sum up, data gaps in the services sector are much more significant than those in goods-producing industries. As we move more and more to a service economy, sound and effective policy development is hampered by the lack of comprehensive and accurate data on service industries in general and services trade in particular. We believe it is essential that resources be devoted to enhance the coverage and quality of service industry output, price, and trade data.

Environmental Scan Initiative

Valerie Howe
Department of Justice

Scanning is an important part of any government department's effort to formulate plans, policies, and strategies – in short, to plan its future course of action. An understanding of the environment is gained from a scan of internal and external factors and trends that have the potential to influence the organization or department. This article provides an update on the different types of scanning activities ongoing within the federal government, profiles the Environmental Scanning Practice (ESP) group, and introduces a new interdepartmental initiative to create a government-wide scan. The initiative will be based on input from government departments that have expressed a strong interest in participating.

Generally, a typical scan is a report capturing a view of the environment around the organization. The purpose is to detect new, relevant events and facts. The macro-environment is generally captured under five broad areas expressed in the acronym, STEEP. Those areas, which generally become chapters in the scan, are:

- S socio-cultural,
- T technological,
- E economic,
- E environmental, and
- P political (governmental).

More detailed scans also provide key information about an organization's internal capacity to respond to environmental pressures.

Scanning within the Government of Canada

Virtually all departments have discovered the benefits of conducting a scan of their individual environments. A

common challenge is that of integrating different types of scans and strategic information within departments – and of accessing the best information from other members of the federal departmental community. By way of research, interviews with about 30 international scanners,¹ and work by the community of practice, a number of dimensions have been identified. Scans, both within the federal government and elsewhere, vary in terms of when they are done (regularly, cyclically), the focus or breadth of scope, and how the scan fits within the organization.

The content of a department's scan can vary widely. Some scans can be comprehensive, while others focus on specific topics, for example, a scan of risks or one on legal issues. Finally, other important areas of variation include the detail of statistical content and analysis, the extent to which senior researchers and analysts contribute their expertise, and whether or not the scan draws implications and conclusions from the information discovered. For example, the question might be asked, what does it mean for us if globalization is affecting everything? Some scans draw implications; others leave this to the management client.

The Community of Practice

An interdepartmental working group on scanning has been meeting for more than two years. It was established at the request of the Interdepartmental Directors General of Policy Network, an informal group, and put into place by the Chair of that group, Michelle Gosselin, Director General, Policy Integration and Co-ordination, Department of Justice. After sharing scans for the first year, the group transformed itself into a practice group, and developed terms of reference.

Valerie Howe is a Senior Research Officer in the Research and Statistics Division at the Department of Justice.

1. Act as a community of practice on environmental scanning and analysis methods.
2. Build expertise in environmental scanning and analysis.
3. Share resources and develop content for scanning.

More than 20 departmental representatives meet once a month to discuss, network, and conduct workshops to enhance the scanning capacity of both individual departments and the federal government as a whole.

The Co-ordinated Scan

Now in its third year, the ESP group decided it was ready to take on a major initiative – the development, as a pilot, of the first scan co-ordinated across the federal government. The plan builds on what we have learned about scanning within the government. The model calls for each department to distill its special knowledge of specific task areas into one-page briefings on important topics. The content will cover each of the elements of the STEEP model, with the addition of Canada in the world, making this a STEEP-W exercise. Statistics Canada will make a vital contribution with data that will ground the domestic analysis. The ESP group has decided to begin with the topic of Canada in the world, drawing upon, and contributing to, recent work by Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defence.

The hope, perhaps optimistic, is to have a first draft of the complete scan in the fall of 2004. Then, many next steps can be developed. These include analytical discussions on each chapter, and structured or unstructured discussions involving senior policy makers, analysts, and researchers. If your department is not yet involved, and would like to be, please send an e-mail with your contact information to the author to be added to the mailing list.²

Notes

1. Howe, Valerie. *Best Practices in Environmental Analysis: Interviews with Leading Practitioners*. DOJ, Research and Statistics Division, forthcoming.
2. Valerie Howe can be reached at vhowe@justice.gc.ca.

Designing Government

How do governments govern today, and how will do they do it? How do governments choose the tools or instruments they will use to get things done? In today's world, how could these decisions be improved from the standpoint of efficiency, effectiveness, legitimacy, and accountability? *Designing Government* brings together leading experts to examine the instrument choice perspective on government and public policy over the past two decades. The authors examine such issues as accountability, effectiveness, sustainability, legitimacy, and the impact of globalization.

Moving beyond the traditional regulatory sphere and its preoccupations with deregulation and efficiency, the authors trace the complex relationships between instrument choices and governance. The book encourages the reader to consider factors in the design of complex mixes, such as issues of redundancy, context, the rule of law and accountability. These latter factors are especially central in today's world to the design and implementation of effective instrument choices by governments and, ultimately, to good governance. The authors conclude, in fact, that seeing instrument choice itself as part and parcel of designing government and achieving good governance is both the promise and the challenge for instrument-based perspectives in the years ahead.

Ellis, Pearl, Margaret M. Hill, and Michael Hawlett, eds. 2004. *Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance*. Montréal: McGill University Press (forthcoming).

Designing Government

Comment les gouvernements exercent-ils le pouvoir aujourd'hui et sont-ils efficaces? De quelle manière s'y prennent-ils dans le choix des outils ou instruments d'intervention? Dans le monde actuel, notamment les décisions pourraient-elles être améliorées du point de vue de l'efficacité, de la légitimité et de l'inquadrabilité?

Designing Government rassemble les experts en vue d'examiner la perspective du choix des outils d'intervention sur le gouvernement et sur la politique publique au cours des deux derniers décennies. Les auteurs abordent les sujets suivants : l'inquadrabilité, l'efficacité, le développement durable, la légitimité, et l'impact de la mondialisation.

Dépassant le cadre réglementaire classique et ses préoccupations strictement la dérogation et l'efficacité,

les auteurs déterminent les liens complexes entre les choix d'instrumentation et la gouvernance. Le présent livre invite le lecteur à tenir compte des facteurs tels que la redondance, le contrôle, la portabilité du droit et l'impossibilité dans la conception des politiques complètes. Dans le monde actuel, ces dimensions leur sont toutes essentielles. Il s'agit d'un monde où la mise en œuvre des choix d'instruments efficaces par les gouvernements est, en fin de compte, la clé d'un bon gouvernement. En fait, les auteurs en concluent que considérer le choix d'instruments comme faisant partie intégrante de la conception du gouvernement et de la réalisation d'une bonne gouvernance constitue à la fois une promesse et un défi pour les perspectives fondées sur les instruments dans les années à venir.

Ilinda, David, Morgan, M. Hill, et Michael Howett (ed.), 2004. *Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance*. Montréal: McGill University Press. 200 p.

commun des résultats d'analyse durant la première année, le groupe s'est transformé en groupe de praticiens et a formulé un mandat qui fait référence aux grands objectifs suivants :

1. jouer le rôle de communauté de praticiens en ce qui concerne les méthodes d'analyse de l'environnement;
2. bâtir une expertise en analyse de l'environnement;
3. mettre en commun les ressources et élaborer du contenu d'analyse.

À sa troisième année d'existence, le groupe des praticiens en AE considère aujourd'hui qu'il est apte à entreprendre une initiative majeure : la plantation, en tant que projet-pilote, de la première analyse coordonnée à l'échelle du gouvernement fédéral. Ce projet est fondé sur ce que nous avons appris à propos de l'analyse de l'environnement au sein du gouvernement. En vertu de ce modèle, chaque ministère doit synthétiser en une page ses connaissances relatives à des champs d'intervention précis. Le contenu tiendra compte de chacun des éléments du modèle STEEP, et l'élément Le Canada dans le monde viendra s'y greffer, produisant ainsi une démarche STEEP-W. Statistique Canada fournira des données qui serviront de fondement à l'analyse intérieure. Le groupe d'AE a décidé de débiter par le thème du Canada dans le monde en tirant profit des récents travaux réalisés sur ce thème par les Affaires extérieures et la Défense nationale, et en y contribuant.

L'analyse coordonnée

On espère, peut-être de façon optimiste, obtenir une première version de l'analyse complète à l'automne 2004. Une fois l'analyse terminée, différentes options sont possibles quant aux prochaines étapes, par exemple des examens analytiques de chaque chapitre, ou des examens structurés ou non auxquels participeraient des décideurs, des analystes et des chercheurs chevronnés. Si vous désirez que votre ministère participe à l'initiative, alors que ce n'est pas encore le cas, veuillez envoyer à l'auteur vos coordonnées par courriel afin d'être inscrit sur la liste d'expédition².

Notes

1. Howe, Valerie. *Best Practices in Environmental Analysis: Interviews with Leading Practitioners*. Justice Canada, Division de la recherche et de la statistique, à paraître.
2. On peut joindre Valerie Howe à vhowe@justice.gc.ca.

Analyse de l'environnement

Valérie Howe
Ministère de la Justice

Valérie Howe est agente principale de recherche à la Division de la recherche et de la statistique au ministère de la Justice.

L'analyse de l'environnement fait partie intégrante de tout effort entrepris par un ministère pour concevoir des plans, des politiques et des stratégies – autrement dit, préparer son plan d'action. On en vient à comprendre l'environnement en analysant les facteurs et les tendances internes et externes susceptibles d'influencer l'organisation ou le ministère. Cet article fait le point sur les différentes activités d'analyse en cours au sein du gouvernement fédéral, et donne un profil de la communauté des praticiens en analyse de l'environnement (AE), ainsi que présente une initiative interministérielle visant à effectuer une analyse à l'échelle de l'administration fédérale. Cette initiative sera fondée sur la contribution de ministères qui se sont montrés très intéressés à participer.

En général, une analyse de l'environnement est un rapport présentant le contexte dans lequel fonctionne une organisation. Elle a pour objectif de repérer des événements et des faits nouveaux et pertinents. Le macro-environnement est généralement représenté en cinq grands domaines désignés par l'acronyme STEEP. Ces domaines, qui deviennent habituellement des chapitres de l'analyse, sont les suivants :

- S socioculturel,
- T technologique,
- E économique,
- E environnemental,
- P politique (gouvernemental).

Des analyses plus détaillées permettent également d'obtenir des renseignements clés sur la capacité interne d'une organisation de réagir aux pressions environnementales.

Analyse de l'environnement au gouvernement du Canada

Un groupe de travail interministériel sur l'analyse de l'environnement se rencontre depuis plus de deux ans. Créé à la demande du Réseau interministériel des directeurs généraux de la politique, il a été mis en place par la présidente de ce groupe, Michelle Crosslin, qui est directrice générale de l'Intégration et de la coordination de la politique au ministère de la Justice. Après avoir mis en

La communauté des praticiens

autres difficultés courantes, notons d'analyses et de renseignements stratégiques au sein des ministères, et l'accès aux meilleures sources d'information détenues par d'autres ministères fédéraux. Grâce à la recherche, à des entrevues avec quelque 30 analystes internationaux¹ et à des travaux réalisés par la communauté des praticiens (voir ci-dessous), un certain nombre de variations possibles ont été relevées. Les analyses de l'environnement, aussi bien au gouvernement fédéral qu'ailleurs, varient selon le moment de leur réalisation (régulièrement, par cycles), leur portée et leur rôle dans l'organisation. Le contenu d'une analyse de l'environnement d'un ministère peut varier grandement. Certaines analyses sont exhaustives, alors que d'autres portent sur des enjeux particuliers, comme les risques ou les questions juridiques. Enfin, il y a d'autres aspects à variation, comme le détail du contenu et de l'analyse statistiques, l'étendue de la contribution en expertise des chercheurs et analystes principaux, et l'opportunité ou non de tirer des conclusions à partir des renseignements obtenus grâce à l'analyse. Par exemple, on peut se poser la question suivante : quels sont les conséquences pour nous d'un bouleversement dû à la mondialisation? Certaines analyses prévoient des répercussions; d'autres laissent le tout à la discrétion du client-gestionnaire.

de données publiées dans la balance des paiements internationaux donne des renseignements sur les services de transport et de voyage ainsi que sur les services commerciaux et gouvernementaux. On y retrouve environ 30 catégories de services commerciaux avec une ventilation par région. Cette information basée sur les marchandise est ensuite utilisée dans le but d'établir la totalité des exportations et des importations de 27 secteurs de services repris dans le système de classification des industries d'Amérique du Nord (SCIAN) et énumérées dans les tableaux des entrées/sorties. Cependant, pour l'ensemble des données sur les entrées/sorties, il n'y a aucune ventilation par pays. Aux fins d'analyse, la perte d'information au cours du processus est importante.

D'autres problèmes résultent de la façon dont les services sont échangés. C'est pourquoi il est très important

- liées à la confidentialité des données et au fardeau imposé aux entreprises qui y participent. En conséquence, on s'attend à ce que l'information publiée par secteur et par pays pour les échanges de services soit moins détaillée que pour le commerce des marchandises. Cela dit, une nette amélioration est non seulement possible mais impérative, particulièrement quand on considère l'importance croissante des échanges de services.
- Nos recommandations afin de permettre l'avancement de la collecte de données sur les échanges de services sont les suivantes :
- Mettre en place des ensembles de données associant secteurs des services (SCIAN) et partenaires commerciaux (pour les pays où c'est possible).

Conclusion

En résumé, les lacunes statistiques sur les secteurs des services sont beaucoup plus importantes que celles des industries de production de biens. Étant donné que nous tendons de plus en plus vers une économie de services, l'élaboration de politiques rationnelles et efficaces est entravée par un manque de données exactes et exhaustives sur les secteurs des services en général, et plus particulièrement sur les échanges de services. Nous croyons qu'il est essentiel de consacrer des ressources pour augmenter la couverture des enquêtes et la qualité des données sur la production, les prix et les échanges dans les secteurs des services.

Étant donné que nous tendons de plus en plus vers une économie de services, l'élaboration de politiques rationnelles et efficaces est entravée par un manque de données exactes et exhaustives sur les secteurs des services en général, et plus particulièrement sur les échanges de services.

Lacunes dans les données sur les échanges de services

essentielles afin de bien comprendre la productivité et la performance innovatrice des secteurs des services.

de suivre l'évolution de ce secteur. Par exemple, le potentiel d'échange de services ont augmenté avec l'apartition du commerce électronique. Cependant, jusqu'à présent, nous manquons d'information relativement aux services offerts aux usagers.

En se fiant à des sondages sur les échanges de services plutôt qu'à des données sur les marchandises consignées par les douanes, Statistique Canada fait face à des contraintes

- Augmenter le niveau de détail des données se rapportant aux marchandise et aux secteurs (SCIAN) pour le commerce transfrontalier, sans toutefois enfreindre les ententes de non-divuligation.
- Étendre l'échantillonnage de l'enquête aux transactions internationales dans les secteurs des services et maintenir une fréquence permettant de faire une analyse longitudinale de qualité.
- Donner de l'information sur les caractéristiques des entreprises participant aux exportations et aux importations de services.
- Améliorer la comparabilité des données sur les échanges de services au Canada avec celles des autres pays en utilisant la règle internationale recommandée en matière d'appellations conventionnelles.

Lacunes dans les données des secteurs des services

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Industrie Canada

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Introduction

Les secteurs des services représentent environ les deux tiers du PIB et près des trois quarts de l'emploi total au sein de l'économie canadienne et leur importance ne cesse d'augmenter. Les industries fondées sur le savoir et les industries des technologies de l'information et des communications (TIC) sont de plus en plus des secteurs de services. Et les services représentent à environ 13 % de la totalité des exportations canadiennes de biens et de services. Pour toutes sortes de raisons, les données sur les secteurs des services sont limitées et elles ne sont pas aussi fiables que celles qui existent sur les industries productrices de biens. De plus, les secteurs des services ont retenu beaucoup moins l'attention en ce qui a trait à l'élaboration des données et à la recherche sur les politiques que les industries manufacturières et les autres industries de production de biens. Cela a eu pour conséquence de provoquer d'importantes lacunes statistiques qui réduisent notre capacité à comprendre la performance de l'économie canadienne et la dynamique de l'intégration économique nord-américaine. Pour l'élaboration de politiques rationnelles pouvant améliorer le niveau et la qualité de vie des Canadiens, il est essentiel de disposer de données exhaustives et en temps opportun sur les secteurs des services.

Lacunes dans les données sur la production et le prix des services

Les secteurs des services qui connaissent des lacunes statistiques peuvent être divisés en deux grandes catégories. La première catégorie comprend les secteurs ayant des problèmes conceptuels de mesure de la production et pour lesquels la production réelle est souvent évaluée en utilisant des mesures d'intrant comme l'emploi et les heures de travail. Il en résulte que la croissance de leur productivité n'est

qu'hypothétique. La deuxième catégorie regroupe les secteurs où les problèmes conceptuels ne constituent pas un obstacle important à l'élaboration des données, mais où il faut consacrer davantage de ressources pour rendre les études plus actuelles et en étendre le champ d'application. La priorité devrait être conférée à l'élaboration de données fiables portant sur la production et les prix dans des domaines où les problèmes méthodologiques ne sont pas répandus tout en poursuivant aussi un travail méthodologique de concert avec d'autres agences de statistiques et des organismes internationaux comme l'OCDE. En fonction de cet objectif, Statistique Canada prépare actuellement de nouveaux ensembles de données qui seront publiés en juin 2004 et qui comprendront plus de renseignements sur les services de vente en gros et de commerce de détail.

Nos recommandations quant à l'élaboration de données sur les services sont les suivantes :

- Recueillir des données sur la production et les prix dans les domaines de la finance, des assurances, de l'immobilier et des services professionnels, scientifiques et techniques, d'où provient plus du tiers de la valeur ajoutée dans le secteur des services. Le plan de Statistique Canada visant à élaborer des indices des prix pour les services aux entreprises sera un pas de plus dans cette direction.
- Cumuler des données non seulement sur les investissements, l'utilisation des technologies, l'innovation, le stock de capital et les compétences des travailleurs des industries des technologies de l'information et des communications (TIC), mais également sur les principaux secteurs utilisateurs de ces TIC comme la finance, les assurances, la vente en gros et le commerce de détail ainsi que les services professionnels, scientifiques et techniques. Ces données sont

Capital social et intégration des immigrants

La Revue de l'intégration et de la migration internationale est fière d'annoncer la parution prévue en juillet 2004, d'un numéro spécial intitulé « The Role of Social Capital in Immigrant Integration ». Ce numéro a été conçu dans le but de faire avancer les connaissances portant sur le capital social en tant que concept théorique et facteur jouant un rôle dans l'établissement de politiques et de pratiques de politiques et de pratiques. Malgré que le capital social semble représenter, en matière de politique, un moyen potentiel d'améliorer les capacités des groupes marginaux, les connaissances actuelles sont trop imprécises pour justifier des tentatives étrangères de transposition de la portée de la part des décideurs.

Pour commander votre copie de ce numéro spécial, veuillez communiquer avec le bureau de la rédaction de la Revue, par courriel au journals@ubc.ca ou au 780.492.0635. Visitez notre site Web à l'adresse suivante : journals.ubc.ca.

Kenny, Neil L., et Peter Li, eds. 2004. *Revue de l'intégration et de la migration internationale*, volume 5, numéro 2.

Note

quel on doit ajouter une très petite quantité de chlore pour éviter la prolifération des bactéries dans le réseau de distribution), la discussion porte essentiellement sur le manque de compréhension du public des probabilités relatives de maladie ou de mort que peut entraîner *Ciardia* comparativement aux risques que présentent les sous-produits de chloration.

Ce cas illustre les dangers du principe de précaution, principe auquel on fait souvent référence dans l'univers du développement durable et qui stipule qu'on ne devrait pas attendre d'avoir les preuves scientifiques nécessaires pour intervenir quand il y a des risques d'effets néfastes. La science peut fournir de l'information sur les risques connus ainsi que sur les risques probables, mais elle ne peut cependant pas décider pour nous. Bien que la Colombie-Britannique ait invoqué la certitude scientifique que les habitants d'Ericksen tomberaient malade si l'eau continuait à ne pas être traitée, ceux-ci ont de leur côté eu recours au principe de précaution en ce qui concerne les effets à long terme sur la santé des sous-produits de chloration. Dans cette lutte acharnée entre les risques connus et inconnus, chaque camp a préféré le démon qu'il connaissait. Il s'agissait simplement de démons différents.

assurer le fonctionnement et l'entretien des installations de traitement des eaux, particulièrement dans les collectivités éloignées. Comme beaucoup d'autres secteurs industriels au Canada, les services publics font face à une vague de départs à la retraite et la demande d'opérateurs qualifiés est criante.

Peut-être l'évaluation et la divulgation des risques ont-elles constitué le thème le plus intéressant qui ait été abordé. De nombreux participants ont mis en doute l'utilité d'insister sur le mesurage et sur l'élimination des produits chimiques à l'état de traces dans l'eau. Le public en est venu à considérer les sous-produits de désinfection, c'est-à-dire les composés organiques formés au cours du processus de traitement et contenant souvent du chlore, comme étant une menace grave pour la santé. Pourtant, les concentrations de ces produits dans l'eau potable composent des risques d'exposition plus faibles que le fait de mourir frappé par la foudre. Tout le monde s'est entendu sur le fait que les Canadiens ne devraient pas considérer leur eau potable comme allant de soi, mais qu'ils ne devraient cependant pas non plus s'inquiéter outre mesure de risques insignifiants.

La question de l'évaluation et de la divulgation des risques a naturellement orienté la discussion sur la façon de prendre des décisions face à l'incertitude. On a longuement discuté du cas de la municipalité d'Ericksen, en Colombie-Britannique, qui a refusé d'ajouter du chlore à son eau potable, craignant que les sous-produits de chloration puissent causer le cancer, comme les données de Santé Canada le laissent entendre. Cependant, *Ciardia* et occasionnellement *E. coli* ont contaminé l'approvisionnement en eau de la municipalité. Si les résidents de longue date étaient immunisés contre les souches locales, les visiteurs, quant à eux, tombaient régulièrement malades. Bien qu'un accord ait finalement été conclu (l'utilisation d'un traitement de l'eau aux rayons UV plus coûteux

Conférence nationale canadienne et Forum sur les politiques en matière d'eau potable

Calgary, Alberta
Du 3 au 6 avril 2004

Ian Campbell
Projet de recherche
sur les politiques

Ian Campbell
est directeur principal de projet au sein
du Projet de recherche sur les politiques

La plupart des Canadiens ont accès à de l'eau potable salubre et saine jusqu'à leurs foyers grâce à un réseau invisible de tuyaux et de conduites. Il peut y avoir des avis d'ébullition de l'eau, mais cela se produit presque toujours ailleurs. Le souvenir de Walkerton s'estompe avec le temps et encore une fois, les Canadiens considèrent leur eau potable comme allant plus ou moins de soi. Il n'en est cependant pas ainsi pour les personnes qui s'occupent de son approvisionnement.

La Conférence nationale canadienne et le Forum sur les politiques en matière d'eau potable, tenus à Calgary, en Alberta, ont permis d'examiner diverses questions relatives à l'eau potable. Ces conférences ont permis de mettre en lumière quelques grands messages implicites en matière de politiques actuelles sur l'eau potable au Canada.

L'un des principaux messages implicites était l'impression que certaines autorités de réglementation provinciales aient pu aller trop loin depuis les événements de Walkerton en imposant beaucoup de nouveaux règlements sévères aux services publics. La crise de Walkerton, au cours de laquelle sept personnes sont décédées en 2000 après avoir consommé de l'eau municipale contaminée, n'a pas été causée par une réglementation inadéquate, mais plutôt par un manque d'observation et de mise en application de règlements en vigueur. Et plus important encore, les employés responsables de la station municipale de traitement d'eau manquaient de formation. En effet, ils ignoraient comment réagir à des résultats de tests différenciant de ceux auxquels ils étaient habitués. Selon beaucoup de participants, la meilleure façon de pallier cette situation est d'améliorer l'intégration du réseau d'alimentation en eau, c'est-à-dire de protéger la qualité de l'eau de la source aux robinets. Imposer une nouvelle réglementation aux services publics et les obliger à rendre des comptes, alors qu'ils

essaient souvent de mobiliser leurs ressources pour respecter les règlements existants, pourrait en fait mettre en danger la santé publique en détournant l'attention de leur tâche principale, soit assurer la salubrité de l'eau. Qu'on soit en accord ou non avec cet argument, il est évident que toute nouvelle réglementation devrait être évaluée en fonction de ses coûts et de ses avantages.

Autre message implicite : l'impression que les recommandations relatives à la qualité de l'eau potable sont devenues trop axées sur les produits chimiques à l'état de traces présentant un risque inconnu, mais fort probablement minime pour la santé. *Cryptosporidium* et *E. coli* sont les principales menaces réelles pour la santé liées à l'eau potable au Canada. Beaucoup de menaces chimiques, comme les métaux lourds, les pesticides et les produits chimiques perturbateurs du système endocrinien, comportent en fait peu de risques pour la santé même en cas d'exposition chronique, à cause des concentrations infimes que l'on retrouve dans la majorité des eaux brutes canadiennes. Et pourtant, on exige des services publics de certaines provinces de mesurer un nombre toujours plus grand de produits chimiques susceptibles d'être présents ou non dans leurs réseaux et de rendre des comptes à cet égard.

Autre sujet abordé : le financement des services publics, souvent perçu comme insuffisant. Tous se sont entendus pour dire que les consommateurs devraient payer le coût total de leur approvisionnement en eau. Cela permettrait non seulement de mieux financer les services publics, mais aussi d'inciter la population à réduire sa consommation d'eau, ce qui éviterait d'agrandir beaucoup d'usines de traitement de l'eau en période de restrictions budgétaires. Cependant, même grâce à un financement plus généreux, il est peu probable que cela permettrait de résoudre complètement un autre problème épineux, celui de la pénurie de main-d'œuvre hautement qualifiée capable

ALENA : Évaluation après dix ans

Après deux décennies de débats sur ses avantages et ses coûts éventuels, l'ALENA est en vigueur en 1994. En vue d'appuyer la prise de décisions au sujet de l'avenir de l'ALENA, le gouvernement du Canada a financé une évaluation de la performance de l'ALENA, en comparant l'expérience actuelle à la fois aux objectifs des partisans de l'accord et aux faits reprochés par ses détracteurs. Les auteurs examinent la performance économique de l'ALENA, les impacts des changements de réglementation des différends, l'ALENA et l'environnement, la coopération dans le domaine du travail, le commerce de l'énergie et le maintien de l'équilibre nord-sud. Ils se penchent également sur les défis et les possibilités des relations de commerce et d'investissement entre les trois pays, et les retombées plus vastes pour les nouvelles initiatives commerciales dans tout l'hémisphère. Pour plus de renseignements sur ce sujet, consultez le site Web de l'Initiative for International Economics (la version anglaise) : <http://www.ice-intl.org>.

Hudon, Larry, Charles et Jeffrey J. Schmitz, 2004, ALENA : Évaluation après dix ans, Washington, DC : Initiative for International Economics (la version anglaise).

Le PRR effectuera d'autres recherches sur ces questions afin de fournir une évaluation quantitative plus juste des coûts et des avantages d'une convergence en matière de réglementation. Un rapport provisoire de ces résultats est prévu pour juin 2004.

Notes

- 1 Voir *Lois et règlements : l'essentiel*, du Gouvernement du Canada, disponible à l'adresse www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?page=publications&language=fr&doc=legislation/imgoc_f.htm.
- 2 M. Noble a présenté les points saillants d'un document préparé avec Michael Hart intitulé « Smart Borders Requie Smart Regulations: The Impact of Regulatory Differences on Trade and Investment between Canada and the United States ». Cette recherche porte sur le recensement de champs de réglementation où de petites différences entre les normes ou les processus d'approbation imposent des délais de traitement, des coûts élevés, ou les deux, aux entreprises canadiennes vendant des biens sur les marchés américains, et qui pourraient influencer les décisions commerciales relatives au repérage de l'investissement étranger direct en Amérique du Nord.
- 3 Pour une analyse plus approfondie des recherches du PRR dans ce domaine, lire « Les impacts économiques de la convergence réglementaire entre le Canada et les États-Unis », de F. Ndayisenga, dans ce numéro d'*Horizons*.
- 4 Blair, Doug, 2004, « Canada-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation: Approaches and Examples: Background Paper for a Presentation to the PRI-SSHRC Policy Research Roundtable February 13, 2004 ». Fourni sur demande par le PRR. Veuillez communiquer avec Doug Blair au 613.947.3912 ou à l'adresse d.blair@prs-srp.gc.ca.
- 5 Pour une analyse plus détaillée de ces questions, lire « La collaboration peut-elle améliorer la sécurité des systèmes de santé? », de D. Griller, dans ce numéro d'*Horizons*.

des deux pays et de promouvoir une coopération plus étroite sur les questions d'intérêt commun.

Certains participants ont noté que la discussion entourant les progrès ministériels et les projets d'avenir relatifs à la coopération en matière de réglementation faisait écho à des discussions semblables sur les politiques menées au cours des dix dernières années. Il semble que l'on ait accompli peu de progrès tangibles. Richard Paton, de l'Association canadienne des fabricants de produits chimiques, s'est montré assez frustré en affirmant que les organismes canadiens de réglementation ne tiennent pas compte des réalités des marchés qu'ils réglementent. Il a affirmé que les entreprises boudent le Canada, en partie à cause des coûts et des fardeaux de la réglementation. Il s'est surtout montré préoccupé par l'absence apparente d'intérêt, au sein du gouvernement, envers la modification du système de réglementation et la suppression des obstacles intrinsèques. L'essentiel de son message : les questions d'économie et de compétitivité doivent figurer au premier plan des discussions entourant la réglementation, et les organismes de réglementation devraient prendre en considération ces questions dans leurs décisions relatives aux politiques.

Le document de travail présenté par David Griller a soulevé de nombreuses questions semblables à celles mises de l'avant par M. Paton, et Bruce Valiant, d'Organon Canada Ltée, a renforcé cette ligne de pensée. M. Valiant a affirmé qu'interdire aux Canadiens un médicament jugé sans danger par la FDA ainsi que par des millions d'Américains revient à les priver de leurs droits humains fondamentaux. Cependant, en dépit des frustrations exprimées envers le système, ancien comme actuel, il est clairement apparu que de nouvelles idées et méthodes sont présentement à l'étude.

organismes de réglementation devraient être bien placés pour prendre des mesures de coordination plus concrètes avec les États-Unis.

La coopération en matière de réglementation peut-elle améliorer la sécurité des soins de santé?

Selon David Griller, de SECOR Consulting, l'examen des médicaments par Santé Canada prend généralement plus de temps qu'aux États-Unis et dans d'autres pays où normes d'application de la réglementation sont sévères. Les États-Unis effectuent ces examens de manière bien plus approfondie et opportune qu'ailleurs tout simplement grâce à la quantité de ressources mises en place.

M. Griller estime que le Canada est irréaliste, s'il pense pouvoir effectuer le même nombre d'examen que les États-Unis, et avec la même rigueur. Cependant, la collaboration entre les deux pays est, selon lui, possible, tant que toute entente est fondée sur le respect mutuel des compétences des deux partenaires⁵.

M. Griller a conclu en notant la pertinence d'une collaboration avec la Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Elle permettrait, note-t-il, d'effectuer des examens plus opportuns et d'une plus grande rigueur, et, par ailleurs, de rediriger les précieuses ressources en santé au Canada vers les secteurs critiques. Il a fait valoir la validité de la logique sous-tendant une telle démarche, se demandant, toutefois, quand des gestes concrets seraient posés sur ce plan.

Coopération en matière de réglementation : un débat en cours

Les allocutions ont ensuite fait place à la discussion entre organismes de réglementation, universitaires et représentants de divers secteurs d'activités.

accrue en matière de réglementation, et que l'harmonisation des réglementations ne constitue pas nécessairement le but ultime. Dans certains cas, les mesures unilatérales prises par les organismes de réglementation pour rendre leurs démarches plus compatibles avec celles des États-Unis pourraient représenter la meilleure option. Selon M. Blair, il importe surtout de choisir la combinaison appropriée d'outils d'élaboration des politiques, pour permettre au Canada d'employer les ressources de réglementation américaines à son propre avantage⁶.

La recherche du PRR a révélé qu'une vaste gamme d'instruments permettent la coopération en matière de réglementation : de la communication de renseignements à la reconnaissance d'équivalences et à l'harmonisation. M. Blair a tiré trois conclusions de la recherche faite par le PRR sur les expériences internationales : la coopération en matière de réglementation résulte généralement de pressions vers l'intégration économique; cette coopération se fait lentement; et il faut un engagement politique pour assurer sa mise en œuvre.

M. Blair a ensuite demandé si l'on pourrait faire davantage, dans le cadre de l'intégration économique nord-américaine, pour diminuer les coûts en élargissant cette coopération avec les États-Unis. Il a cité de nombreux exemples de cas où une telle coopération – consistant à réduire les coûts de conformité tout en maintenant des protections réglementaires – a contribué, ou contribuerait, à accroître les bénéfices nets pour les Canadiens. Selon les résultats de la recherche menée par le PRR, les organismes de réglementation canadiens communiqueraient quotidiennement avec leurs homologues américains. De telles interactions ont permis d'accroître le savoir et la compréhension réciproques des deux systèmes de réglementation, ainsi que la confiance mutuelle. M. Blair a conclu qu'après des années de renforcement de la confiance, les

John Arsenau, d'environnement Canada, a indiqué que les réglementations environnementales visent principalement la protection de l'environnement, bien que l'efficacité économique et les valeurs de la société soient prises en compte dans le processus de réglementation. Les organismes de réglementation sont d'abord et avant tout responsables de remplir leurs principaux mandats envers le public, auquel ils doivent également rendre des comptes.

La coopération avec les États-Unis en matière de réglementation relative à de nombreuses questions environnementales s'est avérée très profitable. En ce qui a trait aux nouvelles substances, toutefois, les progrès sont plus difficiles, faute de transparence dans les démarches américaines. M. Arsenau a expliqué que ces difficultés sont dues au fait que le régime américain date d'il y a environ trente ans et qu'il accuse du retard par rapport aux autres pays quant à la documentation et à la communication des renseignements entre les agences de réglementation. Le gouvernement canadien et l'Agence des États-Unis pour la protection de l'environnement (EPA) – de pair avec des secteurs d'activités des deux pays – disposent d'un mécanisme de coopération pour promouvoir et faciliter la convergence de leurs réglementations. Environnement Canada joue un rôle de premier plan à l'OCDE pour surmonter ces obstacles sur une plus grande échelle.

Judith Lockett, de Santé Canada, a brièvement mis le groupe au courant des efforts de coopération en matière de réglementation accomplis par son ministère. Mme Lockett a mentionné, en particulier, que la Direction générale des produits de santé et des aliments avait signé, en novembre 2003, un protocole d'entente avec la FDA sur la communication et l'échange de renseignements relatifs aux produits thérapeutiques. Le travail accompli dans le cadre de ce protocole permettra d'informer les pouvoirs décisionnels

les États-Unis². Il a noté l'existence d'un précédent solide pour une coopération canado-américaine accrue en matière de réglementation : la création, tant par des représentants du gouvernement canadien que des entreprises privées, de vastes réseaux avec leurs homologues américains. Ces relations constituent les assises de futures coopérations, garantissant que les choix américains reflètent les intérêts canadiens, et que les priorités et les décisions américaines soient prises en compte dans les préférences canadiennes.

De plus, on constate déjà un degré de convergence élevé entre les objectifs visés par les deux systèmes de réglementation. Les questions de principes fondamentaux et de conception importent moins que celles des détails et des démarches de mise en œuvre de la réglementation. De nombreuses réformes actuellement nécessaires pour supprimer les différences mineures entre les réglementations canadienne et américaine peuvent être apportées unilatéralement.

M. Noble a conclu en soulignant la nécessité d'un engagement politique solide pour progresser davantage. Une nouvelle série de pourparlers sur la manière d'améliorer l'ALENA représenterait, selon lui, l'unique façon de garantir que les deux pays se penchent davantage sur la réglementation et sur l'augmentation de la coopération en la matière.

Quel rôle joue la coopération en matière de réglementation dans l'amélioration de la productivité, de l'innovation et de l'investissement en recherche-développement?

savoir constitue une activité internationale : il n'existe aucune souveraineté sur le savoir; ce dernier circule librement, indépendamment des frontières géopolitiques.

Les commentaires de M. de la Mothe ont fait écho à ceux de M. John Noble : la coordination des idées et la coopération entre les organismes de réglementation s'opèrent principalement de manière officielle, bien à l'écart du radar du gouvernement fédéral. M. de la Mothe a affirmé que les leviers virtuels constituent les nouveaux stimulants à la coopération internationale, et qu'il appartient au gouvernement fédéral de favoriser la création de ces leviers.

Selon M. de la Mothe, il faut parvenir à mieux cerner le rapport entre grappes d'innovation et réglementation. Le Canada doit s'efforcer d'adopter une meilleure démarche en matière de réglementation, représentative de tous les intérêts en cause. Pour le moment, le système canadien est contraignant et rien ne prouve concrètement, a-t-il conclu, que ce système offre plus de protection que celui des États-Unis.

Gains potentiels, défis et perspectives d'avenir

André Downs, du Projet de recherche sur les politiques, a précisé que le régime de réglementation n'est pas une entité statique. Il a indiqué que les réformes nationales en matière de réglementation se poursuivent, et que les progrès accomplis au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années ont créé un environnement bien moins contraignant. Toutefois, si le système de réglementation canadien semble concurrenciel à l'échelle internationale, on ne peut en dire autant en contexte nord-américain : il restreint davantage l'économie que le système américain. M. Downs a également signalé qu'en dépit de la baisse, avec le temps, du degré du caractère contraignant de la réglementation canadienne relative à l'investissement étranger direct (IED), ce degré demeure bien supérieur tant

à la moyenne de l'OCDE qu'à celui des États-Unis. Comparativement à ces derniers, la réglementation canadienne en matière d'IED est plus contraignante pour tous les secteurs économiques, particulièrement dans les domaines du transport, de l'électricité, des services financiers et des télécommunications.

M. Downs a souligné l'importance de ce facteur, les études empiriques démontrant généralement un rapport statistiquement significatif entre règle-mentation, productivité, investissement, recherche-développement, et même exportations. Des recherches effectuées par l'OCDE – qui illustrent la façon dont la convergence de ses réglementations permettrait d'accroître l'exportation de biens et de services de 10 % et de 30 %, respectivement, et l'IED de 10 % – l'ont clairement démontré. De plus, une réglementation serrée des marchés des produits exerce une influence négative tant sur l'investissement intérieur que l'IED, et diminue également la vitesse de ratrapage technologique. Établissant un parallèle avec la présentation de John de la Mothe, M. Downs a précisé que la croissance et la productivité souffrent d'une réglementation contraignante.

Il a également indiqué que les estimations de l'OCDE donnent à penser qu'éliminer les lacunes réglementaires entre le Canada et les États-Unis augmenterait la croissance de la productivité totale des facteurs (PTF) d'environ 0,22 point de pourcentage; résultat plutôt significatif compte tenu du fait que, dans les années 1990, la croissance de la PTF se situait à moins de 1 %³.

Coopération canado-américaine en matière de réglementation : méthodes et exemples

Doug Blair, également membre du RRP, a renchérit sur les propos d'André Downs. Il a souligné les nombreux avantages à tirer d'une coopération

Accroître la coopération en matière de réglementation avec les États-Unis

Table ronde de recherche sur les politiques du PRP-CRSHC

Doug Blair
Projet de recherche sur les politiques

Doug Blair est un chef de projet qui travaille pour le Projet de recherche sur les politiques.

On reconnaît depuis longtemps l'intérêt d'accroître la coopération en matière de réglementation avec notre partenaire commercial le plus important, les États-Unis. Les politiques gouvernementales relatives au pouvoir de réglementation, les nombreuses ententes de coopération en matière de réglementation, ainsi que le large réseau officieux de collaboration existant entre les organismes de réglementation de nos deux pays témoignent, en partie, de ce fait.

Cependant, il est de plus en plus manifeste qu'à ce jour, la coopération canado-américaine en matière de réglementation demeure incomplète; que les coûts liés aux différences réglementaires avec les États-Unis peuvent être considérables; et que les avantages pour le Canada de maintenir un système de réglementation indépendant sont, dans certains cas, douteux.

Le 13 février 2004, le Projet de recherche sur les politiques (PRP) et le Conseil de recherche en sciences humaines du Canada (CRSHC) ont organisé conjointement une table ronde pour discuter d'une coopération accrue entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Spécialistes universitaires, représentants du gouvernement et parties intéressées ont ainsi pu mettre en commun les résultats de leurs recherches, leurs idées et leurs suggestions.

Contexte des politiques

La table ronde a débuté par un exposé de Munir Sheikh, sous-ministre délégué des Finances, qui portait sur le contexte sous-jacent des politiques relatives à la coopération en matière de réglementation.

La politique canadienne en matière de réglementation est déjà bien articulée. L'objectif global consiste à maximiser le bien-être économique et social et la sécurité des Canadiens, tout en garantissant efficacement les compromis socio-économiques potentiels. M. Sheikh a fait valoir, exemples à l'appui, que l'élaboration de la meilleure réglementation possible doit demeurer l'objectif

visé et que, dans certains cas, coopérer avec les organismes réglementaires américains peut jouer un rôle important dans l'atteinte de cet objectif.

En ce qui a trait à l'approbation des médicaments – le but commun étant la possibilité de se procurer des médicaments efficaces et sans danger – M. Sheikh a noté la lenteur du Canada par rapport aux États-Unis et le désavantage propre aux « petits pays » dont le Canada est victime : pour traiter le même nombre de prestations de médicaments que les États-Unis, il ne dispose que du dixième des ressources réglementaires de ces derniers. Le Canada ne peut donc simplement pas se permettre de fonctionner de façon totalement indépendante et doit mettre au point un système des plus efficaces.

Inversement, M. Sheikh a indiqué que les méthodes du Canada en matière de réglementation relative au domaine financier et aux jeunes entreprises sont plus efficaces que celles des États-Unis, et que, sur ces plans-là, une harmonisation n'est donc pas nécessaire.

Comme exemple de « réglementation bien pensée », M. Sheikh a proposé que le Canada se réfère, comme point de départ, aux pratiques des États-Unis en la matière et qu'il s'en distancie quand c'est dans son intérêt de le faire. Il faudrait aussi recueillir des renseignements relatifs à l'efficacité des réglementations, conjugués aux efforts internationaux d'harmonisation des exigences relatives aux données, aux formats de mise en œuvre de la réglementation, à l'évaluation du risque et aux processus de prise de décisions.

Pourquoi se concentrer sur la coopération en matière de réglementation avec les États-Unis?

John Noble, de l'Université Carleton, a expliqué les raisons pour lesquelles le Canada devrait concentrer ses efforts sur une coopération internationale en matière de réglementation avec

le Canada perdre de son indépendance politique si l'intégration économique avec les États-Unis se poursuit. Dans la plupart des cas, la convergence des politiques est attribuable à l'existence de tendances sociales semblables et à des pressions sur les politiques publiques (p. ex., le vieillissement, les innovations, les taxes, etc.). En réalité, l'élaboration et la prestation des politiques sociales semblent plutôt avoir divergé sous l'ALENA et il en va de même pour de nombreux domaines des politiques sociales de l'Union européenne.

De plus, alors que l'on prévoit que la croissance économique sera plus forte ailleurs dans le monde qu'aux États-Unis dans les décennies à venir en raison d'un phénomène grandissant de convergence, notre voisin continuera à offrir le plus facile d'accès et le plus attrayant pour les entrepreneurs canadiens. Il est donc important de maximiser la fluidité des liens économiques entre les deux pays à l'aide d'initiatives stratégiques visant à réduire les obstacles restants au commerce et à l'investissement, y compris les différences réglementaires, les règles d'origine et les entraves à la mobilité des facteurs.

Cela n'a pas besoin d'être un choix dichotomique. Le Canada devrait chercher à tirer profit de possibilités commerciales avantageuses en adoptant une stratégie à plusieurs volets visant à maximiser les possibilités économiques avec les États-Unis et le reste du monde. Au cours des dernières années, l'économie américaine a été le moteur de croissance de l'économie mondiale. En raison de sa proximité, de relations historiques et d'une ouverture de plus en plus grande, le Canada a pu connaître une croissance commerciale sans précédent des échanges avec ce pays. Si la croissance économique en dehors de l'Amérique du Nord devait être plus solide à l'avenir, un profil similaire pourrait se dégager

alors que les entreprises canadiennes bénéficieraient d'une forte croissance économique à l'étranger. De plus, ces entreprises devraient tirer profit de leur accès au marché nord-américain pour devenir plus compétitives et s'en servir comme tremplin vers les autres marchés. Par conséquent, le Canada devrait adopter des options de politiques qui maintiendront ouvertes les possibilités commerciales sur les deux fronts.

La plupart d'entre nous sont d'accord avec le point essentiel de l'argumentation de John Hellwell, selon lequel la séparation économique des États-nations, comme en témoigne l'effet frontière, continuera de permettre aux gouvernements de développer des politiques en matière de services sociaux, d'éducation, de santé et autres, qui tiennent compte, et devraient tenir compte principalement des préférences nationales. En même temps, il est néanmoins primordial que les gouvernements mettent en œuvre des politiques qui créent des débouchés et des occasions d'affaires qui contribuent à leur tour au bien-être de la population.

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Note

1. C'était l'une des conclusions clés de l'atelier organisé à Montréal du 20 au 22 novembre 2002 par Industrie Canada et par Développement des ressources humaines Canada intitulé Les liens en Amérique du Nord – Aspects sociaux et marchés du travail.

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Coulombe, Serge, 2002. « Effet frontière et degré d'intégration économique nord-américaines », communication préparée en vue de l'atelier intitulé « Les liens en Amérique du Nord – Aspects sociaux et marchés du travail » organisé par Industrie Canada et Développement des ressources humaines Canada, 20-22 novembre 2002, Montréal.

économique moindre. Sur ce plan, les frontières ont leur importance, mais, économiquement parlant, cela semble plus vrai pour un pays plus petit.

Parmi les orientations de recherche prometteuses, signalons l'influence de la structure industrielle et spatiale dans le commerce régional nord-américain, en particulier le niveau de spécialisation des économies régionales canadiennes et le rôle des grappes industrielles. Brown (2003) et Coulombe (2003) ont déjà abordé ces facteurs déterminants en démontrant que le commerce international des économies régionales canadiennes semble compléter le commerce inter-provincial et non s'y substituer comme on le croyait.

Comme le souligne Coulombe, « le développement du commerce nord-sud a augmenté le degré de spécialisation des économies régionales canadiennes. Étant donné la structure de l'économie canadienne (centre et périphérie), cela pourrait stimuler le commerce entre les provinces périphériques et centrales, en particulier pour les biens intermédiaires et les produits primaires » (Coulombe, 2003, p. 13).

Le débat théorique provoqué par McCallum et Helliwell sur l'effet frontière a contribué à démystifier la dynamique du commerce transfrontalier entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Il a également démontré que, même si le modèle de gravité est attirant par sa simplicité, il a ses limites et qu'il faut faire plus de recherche pour guider le processus politique.

Les ramifications politiques

Le débat sur l'effet frontière a des répercussions qui vont au-delà de la dimension théorique. Pour la prescription de politiques, cet effet peut être interprété de deux façons. Il peut d'abord, être perçu comme une protection assurant au Canada une certaine discrétion sur le plan des politiques. Se référant aux résultats de MM.

McCallum et Helliwell, certains ont affirmé que l'importance de sécuriser les liens économiques nord-américains et minimiser l'importance de sécuriser les liens économiques nord-américains et affaiblir peut-être de la complémentarité à l'égard de certains défis stratégiques. Comme l'écrit John Helliwell dans *Globalization and Well-being, [Traduction]* « le résultat obtenu par John McCallum laisse fortement entendre que les économies nationales possèdent une structure interne beaucoup plus dense que l'on croyait et, par conséquent, l'ampleur de la mondialisation est beaucoup moindre que l'on croit » (2003, p. 19).

Par contre, au même moment, la persistance de l'effet frontière semble indiquer que le Canada peut réaliser plus de commerce et plus de gains économiques en atténuant la résistance toujours présente au commerce bilatéral et aux liens économiques avec les États-Unis. En effet, on ne peut ignorer la possibilité de réaliser des gains importants en éliminant les barrières commerciales qui subsistent. Il ne faut pas oublier que les estimations de l'effet frontière pour le commerce entre les États américains et le commerce au sein de l'Union européenne sont beaucoup plus basses (1,6). Donc, l'effet pourrait diminuer considérablement entre le Canada et les États-Unis. En effet, Anderson et van Wincoop (2001) pensent que l'élimination des barrières commerciales entre les deux pays pourrait faire augmenter les échanges de 44 %. Coulombe (2002), en extrapolant les résultats de leur analyse, pense que l'élimination de ces barrières pourrait générer une augmentation de 25 % des échanges.

Ce pronostic s'appuie à la fois sur le survol de la recherche présentée plus haut et sur la nature évolutive de l'environnement économique nord-américain, qui indique que :

- les estimations faites à ce sujet peuvent être très sensibles aux hypothèses de base, aux méthodes d'évaluation et au point de comparaison utilisé ; et

- l'effet frontière est encore significatif, mais a diminué considérablement grâce à des mesures de libéralisation des échanges comme celle de l'ALE et de l'ALENA.

Tous s'entendent pour dire que différents facteurs, comme l'absence d'une devise unique, l'existence de barrières non tarifaires, le rôle des réseaux locaux, l'identité, le partage des valeurs et le capital social, favorisent le maintien de l'effet frontière. Il faut tout de même faire plus de recherches en raison de l'incertitude entourant l'ampleur, l'orientation future ainsi que les différences régionales de cet effet.

Les répercussions sur l'économie et les politiques commerciales du Canada

Dans *Globalization and Well-being*, John Helliwell soutient que le Canada devrait surtout compter sur une approche commerciale multilatérale tout en réduisant sa dépendance vis-à-vis des liens bilatéraux avec son voisin américain. Son raisonnement se fonde essentiellement sur deux hypothèses. D'abord, le fait que tout renforcement des relations économiques avec les États-Unis pourrait mettre en danger sa capacité de suivre des politiques sociales et économiques indépendantes. Ensuite, le fait que l'on prévoit une croissance économique plus forte à l'extérieur du continent nord-américain.

Toutefois, l'évolution des relations économiques canado-américaines au cours des quinze dernières années ne soutient pas cette affirmation. Le Canada a pu continuer d'offrir des politiques en matière de services sociaux, d'éducation et de santé adaptées aux préférences nationales. L'expérience de l'Union européenne est la preuve que les pays peuvent maintenir des politiques sociales indépendantes même en présence d'une forte intégration économique. Par conséquent, rien ne vient étayer la crainte de voir

Une nouvelle analyse de l'effet frontière

Plusieurs études basées sur le travail de John McCallum ont répété l'exercice dans d'autres pays et à d'autres périodes, par exemple, celles de Wei (1996) et de Helliwell (1998). Dans certains cas, l'effet frontière s'est révélé être étonnamment important.

Toutefois, les améliorations apportées aux données et l'utilisation des données de l'après-ALÉ et l'après-ALÉNA, qui n'étaient pas disponibles lors de la recherche initiale de M. McCallum, ont révélé une diminution rapide des évaluations de l'effet frontière.

En améliorant la méthode de John McCallum et en utilisant de nouvelles données, John Helliwell a évalué que l'augmentation rapide du commerce nord-sud observée à la suite de la mise en œuvre de l'ALÉ a réduit l'effet frontière de 17 en 1981 à environ 12 en 1996, la plus grande partie de la diminution étant observée avant 1994. M. Helliwell avait également évalué un effet frontière beaucoup plus important pour les secteurs des services que pour ceux des marchandises avec un ratio allant de 29 à 42 de 1988-1996.

Plusieurs réponses plus générales qui ne se basaient pas sur des modèles de gravité ont été suggérées depuis lors pour expliquer la persistance de l'effet frontière. L'une des explications est que les économistes ont toujours sous-estimé le rôle de coûts frontaliers moins faciles à quantifier comme les risques liés aux taux de change et les barrières non tarifaires. Ils ont peut-être oublié des facteurs sociaux importants comme les liens historiques, les affinités sociales et culturelles et la langue commune, toutes des explications supplémentaires aux tendances des flux commerciaux ajustés pour les effets de gravité. Voilà l'essentiel de l'hypothèse de M. Helliwell.

Une deuxième explication est liée à la localisation des entreprises. Même lorsque les coûts des échanges trans-

en physique, le modèle de gravité suppose que les échanges commerciaux sont largement déterminés par la distance physique et la taille des économies. La taille est donnée par le PIB, et la distance reflète les coûts de transactions, particulièrement ceux du transport.

Une découverte déterminante de John McCallum (1995) est qu'en plus de l'impact de la distance, les frontières nationales réduisent le commerce beaucoup plus que l'on pourrait le penser compte tenu de la protection tarifaire et des autres barrières commerciales officielles. M. McCallum a examiné le commerce interprovincial, celui entre provinces et États et l'importation de l'effet frontière avec les États-Unis et a conclu que « toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, le commerce entre deux provinces est plus de 20 fois plus dense au commerce entre une province et un État ». Autrement dit, compte tenu de la distance et de la taille relative des régions, le commerce intranational était plus de 20 fois plus dense que le commerce international.

La sortie de cette étude a créé une onde de choc dans la communauté de la recherche économique parce que l'on s'attendait à ce que l'étendue des liens économiques canado-américains serait beaucoup plus grande compte tenu des barrières commerciales officielles peu élevées, de la réduction significative des coûts de communication et de transport, et de l'intensité des réseaux sociaux et économiques reliant les deux pays. L'effet frontière représentait un réel défi au bon sens économique.

Expliquer ce paradoxe demeure un élément important dans le programme de recherche parce que les effets frontières déjà estimés sont en contradiction directe avec l'opinion répandue concernant le niveau de l'intégration économique entre partenaires commerciaux, plus spécifiquement entre le Canada et les États-Unis.

frontaliers sont peu élevés, les firmes essaient de les éviter en s'établissant à l'intérieur des mêmes frontières que la majorité de leurs clients et fournisseurs, réduisant ainsi le besoin de commerce transfrontalier. Cette dernière explication est particulièrement importante pour les relations canado-américaines en raison de la différence de taille respective des deux pays et de l'importance des économies d'échelle.

Les recherches utilisant des modèles de gravité plus perfectionnés et des données récentes sur le commerce intérieur des États-Unis et du Canada ont jeté un nouvel éclairage sur l'effet frontière. Par exemple, Anderson et van Wincoop (2001) retracent l'origine d'un tel effet dans un modèle théorique de commerce multilatéral et démontrent que l'approche simple et non théorique de John McCallum et consorts est tendancieuse. Leur évaluation de l'effet frontière est 10,7. L'argument clé de Anderson et van Wincoop est le suivant : l'économie américaine est beaucoup plus grande et plus diversifiée que celle du Canada. De plus, les États américains ont plus de possibilités de commercer que les provinces canadiennes. Cela veut dire que les barrières commerciales modestes entre les deux pays créent un important effet frontière pour les provinces canadiennes, mais non pour les États américains : elles auraient plutôt un impact limité pour ces derniers. Anderson et Wincoop ont intitulé cet effet « résistance multilatérale ».

En plus des barrières non tarifaires, des facteurs sociaux, des effets de taille et de la résistance multilatérale, Coulombe (2002) démontre que la géographie et la densité économique sont également essentielles pour comprendre cet effet. Par rapport aux États américains, les provinces canadiennes sont, en général, plus éloignées de leurs partenaires commerciaux potentiels. De plus, ceux-ci ont une densité

La

mondialisation
et le bien-êtrel'effet frontière,
le rôle del'État-nation
et les relationséconomiques
canado-

américaines

John Helliwell
(UBC Press, 2002)Analyse par
André Downs
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Projet de recherche sur les politiques.

Introduction

On observe un perpétuel débat au sein de la collectivité canadienne des politiques sur l'importance de la frontière canado-américaine comme entrave au commerce et autres transactions économiques et la mesure dans laquelle « l'effet frontière » pourrait isoler le processus d'élaboration des politiques au Canada face à l'évolution mondiale et nord-américaine.

L'ouvrage *Globalization and Well-being* de John Helliwell, lauréat 2002-2003 du prix Donner consacrant le meilleur ouvrage dans la catégorie des politiques publiques canadiennes, constitue une contribution importante à ce débat. En termes clairs, John Helliwell explique comme suit l'impact de l'effet frontière et l'effet protecteur correspondant sur l'élaboration des politiques nationales :

- en raison du rôle prépondérant de la géographie et de la présence de frontières beaucoup plus hermétiques qu'on ne le croit généralement, on a sous-estimé l'importance du dossier de l'autonomie nationale relativement à la mondialisation;
- il est plus facile et moins coûteux de fonctionner au sein de réseaux fondés sur la confiance et le partage de normes, et la densité de ces réseaux diminue avec la distance, surtout dans le cas de réseaux transfrontaliers; en conséquence, les différences de densité de réseau peuvent expliquer celles du commerce et des autres transactions économiques transfrontalières;
- le bien-être d'une personne ne dépend pas tant de sa richesse matérielle, comme peuvent le soutenir le discours prédominant et certaines orientations de politiques; par exemple, la santé et l'éducation ont des effets directs et indirects très puissants sur le bien-être et elles génèrent d'importantes externalités fortes et positives;

Les origines de l'effet

frontière

Par contre, on pourrait discuter du fait qu'en raison de l'incertitude concernant la mesure, l'évolution et le rôle protecteur de l'effet frontière, les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques canadiens ne peuvent pas supposer que cet effet permet aux gouvernements canadiens de promouvoir des politiques reflétant strictement les valeurs et les préférences nationales sans tenir compte des développements sur le plan international et particulièrement nord-américain.

- il est possible de maintenir et de faire progresser des politiques conçues à des fins domestiques, particulièrement celles qui touchent le domaine social, en raison du degré élevé de séparation entre les économies des pays et leurs sociétés;
- l'importance du tissu social et institutionnel offre plus de latitude aux responsables de l'élaboration des politiques pour établir des politiques basées principalement sur les préférences nationales et non sur les pressions internationales ou, dans le cas du Canada, de l'environnement nord-américain.

Pour clarifier quelque peu ce débat crucial sur les politiques publiques, il est primordial d'examiner les fondements théoriques et l'évidence empirique qui appuient le concept d'effet frontière. Une doctrine fondamentale dans le monde de l'économie internationale stipule que la distance et la taille ont une influence sur le volume des échanges bilatéraux entre nations. Tout comme l'équation de la gravité

Plus particulièrement, la fragmentation de la production, et le va-et-vient intensif des échanges intra-sectoriels qui en découlent, pourront accroître considérablement les similitudes de déroulement des cycles économiques entre divers pays.

Evaluation empirique

Le principal défi de l'étude empirique des effets de l'intégration des échanges sur le synchronisme des cycles économiques consiste à isoler l'effet de l'intégration des échanges de celui d'autres facteurs liés au synchronisme des cycles économiques entre plusieurs pays.

Dans l'un des plus importants articles publiés sur le sujet au cours des dernières années, Frankel et Rose démontrent que, de 1959 à 1993, les pays de l'OCDE ayant des liens commerciaux étroits ont également affiché des cycles économiques très fortement corrélés (1998)⁶. Les résultats de leurs calculs de régression montrent que l'augmentation d'un seul écart type de l'intensité des échanges accroît de 0,13 la corrélation bilatérale des cycles économiques.

Le document duquel est tiré le présent article tente ainsi de préciser la méthode de Frankel et Rose en utilisant les données régionales du Canada et des États-Unis, et en incluant les données sur les échanges intra-sectoriels dans l'analyse de régression. Les avantages de ces précisions et adaptations sont doubles :

- les données régionales permettent de mieux isoler l'effet de l'intégration des échanges commerciaux, ce qui permet de se concentrer exclusivement sur l'aspect structurel des transmissions (au lieu d'avoir à étudier, par exemple, les différences politiques entre les pays, comme l'ont fait Frankel et Rose);
- l'inclusion de données sur les échanges intra-sectoriels nous fournit un contexte unique pour évaluer si les changements de structure des échanges, comme la hausse du

deux pays?

Nos estimations vont globalement dans le même sens et se rapprochent

même de celles qu'ont obtenues

Frankel et Rose. On pense que l'inté-

gration accrue des échanges commer-

ciaux entre régions a des effets positifs

marqués sur le synchronisme des

cycles économiques entre les régions

du Canada et des États-Unis. Cela est

dû au fait que les échanges entre les

régions du Canada et des États-Unis

sont en grande partie dominés par

les effets des échanges intra-sectoriels,

qui accroissent l'interdépendance

des régions.

Conclusion

Nos résultats, malgré les adaptations

que nous avons apportées, vont dans

le même sens que les conclusions

générales de Frankel et Rose, à savoir

que la croissance des échanges com-

merciaux entre le Canada et les États-

Unis a donné lieu à un synchronisme

accru des cycles économiques entre

les deux pays.

Renvois

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Francesco Giavazzi (dir.), *The Transition to*

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Notes

1 Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que

les auteurs et ne doivent aucunement

être attribuées au ministère du Commerce

international ou au gouvernement du

Canada.

2 Les données sur le PIB sont exprimées en

monnaie locale, en dollars constants de

1997 ou prix en chaîne. Les données sur

Le PIB sont modifiées de la manière sui-

vante : d'abord, nous prenons les loga-

ritmes naturels du PIB de façon à

pouvoir interpréter la variable qui en

découle comme un taux de croissance.

Puis, nous faisons abstraction des ten-

dances temporelles de la variable, au

moyen du filtre de Hodrick Prescott (HP)

(au moyen du paramètre de lissage tradi-

tionnel de 1600).

3 L'indice de concordance calcule le nom-

bre de périodes durant lesquelles les

cycles nationaux sont dans la même

phase, en termes de fraction du nombre

total de périodes de l'échantillon. Si deux

cycles sont en parfait synchronisme,

c'est-à-dire qu'ils se situent exactement

au même point, le coefficient de corréla-

tion sera de 1; s'ils ne sont pas en corréla-

tion, le coefficient sera de 0.

4 Les données sur le PIB présentées dans ce

tableau font abstraction des tendances

temporelles; la méthode utilisée pour ce

faire est le filtre HP.

5 Nous utilisons trois procédés différents :

1) nous appliquons le filtre Hodrick

Prescott (HP) pour retirer la dimension

des tendances temporelles dans les vari-

ables; 2) nous retirons la dimension des

tendances temporelles des variables en

calculant le premier écart des variables, et

en multipliant par 100; 3) nous retirons

la dimension des tendances temporelles

des variables en examinant la forme

d'une régression de la variable de la ten-

dance de temps linéaire.

6 Frankel et Rose ont utilisé à la fois la

méthode traditionnelle des moindres car-

rés et celle des variables instrumentales,

mais affichent une préférence pour cette

dernière, suivant l'hypothèse qu'une

approche commune en matière de poli-

tique monétaire ou un taux de change

fixe pourraient fausser les données de cor-

relation entre l'intégration des échanges

et le synchronisme des cycles écono-

miques. Ils ont recours aux paramètres

fictifs de la distance, de la proximité et de

variables à expliquer les échanges et selon

l'hypothèse qu'ils sont déterminés de

L'extérieur et par ailleurs non reliés aux

cycles économiques

À l'instar de Frankel et Rose, les auteurs

utilisent la méthode des moindres carrés

dans l'évaluation des coefficients de l'in-

tensité des échanges. Les trois variables

instrumentales choisies sont déterminées

de l'extérieur : distances, populations

régionales, et réductions tarifaires entre

le Canada et les États-Unis.

Corrélations moyennes des variations du PIB réel entre les régions du Canada et des États-Unis, 1981-1995

Calcul de Tendance	Filtre HP	différences temporelle linéaire	
		Canada - régions	E.-U. - régions
0,471	0,496	0,565	0,739
0,681	0,716	0,561	0,596

il est palpable. Ce que nous tirons de cette analyse est qu'en termes de dynamisme et de corrélation des variations des cycles économiques, l'économie canadienne s'est davantage intégrée à l'économie américaine. Les facteurs qui devraient normalement contribuer à un resserrement du synchronisme des cycles économiques des deux pays fait l'objet de la section suivante.

Les causes de la nouvelle situation

Les fluctuations dans la croissance de toute économie peuvent survenir à la suite de chocs découlant de facteurs tels qu'une nouvelle politique économique, le volume d'investissement des entreprises, les décisions en matière d'épargne et de consommation, de même que la productivité de la main-d'œuvre et des capitaux. Ces chocs peuvent également se transmettre à d'autres pays par la voie des divers liens économiques et structurels que sont le commerce et les investissements internationaux, les marchés financiers et les retombées technologiques telles qu'on les conçoit traditionnellement, ou par la voie des liens politiques ou institutionnels comme la mobilité de la main-d'œuvre, une approche commune en matière de politique monétaire, et une coordination des politiques de taux de change. Autrement dit, le synchronisme des cycles économiques pourrait très bien résulter de l'application

ne le sont les régions canadiennes avec elles, alors que les régions canadiennes sont en plus étroite corrélation avec les régions des États-Unis qu'entre elles. Ces résultats correspondent aux calculs fondés sur trois méthodes distinctes faisant abstraction des tendances temporelles (se reporter au tableau 2). Les résultats présentés ci-dessus semblent contredire les constatations empiriques que l'on trouve dans les documents traitant des « effets frontaliers » et prétendant qu'une fois redressées pour tenir compte de la taille des populations et des distances, les données sur le commerce intérieur (inter-provincial) du Canada sont de plusieurs fois supérieures aux échanges transfrontaliers, c'est-à-dire que l'économie nationale canadienne est plus intégrée que ne le sont les quelques économies régionales transfrontalières. L'effet frontalier entre le Canada et les États-Unis a passablement diminué depuis l'entrée en vigueur de l'Accord de libre-échange, mais il demeure néanmoins bien palpable. Aussi, les politiques nationales visant la promotion d'une identité culturelle nationale propre ainsi que des valeurs, institutions et règles distinctes, ont généralement pour effet de favoriser la production intérieure, ce qui devrait se traduire par un volume moindre d'échanges internationaux qu'en l'absence de telles mesures.

Selon notre analyse de cette question, l'effet de frontière existe bel et bien et

tion volontaire par les pays concernés optimale. Par exemple, certains pays tendent à relier volontairement leur monnaie à celle de leur principal partenaire commercial afin de profiter des gains associés à une plus grande stabilité des taux de change. De même, l'adoption par les autorités concernées d'une approche commune en matière de politique monétaire aura une incidence positive sur la corrélation des cycles économiques. Cette constatation a encouragé Frankel et Rose (1998) à affirmer que les pays « mauvais candidats » ex ante à l'inclusion dans une union monétaire pourraient satisfaire le critère ex post car l'entrée dans une telle union pourrait bien donner une impulsion supplémentaire à l'expansion du commerce qui, à son tour, favorisera une corrélation plus étroite des cycles économiques.

L'argument que l'on sert habituellement pour expliquer pourquoi une hausse du commerce international renforcerait la corrélation de l'activité économique entre plusieurs pays est assez direct : l'intensification du commerce international accroît l'ampleur des chocs entre les pays. En réalité, l'incidence de l'intégration des échanges sur la corrélation des cycles économiques peut très bien aller dans les deux sens. D'une part, l'ouverture du commerce peut mener à une spécialisation croissante de la production suivant l'avantage comparatif de chacun des pays concernés par rapport à ses partenaires commerciaux, ce qui mène à des échanges intersectoriels. Si des types de production différents sont soumis à des chocs de nature différente, une intégration accrue des échanges, du fait qu'elle entraîne une plus grande spécialisation, pourra avoir pour effet de réduire la corrélation des cycles économiques (Krugman, 1993). D'autre part, si les modèles de spécialisation de la production et des échanges se développent essentiellement dans les secteurs d'activité soumis aux mêmes chocs, la spécialisation pourra alors avoir un effet de synchronisation des cycles économiques.

TABLEAU 1

Comme nous l'avons mentionné précédemment, l'intensification de l'intégration économique canado-américaine a également une dimension régionale importante, qui reflète bien l'expansion rapide des échanges à l'échelle régionale (provinces-États). Pour compléter la situation, l'on observe un déclin de l'importance relative du lien traditionnel est-ouest ou inter-provincial, au profit d'un axe commercial nord-sud. Pour bien comprendre la portée globale de cette évolution du synchronisme des cycles économiques, reportons-nous aux données provinciales présentées au tableau 1, qui expose les corrélations des variations du PIB réel des diverses régions du Canada et des États-Unis. Plusieurs tendances se démarquent et chacune est décrite ci-après.

D'abord, entre les régions du Canada, l'activité économique de l'Ontario est en étroite corrélation avec celle du Québec; le coefficient de corrélation s'établit à 0,926, et ce taux est le plus élevé de toutes les régions du Canada. Mais les corrélations faiblissent le long de l'axe est-ouest. Par exemple, le coefficient estimatif de corrélation entre l'Ontario et les Prairies passe à 0,48,

La situation est complètement différente, cependant, en ce qui touche aux corrélations entre les régions des deux extrémités de l'espace géographique du pays : les régions de l'Atlantique et des Prairies, et la région de l'Atlantique et la Colombie-Britannique. Les coefficients estimatifs de corrélation pour ces deux couples de régions se sont établis à -0,085 et 0,074 respectivement. Des taux de corrélation aussi faibles, on croitait presque que ces économies sont complètement détachées l'une de l'autre ont surpris étant donné la politique monétaire unique imposée dans toutes les régions du Canada et la mobilité de la main-d'œuvre entre les régions. Ces facteurs ont atténué les écarts entre les cycles économiques régionaux, s'ajoutant aux nombreuses politiques adoptées en matière sociale, économique et d'infrastructures, qui visent la promotion de l'unité économique et sociale du pays.

Ensuite, entre les régions du Canada et des États-Unis, l'Ontario comme le

Québec affichent des taux plus élevés de corrélation avec toutes les régions des États-Unis qu'avec le reste du Canada, sauf entre l'Ontario et le Québec, et entre l'Ontario et la région Atlantique. Comme prévu, les variations de l'activité économique dans la région Atlantique sont plus étroitement corrélées aux variations dans le nord-est des États-Unis qu'à celles de plusieurs régions du Canada, y compris le Québec. De même, les cycles économiques de la région des Prairies sont plus étroitement alignés sur ceux du Midwest américain et du sud des États-Unis qu'avec le reste du Canada. La seule exception est la Colombie-Britannique, qui affiche de faibles corrélations avec toutes les régions des États-Unis (les coefficients vont de 0,359 à 0,48, le plus élevé, bien que très légèrement, étant celui avec le Midwest), mais des corrélations relativement élevées avec les autres régions canadiennes, particulièrement les Prairies et le Québec. Les liens étroits de la Colombie-Britannique avec les autres régions du Pacifique pourraient expliquer en grande partie cette tendance.

Troisièmement, les régions des États-Unis semblent en moyenne plus étroitement corrélées entre elles que

Corrélations des variations du PIB réel des diverses régions du Canada et des États-Unis, 1981-1999⁴

LES RÉGIONS DU CANADA		LES RÉGIONS DES ÉTATS-UNIS	
Canada	États-Unis	Canada	États-Unis
Région Atlantique	Atlantique	1	
Québec	Québec	1	
Ontario	Ontario	1	
Prairies	Prairies	1	
C.-B. & Nord	C.-B. & Nord	0,074	0,274
		0,512	0,771
		0,640	0,630
		1	0,486
			1
			0,648
			0,459
			0,645
			0,737
			1
			0,638
			0,787
			1

l'économie canadienne par rapport à l'évolution de l'activité économique des États-Unis laisse supposer que les responsables canadiens de l'élaboration des politiques n'avaient pas à prévoir de changements de politiques aux États-Unis à court terme, ni à y réagir, et qu'ils pouvaient maintenir le cap de leurs politiques jusqu'au moment où le cycle économique des États-Unis commencerait à toucher l'économie canadienne, soit un an plus tard. Cependant, à compter des années 1980, une nouvelle tendance s'est manifestée, et le synchronisme des cycles économiques des deux pays a commencé à se resserrer, l'économie canadienne fluctuant presque au même moment que l'économie aux États-Unis, bien que l'amplitude des variations demeurait très différente. Nous avons créé un indice de concordance pour mesurer cette situation sur deux sous-périodes, avant 1980 et après 1980³. Nos calculs montrent que le nombre d'années pendant lesquelles le Canada et les États-Unis se sont trouvés dans la même phase du cycle économique, en terme de fraction du nombre total d'années étudié, est passé de 0,8 de 1951 à 1979, à 0,85 entre 1980 et 1999. La figure 2 présente la deuxième méthode de mesure du synchronisme des cycles économiques, les coefficients de corrélation entre les variations du PIB réel aux États-Unis et au Canada de 1950 à 1979 et de 1980 à 1999. Les données sur le PIB réel sont calculées au moyen de deux indices de prix différents, soit l'indice de prix en chaîne et des prix en valeur constante. Dans les deux cas, les résultats soutiennent la conclusion d'un synchronisme croissant des cycles économiques des deux pays au cours des 50 dernières années. Pendant la première sous-période (1950-1979), les coefficients estimatifs de corrélation se sont établis à 0,586 pour l'indice de prix en chaîne, et à 0,699 pour l'indice des prix en valeur constante. Cependant, ces corrélations ont été nettement plus prononcées au cours de la deuxième sous-période

FIGURE 2

Moyenne de la diversité selon la taille de la ville pour certaines villes, 1992-2002





FIGURE 2

Corrélation des variations du PIB réel entre le Canada et les É.-U., 1950-1999



De l'influence internationale sur le synchronisme des phases du cycle économique en Amérique du Nord

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Nous nous intéresserons dans le présent article au synchronisme des phases du cycle économique entre le Canada et les États-Unis d'un point de vue régional. Nous verrons si l'augmentation des échanges régionaux entre les deux pays a mené à une corrélation marquée de la simultanéité de l'activité économique d'un pays à l'autre.

Depuis l'entrée en vigueur de l'Accord de libre-échange (ALE) entre le Canada et les États-Unis en 1989, l'économie canadienne s'est intégrée progressivement à l'économie américaine. Quelques chiffres permettent de mettre la situation en perspective :

les échanges de biens et services canadiens avec les États-Unis ont doublé en pourcentage du PIB, passant d'une moyenne de 30 % dans les années 1970 à plus de 60 % à la fin de des

années 1990, l'essentiel de la hausse faisant suite à l'entrée en vigueur de l'Accord en 1989. À l'échelle régionale, toutes les provinces canadiennes ont considérablement accru le volume de leurs exportations vers les États-Unis; celles-ci ont en effet doublé, en pourcentage du PIB, pour passer de 18,6 à 37,6 % au cours de la période 1989-2002, tandis que les exportations est-ouest ou interprovinciales chutaient de 22,5 à 19,7 % du PIB au cours de cette période. Le resserrément des liens économiques entre le Canada et les États-Unis a soulevé la question de savoir si l'intégration économique accrue des deux pays a suscité un plus grand synchronisme des phases du cycle économique, ou un mouvement réciproque plus prononcé du PIB entre les deux nations.

Le concept d'un synchronisme croissant des phases du cycle économique entre pays est d'une grande importance lorsque vient le temps d'adopter des politiques économiques nationales, qu'il s'agisse d'élargir le cadre des échanges et de coordination ou de conclure de nouvelles ententes commerciales ou monétaires. De fait, le synchronisme des phases du cycle

économique constitue un élément important de la documentation traitant d'une zone monétaire optimale, et joue un rôle prépondérant dans l'évaluation des coûts liés à l'imposition de limites à une politique monétaire indépendante. Ainsi, l'analyse de cette question a fait l'objet d'une attention marquée au cours des dernières années, car elle est très pertinente au vu de l'Union économique et monétaire européenne (UEM) et de l'intégration économique continue en Amérique du Nord.

Corrélations : évolution ou statu quo?

L'on parle de synchronisme des phases du cycle économique lorsque le moment et l'ampleur de modifications d'envergure de l'activité économique de plusieurs pays se ressemblent de plus en plus. On a recours à deux grandes méthodes pour mesurer le synchronisme du cycle économique (FMI, 2001 et FMI 2002). La première, la corrélation de concordance, sert à calculer le nombre de périodes pendant lesquelles les cycles de divers pays sont en même phase. La deuxième, la corrélation de la production, mesure les similarités en ce qui touche au moment et à l'ampleur des variations de production. Selon cette méthode, l'on dira des cycles économiques nationaux qu'ils sont synchronisés si la corrélation entre eux est directe et marquée. Plus celle-ci est directe, plus étroit sera le synchronisme des cycles. La méthode de la corrélation de la production a été la plus utilisée, et c'est également celle que nous privilégierons ici.

La figure 1 expose l'évolution du PIB au Canada et aux États-Unis entre 1950 et 1992. Les données sur le PIB font abstraction des tendances temporelles afin de bien mettre en lumière les fluctuations du cycle économique. Un coup d'œil à ce graphique permet de constater que les fluctuations du PIB réel du Canada ont toujours suivi d'une année celles

1990 et au début des années de ce siècle³, les grandes villes (population supérieure à 500 000 habitants) sont devenues légèrement moins diversifiées (plus spécialisées). Par ailleurs, les petites villes (10 000 à 99 000 habitants) et les villes de taille moyenne (100 000 à 499 000 habitants) ont gagné en diversification au cours de cette même période (voir la figure 2). Bien que leur ampleur soit relativement faible, ces changements témoignent de la lenteur de l'évolution de la structure urbaine et montrent que les industries se sont déplacées des grands centres urbains vers des centres urbains plus petits. La vérification des hypothèses à la source de ces tendances dépasse la portée de cet article. Néanmoins, il est possible de les placer dans le contexte de deux des forces structurelles sur lesquelles reposent les changements dans l'économie canadienne pendant la dernière décennie, à savoir les changements technologiques et la libéralisation des marchés. Sur le plan théorique, l'accroissement du commerce devrait conduire à des économies urbaines moins diversifiées, à mesure qu'elles se spécialisent dans des branches d'activités où elles ont un avantage comparatif sur les marchés internationaux. Une plus grande spécialisation des grandes villes va de pair avec les effets de la libéralisation des marchés, ce qui n'est pas le cas de l'augmentation de la diversité des petites et des moyennes villes. On peut supposer néanmoins que cette dernière tendance soit le résultat de la baisse des coûts de transport et de communication résultant d'investissements dans les nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication. Cette baisse des coûts peut avoir incité les industries à s'installer dans de petites villes et des régions rurales pour profiter des taux de salaire moins élevés qui y prévalent (Kilkenny, 1998).

Conclusion

Le degré de diversification varie beaucoup d'une ville canadienne à l'autre. Ce qui donne à penser que les économies urbaines peuvent aussi différer du point de vue de leur stabilité économique et de leur potentiel de croissance.

L'analyse démontre que les degrés de diversité sont étroitement reliés à la population des régions urbaines. Le degré de diversification augmente avec la taille des villes. Toutefois, les degrés élevés de diversité ne se limitent pas aux villes dont la population se chiffre dans les millions. Les villes dont la population se situe autour de 100 000 habitants enregistrent souvent le même degré de diversité que des centres urbains beaucoup plus grands.

Au cours de la période étudiée, l'économie du Canada s'est davantage intégrée aux marchés mondiaux et a connu des bouleversements technologiques liés à la révolution des technologies de l'information. L'intégration aux marchés mondiaux est associée à la fois à une diminution de la diversification industrielle des grands centres urbains canadiens et à une dispersion plus grande de l'activité économique en faveur des centres urbains de petite et de moyenne taille, qui peut avoir découlé de la mise en œuvre des nouvelles technologies, lesquelles ont entraîné une réduction des coûts de transport et de communication.

Renvois

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Notes

- 1 Statistique Canada met à votre disposition une version plus détaillée de cette analyse sur la diversité des villes canadiennes et sur les descriptions des données et des méthodes utilisées. Voir Beckstead, D. et M. Brown. « De Labrador City à Toronto : la diversité industrielle des villes canadiennes, 1992 à 2002, Aperçus sur l'économie canadienne » no 11-624-MIE2003003, Direction des études analytiques, Ottawa, Statistique Canada.
- 2 Les villes définies sont les régions métropolitaines de recensement (RMR) et les agglomérations de recensement (ARR). Cette différence n'est toutefois pas significative statistiquement. Néanmoins, cette conclusion correspond à la baisse de la diversité dans le secteur de la fabrication au cœur des grandes villes (plus longue période).
- 3 Cette différence n'est toutefois pas significative statistiquement. Néanmoins, cette conclusion correspond à la baisse de la diversité dans le secteur de la fabrication au cœur des grandes villes (plus longue période).

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Diversité industrielle en fonction de la population, 2002


FIGURE 1



aToronto 2002 = 100.
Source : Mise en tableau spéciale, Registre des entreprises et Recensement, 1996.

FIGURE 2

Moyenne de la diversité selon la taille de la ville pour certaines villes, 1992-2002



L'augmentation de la diversité est à la fois une cause et un effet de la croissance des niveaux de population. Il ressort aussi de la figure 1 que le rapport entre la population et la diversité n'est pas linéaire. Dans le cas des petits centres urbains, c'est-à-dire ceux qui comptent entre 10 000 et 100 000 habitants, une augmentation de la population a un effet positif très important sur la diversité. Toutefois, dans le cas des grands centres urbains, le rapport entre la diversité et la taille est beaucoup plus faible.

Selon toute vraisemblance, le rapport entre la taille de la population et la diversité des grandes villes est relativement faible en raison des minces possibilités de voir de nouvelles industries s'y installer. La croissance démographique dans les petites villes attire de nombreuses nouvelles industries

désireuses de desservir le marché local. Dans le cas des grands centres, les industries qui dépendent des marchés locaux pour survivre sont déjà implantées. Les autres industries sont celles qui sont installées dans un nombre

relativement restreint de villes. Si elles sont plus rares, c'est parce qu'elles ont besoin de facteurs de production parti-

culiers (p. ex., la transformation du poisson) ou qu'elles comportent des économies d'échelle significatives (p. ex., la fabrication d'avions) ou encore qu'elles dépendent d'importantes économies d'agglomération (p. ex., les services financiers). Par conséquent, il semble y avoir peu de possibilités de diversification des économies des grands centres urbains.

La diversité industrielle au

fil du temps

En plus d'avoir des conséquences sur les degrés de diversité industrielle, la taille des villes est également fonction de la diversification dans le temps (voir la figure 2). Au cours des années

L'évolution de la diversité industrielle des villes canadiennes, 1992-2002

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Introduction

Cet article¹ est tiré d'une étude qui décrit la diversité industrielle des villes canadiennes². Il compare les villes canadiennes les unes aux autres sur le plan de leur degré de diversité et décrit l'évolution de ces degrés au cours des dix dernières années, de 1992 à 2002. Ces années ont marqué une période de changements structurels importants dans l'économie canadienne, résultant en partie de la libéralisation des échanges, de l'intégration de l'économie continentale et des changements technologiques, tous des éléments qui peuvent avoir eu des répercussions sur la diversité industrielle des villes canadiennes.

Deux raisons principales poussent les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques à considérer la diversité comme une caractéristique positive des économies urbaines (Quigley, 1998). La première est le fait que les économies diversifiées sont considérées comme des économies stables (Baldwin et Brown, 2003). Les petites villes mono-industrielles sont vulnérables à la récession que pourrait subir leur industrie principale et qui pourrait se traduire par des taux de chômage élevés et l'exode de travailleurs. Les localités qui regroupent un vaste éventail d'industries sont mieux en mesure de survivre à l'effondrement d'un ou de plusieurs de ses industries, les travailleurs étant plus susceptibles de trouver rapidement des emplois dans d'autres secteurs. La deuxième raison est que les économies diversifiées sont considérées comme plus dynamiques. Les villes diversifiées sont des pépinières de nouvelles idées, ces dernières étant plus facilement transférables d'une branche d'activité à l'autre, ce qui favorise des degrés plus élevés de croissance (Jacob, 1969; Glaeser, 1992; Glaeser, 2000; Duranton, 2001). Tout au long de l'étude, nous mesurerons la diversité à l'aide d'un indice qui tient compte du nombre

d'industries présentes dans chaque ville et de la façon dont l'emploi est réparti entre elles. Plus le nombre d'industries présentes dans une ville est élevé et plus la distribution de l'emploi est répartie de façon égale, plus l'indice est élevé. Afin de faciliter l'exposé, la diversité de chaque ville est comparée à celle de Toronto, dont le degré de diversité est considéré comme égal à 100.

La diversité d'une ville canadienne à l'autre

On observe des écarts importants dans le degré de diversité des différentes régions urbaines au Canada. Cela ressort clairement de la figure 1, qui relie le degré de diversité de chaque région urbaine à son niveau de population. En 2002, Montréal était la région urbaine la plus diversifiée au Canada, et elle a obtenu un indice de diversification de 108. Toronto, Vancouver et Winnipeg suivent de près. Le centre urbain le moins diversifié (ou le plus spécialisé) était Kitimat, dont le degré de diversité était se situe à peu près au huitième de celui de Montréal.

Les grands écarts dans les degrés de diversité entre les villes ne sont pas aléatoires. Comme le montre la figure 1, il existe un rapport manifeste entre la diversité et la taille de la population. Les localités qui comptent les populations les plus faibles ont tendance à avoir les économies les plus spécialisées (ou les moins diversifiées). Par ailleurs, les grands centres urbains ont les économies les plus diversifiées. Il est permis de croire qu'il existe deux facteurs reliant la taille de la population et la diversité. Premièrement la croissance de la population peut être partiellement attribuable à l'arrivée de nouvelles industries et aux nouveaux emplois qu'elles créent. Deuxièmement, à mesure que la population des villes augmente, leur marché local fait de même, ce qui permet d'appuyer une diversité plus grande d'industries.

Bien que ce portrait aille dans le sens des attentes suscitées par l'analyse de Courchene, l'aspect dynamique de cette tendance est un aspect de convergence généralisée tant entre les États et les provinces qu'entre les provinces elles-mêmes.

En examinant nos différents ensembles de paires État-province, nous constatons que tous les appariements suivent une même tendance. À l'exception des appariements de référence, les écarts entre les paires État-province sont invariablement moins importants lorsque le critère de la proximité géographique est utilisé que nos mesures d'intégration économique. En 2000, les écarts moyens entre les paires État-province contigus (36,0 %) et les paires État-province formées à partir de notre définition de la proximité (37,5 %) étaient nettement moins importants que les écarts moyens entre toutes les paires de provinces (43,5 %). Ils étaient même inférieurs aux écarts moyens entre les paires de provinces contigües (48,9 %). À titre de comparaison, les paires État-province créées en fonction des échanges (52,4 %) et de la concurrence (52,8 %) sont les moins similaires parmi tous les ensembles de paires de provinces ou de paires État-province. Ces tendances semblent remettre en question l'argument selon lequel la convergence s'explique principalement par des échanges accrus.

Observations

Dans notre recherche initiale, nous avons tenté d'évaluer la mesure dans laquelle l'analyse des tendances transfrontalières de convergence des politiques peut mettre en lumière la question de savoir si une intégration économique accrue entraîne la convergence des politiques. Dans les domaines que nous avons examinés d'un point de vue empirique, nous pouvons faire les observations suivantes. D'abord, les tendances infranationales ne semblent pas remettre fondamentalement en cause les tendances nationales de convergence et de divergence. Toutefois, certaines

tendances infranationales intéressantes présentent des différences de degré, voire d'orientation, par rapport aux tendances nationales, et nous croyons que ces différences, lorsqu'elles seront décrites en détail, nous permettront d'avoir une meilleure compréhension analytique de questions plus larges sur la convergence. De plus, certaines données après 1995 viennent appuyer l'hypothèse selon laquelle il y aurait convergence entre les entités infranationales et transfrontalières, ce qui n'apparaît pas clairement dans les analyses nationales. C'est le cas des gains dans la part du revenu pour le quintile supérieur des États et des provinces jumelés selon notre indice de proximité (comprenant la distance et le nombre d'habitants), ainsi que des paires ayant un niveau élevé d'échanges après 1995. De même, dans les années 1990, la convergence entre les États et les provinces quant aux dépenses consacrées à la réduction et au contrôle de la pollution est plus marquée entre les paires État-province contigus que parmi tous les États et les provinces mis ensemble.

Les résultats de cette analyse indiquent qu'il est nécessaire d'élargir notre recherche pour inclure de nouveaux indicateurs et aspects des résultats des politiques afin d'évaluer l'existence de tendances similaires aux tendances décrites ci-dessus. De plus, il serait utile d'établir des comparaisons détaillées entre des paires transfrontalières précises (p. ex., Colombie-Britannique-Washington, Ontario-Michigan). Enfin, un programme de comparaison et de différenciation plus rigoureux des paires comportant différentes caractéristiques (p. ex., proximité, interdépendance commerciale, etc.) est nécessaire pour comprendre les relations de cause à effet entre des facteurs tels que l'intégration économique et la convergence des politiques. Une telle recherche promet d'enrichir considérablement les études nationales actuelles sur l'influence transfrontalière des politiques.

Renvois


Notes

- 1 Ce programme de recherche a été financé grâce à une subvention du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada. Les auteurs aimeraient remercier Matt Walcott pour son aide inestimable à la recherche.
- 2 Les provinces peuvent également adapter leurs politiques en réaction aux pressions concurrentielles exercées par les États américains en l'absence de niveaux élevés de commerce de marchandises entre eux. Par exemple, les provinces font concurrence aux États non seulement en matière de commerce mais aussi d'investissement. Pour avoir une idée de ces pressions concurrentielles, nous avons mené une enquête écrite et téléphonique auprès de représentants chargés du développement économique et de chambres de commerce ou de conseils de développement commercial des dix gouvernements provinciaux. Nous leur avons demandé d'identifier les États canadiens par rapport aux provinces canadiennes qu'ils considéraient comme leurs principaux concurrents en matière de commerce et d'investissement. De plus, nous avons demandé aux répondants quels étaient les États ou les provinces qu'ils utilisaient comme « principales références » pour savoir vers où les provinces se tournaient lorsqu'elles se positionnaient dans un environnement économique concurrentiel.

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FIGURE 3



la mobilité interprovinciale de la moitié inférieure), nous observons une tendance à la convergence interprovinciale et à la divergence transfrontalière.

formées d'après le critère de la proximité géographique et les paires créées en fonction des indicateurs d'intégration économique et de concurrence. Contrairement aux tendances de la moitié inférieure, les deux ensembles de paires les plus similaires en 2000 reposent sur les échanges et sur notre indice de proximité (qui tient compte de la distance et du nombre d'habitants). Dans ce cas-ci également, la tendance générale de convergence est plus marquée après 1995.

Les résultats obtenus pour ces catégories de revenus vont généralement à l'encontre de la tendance prévue dans l'analyse de Courchene, selon laquelle les écarts entre les provinces devraient augmenter, alors que ceux des régions frontalières devraient diminuer. L'image qui se dégage va plutôt à l'inverse de cette tendance : les différences transfrontalières ont augmenté de façon générale, tandis que les écarts entre les provinces ont généralement diminué. Nos résultats appuient d'ailleurs la tendance prévue dans l'analyse de Courchene après 1995. Les écarts entre les provinces contiguës ont augmenté au lieu de diminuer, tel qu'observé depuis 1980, bien que la tendance entre les provinces soit toujours à la convergence. De plus, la convergence observée dans les réductions de la part du revenu du quintile supérieur des paires État-province est plus marquée après 1995.

L'on pourrait précisément s'attendre à des tendances distinctes parmi les différentes catégories de revenus lorsque la convergence repose sur la mobilité entre les régions. Dans le cas du quintile supérieur, qui est susceptible d'être le plus mobile entre les régions, il y a présence de convergence tant entre les provinces qu'entre les États et les provinces après 1990. Dans le cas de la moitié inférieure de la répartition des revenus, où la mobilité transfrontalière est beaucoup plus limitée (autant par rapport à la mobilité transfrontalière du quintile supérieur qu'à

Gain dans la part du revenu, moitié inférieure : Écart moyen entre les paires




FIGURE 1

Gain dans la part du revenu, quintile supérieur : Écart moyen entre les paires




FIGURE 2

la part du revenu de marché avant impôts et transferts – de la moitié inférieure de la répartition des revenus, du quintile inférieur et du quintile supérieur (voir la figure 1).

L'examen de l'écart moyen des gains dans la moitié inférieure de la répartition des revenus entre des paires d'état-province formées à partir de divers critères révèle une tendance générale vers des différences légères – ment à la hausse pour l'ensemble de la période. Les États et les provinces contigus constituent une exception marquée à cette tendance générale, car il existe une convergence notable de 1980 à 1990, qui diminue légèrement dans les années 1990. Bien que la différence entre nos mesures de proximité géographique et d'intégration économique et de concurrence n'apparaissent pas clairement en 1980, les écarts entre les paires sont invariablement moins importants dans nos mesures de proximité géographique que dans nos mesures d'intégration économique après 1990. (Une tendance similaire apparaît clairement dans la comparaison des gains du quintile inférieur.)

Nous observons une tendance différente quant aux écarts de réduction dans la part du revenu du quintile supérieur. Dans ce cas, la tendance générale des paires État-province est à la convergence (voir la figure 2). Bien que le degré de convergence au fil du temps et les niveaux de différence en tout temps varient selon nos divers ensembles de paires, il n'y a pas de différence évidente entre les paires

Sommaire des Provinces-Etats



Protection sociale et redistribution du revenu

Dans nos comparaisons, nous examinons les différences et les similitudes dans l'incidence nette des impôts et des transferts sur la répartition des revenus, en nous intéressant aux gains dans la part du revenu – la différence de proportion du revenu final entrant dans une tranche de revenu donnée après impôts et transferts par rapport à

-
- Proximité géographique
- Provinces/Etats contigus
 - Provinces/Etats rapprochés
 - Indice de proximité
- Intégration économique/
concurrence
- Intégration économique
 - Concurrence
 - Référence

concurrentielles accrues. La décentralisation de la fédération canadienne, attribuable en partie à la politique du nationalisme québécois et à la dynamique de l'intégration économique et de la mondialisation décrite ci-dessus, a renforcé la domination politique provinciale. En outre, les provinces possèdent leurs propres structures économiques et habitudes commerciales qui nécessitent une adaptation particulière des politiques, et les gouvernements provinciaux sont probablement plus exposés que le gouvernement fédéral aux pressions exercées par l'intégration économique et la concurrence transfrontalières. Ainsi, selon Courchene, les provinces adapteront de plus en plus leurs politiques publiques aux tendances des États américains avec lesquels elles sont exposées à la concurrence et aux effets de l'intégration (Courchene, 1998 : 289-291).

Par ailleurs, les régions du Canada ne sont pas en cours d'intégration économique avec une masse informelle qu'on appelle les États-Unis, mais plutôt avec des régions et des États américains particuliers. Par conséquent, il est essentiel de reconnaître l'importance des États dans différents domaines de politiques publiques, et la mesure dans laquelle cette importance s'est accrue avec le temps. Les États sont devenus des acteurs de plus en plus importants sur le plan de l'élaboration des politiques publiques, tant en raison des transferts de responsabilités que du fait que les années 1990 ont été bonnes pour les coffres des États. Les gouvernements des États avaient les ressources nécessaires pour accroître leur capacité de recherche sur les politiques, assumer de nouvelles responsabilités et innover dans bien des cas. Ainsi, l'examen des similitudes et des différences transfrontalières des politiques à l'échelle internationale pourrait bien permettre de mieux évaluer le lien entre l'intégration économique et la convergence des politiques que les comparaisons nationales.

L'identification des paires ou des sous-groupes d'États et de provinces aux fins de l'examen de la convergence des politiques repose sur les causes présumées de la convergence. Si la cause présumée de la convergence est l'interpénétration des cultures ou les retombées transfrontalières (comme dans le cas des politiques intergouvernementales sur la pollution), il conviendrait d'étudier les provinces et les États voisins. Si l'intégration économique est la cause présumée de la convergence des politiques, il serait préférable d'examiner les provinces jumelées aux États avec lesquels elles ont les liens économiques les plus forts (p. ex., les niveaux d'échanges les plus élevés). Si l'adaptation des politiques en réaction à la concurrence directe est

Identification des paires transfrontalières État-province

sont maintenant au centre des analyses nationales et constituent des candidates évidentes à une nouvelle approche venant compléter ces analyses. Enfin, ces deux domaines sont au cœur des préoccupations de ceux qui s'inquiètent des effets de convergence de l'intégration économique.

Les régions du Canada ne sont pas en cours d'intégration économique avec une masse informelle qu'on appelle les États-Unis, mais plutôt avec des régions et des États américains particuliers.

- la proximité géographique permet d'apparier les États et les provinces qui partagent une frontière naturelle ou des routes directes et de créer seize paires État-province;
- la contiguïté géographique permet d'apparier les États et les provinces qui partagent une frontière naturelle ou des routes directes et de créer seize paires État-province;
- la contiguïté géographique permet d'apparier les États et les provinces qui partagent une frontière naturelle ou des routes directes et de créer seize paires État-province;

- l'intégration économique permet d'apparier les États et les provinces d'après un indice du commerce provincial de marchandises avec chaque État américain (mesuré en proportion du PIB provincial) et de créer des paires avec le premier État pour chaque province ainsi que le deuxième État en présence d'un indice supérieur à la moyenne des meilleurs États. La concurrence

Intégration économique et transfrontalière des politiques sociales et environnementale des provinces canadiennes et des États américains

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Les observateurs doutent de plus en plus que l'intensification de l'intégration économique continentale entraîne la convergence des politiques entre le Canada et les États-Unis (Hoherg, 2002). Toutefois, plusieurs raisons portent à croire que la convergence transfrontalière des politiques se manifesterait plus rapidement et fortement à l'échelle provinciale plutôt que nationale ou fédérale. En fait, l'examen des tendances de similitude et de différence transfrontalières des politiques entre les provinces canadiennes et les États américains – particulièrement en matière de politiques sociale et environnementale – pourrait bien permettre de mieux évaluer le lien entre l'intégration économique et la convergence des politiques que les comparaisons nationales.

Dans notre recherche, nous examinons l'hypothèse selon laquelle la convergence des politiques au fil du temps est plus importante entre des paires précises d'États américains et de provinces canadiennes fortement liées qu'elle n'apparaît dans les comparaisons nationales. Nous avons établi une méthodologie pour identifier des paires d'États américains et de provinces canadiennes fortement liées d'après diverses mesures de proximité géographique et de degré d'intégration économique. Nous nous concentrons sur des aspects précis de la politique sociale (les niveaux de protection sociale et de redistribution du revenu) et environnementale (la réduction le contrôle de la pollution), puisque ces domaines sont source de grandes préoccupations quant aux effets de convergence de l'intégration économique continentale.

Nous avons constaté que, en matière de protection sociale et de redistribution du revenu, ainsi que de dépenses consacrées à la protection de l'environnement, les tendances infranationales ne remettent pas fondamentalement en cause les tendances nationales de convergence et de divergence. Par ailleurs, les tendances de similitude et

de différence au fil du temps de divers sous-ensembles de paires État-province présentent généralement des différences de degré, voire d'orientation, par rapport aux tendances nationales. Toutefois, après 1995, une tendance de convergence à l'échelle des États et des provinces semble se dessiner, ce qui n'apparaît pas clairement dans les tendances observées à l'échelle nationale.

Gouvernements infranationaux, intégration économique continentale et convergence des politiques

Bien que les études nationales nous permettent d'accroître notre compréhension de la relation entre l'intégration économique et l'autonomie de politique intérieure, il est aussi essentiel d'examiner cette relation à l'échelle infranationale. C'est l'une des grandes conséquences des tendances à la décentralisation liées à la mondialisation. Tandis que leur pouvoir économique augmente, les régions et les gouvernements infranationaux des pays peuvent considérer avantageux de passer par-dessus leur gouvernement national et de se lier à des superstructures (Courchene, 1998 : 272-273) en raison de leurs exigences économiques particulières. Dans le cas probable où des gouvernements infranationaux seraient économiquement mieux intégrés que d'autres aux marchés internationaux, ces gouvernements pourraient réclamer plus de latitude en matière d'élaboration de politiques pour faire face aux effets et aux tendances de l'intégration. Ce raisonnement sous-entend que l'indépendance politique des entités infranationales telles que les provinces canadiennes et les États américains continuera d'augmenter à mesure que la mondialisation et l'intégration économique se poursuivront.

En fait, les provinces contiennent déjà certains des plus importants leviers de politique pour s'adapter à l'intégration économique et aux pressions

Les incidences politiques pour le gouvernement du Canada

L'état du Washington. Dans cet exemple au moins, une instance supérieure – dans ce cas, l'Office National de l'énergie – a tranché la question (Hume, 2004, p. 1).

Quatrième, la coopération entre partenaires limitrophes peut mener à des initiatives communes axées sur un tiers, comme ce fut le cas lors de la mission du Manitoba et des États américains en Europe. Pourtant, jusqu'à présent, nous avons dénombré peu d'initiatives conjointes de ce type. L'appui des États américains à la candidature de Vancouver pour les Jeux olympiques en fait partie, comme d'autres efforts, notamment dans le domaine du tourisme, qui ont pour objectif de promouvoir conjointement la Nouvelle Angleterre et les Maritimes en Europe, ou la région du Nord-Ouest en Europe et en Asie.

La coopération transfrontalière est à la hausse partout.

s'inquiéter de ce nouveau phénomène régional et transfrontalier. On ne peut nier les deux tendances que nous avons mises en évidence, soit la fragmentation des relations internationales selon des axes sectoriels et la restructuration régionale. Elles font maintenant partie intégrante des relations canado-américaines et ne semblent pas en voie de disparaître.

En ce qui a trait à la coopération régionale transfrontalière, elle semble profiter aux intervenants locaux en permettant une meilleure compréhension et la mise en commun des intérêts partagés. En ce sens, ce phénomène représente un avantage pour tous, dans la mesure où il fait avancer la cause d'une meilleure coopération globale entre le Canada et les États-Unis.

Jusqu'à présent, les organismes régionaux ont toujours respecté leurs limites de compétence et ont généralement joué le rôle de relais des politiques nationales dans les régions. Par conséquent, ils devraient être perçus comme un atout dans les relations avec les États-Unis.

En Amérique du Nord et en Europe, la coopération transfrontalière [*Transduction*] dépend en grande partie du contexte et de l'intensité de la conscience régionale, des identités locales et des discours idéologiques » (Scott, 1999, p. 606), mais ce sont là les ingrédients habituels d'une fédération. La coopération transfrontalière ajoute une nouvelle dimension aux relations fédérales-provinciales, mais le cœur de la question reste le même. Toutes les provinces ou régions ne participent pas à ce type de coopération de la même façon ni dans la même mesure, et le gouvernement du Canada devrait tenir compte de ces différences dans son approche des relations canado-américaines.

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- Cet article est né d'une étude en cours. La première partie de notre analyse, surtout structurelle, est terminée; de ce travail découlent les conclusions du présent article. La partie suivante de notre démarche, plus fonctionnelle, fera l'objet d'une perspective nouvelle, sur ces dynamiques régionales. La première partie de notre étude, *A Typology of the Canada/US Relationships*, est à la disposition du public sur demande.

qui ne relèvent pas des provinces ou des États. Nous ne connaissons qu'un seul contre-exemple, celui de la GNA/PMEC, qui a adopté une résolution sur la Chine pour des raisons humanitaires, liées aux événements de la place Tiananmen en 1989. Cette situation est plus complexe lorsqu'il s'agit de domaines dont les provinces et les États sont responsables, mais où ces questions transcendent la région, comme c'est le cas pour l'énergie ou l'environnement. Le PNWER a décidé, par exemple, d'étudier certains aspects techniques du Protocole de Kyoto. Or, dans certains domaines de compétence partagée ou d'intérêts communs, les organismes ont traditionnellement travaillé en étroite collaboration avec les autorités fédérales, ce qui est souvent le cas en agriculture, en transports, en sécurité frontalière et en environnement. Cette collaboration n'empêche pas le lobbying régional, qui est une des raisons d'être de tels organismes, mais il peut arriver que les perspectives régionales prennent le pas sur les priorités nationales, comme ce fut le cas des pluies acides avec la GNA/PMEC.

D'autre part, les provinces et les États apprennent beaucoup les uns des autres. Dernièrement, lors d'une réunion du PNWER, les représentants américains ont adopté une résolution exigeant de leur gouvernement fédéral d'être mieux informés sur les négociations commerciales. Cette résolution invite : *[Traduction]* « les législateurs des États à examiner la loi albertaine sur la mise en œuvre des ententes commerciales internationales afin de déterminer si elle pourrait s'appliquer aux États américains » (PNWER, 2003, p. 1).

Troisièmement, cette coopération vise toujours à promouvoir le bon voisinage. L'échange d'information est une des façons d'y arriver, mais de plus en plus de mécanismes ont également été conçus pour éviter ou résoudre d'éventuels différends.

Lacs (même si aucun de ces organismes n'a encouragé la coopération interrégionale au-delà des questions environnementales). Il existe d'autres initiatives régionales telles que l'Association des Maires des Grands Lacs et du Saint-Laurent, dont le secrétariat se trouve à Québec, ou le protocole d'entente entre l'Ontario et les États de New York et du Michigan. Pour l'instant, la région ne semble pas véritablement s'organiser en groupe de travail, si l'on excepte le réseau des Grands Lacs, qui pourrait devenir une dimension majeure, mais unique, de l'entité régionale.

Dans les Prairies, la régionalisation n'en est qu'à ses débuts. On observe une coopération entre le Manitoba et ses voisins en matière de gestion du Bassin de la rivière Rouge, par exemple. La province a également conclu un protocole d'entente avec le Minnesota, et la Saskatchewan avec le Montana, mais ces initiatives ne forment pas encore une tendance régionale, malgré les efforts de quelques ONGs, américaines pour la plupart, qui tentent de promouvoir le concept des Grandes Plaines du Nord. Pourtant, le manque de structure organisationnelle n'a pas empêché le Manitoba de participer à une mission conjointe avec des États américains dans le nord de l'Europe, au sujet de la diversification énergétique. À cette occasion, la province a d'ailleurs signé un protocole d'entente avec l'Islande, lors d'une cérémonie à laquelle assistaient les ambassadeurs du Canada et des États-Unis.

Leçons tirées de la coopération transfrontalière

La première observation flagrante que nous inspire cette coopération est presque tautologique : les priorités des organismes transfrontaliers sont axées sur les dimensions régionales des domaines qui relèvent des provinces et des États, qu'il s'agisse de compétence exclusive ou partagée. De manière générale, les organismes ne s'impliquent pas dans des questions

La GNA/PMEC est un groupe utile au sein duquel les gouvernements voisins ont eu la possibilité de dialoguer sur des sujets d'intérêt commun. Mais c'est beaucoup plus encore, il a commandité des études très influentes sur de nombreuses questions, dernièrement, il a déployé beaucoup d'efforts dans le domaine environnemental; le Groupe de travail sur le mercure a présenté un rapport, puis une lettre au Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement pour lui faire part de ses résultats et de ses recommandations. Au fil des ans, la Conférence a présenté un certain nombre de résolutions aux gouvernements fédéraux. Elle a demandé que soit abrogé l'article 110 de la loi américaine sur la réforme sur l'immigration clandestine et la responsabilité des immigrants (*Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act*) de 1996, qui imposait de nouveaux contrôles des étrangers aux frontières américaines, à leur entrée et à leur sortie. Au sujet des pluies acides, la conférence a aussi passé une résolution exhortant « l'Environnemental Protection Agency (EPA) des États-Unis à réexaminer sa décision concernant [les règles entourant les nouvelles sources en vertu de la loi sur la lutte contre la pollution atmosphérique] et à s'engager dans la protection de la santé de tous les citoyens » (GNA/PMEC, 2003, p. 1).

Pourtant, malgré toutes ces initiatives, la Conférence n'est pas le point de ralliement que le PNWER est devenu dans l'Ouest. Bien que la coopération transfrontalière gagne aussi en importance dans l'Est, elle ne se traduit pas par la même émergence d'une région transfrontalière. Cette tendance demeure cependant plus marquée que ce que l'on retrouve dans d'autres régions frontalières.

Pourtant, la coopération transfrontalière connaît une recrudescence partout. Dans la région des Grands Lacs, l'Ontario et le Québec ont le statut de membres associés au sein du conseil des Gouverneurs des Grands Lacs et de la commission des Grands

Généralement, cette coopération se fait dans les mêmes gammes de secteurs, quelle que soit la région. Il n'est pas surprenant qu'elle s'étende surtout aux domaines de compétence provinciale ou partagée, ou du moins aux domaines où les intérêts sont partagés entre différents ordres de gouvernements, tels que le commerce, l'agriculture, les transports, l'énergie, le tourisme, la technologie en général, l'environnement et, bien sûr, les questions frontalières. Ce type de coopération peut prendre la forme de nouveaux organismes, ou de nouveaux mandats pour les organismes existants. Plus important encore, il ne semble pas y avoir de tendance prévisible et la nature des nouvelles organisations varie énormément selon les circonstances. En outre, le même genre d'organismes peut exister dans des régions différentes, par contre chaque région a sa propre combinaison d'organismes.

De plus en plus de provinces signent des protocoles d'entente avec les États voisins : l'Alberta avec le Montana (1985), le Manitoba avec le Minnesota (1988), la Colombie-Britannique avec l'État du Washington (1992), l'Ontario

avec les États de New York (2001) et du Michigan (2002), le Québec avec l'État de New York (2002), etc. Apparaissent, ces ententes étaient plutôt des ententes ciblées, sur l'environnement par exemple, alors qu'elles tendent maintenant à être plus vastes, axées surtout sur une coopération économique et laissez plutôt entrevoir l'émergence de régions transfrontalières.

Simultanément, dans certains domaines, la coopération transfrontalière semble transcender les limites traditionnelles de la paradiplomatie et laisse plutôt entrevoir l'émergence de régions transfrontalières.

L'évolution de la paradiplomatie transfrontalière

Canada et les États-Unis, on discute de questions telles que l'hygiène vétérinaire liée au commerce, la biotechnologie agricole et l'octroi de licences. De plus, les provinces canadiennes travaillent en étroite collaboration avec la US National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, et en sont parfois membres.

des organismes régionaux d'Amérique du Nord. Parmi ses membres, on compte la Colombie-Britannique, l'Alberta, le Yukon, l'Alaska, l'Idaho, le Montana, l'Oregon et l'État du Washington. C'est le seul organisme de cette envergure créé exclusivement pour encourager la coopération régionale.

Sa structure est élaborée : le PNWER est composé d'un Comité Exécutif, d'un Conseil des délégués et d'un Conseil du secteur privé, de groupes de travail et d'un Secrétariat. Une des caractéristiques frappantes du PNWER réside dans sa représentation, qui couvre à parts égales les secteurs public et privé, les membres canadiens et américains, les membres des assemblées législatives et de l'exécutif, la minorité et la majorité (l'opposition, au Canada).

Les résolutions adoptées par le PNWER sont manifestement marquées par les priorités régionales, que ce soit l'énergie, l'agriculture ou l'environnement.

une coopération régionale.

Alors que les relations internationales se fragmentent et que l'engagement des provinces à l'échelle internationale s'intensifie sur les questions sectorielles, une nouvelle dynamique émerge :

Malgré cette orientation claire, le PNWER n'a pas critiqué outre mesure les gouvernements fédéraux. Au mieux, on recense une résolution de 2003 exhortant le gouvernement américain à lever l'embargo sur le bœuf canadien. Pourtant, il est indéniable que la solidarité régionale se manifeste. Notons, en l'occurrence, l'appui accordé à la Ville de Vancouver par quatre États-membres du PNWER pour sa candidature aux Jeux olympiques d'hiver, qui a suscité la critique du *New York Times* (NYT, 2003).

La Côte Est est une autre région qui permet d'établir une comparaison. La Conférence des gouverneurs de la Nouvelle-Angleterre et des premiers ministres de l'est du Canada

(GNA/PMEC) a vu le jour en 1973. C'est une institution beaucoup plus simple que le PNWER. Elle dispose d'un secrétariat double – composé, du côté américain, du personnel du secrétariat de la Conférence des gouverneurs, et, du côté canadien, du personnel du secrétariat du Conseil des premiers ministres de l'Atlantique. La Conférence GNA/PMEC est également composée de groupes de travail ou de comités tels que le Comité du Nord-Est sur l'énergie (CINE) ou le Corridor international de biotechnologie du Nord-Est.

Lors de la réunion tenue en 2000 à Halifax, la Conférence est entrée dans une nouvelle phase avec la création du Comité permanent sur le commerce et la mondialisation, chargé d'examiner les questions relatives aux transports et aux frontières et d'encourager les échanges commerciaux entre ses membres. C'était la première fois que le secteur privé tenait une tribune parallèlement à la réunion de la Conférence.

L'adhésion aux organismes américains constitue une autre forme fréquente de coopération. Le Council of State Governments, la National Conference of State Legislatures, la National Governors Association et leurs directions régionales ont accordé le statut de membre – soit à part entière, soit de membre associé ou affilié – aux gouvernements provinciaux, à leur assemblée législative et à leur premier ministre. En revanche, on ne semble pas assister à l'adhésion d'états américains aux organismes canadiens, ce qui témoigne d'une asymétrie, qui fait partie des aspects surprenants de ces relations états-provinces.

Tout porte à croire que, dans le domaine de la paradiplomatie mondiale, la présence des provinces aux États-Unis s'est beaucoup intensifiée ces dernières années, l'élément nouveau résidant dans les échanges directs entre certains premiers ministres et les autorités du gouvernement américain. Pourtant, globalement, les événements des dernières décennies sont signe d'une plus grande coopération entre États et provinces.

Passons maintenant à un aspect plus innovateur des relations États-provinces : la paradiplomatie transfrontalière.

La paradiplomatie transfrontalière

Ces mêmes causes sous-jacentes, soit l'importance des questions d'ordre économique, la libéralisation du commerce, etc., ont poussé les provinces à porter davantage d'attention à leurs partenaires dans le monde entier et, particulièrement, à leurs partenaires voisins. Cette tendance n'est pas unique aux relations canado-américaines : on l'observe également en Europe. En fait, c'est l'illustration sur le plan des relations internationales, d'un phénomène plus vaste encore, associé à la modernité en

centraux dans une série de domaines, tels que l'énergie, les transports, l'agriculture, mais également l'environnement, la culture et même l'administration publique. Aujourd'hui, des directions et ministères des gouvernements centraux disposent de leurs propres réseaux internationaux. Pour les mêmes raisons, les relations internationales sont devenues de plus en plus importantes pour les gouvernements infra-fédéraux, étant donné leur compétence dans la plupart de ces secteurs.

Ces mêmes causes sous-jacentes, soit l'importance des questions d'ordre économique, la libéralisation du commerce, etc., ont poussé les provinces à porter davantage d'attention à leurs partenaires dans le monde entier et, particulièrement, à leurs partenaires voisins. Cette tendance n'est pas unique aux relations canado-américaines : on l'observe également en Europe. En fait, c'est l'illustration sur le plan des relations internationales, d'un phénomène plus vaste encore, associé à la modernité en

La paradiplomatie transfrontalière traite des liens entre les provinces et les États américains voisins. Récemment, c'est dans le domaine de la paradiplomatie transfrontalière que l'intensité des activités est la plus importante et que les initiatives prennent les formes les plus innovatrices, signalant, peut-être, l'émergence de régions transfrontalières.

(sous-entendus gouvernementales) des différents gouvernements » (Keohane et Nye, 1976, p. 4) et d'autre part, une restructuration de ces relations autour des priorités régionales.

La fragmentation des relations internationales

L'attention portée aux questions économiques, l'accent sur la libéralisation du commerce et l'ouverture des frontières aux biens, aux services, aux personnes et aux idées qui en résulte ont fait des relations internationales le prolongement des responsabilités domestiques des gouvernements

général, selon lequel / *Traduction* / « lorsque les relations sociales s'étendent latéralement et font partie d'un même processus, nous observons davantage de pression vers une autonomie locale et une identité culturelle régionale » (Giddens, 1990, p. 65).

Les ententes commerciales entre le Canada et les États-Unis, puis le Mexique, ainsi que les négociations précédant et suivant la création de l'OMC, illustrent la fragmentation des relations internationales et y ont contribué. Les questions sectorielles

étaient souvent tellement complexes qu'elles exigeaient des négociations spéciales avec des experts et qu'elles menaient régulièrement à des ententes précises ou des traitements spéciaux en matière de services, d'agriculture, d'environnement, de culture, etc. En outre, ces négociations exigeaient également des consultations permanentes après la signature des ententes. Étant donné leurs compétences partagées, les provinces ont participé aux négociations et ont continué à s'impliquer lors de la mise en œuvre desdites ententes.

À titre d'exemple, en agriculture, l'Accord agricole États-Provinces a été conclu en 1984. Il est devenu l'Accord trilatéral sur l'agriculture au moment où le Mexique s'est joint à ses partenaires nord-américains. Au cours de ses réunions annuelles, il rassemble des représentants de provinces canadiennes et des États américains et mexicains, qui discutent des défis auxquels est confronté leur secteur agricole respectif. On a mis sur pied trois groupes de travail bilatéraux (Can-US, Can-Mexique, US-Mexique). Entre le

Les dynamiques régionales des relations États-provinces le Canada et les États-Unis

Jean-François Abgrall
Projet de recherche
sur les politiques

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est un consultant qui travaille pour le
Projet de recherche sur les politiques.

Depuis longtemps, les provinces canadiennes et les États américains entretiennent des relations bilatérales. Pourtant, ces relations sont aujourd'hui si fréquentes et diverses que, plus que jamais, elles sont devenues une partie essentielle de la relation canado-américaine. De nouveaux protocoles d'entente, conventions et accords confirment et revitalisent constamment ces relations. Non seulement l'univers des relations entre États et provinces s'étend-il rapidement, mais la complexité de celles-ci évolue également. Il est urgent et nécessaire pour les gouvernements fédéraux des deux pays, et surtout pour le gouvernement du Canada, de mieux saisir cette dynamique et ses implications. Pour pouvoir évaluer les conséquences de l'évolution de ces relations, il faut étudier l'ampleur des transformations qu'elles subissent. Dans un premier temps, nous commencerons par faire un exposé détaillé de la situation actuelle.

L'objectif général de notre démarche est de formuler des recommandations de politiques pour le gouvernement du Canada, à partir des implications de ce type de relations¹. Le but du présent article est plus modeste : il s'agit d'examiner le réseau des liens entre provinces et États. Ce sera le cœur de notre article. Ensuite, nous réfléchirons sur certaines des leçons que l'on peut tirer aujourd'hui des relations États-provinces contemporaines. De plus, nous proposerons certaines hypothèses liées aux implications politiques ainsi que des recommandations, mais elles ne seront qu'un aperçu de ce qui semblerait s'annoncer. Ces dernières considérations constitueront les deux parties plus brèves de la fin de notre article.

La paradiplomatie générale

Le but d'exercer une influence sur le comportement des États [*Traduction*] « dans centraux étrangers, ou les gouvernements provinciaux et les gouvernements existent entre les gouvernements porte plus précisément aux liens qui La paradiplomatie générale se rap-

On a également assisté à des missions diplomatiques provinciales à l'étranger. Le Québec dispose de sept bureaux de ce type aux États-Unis, l'Alberta, d'un à Portland, en Oregon, et elle prévoit en ouvrir un autre à Washington D.C. prochainement. Le premier ministre McGuinty a également annoncé son intention de re-ouvrir certains bureaux de l'Ontario à l'étranger. Les États-Unis organisent également régulièrement des visites officielles et des missions au Canada. Plus de dix états disposent de bureaux dans notre pays.

Plus récemment, les visites officielles ont pris une autre dimension, puisque certains premiers ministres provinciaux n'ont pas limité leurs contacts aux seuls représentants des États. Les premiers ministres Klein et Hamm ont rendu visite séparément au vice-président Cheney. Cependant, certains premiers ministres ont exprimé leurs réserves vis-à-vis de ce genre d'initiativ

Dans le cadre de la paradiplomatie générale, les missions commerciales et les visites officielles sont courantes. Les provinces de l'Atlantique se sont jointes au gouvernement du Canada pour créer l'équipe Canada Atlantique. Les premiers ministres Klein et Campbell ont entrepris une mission conjointe au Texas et en Californie à la fin de 2003. L'une des premières initiatives à l'étranger des premiers ministres Charest et McGuinty, nouvellement élus, fut d'aller rencontrer des hauts fonctionnaires américains à New York.

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Notes

- 1 Christian Boucher est agent principal de recherche en politiques au PRR. Il a été sondeur dans le cadre d'un programme d'échanges de EKOS Research Associates Inc. Le présent article est tiré d'un rapport exhaustif, dont la version intégrale est à la disposition du public sur demande envoyée à c.boucher@prs-srp.gc.ca.
 - 2 Allocution à la Chambre des communes, Ottawa, 18 juin 1936.
 - 3 Ils ont conclu que les principales valeurs des sociétés canadienne et américaine sont convergentes et se ressemblent de plus en plus avec le temps.
 - 4 Nevitte (1996) a constaté qu'entre 1981 et 1990, les valeurs des deux pays ont évolué suivant une trajectoire semblable dans 22 dimensions sur les 25 présentées.
 - 5 Jeffrey Simpson (2000) a affirmé que les deux pays *[Traduction]* « se rapprochent de plus en plus » et « ce rapprochement survient non pas en raison d'une évolution observable chez les Américains (...) mais bien parce que ce sont les Canadiens qui s'américanisent ».
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- du Forum des politiques publiques : <www.pppforum.ca>.
- Pour plus d'information sur cette conférence, consulter le site web <www.pppforum.ca>.
- Renvois
- et politiques.
- forcement des relations économiques
- sance de l'autre, mais aussi par un ren-
- seulement par une meilleure connais-
- fait de réels progrès. Celle-ci passe non
- rapports entre le Canada et le Mexique
- sera efficace que si la consolidation des
- ment cruciale. Cette collaboration ne
- ciation face aux États-Unis est égale-
- pour augmenter leur pouvoir de négocier
- du Canada et du Mexique à collaborer
- campagne de propagande. La capacité
- des éléments clés du succès de toute
- aux États-Unis ont été perçues comme
- américains et l'acquisition de partisans
- en fonction des intérêts domestiques
- outre, la formulation des problèmes
- un investissement de notre part. En
- entre les deux pays, ce qui sous-entend
- la complexité des relations qui existent
- que les États-Unis comprennent mieux

Qu'en pensent les spécialistes?

Yves Poisson, Forum des politiques publiques

Qu'aux valeurs que nous partageons et aux points que nous avons en commun avec nos voisins du Sud?

Il est possible de renforcer l'intégration économique nord-américaine tout en préservant l'autonomie nationale, politique, sociale et culturelle. Telle est la conclusion

essentielle émanant de la deuxième conférence du Forum des politiques publiques, *Repenser l'intégration nord-américaine*. La conférence s'appuyait sur les résultats d'un sondage portant sur les valeurs et les attitudes au Canada, aux États-Unis et au Mexique face à l'intégration nord-américaine, effectué par EKOS Research Associates. Des conférenciers experts provenant de ces trois pays ont commenté les résultats et partagé leur vision de l'évolution de l'intégration nord-américaine.

L'évolution spectaculaire de l'intégration économique en Amérique du Nord n'est pas un phénomène nouveau. Cette intégration ne s'inscrit pas dans le cadre d'une identité continentale ni d'une intégration politique du même ordre que celle de l'Union européenne. Les données présentées par EKOS lors de cette conférence indiquent au contraire que l'identité nationale est une valeur primordiale pour les Canadiens, les Américains et les Mexicains. En outre, l'autonomie dont a fait preuve le Canada dans ses politiques destinées à définir son attitude face à l'Irak ou à la marijuana, entre autres, n'a pas suscité de réaction majeure de l'opinion publique américaine sur le Canada et pourrait même avoir amélioré l'image de ce dernier dans l'esprit américain. Autrement

dit, on peut affirmer que le Canada et le Mexique ne sont pas obligés d'américaniser leurs politiques et leurs cultures pour profiter des avantages d'une économie nord-américaine intégrée.

Le phénomène apparaît clairement si l'on observe l'attitude des Canadiens face à l'intégration nord-américaine. S'il subsiste des craintes face à l'américanisation, les Canadiens se montrent de plus en plus à l'aise dans les discussions relatives à l'intégration économique, qu'ils distinguent des domaines politique et culturel. Par ailleurs, si les Canadiens, les Améri-

politique et culturel.

S'il subsiste des craintes face à l'américanisation, les Canadiens se montrent de plus en plus à l'aise dans les discussions relatives à l'intégration économique, qu'ils distinguent des domaines

Les politiques environnementales sont l'un des domaines les plus prometteurs pour l'intégration. Les Canadiens, Américains et les Mexicains souhaitent parvenir à une harmonisation dans le cadre d'une émulation nord-américaine vers l'excellence. La qualité de l'eau, le traitement des agents toxiques et de la pollution atmosphérique sont des priorités communes, alors que le changement climatique demeure sujet à controverse. Il est intéressant de remarquer que les données d'EKOS indiquent que, dans chaque pays et uniquement dans ce domaine, l'opinion publique

se prononce majoritairement en faveur d'une gestion environnementale nord-américaine intégrée. La place accordée à l'environnement dans les négociations commerciales est également un sujet particulièrement important. Les participants ont souligné le rôle de la Commission pour la coopération environnementale au sein de l'ALENA et la nécessité d'augmenter les ressources mises à sa disposition pour lui permettre de remplir son mandat.

Dans le contexte de l'intégration nord-américaine, une exploration plus approfondie des relations entre le Canada et le Mexique paraît également essentielle. De nombreux participants ont insisté sur les avantages d'un renforcement de cet aspect des relations nord-américaines. Ensemble, le Canada et le Mexique doivent s'efforcer d'améliorer leur image aux États-Unis et d'augmenter leur capacité à faire pression sur le système politique de ce pays lorsque leurs intérêts sont en jeu. Le Canada a tout avantage à ce

Les participants à la conférence se sont entendus pour dire que ces facteurs et la situation politique aux États-Unis rendent peu probable l'émergence prochaine de changements de l'ampitude de l'ALENA. Par contre, sur la base d'une confiance nouvelle et des avantages que l'ALENA offre aux trois pays, l'intégration semble pouvoir évoluer progressivement. À moyen terme, les étapes de cette évolution pourraient être la recherche d'améliorations aux méthodes de résolution des différends, qui s'appliqueraient à des domaines antérieurement exclus, et le renforcement de l'efficacité de la protection de l'environnement.

Notre analyse tend à démontrer au contraire que non seulement les valeurs canadiennes et américaines n'ont pas convergé pendant la période de 1981 à 2000, mais les données cumulatives révèlent que ces deux sociétés s'éloignent l'une de l'autre.

en utilisant des mesures différentes des valeurs. En compilant les données de ce test de parallèles pour la période de 1990 à 2000, nous avons constaté que, dans la majorité des cas, les valeurs entre les deux pays suivent des trajectoires différentes (11 des 26 cas seulement ont mon-

tré une trajectoire semblable), ce qui soutient davantage la thèse de la divergence des valeurs.

5. Un des axes de raisonnement semble plus clairement défini. L'hypothèse antérieure voulant que [Traduction] « les États-Unis montrent au Canada l'image de son propre avenir » (Horowitz, 1973) n'apparaît pas plausible à la lumière de nos données⁵. Le schéma en serait plutôt un de deux pays s'influençant l'un l'autre au chapitre des principales valeurs. Où sont les preuves à l'appui de l'hypothèse du « retard culturel » ? Globalement, le tableau 1 démontre que les deux sociétés prennent la tête en ce qui concerne les valeurs partagées à l'échelle nationale. Par exemple, les Canadiens ont pris les devants en 1990 et 2000 dans les domaines suivants : orientation des gouvernements (approches post-moderne et néolibérale), conscience sociale (enseigner aux enfants à faire attention aux autres), permmissivité morale, emploi (réalisation de soi), ainsi que fierté nationale et intérêt pour la politique. Quant aux États-Unis, ils ont pris les devants systématiquement en 1990 et 2000 dans les domaines du soutien à la méritocratie, de la maîtrise de son propre destin, des convictions religieuses (à enseigner aux enfants), de l'intolérance situationnelle au plan social, ainsi que du sens de l'économie et de la

4. Les tendances de divergences entre le Canada et les États-Unis ne sont pas clairement tracées, et la distinction entre convergence et divergence est particulièrement ténue depuis les vingt ans, particulièrement en ce qui touche aux dimensions sociale et politique. Dans le cas des questions touchant à la morale, nous avons observé une grande divergence de 1981 à 1990, puis une nette convergence de 1990 à 2000, ce qui établit un écart net de divergence pour la période de 1981 à 2000. En ce qui a trait à la dimension économique, l'on a observé une légère tendance à la convergence de 1981 à 1990, et une tendance prononcée vers la divergence de 1990 à 2000, ce qui donne une tendance marquée à la divergence.

aux États-Unis.

hausse au Canada et une baisse pays et la laïcité affichent une hausse au Canada et une baisse sociale affichent une baisse au Canada mais une hausse aux États-Unis, alors que la défense de son cosmopolitisme et la permmissivité Pour la période de 1990 à 2000, le et attitude face à la protestation. cratie, intérêt pour la politique signifiants : soutien à la méritocratie, intérêt pour la politique s'observent dans des domaines que ces différences de trajectoires soulignons, car cela est important, la divergence des valeurs.

Conclusion

En conclusion, cet article laisse entendre que les valeurs canadiennes et américaines ont grandement évolué au cours des vingt dernières années, et que des écarts demeurent à plusieurs égards importants entre les deux pays. Lipset a peut-être eu raison une fois de plus en affirmant, à la fin des années 80, que l'ALE n'aurait pas pour effet d'américaniser les Canadiens. Plus récemment, Adams (2004) concluait que [Traduction] « l'adoption de l'ALÉNA en 1994 n'a eu aucun effet marqué sur les valeurs sociales des Canadiens ». Ashford et Timms (1992) avaient tiré pareille conclusion de leur analyse de l'évolution des valeurs en Europe pendant la période de 1981 à 1990. Selon ces auteurs, [Traduction] « les cultures et positions nationales européennes demeurent vigoureusement différentes en dépit des liens économiques et politiques de plus en plus étroits entre les pays membres de l'UE ». Notre étude démontre que la situation est très semblable en Amérique du Nord.


Malgré tout, au-delà des thèses de sociétés distinctes ou d'inévitables copies conformes, la question demeure : les Canadiens se laissent-ils gentiment bercer par l'illusion narcissique des petites différences ? Autrement dit, croyons-nous que notre identité tient plus à l'étendue de ce qui nous distingue des États-Unis

laïcité. D'autres chercheurs sont arrivés aux mêmes conclusions à l'égard de la thèse d'une américanisation certaine. Ingelhart et Baker (2000), par exemple, ont avancé qu'à l'échelle internationale, cette américanisation se déroute sur le plan superficiel du « Coca-Cola » et du « Big Mac » : [Traduction]

« globalement, les sociétés en voie d'industrialisation ne sont pas en train de s'américaniser, car leur population demeure attachée à des valeurs et des croyances plus traditionnelles que celles de toute autre société également prospère ».

FIGURE 2

Différences entre le Canada et les É.-U. par domaine



- Canada-États-Unis (la question a-t-elle été posée dans les deux pays?);
- importance (l'ajout de cet élément élargit-il la portée de la recherche?);

Dans un deuxième temps, nous avons regroupé les éléments de sondage retenus en 28 mesures, au moyen d'une combinaison de méthodes, notamment des techniques multidimensionnelles et bidimensionnelles. Enfin, nous avons regroupé les 28 mesures en quatre grandes catégories ou dimensions (économique, politique, sociale et morale). Le tableau 1 présente les 28 mesures et les quatre dimensions.

Analyse

1. Le Canada et les États-Unis ont considérablement évolué au cours des 20 dernières années. Dans certains cas, l'on a observé des mouvements de plus de 30 points de pourcentage en environ vingt ans, ce qui est très significatif et surtout peu courant

dans le domaine de la recherche sur les valeurs. Par ailleurs, l'on constate une grande cohérence dans les changements observés qui, globalement, soutiennent la thèse postmoderne voulant que le Canada et les États-Unis aient développé des approches beaucoup plus progressistes et séculières à l'égard de certaines questions économiques, sociales, politiques et morales. La figure 1 présente un sommaire de quelques éléments de sondage choisis affichant une évolution marquée dans les deux pays de 1981 à 2000, et la figure 2 présente des données plus globales pour chaque dimension sociale.

2. L'écart des valeurs entre le Canada et les États-Unis est mince; il se situe à environ sept points de pourcentage entre 1981 et 2000. Les différences, observées dans toute une gamme d'indicateurs, sont plus nuancées que divergentes, sauf en ce qui touche aux questions religieuses et morales, où l'on constate des écarts tournant autour

des quatorze points de pourcentage. Cette première série de constatations suit la direction prévue. Après tout, le Canada et les États-Unis entretiennent des rapports privilégiés en matière économique et sociale. Nevitte (1996) a déclaré que dans une perspective globale, le Canada et les États-Unis ont des valeurs très semblables et ont plus en commun qu'avec toute autre nation dans le monde. En somme, les divergences de valeurs entre les deux pays tendraient davantage à la forme qu'au fond.

3. La trajectoire de l'évolution des valeurs est plus complexe. Selon l'analyse de l'« interdépendance » et « structurelle », et les affirmations de certains des pionniers de la recherche sur les valeurs au Canada et aux États-Unis (Nevitte, Inglehart et Basanez³, l'on aurait pu s'attendre à constater une convergence des

valeurs des deux pays au cours des deux dernières décennies. Or, tel n'est pas le cas. Dans l'ensemble, notre analyse tend à démontrer au contraire que non seulement les valeurs canadiennes et américaines n'ont pas convergé pendant la période de 1981 à 2000, mais les données cumulatives révèlent que ces deux sociétés s'éloignent l'une de l'autre. En effet, Adams (2003), qui a utilisé aux fins de son analyse une série différente de valeurs et de méthodologies, a conclu que les Canadiens se distinguent des Américains dans 73 % des 56 valeurs et, dans le cas de 43 de ces valeurs, l'écart s'est creusé de 1992 à 2000. Or, nos études ont produit des résultats très semblables (des 86 valeurs étudiées pour la période de 1990 à 2000, l'écart se creuse dans 47 % des cas). Ensuite, Nevitte (1996) a découvert que les valeurs des deux pays évoluaient plus ou moins parallèlement dans les données des WVS de 1981-1990⁴. Nous avons pu confirmer ce modèle pour la même période et avec les mêmes données mais

touristique à destination des États-Unis, qui représentent à leur tour la source la plus importante de tourisme au Canada (Fry, 2003).

Les arguments reposant sur le principe de l'interdépendance peuvent également être étendus à la proximité géographique des États-Unis et du Canada. Comme l'a si bien souligné Krugman, [Traduction] « le Canada est fondamentalement plus proche des États-Unis que de lui-même » (Krugman, 1991). Harris et Schmitt (2001), pour leur part, remarquent que plusieurs provinces canadiennes sont [Traduction] « plus proches des États du nord des États-Unis que de certaines provinces canadiennes éloignées ».

Par ailleurs, les infrastructures entre les deux pays constituent un immense réseau de connexions : à l'échelle du continent, réseaux ferroviaire et électrique, pipelines de gaz et voie maritime du Saint-Laurent se déploient de plus en plus dans un axe nord-sud (Fried, 2003). Et à un autre niveau d'intégration, le Canada et les États-Unis ont sans conteste l'intérêt stratégique commun de la défense du continent.

Enfin, l'argument « culturel » s'appuie sur le large éventail de produits culturels des États-Unis et sur le volume élevé d'échanges entre les deux pays en ce qui touche aux médias et aux communications. Les tenants de cet argument sont d'avis que les différences culturelles s'estompent avec les assauts que subit la culture canadienne de la part des médias américains. De fait, environ 80 pour cent de la population canadienne a accès à l'ensemble des grandes chaînes de télévision des États-Unis. Cependant, l'analyse des quelques recherches empiriques menées sur les valeurs des médias américains ne permet pas de conclure à un lien décisif (Surlin, 1995). Il semble que les médias américains aient une incidence sur les connaissances des Canadiens (au courant par exemple des questions d'intérêt public aux États-Unis), mais


l'argument est réfutable en ce qui touche à l'incidence des médias américains sur les perceptions, les valeurs, les convictions et les normes. Il n'y a pas de consensus quant à la meilleure manière de déterminer la forme et la substance de ce que l'on appelle les valeurs d'une population. Dans le passé, l'on a utilisé pour ce faire des méthodes qualitatives et quantitatives (analyse des lois, règlements, constitutions et politiques de gouvernements, ententes institutionnelles et mesures telles que le taux de criminalité, le taux de syndicalisation et les sondages). Les questionnaires des sondages constituent finalement l'approche la plus objective, qui permet la comparaison la plus pertinente de périodes et de peuples, ainsi que l'analyse la plus vaste. Nous nous sommes intéressés surtout aux trois vagues des *World Values Surveys* (1981, 1990 et 2000), sur la base desquels aucune évaluation des valeurs

Données et méthodes

L'argument est réfutable en ce qui touche à l'incidence des médias américains sur les perceptions, les valeurs, les convictions et les normes. Il n'y a pas de consensus quant à la meilleure manière de déterminer la forme et la substance de ce que l'on appelle les valeurs d'une population. Dans le passé, l'on a utilisé pour ce faire des méthodes qualitatives et quantitatives (analyse des lois, règlements, constitutions et politiques de gouvernements, ententes institutionnelles et mesures telles que le taux de criminalité, le taux de syndicalisation et les sondages). Les questionnaires des sondages constituent finalement l'approche la plus objective, qui permet la comparaison la plus pertinente de périodes et de peuples, ainsi que l'analyse la plus vaste. Nous nous sommes intéressés surtout aux trois vagues des *World Values Surveys* (1981, 1990 et 2000), sur la base desquels aucune évaluation des valeurs

FIGURE 1

Le virage vers des valeurs post-modernes ou laïques constitue le changement le plus marqué au sein des deux sociétés entre 1981 et 2000



À partir des recherches sur les valeurs du grand public menées dans le passé, nous avons élaboré un cadre d'analyse exhaustive des sociétés canadienne et américaine depuis l'instauration de l'Accord de libre-échange entre le Canada et les États-Unis (ALÉ). Notre première tâche a consisté à réduire le nombre de données à l'étude et à concentrer notre attention sur un groupe de base d'indicateurs. Nous avons dû procéder en trois étapes. D'abord, nous avons retenu 85 éléments individuels de sondage sur un total de près de 300, en nous fondant sur les trois critères suivants :

- séries chronologiques (avons-nous au moins deux passages dans le temps?);

TABLEAU 1

Évolution des valeurs au Canada et aux États-Unis

Nbre d'éléments

En tête de peloton*
1990 2000

I Dimension économique

1	2	s. o.	Canada	1	2	Perspectives économiques (amélioration sur 1/5 ans)
2	4	s. o.	Canada	1	2	Soutien au marché libre (% de soutien au marché libre)
3	5	Canada	Canada	1	5	Emploi – réalisation de soi (% de 5 sur 5)
4	5	Canada	Canada	1	5	Emploi – confort (% de 5 sur 5)
5	1	É.-U.	Canada	1	1	Valeur à enseigner aux enfants : sens de l'économie (% important)
6	1	É.-U.	Canada	1	1	Soutien à la méritocratie (% de soutien)
7	1	É.-U.	Canada	1	1	Maîtrise de son destin (% d'adeptes de la maîtrise)

II Dimension politique

8	1	Canada	Canada	1	1	Intérêt pour la chose politique (% très ou relativement intéressés)
9	4	Canada	Canada	1	4	Confiance envers les institutions d'État (% de confiance)
10	4	É.-U.	Canada	1	4	Confiance envers les institutions non gouvernementales (% de confiance)
11	1	Canada	Canada	1	1	Sentiment de fierté nationale (% de fierté)
12	1	É.-U.	Canada	1	1	Défense de la patrie (% en faveur)
13	1	Canada	Canada	1	1	Cosmopolitisme (% local)
14	5	É.-U.	Canada	1	5	Attitude en matière de protestation (% en faveur)
15	6	Canada**	Canada	1	6	Priorité des valeurs néo-libérales (% de néo-libéraux)
16	6	Canada**	Canada	1	6	Orientations post-modernes (%)
17	3	s. o.	Canada	1	3	Éthique environnementale (% en faveur d'une éthique rigoureuse)

III Dimension sociale

18	5	É.-U.	Canada	1	5	Intolérance situationnelle - plan social (% d'intolérants)
19	2	É.-U.	Canada	1	2	Intolérance situationnelle - plan racial (% d'intolérants)
20	4	É.-U.	Canada	1	4	Permissivité sociale (% estimant que un comportement au moins est justifiable)
21	1	Canada	Canada	1	1	Bien-être subjectif (% affirmant être bien)
22	3	Canada	Canada	1	3	Rapport égalitaire dans le couple (% en faveur)
23	2	Canada	Canada	1	2	Valeur à enseigner aux enfants : l'attention aux autres
24	1	s. o.	Canada	1	1	Confiance envers les Américains (Canada)/envers les Canadiens (É.-U.)

IV Dimension morale

25	6	Canada	Canada	1	6	Permissivité morale (% pour qui c'est justifiable)
26	1	É.-U.	Canada	1	1	Valeur à enseigner aux enfants : convictions religieuses
27	3	É.-U.	Canada	1	3	Valeur à enseigner aux enfants : laïcité (% pour qui c'est important)
28	1	É.-U.	Canada	1	1	Foi religieuse subjective (% croyant en Dieu)
29	1	É.-U.	Canada	1	1	Pratique religieuse (% allant à l'église au moins une fois par semaine)

Une définition exhaustive de ces mesures peut être obtenue sur demande.

* Les données ont été compilées de la manière suivante : si, par exemple entre 1981 et 1990, les valeurs canadiennes s'approchent du niveau des valeurs américaines en 1981, nous estimons que les Américains sont en tête du peloton par rapport aux Canadiens. Si au contraire pendant cette même période les valeurs aux États-Unis s'approchent des niveaux des valeurs au Canada en 1981, nous estimons que les Canadiens sont en tête devant leurs voisins du Sud. Nous avons compilé ces données pour 1990 et 2000.

** Nevitte (1996).

ou durable sur les perceptions entre les deux pays; aux États-Unis, cela n'a

D'autres ont avancé l'argument « historique » pour étayer leur thèse

de deux pays différents. Ainsi Lipset (1990) attribue les divergences de

valeurs entre le Canada et les États-Unis aux circonstances distinctes qui

ont entouré la fondation de chacun des pays, puis à leur parcours his-

torique respectif. Le sondeur Michael Adams suit un raisonnement sem-

blable, affirmant que le Canada et les États-Unis sont [*Traduction*] « fonda-

mentalement distincts », « l'ont tous les deux » et que « [les deux pays]

ont été séparés à la naissance, puis structurés et dirigés de manières dif-

férentes ». Adams laisse également entendre que les principes de base

des constitutions et de l'évolution des nations ont divergé dès le départ.

Ainsi la vie, la liberté et la poursuite du bonheur sont au cœur de la tradition

constitutionnelle américaine, alors que le cadre constitutionnel canadien se

fonde essentiellement sur des valeurs de paix, d'ordre et de bonne gouver-

nance. Adams poursuit en affirmant que le Canada s'est bâti sur fonds de

compromis tandis que les États-Unis se sont construits par voie de con-

quête. Le Canada a vécu des révoltes et les États-Unis une guerre civile, qui

divise encore à ce jour le Nord et le Sud. Pour citer le président Mackenzie

King, « si certains pays ont trop d'histoire, le Canada, lui, a trop de géogra-

phie. Contrairement aux États-Unis, nous avons peu de hauts faits à

célébrer : ni révolution, ni déclaration d'indépendance, ni guerre civile pour

libérer les esclaves »².

Certains observateurs ont privilégié l'argument « structurel » pour appuyer

la thèse de la divergence. Ainsi, selon Horowitz (1973), les écarts entre les

systèmes de valeurs pourraient être attribuables en premier lieu aux dif-

férences structurelles fondamentales entre les deux pays. Ainsi, prétend-il, le Canada [*Traduction*] « s'est deve-

loppé plus lentement et a mis plus

de temps à rejeter les valeurs et le style de vie caractérisant une société moins industrialisée, et encore surtout agaire ». Ce raisonnement suppose que, si le Canada et les États-Unis se rapprochent sur le plan structurel, leurs valeurs devraient également converger. Les deux dernières décennies ont offert plusieurs exemples d'une telle convergence sur le plan structurel. Pensons aux domaines des études

L'immensité géographique, la densité démographique relativement faible et les ressources moins abondantes du Canada le rendent plus étroitement tributaire de l'engagement de l'État dans le processus économique afin de fournir des services n'intéressant pas le capital privé ou pour lesquels il n'existe pas de marché rentable.

L'argument de l'« interdépendance » tient la route à plusieurs niveaux d'étude, mais il se définit dans une large mesure sur le plan économique et soutient la thèse de la convergence des valeurs. Sur le plan économique, les deux pays ont certainement les liens commerciaux bilatéraux les plus étroits dans le monde (Fry, 2003). Chacun représente pour l'autre la plus grande source d'importations et

d'exportations, le volume des échanges a triplé au cours des dix dernières années, et il a sextuplé depuis vingt ans (MAECI, 2003). En outre, l'on sait que le volume des investissements des Canadiens aux États-Unis, et des Américains au Canada, est très élevé. Les échanges canado-américains se sont accrus à un rythme beaucoup plus rapide que les échanges inter-provinciaux au cours des années 1980 et 1990 (Coulombe, 2003), mais depuis 2000, les économies régionales au Canada comptent davantage sur les échanges interprovinciaux comme source première de croissance (Statistique Canada, 2004). Plus des deux tiers du commerce de marchandises entre les États-Unis et le Canada constituent, de fait, des échanges intrasociétés (MAECI, 2003). Le recours accru aux importations de l'un et l'autre comme intrants destinés à la production d'exportations vers l'un et l'autre pays constitue également une tendance croissante (Schwanen, 2003). Le Canada reçoit la plus grande part de ses droits de propriété industrielle à l'étranger d'investisseurs américains, et les États-Unis les leurs d'investisseurs canadiens (le phénomène est cependant en baisse de part et d'autre). Outre ces liens commerciaux, le Canada constitue le plus grand bassin

post-secondaires, de la place des femmes sur le marché de l'emploi, du vieillissement de la population, de l'accès aux ordinateurs et à Internet. Ces quelques indicateurs témoignent d'une tendance marquée au cours des deux dernière décennies. Selon d'autres penseurs, comme Lipset (1990), les facteurs structurels comme l'écologie, la démographie et l'économie ont exercé une influence prépondérante sur l'évolution des valeurs et des perceptions à l'égard des gouvernements des deux côtés de la frontière. L'immensité géographique, la densité démographique relativement faible et les ressources moins abondantes du Canada le rendent plus étroitement tributaire de l'engagement de l'État dans le processus économique afin de fournir des services n'intéressant pas le capital privé ou pour lesquels il n'existe pas de marché rentable. Aux États-Unis, l'on a accordé moins d'importance à l'engagement de l'État en matière économique et de protection contre un voisin puissant. Certains historiens de l'économie avancent même la « théorie lauréntienne », selon laquelle le Canada n'aurait pas survécu comme pays sans l'intervention de l'État et ses liens économiques avec l'Europe.

Le Canada, les États-Unis et leurs valeurs

situations, distinctes, copies conformes ou fierté nationale reposant sur d'infimes différences?

Christian Boucher
Projet de recherche
sur les politiques

Christian Boucher est un agent principal de recherche en politiques qui travaille pour le Projet de recherche sur les politiques.

« Il est normal pour [...] des groupes de personnes semblables d'« examiner leurs différences par ailleurs minimales et superficielles. Plus ils se ressemblent, plus ces groupes cherchent des moyens à se distinguer l'un de l'autre [...] le fait de s'unir face aux autres est un comportement humain normal. » — Sigmund Freud, sur le narcissisme des petites différences, 1930.

La comparaison entre le Canada et les États-Unis provoque toujours de vifs débats au sein de la communauté des chercheurs et praticiens dans le domaine des politiques publiques. En ce dixième anniversaire de l'ALENA, l'étendue des similitudes et l'écart entre les systèmes de valeurs et les croyances, ainsi que leur évolution au cours de l'histoire, sont aussi importants qu'opportuns aux fins de l'élaboration des politiques. L'on connaît les deux grandes approches en la matière. D'abord la thèse de l'inévitable convergence des valeurs canadiennes vers les valeurs américaines, parallèlement à l'intégration croissante de l'économie canadienne à celle de son voisin du Sud (Inglehart et coll. 1996; Simpson, 2000; Pastor, 2001). Et la thèse de l'imprévisibilité ou le mythe de la convergence des valeurs (Lipset, 1990; Adams, 1997 et 2003 a et b). Par ailleurs, la plupart des disciplines liées aux questions de société ont leur propre explication de la trajectoire des valeurs canadiennes et américaines au cours des deux dernières décennies. Mais existe-t-il entre ces deux thèses des différences qui ne soient purement sémantiques? La majorité des analystes conviendrait que, globalement, le Canada a plus de choses en commun avec les États-Unis qu'avec les autres pays du G8. Néanmoins, les tendances que suivent les valeurs et croyances au Canada et aux États-Unis, que ce soit au rapprochement ou à l'éloignement, ont une incidence marquée sur les politiques adoptées au Canada. Les liens les plus directs portent sur l'identité nationale, le développement

économique régional, la collaboration des institutions et une intégration économique accrue. Le présent article a pour principal objectif d'examiner les caractéristiques communes ou au contraire carrément divergentes des deux sociétés, au moyen principale-ment des systèmes de valeurs et des croyances de la population, et d'en évaluer la trajectoire pendant la période d'intégration économique accélérée des vingt dernières années.

Perspectives sur l'évolution des valeurs au Canada et aux États-Unis

Sans doute l'argument de la « réglementation » est-il celui qui a été le plus utilisé au cours des dernières décennies pour souligner les divergences de valeurs entre les deux pays. Ainsi, l'adoption de la *Loi sur les langues officielles* en 1969, puis les travaux de la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme, et enfin la *Loi sur le multiculturalisme canadien* en 1985, ont souvent été cités en exemples des différences entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Par contre, l'introduction, en 1981, de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, qui restreint le pouvoir de l'État au profit d'une protection juridique accrue des droits individuels, a souligné l'américanisation du Canada aux yeux de certains observateurs. Plus récemment, le Canada s'est démarqué à divers égards : contrôle des armes à feu, décriminalisation de la marijuana, mariage de conjoints du même sexe, protocole de Kyoto et guerre en Irak. Le sondeur Frank Graves (2003) a soumis l'hypothèse que [*Traduction*] « la nouvelle trajectoire nord-américaine a peut-être dévié par suite des décisions distinctes des pays nord-américains au sujet de questions telles que la ratification du protocole de Kyoto et la guerre en Irak », mais, résultats de sondages à l'appui, il semble que les « principaux différends (récents) en matière de politiques n'aient pas eu d'effet négatif important

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Notes

- 1 À ce stade de notre projet de recherche, nous nous concentrons sur les grappes industrielles locales, régionales et métropolitaines et nous analysons les données pour les institutions politiques et administratives (p. ex. provinces, états, et régions métropolitaines). Les régions économiques ne correspondent vraisemblablement pas avec les institutions politiques et administratives; par conséquent, notre intérêt dans les travaux qui traitent de l'identification des régions économiques (p. ex. Fezer et Sweeney, 2002).
 - 2 Les villes du Nord-est et Midwest suvantes ont renversé les baisses : Providence, Boston, Jersey City, Worcester, St. Paul, New York City, Minneapolis, Chicago, et Kansas City.
 - 3 Cette section provient du MAECI (2003).
 - 4 Données BLS des États-Unis sur le PIB réel, 1996=100. La méthode utilisée exclut la rémunération du personnel des forces armées et des fonctionnaires en poste en dehors des États-Unis.
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
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Une étude récente, publiée par le Brookings Institute, de quatorze régions métropolitaines des États-Unis abritant des entreprises de technologies de pointe, a révélé que ces entreprises se spécialisent dans quelques produits et technologies (Cortwright et Mayer, 2001). L'examen des données sur la concentration des emplois, les

- le salaire local moyen est corrélé au salaire moyen des secteurs des échanges commerciaux (r^2 de 0,69 %);
- les économies des États aux É.-U. étaient en moyenne plus concentrées en grappes industrielles exportatrices en 2000 qu'en 1990, ce qui confirme que la spécialisation est un phénomène en croissance en Amérique du Nord; et
- le salaire moyen et le brevetage sont clairement et nettement liés à la proportion des emplois dans les grappes exportatrices fortes (r^2 de 0,377 %).

Le nouveau rôle pour les politiques

Il faudra sans doute, pour donner aux régions métropolitaines et provinciales canadiennes les moyens d'une concurrence efficace en Amérique du Nord, adopter de nouvelles politiques dans un ensemble de domaines.

Les politiques adoptées par les administrations fédérale, provinciales et des régions métropolitaines influent sur

Le développement des zones urbaines de nombreuses manières interdépendantes, comme l'illustre la figure 1. En plus des relations intergouvernementales, les politiques sectorielles, d'infrastructure, d'éducation, et d'innovation devraient être revues à la lumière des spécialisations de grappes industrielles développées dans les régions canadiennes.

Les gouvernements fédéraux, des États et provinciales ainsi que des régions et municipalités, modifient progressivement leur approche en ce qui touche au développement économique. En effet, l'on observe l'attention accrue accordée aux facteurs continentaux, aux déterminants micro-économiques de la croissance, à l'innovation, aux systèmes de production et aux grappes industrielles en région, à l'accessibilité et disponibilité de la technologie, compétences de la main-d'œuvre, disponibilité de capitaux nationaux et investissements étrangers directs, infrastructures multimodales modernes, sans parler des questions liées à la qualité de vie qui attirent et gardent des ressources humaines hautement qualifiées, au capital social et aux préoccupations sociales et environnementales. Nos recherches visent à fournir des renseignements sur ces diverses variables et à estimer leur contribution à la croissance et à la capacité concurrentielle des régions métropolitaines. Le projet du PRR sur les régions économiques devrait, par conséquent, contribuer de manière pertinente aux propositions de politiques visant un meilleur développement économique aux niveaux métropolitain, provincial et national.

Renvois

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Création d'une banque de données sur l'Amérique du Nord

L'une des premières tâches entreprises dans le cadre de notre projet a consisté à créer une banque de données qui puisse décrire les dimensions régionales du processus d'intégration au Canada et aux États-Unis. Nous procédons à la compilation de données harmonisées et compatibles aux quatre niveaux suivants de regroupement :

- Canada et États-Unis;
- macro-régions, c'est-à-dire groupes de provinces et huit ou neuf régions des États-Unis, selon Census ou BEA;
- provinces et États; et
- CMSA et MSA aux États-Unis, et RMR (25/27) au Canada.

Les variables à l'étude sont les suivantes : données démographiques, main-d'œuvre et variables macro-économiques, emploi, salaires, nombre d'entreprises, grappes industrielles, quotients de localisation, indices de spécialisation et de localisation en Amérique du Nord.

Notre banque de données nous permettra de procéder à une estimation empirique des déterminants de l'innovation et de la productivité en régions métropolitaines. Une de nos hypothèses veut que l'ampleur du développement des grappes industrielles et leur localisation aideront à expliquer une partie de l'écart de productivité entre le Canada et les États-Unis.

Par ailleurs, cette banque de données servira au suivi de l'évolution des économies régionales en Amérique du Nord, et à l'évaluation des effets des initiatives stratégiques mises en place.

Statistique Canada et Industrie Canada sont quelques-uns des services qui se sont joints au PRR dans ce projet de création d'une banque de données, qui sera mise à la disposition de tous les ministères du gouvernement fédéral.

Les effets des grappes industrielles sur la performance économique

Les études récentes commentent à documenter, d'une manière acceptable sur le plan empirique, les effets des grappes industrielles en régions métropolitaines sur le niveau et la croissance des salaires, l'innovation, la productivité et les exportations de ces régions. Dans un article publié récemment sur la performance économique des

performance économique

- régions et des grappes industrielles, Michael Porter (2003) présente les résultats de son analyse de régression multiple :
- près de 30 % de l'écart des salaires entre les régions est lié aux écarts de volume de brevêtage (activité essentiellement urbaine);
- les secteurs de services commerciaux et de 20 % supérieurs à ceux offerts dans les secteurs de production commercialisables;

sous-grappes industrielles au Canada dont la position concurrentielle est assez solide pour se développer et fructifier au nord de la frontière, et ce, dans le contexte du processus d'intégration que l'on connaît. Nous voulons également décrire et comprendre les changements des origines des exportations et importations à mesure que l'effet frontalier diminue (Brown, 2003).

Une intégration accrue pourrait se traduire par une complémentarité croissante des échanges nord-sud et interprovinciaux et certaines régions métropolitaines comme Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver et Halifax, pourraient développer de nouvelles et vigoureuses activités comme points de transbordement multimodal pour le commerce intra-nord-américain et avec l'étranger.

Métropolisation et commerce inter-régional et international

Une proportion croissante du Produit national brut (PNB) tire sa source des régions métropolitaines (métropolisation). C'est ainsi que nous observons une croissance du commerce inter-régional et international.

La population et l'emploi ont augmenté plus rapidement dans les régions métropolitaines canadiennes, alors que les régions situées à plus d'une heure de route des agglomérations urbaines de plus de 500 000 personnes vivent actuellement un déclin démographique (Polèse, 2003). Cette situation découle de l'importance croissante de l'information et du savoir dans nos économies, du rôle des économies d'agglomération qui accompagnent les grappes industrielles (particulièrement dans les secteurs de services), de l'importance de la proximité dans le secteur de la fabrication de produits de moyenne technologie et de technologie de pointe, et des restrictions imposées à l'exploitation des ressources primaires.

population, et au neuvième en terme d'emploi, montrent que les effets de l'intégration nord-américaine comme à l'influer négativement, comme c'est le cas de la région des Grands lacs, situé au neuvième rang à la fois en terme de croissance de la population et de d'emploi.

Croissance du PIB réel dans les macro-régions des É.U., États, et régions métropolitaines entre 1989 et 2001

Entre 1989 et 2001, le Produit intérieur brut réel (PIB) des États-Unis s'est accru de 3,0 % par année en moyenne⁴. La sous-région des Rocheuses, qui comprend les États du Colorado, de l'Idaho, du Montana, de l'Utah et du Wyoming, a connu la croissance la plus forte (5,0 %). La sous-région des Grands lacs a connu une croissance inférieure à la moyenne nationale (2,7 %), et que la région du Nord-est est la macro-région qui a enregistré la croissance la plus faible (2,3 %).

Les données sur la croissance du PIB entre 1997 et 2002 compilées au niveau des métropolitain statistical area (MSA) et central métropolitain statistical area (CMSA) révèlent que les taux de croissance les plus élevés, soit entre 35 % et 42 %, ont été constatés à Austin, Denver, Houston et San Diego, régions métropolitaines toutes situées dans le sud-ouest des États-Unis.

Les taux de croissance du PIB les plus faibles, soit dans la fourchette de 17 % à 20 %, ont été constatés dans les villes du nord du pays, près de la frontière canadienne : Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit et Rochester.

Le déplacement de l'industrie automobile vers le sud et la localisation des activités électroniques de haute technologie dans le sud explique certaines des recompositions territoriales de l'activité économique. L'intérêt pour le gouvernement, c'est de déterminer si la performance du Sud-ouest, en général plus dynamique que celle

observée dans le Nord-est et Midwest, va influencer négativement les provinces canadiennes et les régions métropolitaines dans le contexte d'une plus grande intégration nord-américaine.

Croissance du revenu personnel dans les régions métropolitaines des É.U. entre 1990-2001

Les données sur la croissance du revenu personnel par région métropolitaine entre 1990 et 2001 indiquent que toutes les régions métropolitaines classées dans les dix premières sont situées dans le sud-ouest des États-Unis.

Exception faite de Honolulu, la dernière de la liste de classement des 141 MSA et CMSA que nous examinons, les régions métropolitaines des États-Unis situées à proximité de la frontière canadienne figurent au bas de la liste des régions classées selon la croissance du revenu personnel entre 1990 et 2001. Il y a cohérence entre ces données et le transfert au sud de l'activité manufacturière.

Dans les années 1970 et 1980, la croissance moyenne du revenu personnel par habitant des régions métropolitaines était comme suit : 14 % et 19 % pour les 250 MSA, 5 % et 32 % pour les MSA du Nord-est, 13 % et 15 % pour les MSA du Midwest, 18 % et 19 % pour les MSA du sud, et 17 % et 17 % pour les MSA de l'ouest (Pack, 2002). Notons le taux d'augmentation extrêmement élevé des MSA du Nord-est.

Une analyse des données sur le revenu personnel par habitant des années 1990 révèle que Boston occupe la cinquième place parmi les dix premières villes avec une croissance de 69 %, Minneapolis la septième avec 67 % et Seattle, la neuvième avec 65 %. Ces résultats montrent que la description du processus de recomposition territoriale comme étant un simple déplacement vers le Sud-est est insuffisante. Le fait que les grappes

industrielles soient responsables de ces résultats est une hypothèse que nous sommes en train de vérifier.

Il est intéressant de noter, toutefois, que Boston, Minneapolis et Seattle ne se trouvent pas en tête de liste en termes de croissance du PIB et du revenu personnel. Les données révèlent en effet que l'augmentation de la population dans ces trois régions métropolitaines entre 1990 et 2001 a été relativement faible, soit de 18,6 %, 20,7 % et 7,6 % respectivement, contre 55 % à Austin, 51 % à Phoenix, et 43 % à Atlanta et Raleigh. Or, des données plutôt bonnes à court terme par habitant masquent peut-être des difficultés à venir dans ces régions à moyen et à long termes.

Les données sur la rémunération moyenne du salarié entre 1990 et 2001 soulignent par ailleurs le rôle et l'importance des facteurs locaux et régionaux à l'égard de la croissance économique. La présence de Seattle (3^e place) et de Boston (5^e place) dans le classement des régions métropolitaines selon ce facteur révèle le rôle déterminant de l'innovation et des technologies de l'information des régions métropolitaines dans le développement économique.

Dispersion de l'activité manufacturière des États-Unis vers le sud, vers l'ouest et vers des régions non métropolitaines

Une analyse préliminaire confirme les résultats obtenus par Holmes et Stevens, soit que l'activité manufacturière états-unienne s'est déplacée vers le sud, l'ouest et des régions non urbaines du pays (2003).

Le déplacement de certaines usines de l'industrie automobile (soit dans le sud-ouest des États-Unis ou dans les maquiladoras mexicaines, et plus récemment en Chine) illustre bien le modèle qui pourrait toucher d'autres secteurs économiques et grappes industrielles au Canada. Le projet du PRR vise à repérer les grappes et

et une croissance supérieure à la moyenne des régions métropolitaines. Les villes ayant supprimé les baisses de population sont éparpillées dans l'ensemble du pays². Les données suivantes sur la croissance démographique entre 1980 et 2002 sont tirées de Poitras et Sawchuk (2003). À l'échelle nationale, les taux de croissance démographique sont semblables, soit 1,13 au Canada et 1,10 aux États-Unis, mais l'on constate de grandes disparités entre les régions. Les taux annuels moyens de croissance démographique dans les provinces ont été les suivants entre 1980 et 2002 :

Croissance démographique annuelle moyenne des provinces, 1980-2002

Provinces de l'Atlantique	0,23 %
Québec	0,62 %
Ontario	1,47 %
Prairies	0,35 %
Alberta	1,61 %
Colombie-Britannique	1,89 %
Territoires	1,60 %

Pendant cette même période, la croissance démographique annuelle moyenne des régions des États-Unis était la suivante :

Croissance démographique annuelle moyenne des régions, E.-U. 1980-2002

Nord-est	0,62 %
Midwest	0,49 %
Grands lacs	0,42 %
Plaines	0,57 %
Sud-est	1,38 %
Sud-ouest	1,96 %
Rochesses	1,74 %
Extrême Ouest	1,85 %

Au cours de la dernière décennie, c'est-à-dire de 1990 à 2001, les macro-régions d'Amérique du Nord ont connu les taux de croissance démographique les plus rapide, comme suit :

Croissance de la population de macro-régions nord-américaines choisies, 1990-2001

Rochesses	29,1 %
Sud-ouest	25,8 %
Colombie-Britannique	24,6 %
Sud-est	18,2 %
Extrême Ouest	18,3 %
Ontario	15,5 %
Prairies	12,2 %
Plaines	9,5 %
Grands lacs	9,0 %

Source : PRP, banque de données sur l'Amérique du Nord

Des tableaux présentés ci-dessus, plusieurs points méritent d'être soulignés :

- la présence de la Colombie-Britannique et de l'Ontario dans le groupe des régions à forte croissance démographique;
- certaines régions, telles les Rochesses et la Colombie-Britannique, ont connu une croissance semblable à celle de la zone du Sud-ouest, généralement considérée comme la région économique en croissance rapide;
- la zone du sud-est affiche un taux plus élevé que celui de l'Ontario. Cette progression soulève la question suivante : l'Ontario commencerait-elle à ressentir les effets de la disparition l'industrie manufacturière, un phénomène observé aux États-Unis, comme nous le verrons plus loin.

Source : PRP, banque de données sur l'Amérique du Nord

Sud-ouest	43,09 %
Rochesses	42,97 %
Sud-est	25,10 %
Colombie-Britannique, Extrême Ouest	20,01 %
Plaines	19,96 %
Prairies	18,42 %
Grands lacs	16,04 %
Ontario	14,89 %
Québec	10,06 %
Provinces de l'Atlantique	8,96 %
Midwest	8,93 %

Croissance de l'emploi dans des territoires choisis, 1990-2001

L'emploi total a augmenté comme suit entre 1990 et 2002 dans les macro-régions et les régions métropolitaines :

Évolution de l'emploi et du PIB à l'échelle régionale : macro-régions, provinces et États

Une série de facteurs peut expliquer ces tendances, notamment les salaires et les prix des terres moins élevés dans le Sud, les changements technologiques, l'appartenance de la population, la pénétration des exportations, le réseau routier national, les projets sur l'eau, les politiques économiques, et la performance relative des grappes industrielles dans différentes régions, une hypothèse que nous vérifions dans le cadre de notre projet.

Étant donné que les cinq premières macro-régions sont les mêmes dans les deux cas, il existe une corrélation positive entre le taux de croissance de la population et celui de l'emploi tels qu'indiquent les tableaux ci-dessus. Le fait que l'Ontario se situe au sixième rang en terme de croissance de la

Quelques caractéristiques de l'intégration et de la régionalisation en Amérique du Nord

L'étude des données sur la population, l'emploi, le revenu personnel et les flux d'échange des macro-régions, états et provinces, et régions métropolitaines révèle que la recomposition territoriale de l'activité économique est un phénomène continu. Des analyses préliminaires semblent indiquer une baisse dans la région du Nord-est et celle des Grands Lacs (mis à part quelques exceptions au niveau métropolitain), un déclin relié à la dissipation dans la ceinture manufacturière des États-Unis, et une métropolisation accrue.

Tendances démographiques au Canada et aux États-Unis

Entre 1950 et 1996, le pourcentage du total de la population des régions métropolitaines dans le Nord-Est a baissé de 34 % à 20 %, et dans le Midwest de 29 % à 24 %. Le Sud a vu son pourcentage augmenter pour passer de 23 % à 33 %, et l'Ouest de 14 % à 23 % (Pack, 2002). Une étude récente, effectuée par Rapaport (2003), portant sur le déclin et la croissance des régions urbaines des États-Unis entre 1950 et 2000 a confirmé un déplacement régional de la population du Nord-est et du Midwest vers le Sud et l'Ouest, et des grandes villes vers les banlieues, mais à un rythme plus modéré au cours des années 1980 et 1990 que plus tôt. Rapaport a également montré qu'à l'intérieur de chaque région, certaines régions métropolitaines ont augmenté plus vite que d'autres. Les villes enregistrent une baisse continue dans le Nord-est et le Midwest, tandis que celles en augmentation continue se trouvent dans le Sud et l'Est; celles-ci ont également connu une perte de population inférieure à la moyenne dans les banlieues

Néanmoins, les entreprises membres de grappes bénéficient d'externalités positives à la fois locales et non locales. Certaines entreprises font partie des grappes nord-américaines mondiales. Les plus grandes entreprises en grappes locales agissent également comme structures de réseaux entre les composantes régionales. D'où l'importance pour nous de

La participation conjointe des entreprises canadiennes et états-uniennes dans le cadre d'une même grappe transfrontalière voire trans-régionale peut donner à ces entreprises une longueur d'avance sur les entreprises à l'étranger. Ce qui peut constituer un nouvel élément dans une quatrième option commerciale éventuelle pour le Canada.

d'ailleurs. Les grappes industrielles abaissent les barrières à l'acquisition et à l'utilisation du savoir produit ou utilisé localement, ou importé de firmes membres de la même grappe industrielle de l'extérieur. Les nouvelles entreprises se joignant à des grappes industrielles s'évitent l'étape de la cueillette d'information sur le contexte d'affaires régissant en dehors de leur regroupement. Un deuxième facteur fait des régions et de la spécialisation de leurs grappes industrielles des éléments de plus en plus importants du point de vue d'objectif en matière de politiques. Il s'agit de la tendance croissante des entreprises à restructurer et à relocaliser leurs diverses unités dans des régions spécialisées en production, en finance, ou en commercialisation. Bien que contre-intuitive, l'analyse quantitative révèle que les réductions de coûts de transmission de l'information, utiles à la localisation à l'étranger d'activités à moindre valeur ajoutée, ont accru l'importance des interactions directes dans les villes et régions, ce qui constitue notre troisième facteur fondamental.

La plus grande capacité concurrentielle des grappes industrielles dans certaines régions canadiennes s'acquiert parfois au détriment des grappes constituées aux États-Unis ou ailleurs à l'étranger. Il ne s'agit cependant pas d'une situation de jeu à somme nulle. La participation conjointe des entreprises canadiennes et états-uniennes dans le cadre d'une même grappe trans-frontalière voire trans-régionale peut donner à ces entreprises une longueur d'avance sur les entreprises à l'étranger. Ce qui peut constituer un nouvel élément dans une quatrième option commerciale éventuelle pour le Canada (p. ex. la diversification par l'intégration de grappes industrielles nord-américaines).

Régions économiques en Amérique du Nord

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Le gouvernement fédéral ainsi que les administrations provinciales, régionales et métropolitaines

doivent cerner clairement les spécialisations des diverses régions métropolitaines au Canada, mais également à l'échelle nord-américaine, voire mondiale. Il leur faut bien saisir la nature des moteurs de la croissance des villes-régions, et mettre sur pied des initiatives stratégiques qui renforceront leur position concurrentielle afin que celles-ci s'adaptent à l'évolution constante du processus d'intégration économique. Dans le cadre du projet intitulé Liens nord-américains, le PRP mène un programme de recherche sur les régions économiques susceptibles d'aider les gouvernements à atteindre ces objectifs.

Cet article examine les analyses théoriques récentes et les résultats d'études empiriques qui expliquent l'importance grandissante de l'agglomération d'activités économiques dans des grappes industrielles locales-régionales-métropolitaines, transfrontalières (p. ex. dans les provinces et états rapprochés géographiquement les uns des autres) et trans-régionales (situées loin d'un de l'autre mais faisant partie de la même grappe). Les données sur la population, l'emploi, le PIB et le revenu personnel présentées visent à décrire les principales caractéristiques de la recomposition de l'activité économique en Amérique du Nord. Notre programme de recherche est loin d'être terminé et à ce stade, nous visons simplement à fournir un aperçu des questions et hypothèses qui guident la recherche.

Importance grandissante de grappes industrielles locales, transfrontalières et transfrontières

L'intérêt accru que suscitent les régions économiques est fondé sur des notions théoriques et les résultats d'études empiriques récentes, qui révèlent que les régions économiques qui fonctionnent bien, et les grappes industrielles

que l'on y trouve, contribuent de manière positive à la croissance et à la productivité. Ainsi une performance accrue des diverses régions économiques dans une économie nord-américaine de plus en plus intégrée devrait-elle susciter une meilleure performance des provinces canadiennes et du Canada, de l'Amérique du Nord et du monde.

Trois grands facteurs, étroitement liés, jouent un rôle clé dans ce processus d'intégration et ils sont particulièrement pertinents pour bien saisir l'importance grandissante des grappes industrielles, définies en terme de concentration géographique des industries de produits finis, leurs chaînes d'approvisionnement, des autres industries qui partagent avec elles des affinités en technologie ou en capital humain et d'autres organismes d'aide spécifiques, p. ex. les universités, les installations de R&D et les investisseurs en capital de risque¹.

Le premier est le rôle croissant des économies d'urbanisation en général, et des économies de localisation en particulier, dans un contexte exigeant sans cesse de nouvelles innovations, surtout dans les domaines de l'information, du savoir et des technologies. La proximité géographique est plus importante sur le plan de l'innovation technologique. Des analyses récentes de données sur le brevêtement ont démontré que les inventeurs ont davantage recours au savoir local qu'au savoir étranger, et davantage au savoir en provenance de régions métropolitaines qu'à celui venant de l'extérieur (Sonn et Storper, 2003).

L'intégration crée au sein des marchés locaux une concurrence entre produits identiques ou semblables en provenance d'endroits différents, et les entreprises doivent innover sans cesse plus rapidement pour pouvoir y faire face. Selon Sonn et Storper, il devient de plus en plus difficile de codifier et de normaliser le savoir à mesure que s'accroît le flux de l'information. Les entreprises d'une même région tissent

baissent d'environ 1 %, ce qui entraîne une hausse de 0,1 % des dépenses réelles des consommateurs. Le PIB global ou la valeur ajoutée augmente légèrement, entre 0,07 et 0,09 %. Comme il fallait s'y attendre, les gains économiques provenant des tarifs extérieurs communs des États-Unis sont beaucoup plus réduits que ceux du Canada, car la réduction des droits moyens n'est que de 0,08 à 0,23 point de pourcentage. De plus, les échanges commerciaux jouent un rôle bien moins important dans l'économie américaine que dans l'économie canadienne.

Élimination des règles d'origine de l'ALENA

Comme nous l'avons signalé précédemment, on arrive à l'élimination des règles d'origine de l'ALENA en alignant les droits tarifaires de la NPF sur ceux de l'ALENA. Cette opération exige une réduction de 2,11 points de pourcentage de la moyenne des droits au Canada, de 0,6 point aux États-Unis et de 5,72 points au Mexique. Par conséquent, les gains résultant de l'élimination des règles d'origine sont nettement plus élevés que ceux qui proviennent des tarifs extérieurs communs du Canada et des États-Unis. Les échanges commerciaux du Canada augmentent d'environ 1,3 %, ce qui correspond à un gain de PIB réel ou de valeur ajoutée de 1 %. Le PIB des États-Unis augmente de plus de 0,1 % et celui du Mexique, lui, augmente de plus de 5 % en raison de l'élimination des règles d'origine.

Union douanière

Ce scénario juxtapose les tarifs extérieurs communs et l'élimination des règles d'origine. Les résultats des simulations donnent à penser qu'une union douanière canado-américaine augmenterait le PIB réel du Canada de 1,1 %, celui des États-Unis de 0,1 % et celui du Mexique de plus de 5 %. Comme on s'y attendait, l'offre intérieure de produits de consommation au Canada baisse en raison de

l'augmentation de la pénétration des importations sur le marché intérieur, alors que les exportations américaines au Canada augmentent de plus de 25 %, et les exportations mexicaines de plus de 40 % dans les deux simulations. Par contre, les exportations canadiennes au États-Unis augmentent également de plus de 25 %.

Les répercussions sur les industries reflètent les changements au niveau des importations et des exportations. Dans les deux simulations d'union douanière, la valeur ajoutée augmente dans tous les secteurs industriels canadiens, hormis le secteur alimentaire, où elle baisse en raison de l'augmentation importante des importations d'aliments. Par ailleurs, les grands bénéficiaires sont le secteur automobile et les secteurs à forte composante technologique. Aux États-Unis, la valeur ajoutée baisse dans les secteurs de l'agriculture et de l'automobile alors que les secteurs de la fabrication et des services y gagnent. Au Mexique, les bénéficiaires seraient le textile, l'automobile et les secteurs à forte composante technologique. Les transferts intersectoriels sur le plan de la main-d'œuvre correspondent aux changements dans la valeur ajoutée et les salaires réels. Au Canada, l'emploi augmentera de façon importante dans les secteurs de l'automobile et de la technologie.

En bref, nos conclusions laissent entendre que les tarifs extérieurs communs et l'élimination des règles d'origine renforceront les liens entre les trois pays membres de l'ALENA et seront avantageux pour les trois. Les résultats des simulations sont très robustes à l'égard des valeurs des paramètres clés de ce modèle.

Renvois

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Notes

- 1 Cet article est une version abrégée de « Economic Impacts of a Possible Canada-U.S. Customs Union: Simulation Results from a Dynamic CGE Model », Les auteurs tiennent à remercier Renée St-Jacques, économiste en chef à Indus-trie Canada pour ses judicieux conseils sur une version préliminaire de cet article.
 - 2 Le modèle que nous utilisons est une version exhaustive du prototype de Lavoie et coll. (2001).
 - 3 Pour notre propos, MERCOSUR comprend l'Argentine, le Brésil, et l'Uruguay (ne disposant pas de données sur l'économie du Paraguay dans notre base, nous n'avons pas tenu compte de ce pays).
 - 4 Cet article est un exception majeure au principe de la NPF du GATT et de l'article principal traitant des unions douanières et des ALB.
 - 5 Pour un bon aperçu des règles d'origine et de leurs conséquences sur l'intégration régionale, voir Brenton (2003).
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ne pouvaient déroger au principe que dans la mesure où ces dérogations auraient un effet équivalent aux politiques et aux pratiques appliquées avant cette entente préférentielle et que cette préférence devait englober « l'essentiel des échanges commerciaux » entre les pays participants⁴. Afin de simuler les répercussions économiques d'une union douanière canado-américaine, nous commencerons par analyser les répercussions des tarifs extérieurs communs (TEC) du Canada et des États-Unis sur les pays non membres de l'ALENA ainsi que celles de l'élimination de tous les tarifs existants entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Nous avons deux scénarios possibles en ce qui a trait aux tarifs extérieurs communs. Dans le premier, les tarifs extérieurs communs sont assimilés aux droits tarifaires minimum imposés par le Canada et les États-Unis aux pays non membres de l'ALENA dans les grands secteurs industriels. Dans le deuxième scénario, on assimile les droits tarifaires des États-Unis aux tarifs extérieurs communs des deux pays vis-à-vis des pays non membres de l'ALENA.

Dans un troisième scénario, nous simulons les répercussions de l'élimination des règles d'origine de l'ALENA afin de permettre l'importation canadienne et américaine de produits provenant de pays non membres de l'ALENA. Les règles d'origine précèdent les conditions d'octroi d'un tel privilège⁵. Selon l'ALENA, l'importateur doit remplir et signer un certificat d'origine des produits et le présenter aux autorités douanières avant qu'on lui accorde un traitement tarifaire préférentiel. Les droits de douanes entre le Canada et les États-Unis sur presque tous les produits admissibles à titre de produits d'origine sont éliminés, et ces droits sont peu élevés ou nuls pour l'échange de ces produits entre le Mexique et les États-Unis. Si un produit n'est pas admissible aux tarifs préférentiels de l'ALENA, il est assujéti aux droits tarifaires de la nation la plus favorisée (NPF).

La justification économique des règles d'origine est qu'elles sont nécessaires pour empêcher le détournement des courants commerciaux et protéger les industries nationales contre les pays non membres. Toutefois, les règles d'origine entraîneront le détournement des échanges des pays non-membres de l'ALENA vers les pays membres, ce qui entraîne une mauvaise affectation des ressources productives dans les pays membres. Par exemple, les tarifs préférentiels en faveur des pays membres de l'ALENA peuvent détourner les choix d'intrants des entreprises d'une source peu coûteuse à l'extérieur de l'ALENA vers une source coûteuse au sein de l'ALENA, ce qui débouche sur un manque d'efficacité sur le plan de la production. En plus de ces allocations peu efficaces des ressources, ces restrictions commerciales entraînent des dépenses administratives importantes pour les importateurs et les exportateurs. De plus, les gouvernements doivent payer les coûts de la gestion des règles d'origine imposées. L'estimation des coûts d'observation entraînée par ces règles d'origine dans l'Association européenne de libre-échange (AELÉ) se situe entre 1,4 et 5,7 % de la valeur des exportations (Goffarb, 2003). Si nous appliquons ces mêmes tarifs aux exportations canadiennes vers les États-Unis, le Canada pourrait réaliser des économies de 4 à 18 milliards de dollars annuellement en éliminant les règles d'origine de l'ALENA. Appiah (1999) estime que le coût économique des règles d'origine de l'ALENA pour le Canada se situe entre 0,3 et 3 % du PIB selon la structure du modèle utilisé.

Le modèle que nous utilisons est capable de déterminer les manques d'efficacité dans les allocations résultant du détournement des courants commerciaux provoqué par les tarifs préférentiels. Dans une tentative pour cerner les gains d'une réduction des dépenses administratives des importateurs canadiens et américains, dans le scénario expérimental, nous alignons les taux de la NPF sur les taux de l'ALENA au Canada, au Mexique et aux États-Unis. Cette hypothèse repose sur une observation faite par plusieurs analystes, selon laquelle la plupart des importateurs et des exportateurs préfèrent payer la différence de tarif plutôt que d'effectuer tout le travail administratif nécessaire. Cependant, nous reconnaissons que nous risquons de surestimer les gains provenant de l'élimination des règles d'origine avec notre hypothèse de réduction unitaire des tarifs de la NPF par rapport à ceux de l'ALENA. Les gains simulés et les transferts intersectoriels sur le plan de la main-d'œuvre et du capital pour l'ALENA vers une source coûteuse au sein de l'ALENA, ce qui débouche sur un manque d'efficacité sur le plan de la production. En plus de ces allocations peu efficaces des ressources, ces restrictions commerciales entraînent des dépenses administratives importantes pour les importateurs et les exportateurs. De plus, les gouvernements doivent payer les coûts de la gestion des règles d'origine imposées. L'estimation des coûts d'observation entraînée par ces règles d'origine dans l'Association européenne de libre-échange (AELÉ) se situe entre 1,4 et 5,7 % de la valeur des exportations (Goffarb, 2003). Si nous appliquons ces mêmes tarifs aux exportations canadiennes vers les États-Unis, le Canada pourrait réaliser des économies de 4 à 18 milliards de dollars annuellement en éliminant les règles d'origine de l'ALENA. Appiah (1999) estime que le coût économique des règles d'origine de l'ALENA pour le Canada se situe entre 0,3 et 3 % du PIB selon la structure du modèle utilisé.

La réduction des droits tarifaires entraîne celle des prix des importations et stimule les échanges commerciaux et la consommation au Canada et aux États-Unis. Elle entraîne de plus des transferts intersectoriels de capital et de main-d'œuvre, ce qui débouche sur des gains d'efficacité quant à l'allocation des ressources et de PIB réel. Les répercussions sur le plan macro-économique sont très similaires dans les deux simulations avec TEC, car la réduction de la moyenne des droits est plus ou moins identique dans les deux scénarios : -0,91 et -0,87 point de pourcentage, respectivement. Le flux des échanges commerciaux augmente de 4 à 5 % dans les deux scénarios. Les prix des produits de consommation

Résultats des simulations Répercussions économiques des tarifs extérieurs communs

Répercussions économiques d'une union douanière canada-américaine

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An Canada, les relations canado-américaines font l'objet de nombreux débats publics. Beaucoup d'analystes et d'observateurs politiques ont fait diverses propositions afin d'élargir et d'approfondir l'ALENA, dont les suivantes : l'harmonisation des mesures à la frontière et des procédures relatives aux douanes, à l'immigration et aux réfugiés, une plus grande coopération dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, la reconnaissance mutuelle des procédures et pratiques réglementaires du Canada et des États-Unis, la libre circulation de la main-d'œuvre entre les deux pays, le remplacement des droits compensateurs ou antidumping dans les deux pays par une loi commune sur la concurrence, l'union monétaire ou une devise commune, l'harmonisation des tarifs canadiens et américains vis-à-vis des pays non membres de l'ALENA (tarifs extérieurs communs) et l'élimination des règles d'origine de l'ALENA.

Toutefois, il existe peu d'analyses sur les répercussions économiques de ces diverses propositions de renforcement de l'ALENA. Cet article vise à examiner les répercussions économiques d'une union douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis sur les industries canadiennes, à l'aide d'un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique (EGC) visant plusieurs pays et plusieurs secteurs².

Le modèle est calibré selon les données de référence de la base GTAP de 1997 (GTAP 2001). Nous disposons de données GTAP en sept régions/pays et en huit grands secteurs industriels. Les sept régions sont les suivantes : le Canada, les États-Unis, le Mexique, Mercosur, l'Europe latine, l'Europe et le reste du monde³. Les huit principaux secteurs industriels sont : l'agriculture, la transformation des aliments, les industries à forte intensité

de ressources, les industries textile, manufacturière et automobile, la machinerie, l'électronique, ainsi que les services. Le modèle que nous utilisons repose sur l'hypothèse du plein emploi. De plus, dans ce modèle, l'offre de main-d'œuvre est exogène et ne réagit pas aux changements des salaires réels. Ce qui signifie que l'emploi total à l'échelle de l'économie ne dévie pas des hypothèses de base des simulations. Dans le modèle toutefois, l'accumulation du capital est endogène. De plus, dans les simulations, la structure industrielle de l'emploi et du capital répond aux changements dans les variables économiques.

Les variables monétaires ne jouent aucun rôle dans le modèle. Par conséquent, nous ne pouvons traiter les impacts cycliques sur les marchés des produits et sur le marché du travail à l'aide des modèles EGC. Cependant, ces modèles rendent bien l'effet des politiques commerciales et fiscales sur la nouvelle répartition du capital et de la main-d'œuvre entre les secteurs industriels. Les modèles EGC sont donc en mesure de bien rendre compte du gain global en efficacité provenant de cette nouvelle répartition de l'emploi et du capital.

Conception des simulations

L'établissement d'une union douanière ou d'une zone de libre-échange (ZLE) est tolérée en tant qu'exception au principe fondamental de non-discrimination selon l'article XXIV du GATT. Une union douanière regroupe des pays qui éliminent tous les tarifs commerciaux entre eux mais maintiennent des tarifs extérieurs communs sur les échanges avec d'autres pays, qui ne font pas partie de l'union (ce qui déroge techniquement au principe de la nation la plus favorisée). Sur le plan historique, cette exception a été conçue afin de permettre la formation de la Communauté économique européenne (CEE) en 1958. Elle était basée sur le concept selon lequel ces associations, bien que discriminatoires,

Penser l'Amérique du Nord

A l'occasion du 75^e anniversaire de l'accord de libre-échange entre le Canada et les États-Unis et du 100^e anniversaire de l'Accord de commerce nord-américain, l'Institut de recherche en politique a tenu, en octobre 2003, son neuvième congrès intitulé « Thinking North America: Prospects and Pathways ». Les résultats de cet événement seront publiés dans huit toiles qui seront diffusées entre mai et octobre 2004. Les toiles seront également disponibles en format électronique.

Fry Earl, « The Role of Supranational Governments in North American Integration », IRPP, 18 (mars 2004).

Phat Michael, « A New Approach to Trade with the United States: The Trade and Economic Consequences », IRPP, 17 (mai 2004).

Schwann Daniel, « Export Border A Roadmap for a Treaty of South America », IRPP, 20 (juin 2004).

Pour plus de renseignements, veuillez contacter le site Internet de l'IRPP à l'adresse suivante : www.irpp.org.

1 Appliah modélise les règles d'origine de l'ALÉNA comme modification de la classification tarifaire et comme contenu à valeur régionale. Le changement de classification tarifaire s'évalue approximativement en termes de pourcentage accru de valeur ajoutée par unité d'intrant de l'étranger requis pour entraîner le changement de classification tarifaire. Son modèle intermédiaire simule un changement de classification tarifaire équivalant à 30 % de la valeur ajoutée par unité de coût des intrants de l'étranger.

2 En appliquant le tarif NPF à tous les pays du monde entier (à l'exception de la République populaire de Corée et de la Libye), le Canada l'utilise plus comme un taux de base ou un taux non préférentiel. En 1998, les États-Unis a renommé NPF qui devient NTR étant donné que la plupart des nations ont ce statut d'échange avec les États-Unis.

3 Brown et coll. (2003) et Appliah (1999) ont estimé que les avantages globaux et les effets distribués de l'adoption d'un tarif extérieur commun dépendent de la manière dont ce TEC est calculé. Bien que les résultats de ces deux études soient instructifs, l'inclusion d'un troisième pays (le Mexique) n'offre pas une indication fiable des effets économiques probables d'une union douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis.

4 Les quatre exposés suivants présentés à la table ronde sont à la disposition du public sur demande auprès du PRP. Communiqué avec Bob Kunimoto au (613) 943-2401 ou à l'adresse rkunimoto@psrpf.gc.ca.

Estevadeordal, Antoni et Kati Suominen, 2004, *Rules of Origin: A World Map and Trade Effects*.

Chosh, Madannohan et Someshwar Rao, 2004, *Répercussions économiques d'une éventuelle union douanière canado-américaine : résultats de simulations à l'aide d'un modèle Ecic dynamique*. Kunimoto, Bob et Gary Sawchuk, 2004, *Vers l'union douanière : une analyse de la situation*. Mitrus, Rolf et Karin Hoffman, 2004, *Estimating Potential Savings from Streamlining Tariffs Among NAFTA Partners: An Alberta Perspective*.

arrangements « ALÉNA-plus », et la création d'institutions officieuses jouera un rôle dans la définition de l'entente finale. Par conséquent, la recherche doit se poursuivre sur l'impotence accrue des institutions et des liens officieux, et sur leur rôle dans le processus d'intégration entre le Canada et les États-Unis.

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Australie, Commission de la productivité, 2003, « Rules of Origin under the Australia-New Zealand FTA Trade Agreement Interim Research Report », Canberra.

Brown, Prusilla K., Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert Stern, 2003, « Impacts on NAFTA Members of Multilateral and Regional Trading Arrangements and Tariff Harmonization », In *North American Linkages: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada*, dir. Richard Harris, (Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Cadot, Olivier, Jaime de Melo, Antoni Esteveadeordal, Aikio Suwa-Bissmann et Borloma Turnurechud, 2002, « Assessing the Effect of NAFTA's Rules of Origin », Minneo, (arère, Celine et Jaime de Melo, 2003, « A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Any Gains for the South », Allocation présentée au troisième forum du *Regional Integration Network*, Uruguay, 15-18 décembre 2003.

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Krugger, Anne C., 1995, « Free Trade Agreements versus Customs Unions », NBER Working Paper No. W5084, Cambridge, MA: NBER.

Projet de recherche sur les politiques, 2003, « Le Projet sur les liens nord-américains : mise au point du programme de recherche », Document de travail.

En plus des trois questions abordées ci-dessus, plusieurs autres enjeux méritent d'être mentionnés. Le professeur Bill Dymond, de l'Université Carleton, a fait valoir qu'il fallait mener des recherches sur les questions de gouvernance. Il serait bon selon lui de trouver des façons de résoudre les problèmes sans recourir aux traités officiels, que ce soit au moyen d'une union douanière ou d'un autre arrangement « ALENA-plus ». Il a attiré l'attention sur ce qui s'est passé au sein de l'Union européenne, où des institutions officielles ont été créées pendant un certain nombre d'années.

La question de la gouvernance

et des intrants intermédiaires. La poursuite de la mondialisation ne fera qu'accroître ces difficultés. Les problèmes auxquels sont confrontées les petites et moyennes entreprises n'en seraient que plus importants. Comme l'a signalé Lorraine Eden, ces coûts d'autres encore, tels que les coûts d'observation et d'information, touchent toujours plus durement les petites entreprises.

Il faut axer les recherches analytiques sur les raisons pour lesquelles le recours à l'ALENA est si faible. Il faudrait insister davantage sur la question des petites et moyennes entreprises et des défis supplémentaires qu'elles doivent relever pour profiter des occasions offertes par l'ALENA.

RO de l'ALENA en est notamment responsable. La chute des taux de la NPF, qui réduit l'importance de la préférence accordée à l'ALENA, explique aussi ces faibles taux. En outre, plusieurs participants ont fait remarquer à quel point il devait être difficile et coûteux pour les entreprises de recourir à l'ALENA dans le cas des combinaisons complexes de produits. Pour ces produits, il serait difficile de rendre compte de l'origine des pièces

De temps à autre, on a rappelé à l'auditoire que de nombreuses autres questions importantes compromettaient les relations transfrontalières, telles que les différences de réglementation et de normes et les obstacles à la mobilité de la main-d'œuvre. C'est pourquoi John Whalley a affirmé que les discussions avec les États-Unis devraient aller au-delà des négociations sur un TFC et les RO, et porter sur d'autres obstacles commerciaux.

Mot de la fin et perspectives

Dans le contexte du Projet du RRP sur les liens nord-américains, la table ronde sur l'« évolution vers une union douanière » a été très utile.

Si l'établissement d'une véritable union douanière avec les États-Unis ne constitue pas une possibilité réaliste pour certains participants à ce stade-ci, tous s'entendent pour dire qu'il faut déployer des efforts afin de réduire les effets restrictifs et coûteux des RO sur les échanges bilatéraux entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Toutefois, selon certains participants à la table ronde, il faudra axer la recherche future sur une meilleure compréhension des RO de l'ALENA. Parmi ces participants figure Danielle Goldfarb, qui propose de mener des recherches analytiques de nature

sectorielle plus détaillées et ventilées, compte tenu de l'importance des possibilités sectorielles en matière d'harmonisation des tarifs et de libéralisation des RO de l'ALENA. À cet égard, Lorraine Eden a proposé d'évaluer la satisfaction des entreprises du secteur des périphériques d'ordinateur quant aux règles harmonisées dans leur secteur. Elle a proposé de mener une enquête de suivi auprès d'autres industries afin de déterminer de nouveaux candidats à l'harmonisation des RO. Comme l'a souligné Benoît Robidoux, une meilleure compréhension des liens sectoriels permettra d'évaluer en quoi l'harmonisation des RO d'un secteur est susceptible d'influencer les autres secteurs. Les conséquences des RO sur les intrants intermédiaires et le contenu régional de même que sur le déplacement des échanges sont très importantes. Ce type de recherche permettrait également de comprendre les conséquences sectorielles et régionales de l'ALENA. De plus, la table ronde a permis de cerner de nouveaux problèmes et des défis futurs. À cet égard, il faut axer les recherches analytiques sur les raisons pour lesquelles le recours à l'ALENA est si faible. Il faudrait insister davantage sur la question des petites et moyennes entreprises et des défis supplémentaires qu'elles doivent relever pour profiter des occasions offertes par l'ALENA. Ce type de recherche doit permettre d'examiner les conséquences de l'ALENA dans le cadre des décisions d'affaires et d'investissement. Si la question de la faisabilité d'une véritable union douanière n'a pas encore été tranchée, les participants ont fait valoir que des occasions de revoir bon nombre de ces questions se présenteront dans tout nouvel élargissement de l'ALENA ou toute entente commerciale régionale concernant le Canada et les États-Unis. Les questions de gouvernance occupent une part très importante des discussions relatives aux

Qu'en est-il des accords sectoriels?

Malgré les défis de taille que pose une véritable union douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis, on s'accorde généralement à dire que le Canada pourrait tout de même conclure des ententes spéciales à l'échelle sectorielle. Danielle Goldfarb, de l'Institut C.D. Howe, a avancé que le Canada pourrait construire sur la base des accords spéciaux qui existent déjà dans le secteur des périphériques d'ordinateur, ce qui établirait un précédent pour l'harmonisation des autres secteurs. Elle a ajouté qu'il existe de nombreux secteurs candidats au sein desquels les taux de l'ALENA et de la NPF sont faibles ou similaires. Il faut poursuivre les travaux analytiques sur les possibilités sectorielles. Les travaux de Rolf Mirus constituent, selon elle, un bon point de départ.

David Sheehan, de l'Agence des services frontaliers du Canada, a reconnu qu'il y aurait des avantages à éliminer les RO dans la mesure du possible. Nous avons tendance à consacrer de l'énergie et des ressources là où les droits sont élevés, en raison des incitations apparentes à contourner les RO. Toutefois, à mesure que les tarifs baissent et que les RO sont éliminées, nous pourrions consacrer de nouvelles ressources aux secteurs plus problématiques, tels que les vêtements et les textiles. Benoit Robidoux, du ministère des Finances, a rappelé qu'il demeurerait nécessaire de se pencher sur l'ordre des secteurs, puisque les ententes d'harmonisation conclues dans un secteur sont susceptibles d'influencer les autres secteurs. Chaque secteur reçoit l'apport d'autres secteurs tout en contribuant à ces secteurs et à d'autres encore. Nous devons savoir comment ces autres secteurs seront touchés.

André Downs, du PRR, a lancé une mise en garde. Il a signalé que la simple cueillette des « fruits mûrs » des secteurs les plus faciles à harmoniser ne va pas sans conséquence. Nous resterions devant les secteurs

problématiques, et la capacité du Canada à s'attaquer à ceux-ci serait alors restreinte. Une solution de rechange éventuellement plus prometteuse consisterait à harmoniser tous les secteurs simultanément, ce qui permettrait de faire certains compromis. D'autres participants ont avancé qu'une démarche progressive permettrait aussi de libérer des ressources pour vanter être utilisées pour aborder les enjeux de ces secteurs problématiques (p. ex., l'agriculture, les textiles, les vêtements), qui ne seront de toute façon peut-être pas des candidats prometteurs avant que l'on constate des progrès en matière de réduction de la protection au sein de l'OMC et Lorraine Eden a également souligné que, à mesure que de nouveaux accords commerciaux préférentiels sont signés et que le système mondial d'ententes régionales se complique, il devient plus difficile d'harmoniser les RO de deux pays. Par conséquent, si cet objectif mérite d'être poursuivi, il est souhaitable d'aller de l'avant le plus tôt possible.

Les RO de l'ALENA : le temps d'un changement

En ce qui concerne les RO, les participants étaient pratiquement unanimes. Ils considéraient la modification des RO de l'ALENA comme un objectif beaucoup plus facilement réalisable à court terme. Essentiellement, les RO compliquent la vie des entreprises, et tout facteur faisant obstacle à la capacité des exportateurs de saisir des occasions entraîne des coûts de bien-être. Les participants estimaient que le Canada doit s'efforcer d'assouplir les RO de l'ALENA.

À vrai dire, le gouvernement du Canada a déjà amorcé le processus. Les ministères des Finances et des Affaires étrangères participent activement à un processus de consultation sur les RO de l'ALENA. En décembre 2003, ils ont invité les Canadiens intéressés à participer à une consultation sur l'harmonisation

des tarifs de la NPF avec les États-Unis et le Mexique et la libéralisation des RO de l'ALENA. Il est essentiel d'obtenir la contribution de l'industrie avant de donner des conseils en matière de politiques sur des questions aussi techniques. Les États-Unis ont aussi reçu des mémoires, et le Mexique terminera bientôt ses consultations. Les trois pays ont convenu de se réunir à Washington en vue de formuler des recommandations d'ici le 1^{er} janvier 2005 quant à la libéralisation des RO de l'ALENA.

Ceci étant dit, il reste des défis à relever. Par exemple, Daniel Schwanen, de l'Institut de recherche en politiques publiques, a fait remarquer que, lorsque l'ALENA a été négocié, on a adopté les RO pour des motifs protectionnistes et d'autres raisons reflétant le pouvoir de négociation de groupes d'intérêts particuliers. John Whalley a réaffirmé que les RO sont assez mal comprises. Elles sont très spécifiques aux produits et correspondent à un processus de négociation répondant à des préoccupations commerciales. Comme M. Schwanen l'a souligné, nous devons être vigilants pour éviter que d'autres barrières protectionnistes ne remplacent les RO.

En plus du sentiment de protectionnisme, John Helliwell a souligné la prédisposition des entreprises pour le marché intérieur. Nous ne devons ainsi pas espérer de façon réaliste que l'élimination des RO entraînera soudainement de nouveaux investissements des entreprises américaines au Canada. La frontière ne disparaîtra pas, et la prédisposition pour le marché intérieur continuera d'influencer l'entplacement des nouvelles entreprises. Cependant, M. Helliwell a affirmé que la simplification ou l'élimination des RO favoriserait la croissance des échanges tant bilatéraux qu'internationaux.

Les participants à la table ronde ont souligné à maintes reprises les faibles taux d'utilisation de l'ALENA. Évidemment, le caractère restrictif des

Difficultés associées à une union douanière dans le

contexte actuel

On a généralement reconnu, du moins pour le moment, qu'il serait difficile de mettre en œuvre une union douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis et un tarif extérieur commun (TEC) dans le contexte actuel, pour des raisons autant économiques que politiques.

L'auditoire a compris que l'établissement d'une union douanière avec les États-Unis comporte un « coût

d'opportunité », aux dépens d'autres problèmes de politiques publiques. Plusieurs participants estimaient que les avantages d'une union douanière, selon les estimations du modèle

d'équilibre général d'Industrie Canada, bien qu'importants, étaient tout de même suffisamment minimes pour inciter à la prudence dans l'évaluation des possibilités qui s'offrent pour

réduire les conflits commerciaux entre les deux pays (consulter également l'article de Ghosh et Rao dans ce

numéro d'*Horizons*).

Le professeur John Whalley de l'Université de Western Ontario et John Hellwell, de la Banque du Canada, étaient tous deux étonnés de constater que les résultats du modèle d'équilibre général étaient relativement élevés. Richard Lipsey de l'Université Simon Fraser a souligné que le Traité de Rome (qui a donné lieu à la création de la CEE, et par la suite de l'UE), présentait des chiffres négligeables. La leçon à tirer est que les modèles globaux d'équilibre général découlant des ajustements des données micro-économiques pour cerner des avantages dynamiques plus importants. Il faut, selon eux, orienter la recherche future vers des analyses plus ventiles, dans la mesure du possible.

John Hellwell a donné plus de détails quant au coût d'opportunité associé à la création d'une union douanière avec les États-Unis. Il a souligné que l'économie américaine perd de son importance par rapport à l'économie mondiale. Mieux vaut quant à lui s'employer à resserrer les liens avec d'autres pays ayant une croissance rapide, par exemple la Chine. Toutefois, tout en convenant que le Canada doit saisir les occasions chaque fois qu'elles se présentent, Bill Robson, de l'Institut C.D. Howe, a néanmoins soutenu que le Canada a grandement

profité de nos bonnes relations commerciales avec les États-Unis. Il a fait remarquer que les secteurs qui en ont le plus tiré avantage sont ceux au sein desquels les échanges se sont le plus libéralisés, et que ce sont ces avantages que nous souhaitons généraliser à l'ensemble des secteurs grâce à une meilleure relation avec les États-Unis.

Un important problème soulevé par de nombreux participants et réduisant la probabilité d'une entente bilatérale d'union douanière avec les États-Unis à court terme est le manque d'intérêt apparent de la part des États-Unis, qui se concentrent sur d'autres questions de politiques nationales et internationales. Par exemple, Francoy Raynaud, du secrétariat de l'ALENA, a mentionné que si le Canada est le meilleur partenaire commercial de 39 États américains, ces échanges ne représentent qu'une très faible proportion du PIB des États-Unis. Pour cette raison et d'autres événements, une union douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis ne figure pas parmi les

Les participants considéraient la modification des RO de l'ALENA comme un objectif beaucoup plus facilement réalisable à court terme. Essentiellement, les RO compliquent la vie des entreprises, et tout facteur faisant obstacle à la capacité des exportateurs de saisir des occasions entraîne des coûts de bien-être.

Toutefois, la professeure Lorraine Eden, de l'Université A & M du Texas, a exprimé une réserve. Il ne faut pas considérer que la porte est complètement

priorités des décideurs américains. Et si les États-Unis manifestaient leur intérêt, le Mexique insisterait probablement pour en faire partie. M. Raynaud a ajouté que les États-Unis ne seraient pas intéressés à discuter de questions n'ayant aucun rapport avec ses préoccupations actuelles, notamment la sécurité intérieure et la guerre au terrorisme.

Enfin, plusieurs participants ont souligné l'éventuelle perte de contrôle sur certains leviers de politique commerciale susceptible d'accompagner la création d'une union douanière. Le maintien d'un TEC obligerait le Canada et les États-Unis à harmoniser leur position à l'égard des pays tiers en matière de politique commerciale, et les deux pays devraient former un front commun dans les discussions multilatérales. Par exemple, la position actuelle du Canada à propos de Cuba et ses anciens liens avec la Chine représentent des secteurs qui risquent de subir les contraintes d'une politique commerciale harmonisée avec les États-Unis.

Horizons Volume 7 Numéro 1

Qu'en pensent les spécialistes?

Le 26 mars 2004, plus de 30 universitaires et représentants du gouvernement se sont réunis à Ottawa pour discuter de questions importantes liées aux règles d'origine de l'ALENA et aux tarifs extérieurs du Canada et des États-Unis. Cette table ronde fait partie d'une série de tables rondes du PRP-CRSHC (Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada) visant à encourager l'échange et le partage d'information entre les spécialistes du milieu universitaire et ceux qui sont responsables de la conception et de l'élaboration des politiques et des programmes du gouvernement fédéral.

Les participants s'entendent presque unanimement ont eu lieu. Trois sujets en ressortent.

Avantages économiques d'un éventuel tarif extérieur commun

et les États-Unis en franchise de tout droit supplémentaire.

Étant donné que les tarifs du Canada et des États-Unis sont déjà relativement bas et comparables, les gains économiques à tirer de l'adoption d'un tarif extérieur commun sont largement inférieurs aux gains associés à l'élimination des règles d'origine de l'ALENA. À titre d'exemple, Chosh et Rao (2004) ont étudié l'incidence qu'aurait une union douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis et ont évalué que les gains économiques d'une harmonisation tarifaire pour le Canada ne représenteraient qu'un maigre 0,1 % du PIB³. Quant aux États-Unis, ils en tireraient un avantage encore moindre.

Dans l'ensemble, toutefois, le gain combiné pour le Canada de l'instauration d'un tarif extérieur commun et de l'élimination des règles d'origine entre le Canada et les États-Unis, pourrait atteindre près de 1,1 % du PIB, soit environ 12 milliards \$, sur la base du PIB de 2002. Cela constituerait un gain annuel permanent. L'avantage économique combiné pour les États-Unis équivaudrait à une hausse de 0,12 % du PIB, soit 13,5 milliards \$US, sur la base du PIB en 2002.

Conclusion

Les questions entourant la création d'une union douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis, qu'une telle union couvre l'ensemble du système économique ou des secteurs d'activité économique choisis, sont d'ordre technique et sont complexes, mais les avantages à tirer d'une entente de ce type sont considérables. Notre analyse préliminaire de certaines de ces questions permet d'énoncer ce qui suit :

- Les règles d'origine de l'ALENA sont très restrictives par rapport aux règles semblables ailleurs dans le monde, et imposent des coûts élevés d'observation aux entreprises menant leurs échanges dans le cadre de l'ALENA;

Selon les données de 2000 (tableau 1), le tarif NPF moyen du Canada, à 4,4 %, s'approche déjà du tarif NPF/NTR (relations commerciales normales) moyen des États-Unis, qui est de 4,6 %. De plus, 49 % des lignes tarifaires NPF du Canada (p. ex. les biens échangés) sont franches de droits, contre 35 % des lignes tarifaires NPF/NTR des États-Unis. Les taux tarifaires en vertu de l'ALENA sont très faibles dans les deux pays, ce qui se traduit par un ratio de préférence ALENA élevé, soit le taux NPF moins le taux ALENA.

L'analyse des données de 2002 sur les tarifs classés en catégories SH (tableau 2) révèle que les écarts entre les tarifs NPF/NTR au Canada et aux États-Unis sont en général plutôt faibles. Le Canada applique un tarif moyen de 6,8 %, et les États-Unis de 5,1 %, soit un écart de 1,7 point de pourcentage. Toutefois, cet écart découle essentiellement des tarifs élevés sur les importations agricoles au Canada. La catégorie non agricole de l'OMC, qui représente 85 % des lignes tarifaires canadiennes, ne montre aucun écart entre les taux moyens appliqués au Canada et aux États-Unis, tous deux de 4,2 %.

Des 17 catégories hors agriculture, neuf catégories représentant 81 % des lignes tarifaires canadiennes hors agriculture et 68 % de toutes les lignes tarifaires canadiennes, affichent un écart Canada-États-Unis de moins de 1 point de pourcentage.

Cela laisse supposer un nombre élevé de catégories à l'égard desquelles les taux NPF/NTR Canada-États-Unis sont assez proches pour qu'une harmonisation des tarifs et l'élimination des règles d'origine puissent se faire sans heurts.

L'ALENA prévoit déjà un équivalent d'union douanière dans les secteurs des ordinateurs et périphériques où, grâce à une des caractéristiques propres à l'ALENA, les trois pays membres ont éliminé ou graduellement harmonisé leurs tarifs respectifs. Une fois en toile d'ALENA, ces articles peuvent circuler entre le Canada, le Mexique

Tarifs appliqués par catégorie OMC et par catégorie SH, 2002

Total	Lignes tarifaires ¹	Canada ²	E.-U. ³	Écart
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CATÉGORIES OMC				
Agriculture	1 263	21,7	9,8	11,9
OMC hors agriculture	7 086	4,2	4,2	0

Catégories SH

01 Animaux vivants et productions animales	274	55,6	11,4	44,2
02 Substances végétales	438	4,5	4	0,5
03 Huiles et graisses	62	9,3	3,9	5,4
04 Aliments préparés, etc.	498	18,3	13,2	5,1

05 Minéraux	174	1,1	0,7	0,4
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06 Produits chimiques	1 102	3,2	3,9	-0,7
07 Plastiques et caoutchouc	370	4,2	3,7	0,5
08 Cuirs et peaux	227	3,2	4,3	-1,1
09 Bois et articles	113	2,6	2,2	0,4
10 Pâtes, papiers, etc.	194	0,6	0,5	0,1
11 Textiles et articles	1 421	9,8	9,6	0,2
12 Chaussure, coiffure	104	11,6	13,5	-1,9
13 Articles en pierre	185	3,4	5,1	-1,7
14 Pierres précieuses, etc.	65	2,3	3	-0,7

15 Métaux de base et produits de métal	893	2,2	2,3	-0,1
16 Machinerie	1 423	2	1,6	0,4
17 Matériel de transport	238	5,2	2,6	2,6
18 Matériel de précision	345	1,9	3,1	-1,2
19 Armes et munitions	32	3,9	1,5	2,4

20 Marchandises et produits divers	197	5,2	3,2	2
21 Œuvres d'art, etc.	9	1,4	0	1,4

1 Nombre de lignes tarifaires canadiennes

2 OMC (2003) Rapport sur les politiques commerciales, Canada
3 OMC (2004) Rapport sur les politiques commerciales, États-Unis

Évaluation globale des règles d'origine de l'ALENA

Les données empiriques disponibles tendent à démontrer que les règles d'origine de l'ALENA donnent lieu à des coûts économiques élevés et non prévus, et que ces coûts réduisent les bénéfices économiques nets attendus des échanges commerciaux. Les études menées à ce jour révèlent que les règles d'origine de l'ALENA sont relativement onéreuses et restrictives, que le recours aux conditions préférentielles de l'ALENA est inférieur aux prévisions, et que les coûts économiques des règles d'origine de l'ALENA sont élevés.

Une union douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis

À la base, la création d'une union douanière exigerait la négociation et l'application d'un tarif extérieur commun (TEC) sur les importations en provenance de pays tiers. Cette union douanière devrait également compter comme éléments clés des politiques de commerce extérieur harmonisées, une entente de répartition des droits de douane perçus aux frontières, des procédures douanières compatibles. Et, bien sûr, ces éléments devront s'appuyer sur une solide structure de gouvernance.

Comparaison des tarifs NPF/NTR entre le Canada et les États-Unis

La complexité de la négociation et de l'instauration d'un tarif extérieur commun dépend dans une large mesure de l'ampleur de l'écart entre les tarifs extérieurs de chacun des pays, et des accords commerciaux préférentiels qu'ont passés les pays membres avec des pays tiers. S'il y avait un système de TEC Canada-États-Unis, les règles d'origine de l'ALENA n'auraient plus de raison d'être dans le cadre des échanges bilatéraux. Des droits seraient perçus sur les importations de pays tiers, selon les tarifs communs, et les recettes seraient réparties entre le Canada et les États-Unis conformément à une entente de répartition formelle.

TABLEAU 1

Tarifs de l'ALENA contre tarifs NPF

Année		Tarif		Lignes tarifaires franches de droits (% du total)	
Canada	2000	ALENA	NPF	ALENA	NPF
É.-U.	2000	0,3	4,6	95	35

Source : Rapport sur le commerce mondial 2003, OMC, Tableau IB 13

Les règles d'origine de l'ALENA contiennent des restrictions incitant à recourir aux taux tarifaires NPF au lieu de ceux de l'ALENA afin d'éviter les coûts d'observation des règles. L'effet restrictif des règles entraîne de ce fait une baisse du taux d'utilisation du tarif préférentiel et réduit les avantages liés à l'accord de libre-échange.

Le taux d'utilisation du tarif ALENA

représente le pourcentage d'importations admissibles au traitement prévu à l'ALENA entrant dans un pays

membre sous un tarif préférentiel de l'ALENA plutôt que celui des NPF

ou de tout autre tarif. L'examen par Estevadoral et Suominen (2004)

des données sur les importations aux États-Unis de produits canadiens a

démontre que les taux de recours à l'ALENA ont baissé lorsque l'Accord

est entré en vigueur dans les secteurs où les règles d'origine sont les plus

strictes. Il y a donc un rapport inverse entre le taux d'utilisation et le niveau

de l'effet restrictif.

De plus, le taux d'utilisation varie considérablement d'un secteur d'activité à l'autre. Ainsi, le taux est élevé dans le

cas des importations aux États-Unis de produits canadiens tels que les huiles

et graisses (98 %), le textile et les vêtements (95 %) et les plastiques (93 %),

mais il est très faible dans les secteurs des bijoux (15 %), produits du bois

(17 %) et pâtes et papiers (26 %). Ces écarts peuvent refléter des facteurs

divers : effet restrictif de certaines règles d'origine, écarts inter-sectoriels entre les taux tarifaires des NPF et ceux

de l'ALENA, variations sectorielles de l'admissibilité des producteurs au statut de membre de l'ALENA, et le

degré de friction commerciale au sein du secteur.

Le recours à l'ALENA varie par ailleurs considérablement entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Ainsi des vingt secteurs étudiés aux fins de comparaison, six affichent un écart de moins de dix points de pourcentage entre les deux

pays, tandis que six autres affichent un écart de dix à vingt points de pourcentage, et les 8 derniers, un écart de plus de vingt points.

Les raisons de tels écarts n'ont pas été évaluées à ce jour, mais le PRP a entrepris de mener des études exhaustives

de données non regroupées sur le taux d'utilisation de l'ALENA au Canada et aux États-Unis, afin de trouver réponse

à cette question.

Quelle est l'incidence économique des règles d'origine de l'ALENA?

Des règles d'origine restrictives comporte plusieurs inconvénients. D'abord, dans la mesure où les règles

d'origine nuisent aux échanges, les gains de bien-être liés à une zone de

libre-échange ne sont pas réalisés. Ensuite, et peut-être surtout, les règles

d'origine de l'ALENA pourraient avoir pour effet de favoriser les investissements aux États-Unis, puisque les

entreprises multinationales qui cherchent à élargir leurs marchés ont

tout intérêt à minimiser l'incertitude et les coûts nuisant au commerce dans

le cadre de l'Accord de libre-échange. Cela pourrait donc contribuer à une

baisse de la part du Canada des investissements directs effectués en Amérique du Nord.

Troisièmement, des règles d'origine restrictives peuvent inciter les producteurs à utiliser des intrants des pays

membres pour satisfaire aux exigences des règles d'origine, plutôt que des

intrants de pays tiers, même s'ils sont offerts à un prix inférieur. Or, les répartitions inefficientes qui découleraient d'une telle distorsion au chapitre des sources d'approvisionnement et d'achat seraient le résultat de telles politiques.

Que nous révèlent les analyses quantitatives au sujet des coûts économiques des règles d'origine de l'ALENA? Dans

son mémoire scénario intermédiaire¹, Appiah (1999) a estimé les coûts du

bien-être économique des règles d'origine de l'ALENA à 1,5 % à 2,3 % du

PIB. L'auteur affirme que plus les règles d'origine sont restrictives, plus les

coûts sont élevés en termes de PIB perdu. Cadot et coll. (2002) ont pour

leur part utilisé le modèle des exportations mexicaines et évalué un

hypothétique ALENA sans règles d'origine; ils ont estimé que l'élimination des règles d'origine entraînerait

une hausse de 17,8 % des exportations mexicaines aux États-Unis.

Ghosh et Rao (2004), pour leur part, ont conclu que l'élimination des règles

d'origine de l'ALENA entre le Canada et les États-Unis aurait pour effet d'accroître le PIB canadien de 1,0 %, le PIB

des États-Unis de 0,1 %, les exportations canadiennes vers les États-Unis de 19,2 % et les exportations des États-Unis vers le Canada de 22,7 %. Un

sommaire de l'étude réalisé par Ghosh et Rao est présenté ailleurs dans le présent numéro d'Horizons).

En plus des coûts d'observation, les entreprises encourrent des coûts de production ou des coûts économiques lorsqu'elles changent leur méthode de production ou leur combinaison d'intrants uniquement aux fins de répondre aux exigences d'origine. Krueger a déclaré que [*Traduction*] « les producteurs canadiens ont, à l'occasion, opté pour le paiement des tarifs douaniers afférents plutôt que d'engager les frais liés à la preuve d'origine » (1995, p. 15). Cette pratique s'est confirmée récemment lors de discussions avec des importateurs et exportateurs canadiens, qui ont déclaré que cette pratique est particulièrement courante dans le cas de livraisons de faible volume, de petites entreprises, ou chez les exportateurs ayant des connaissances limitées en ce qui touche à l'ALENA. En outre, lorsqu'il est difficile pour une entreprise d'obtenir tous les certificats d'origine auprès de ses fournisseurs, il y a fort à parier qu'elle optera pour le paiement des tarifs douaniers de la nation la plus favorisée (NPF) plutôt que de se réclamer de l'ALENA.

Cadot et coll. (2002) ont calculé les coûts d'observation pour les entreprises des règles d'origine de l'ALENA rattachées aux importations de produits mexicains aux États-Unis. Ceux-ci s'élevaient à 1,9 % de la valeur des importations en 2000. Parallèlement, Carrère et de Melo (2003), qui ont utilisé des données de 2001 sur les importations de produits mexicains aux États-Unis, ont obtenu pour leur part un coût d'observation de 1,7 % sur ces importations.

Bien que ces estimations permettent de supposer que les coûts d'observation rattachés aux échanges entre le Canada et les États-Unis pourraient également être élevés, les données empiriques précises sont insuffisantes à cet égard. Toutefois, on peut supposer que plus les règles d'origine sont strictes et exigeantes, plus les coûts économiques et d'observation seront élevés.



Source : Commission de la productivité de l'Australie (2003).

GRAPHIQUE 1
Indice du caractère restrictif d'accords commerciaux choisis

Les règles d'origine de l'ALENA sont-elles trop restrictives?

Estevadeordal (2000) a créé un indice de l'effet restrictif de diverses structures de règles d'origine dans le monde. Cet indice s'interprète comme un indicateur du niveau d'exigence d'un système de règles d'origine donné envers les exportateurs. Selon l'échelle de 1 (moins restrictif) à 7 (plus restrictif) de son indice, il appert que les règles d'origine de l'ALENA sont très restrictives; celles-ci affichent en effet une valeur-indice moyenne de 5,1, contre 4,5 dans le cas des règles d'origine pan-européennes et 4,2 dans celui des règles d'origine EFTA-Mexique.

La nature restrictive des règles d'origine varie considérablement d'un secteur à l'autre. Dans le cas de l'ALENA et de nombreux autres accords de libre-échange, par exemple, les règles d'origine les plus restrictives touchent aux secteurs d'activité politiquement plus sensibles tels le textile et le vêtement, l'automobile et l'agriculture (Estevadeordal, 2000).

Les règles d'origine qui varient selon le produit ou l'entente ajoutent considérablement à la complexité et aux coûts de participation et d'administration des accords commerciaux. Le poids de ces coûts est particulièrement lourd pour les petites et moyennes entreprises [...]

Brenton (2003).

Vers l'union douanière une analyse de la situation

Robert (Bob) Kunimoto
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sur les politiques

Robert Kunimoto et
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sont agents principaux de
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Introduction

Bien qu'il soit toujours très instructif, le discours sur une plus grande intégration économique du Canada et des États-Unis s'est souvent caractérisé par ses faibles assises empiriques. Par exemple, les tenants d'une intégration économique accrue soulignent volontiers les économies de coûts d'administration et d'observation ainsi que les gains d'efficacité qui découleraient de l'élimination des règles d'origine, des différences d'ordre réglementaire et autres barrières au commerce... mais ils n'ont que peu de données empiriques à présenter pour étayer leurs affirmations.

Le présent article est un sommaire d'une étude présentée à la table ronde RRP-CRSHC du 26 mars 2004. Il a pour objet d'analyser les données empiriques disponibles, particulièrement en ce qui touche à deux questions qui seront d'une importance prépondérante au cours de toute discussion future sur les avantages relatifs d'une union douanière entre le Canada et les États-Unis, c'est-à-dire les règles d'origine de l'ALENA (ou l'Accord) et les écarts tarifaires entre les deux pays.

de vérification.

Les règles d'origine servent à éviter que des importations de pays tiers bénéficient des concessions effectuées par les pays signataires d'un accord commercial préférentiel. Ces règles déterminent le pays d'origine d'un produit donné et les conditions de son admission à un traitement préférentiel. Les frais administratifs liés à l'application, l'administration et la surveillance du système des règles d'origine sont assumés par les gouvernements. Les coûts d'observation, par contre, relèvent des importateurs, exportateurs ou producteurs, selon les exigences des règles d'origine. Ces coûts d'observation comprennent les formalités administratives, comme les formulaires à remplir pour les douanes, et les dépenses d'entreprise associées aux exigences de détermination, de conformité et de preuve de l'origine de produits. Cela couvre les frais de systèmes et programmes informatiques, de tenue des registres, honoraires, suppléments de courrage, et coûts supplémentaires de comptabilité et de vérification.

Règlement sur les règles d'origine de l'ALENA

Les règles d'origine de l'ALENA

coûtent-elles trop cher?

L'honorable Jim Peterson
Ministre du Commerce extérieur
Allocution à la
Chambre de Commerce du Canada
Le 16 février 2004

Nous continuerons de chercher les obstacles au commerce et à l'investissement afin de les éliminer. En octobre dernier, au cours de la réunion de la Commission du libre-échange tenue à Montréal, nous avons convenu des améliorations suivantes :

- libéralisation accrue des règles d'origine de l'ALENA;
- réduction supplémentaire des coûts d'opérations; et
- analyse de l'éventualité d'une harmonisation tarifaire.

Conclusion

Le Canada, étant donné sa population, n'a pas les moyens d'entretenir des organismes de réglementation aussi grands qu'aux États-Unis ou en Europe. Par conséquent, ses ressources doivent être utilisées le plus judicieuse-

ment possible.

Les médicaments à petites molécules, utilisés partout dans le monde, sont très étudiés pour leur innocuité, leur efficacité et leur qualité avec des proce-

dures normalisées et bien établies. C'est pourquoi le Canada devrait s'associer à un organisme de réglementation très réputé, comme la FDA des États-Unis, pour effectuer ces examens très structurés et en partager les con-

statations.

De plus, nous devrions accroître notre effort collectif dans la recherche sur les résultats afin de nous assurer que les médicaments sont correctement utilisés après leur mise sur le marché; en effet, la surconsommation ou la sous-consommation de médicaments normalement bénéfiques occasionne généralement de nombreux problèmes.

Le Canada devrait réaffecter ses précieuses ressources à l'examen de produits qui sont particuliers au marché canadien, comme les produits dérivés du sang, les organes, les vaccins et d'autres produits biologiques. L'histoire récente prouve que ces produits peuvent faire peser sur la santé des Canadiens des menaces considérables, qui surpassent peut-être celles des médicaments à petites molécules.

En outre, le Canada a besoin des ressources nécessaires pour anticiper les défis en matière de réglementation

Renvois

qui se poseront avec les nouvelles technologies de l'industrie pharmaceutique et les changements sociaux.

Compte tenu de toutes ces demandes adressées à Santé Canada, l'organisme de réglementation national, nous devrions partager les tâches de réglementation et de prévoyance avec des partenaires de confiance pour que les dossiers propres au Canada soient adéquatement traités.

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Notes

1 Le grand public croit souvent que les organismes de réglementation mettent eux-mêmes les médicaments à l'essai. Ce qui n'est pas le cas. Les entreprises sont chargées d'intégrer et d'analyser les données recueillies par les établissements médicaux qui procèdent aux essais cliniques. Par contre, les organismes testent la puissance de produits comme les vaccins, qui peut varier d'un lot de production à l'autre.

2 Données sur les ressources humaines et renseignements sur les méthodes d'analyse tirés de : Rawson, 2002.

3 Outre les retards dus au processus d'approbation, l'accès des fabricants aux marchés canadiens est gêné par les provinces, qui prennent un an ou davantage pour inscrire les nouveaux produits sur la liste des médicaments remboursables. Qui plus est, le Canada n'accorde pas de rétablissement de la durée des brevets et ne protège pas la propriété intellectuelle des innovateurs autant que d'autres pays. Ces obstacles comptent parmi les raisons expliquant pourquoi les investissements de R-D des sociétés pharmaceutiques internationales au Canada se situent en deçà des moyennes internationales. Voir SECOR, 2003.

4 Dans un rapport présenté en 1990 au Conseil du Trésor et mis à la disposition de Santé Canada, SECOR propose un mécanisme canado-américain de partage du travail comme moyen d'améliorer l'efficacité dans la réglementation des produits pharmaceutiques.

Ces dernières années, le secteur pharmaceutique se retrouve en crise, en quelque sorte. Découvrir des médicaments pour lutter contre des maladies courantes comme l'Alzheimer, le cancer, les troubles neurologiques et les troubles

Se préparer à la collaboration est d'abord une question de gestion, car il s'agit d'aligner les procédures canadiennes et américaines et de définir les protocoles de travail collectif. Les avantages devront forcément l'emporter sur les coûts par une bonne marge.

choisir la collaboration quand il s'agit d'effectuer des examens réglementaires de produits avec une procédure hautement normalisée.

Recherche sur les résultats en santé

La recherche sur les résultats en santé est un domaine où des investissements minimes produisent un rendement important en matière de réduction des risques et d'amélioration des soins de santé.

Des études nord-américaines ont

démontré que la non-conformité à un régime thérapeutique et des prescriptions inadéquates sont les causes principales des visites à l'urgence (Leboux, 2002).

Il faut faire davantage de recherche et d'éducation en matière d'utilisation des produits pharmaceutiques après leur mise sur le marché. Santé Canada, qui appuie ce genre de recherche, devrait participer activement à l'élaboration de stratégies et structurer ses interventions au sein des instances internationales.

Évolution du secteur pharmaceutique

Le visage changeant de l'industrie pharmaceutique posera de nouveaux défis aux organismes de réglementation. Il sera important d'appliquer avec l'industrie des pratiques exemplaires, des références et des normes en fonction de tendances anticipées. Nous y gagnerions tous si cette démarche prenait la forme d'une collaboration internationale.

Pour tirer un meilleur profit de la protection des brevets et améliorer la coopération des patients, les sociétés pharmaceutiques amalgameront deux anciens médicaments en un seul. Ce procédé soulèvera de nouvelles questions de nature réglementaire, car il faudra savoir comment circonscrire les populations cibles.

La thérapie génique constituera un nouveau mode de traitement. Cette thérapie pourrait nécessiter de nouveaux systèmes de prestation qui libèrent ou expriment des séquences d'ADN ou d'ARN. Établir des politiques de réglementation de ces produits sera un défi technique majeur. De toute évidence, la mise en commun du savoir des chercheurs et des autorités réglementaires de plusieurs États serait le meilleur espoir de construction d'une réglementation satisfaisante.

La FDA aborde déjà quelques-unes de ces questions technologiques émergentes grâce à la recherche et à des ateliers. Une plus grande collaboration serait certainement la bienvenue (FDA, 2003).

Dans l'ensemble, le secteur pharmaceutique risque de ne plus être viable avec le modèle actuel, axé sur les petites molécules. Les nouveaux médicaments, issus de la biologie moléculaire et de la chimie organique traditionnelle, ont été les vedettes des vingt dernières années, mais cette tendance s'essouffle. Découvrir de nouveaux médicaments devient de plus en plus long et coûteux. En outre, l'introduction de produits génériques à l'expiration d'un brevet est aisée. Face à cette situation, les sociétés pharmaceutiques innovatrices sont portées à exploiter la protection offerte par les inventions multiples, comme les médicaments combinés à la prestation ou à un système de diagnostic, ou par des procédés de fabrication complexes et difficilement imitables par les fabricants de médicaments génériques. Tous ces facteurs posent aux

bles auto-immunes s'avère très difficile. La filière des médicaments à petites molécules s'est tarie, ce qui a donné lieu à une vague de fusions de sociétés pharmaceutiques multinationales.

Pour corriger ce problème, les grandes sociétés pharmaceutiques se sont alliées à de petites entreprises de biotechnologie. La conséquence, c'est que de nombreux médicaments en cours de conception sont des molécules biologiques complexes dont la qualité et l'efficacité dépendent en grande partie du processus de fabrication. Les brevets protégeant certaines de ces molécules commencent à expirer et les fabricants de médicaments génériques les lorgnent avec intérêt. Cette tendance nécessitera vraisemblablement une étroite surveillance des productions en cours. Encore une fois, des économies pourraient être réalisées grâce à une collaboration accrue entre les organismes.

Les fabricants de médicaments sont également poussés à établir des rapports coûts/bénéfices avant que leurs produits ne soient admissibles au remboursement. Nous pouvons donc nous attendre à ce que des combinaisons de médicaments et d'instruments diagnostiques entrent dans le processus réglementaire. Nombre d'entre elles seront basées sur le profil génomique des patients. L'évaluation de l'efficacité deviendra plus complexe et nécessitera davantage de travail.

Quels avantages et inconvénients la collaboration apporterait-elle au Canada?

Les Canadiens tireraient de la collaboration avec les États-Unis trois avantages évidents :

- un accès plus rapide à des médicaments qui font une différence;
- une analyse et un examen approfondis des données produites par les essais cliniques du fabricant, apportant une meilleure compréhension de l'efficacité et de l'innocuité du médicament;
- un meilleur déploiement des ressources au sein de Santé Canada.

Un accès plus rapide

Accélérer l'accès à des médicaments qui font une différence, surtout dans les cas de maladies potentiellement mortelles, serait un important pas dans la bonne direction. Ce genre de médicament est normalement examiné en priorité au Canada et aux États-Unis. Pourtant, depuis 1996, la durée médiane d'un examen prioritaire au Canada est de 304 jours pour 43 médicaments, contre 184 jours pour 70 médicaments aux États-Unis (Rawson, 2003). Pour les patients qui souffrent du SIDA ou du cancer, ces différences peuvent compter pour beaucoup. Il est possible de passer d'urgence, mais la paperasserie exige du temps et de l'énergie, et les médecins traitants n'y trouvent pas les mêmes niveaux de confiance.

Un examen plus approfondi

Une mise en commun avec les États-Unis nous permettrait d'être mieux renseignés à propos de l'innocuité et de l'efficacité, dont la FDA est spécialiste. Dans le même ordre d'idées, les États-Unis profiteraient de l'expertise canadienne, particulièrement dans les domaines de la chimie et de la fabrication.

Une meilleure utilisation des ressources

La collaboration permettrait à Santé Canada de réaffecter des ressources aux produits qui sont particuliers au marché canadien, et à mettre davantage l'accent sur l'utilisation optimale des médicaments approuvés. Avec cette capacité supplémentaire, Santé Canada pourrait accroître ses efforts d'élaboration de stratégies et d'adoption de nouvelles approches dans des secteurs négligés comme la bonne utilisation des médicaments, les meilleures pratiques médicales et les résultats cliniques.

Se préparer à la collaboration est d'abord une question de gestion, car il s'agit d'aligner les procédures canadiennes et américaines et de définir les protocoles de travail collectif. Les avantages devront forcément l'emporter sur les coûts par une bonne marge. Santé Canada, qui possède les ressources nécessaires pour soutenir sa stratégie d'accès aux produits thérapeutiques et qui a conclu une entente avec la FDA, ne doit pas tarder à consolider cette relation.

À quoi consacrer les ressources?

Les attentes du public concernant l'innocuité des produits pharmaceutiques sont, à juste titre, très fortes. Pourtant, les produits pharmaceutiques ont généralement été très sûrs. Deux facteurs sont à prendre en compte :

- les méthodes et les protocoles déterminant l'innocuité, l'efficacité et la qualité ont été soigneusement perfectionnés au cours des années et sont mis en commun au plan international;
- les produits eux-mêmes sont couramment utilisés dans de nombreux pays, donc on peut s'attendre à de nombreux résultats d'examens réglementaires et de suivi de produits.

Au Canada, nous devons nous préoccuper davantage des produits destinés au marché canadien. Dans la mesure du possible, nous devrions libérer des ressources pour la surveillance de ces produits en partageant la charge de travail concernant des produits vendus dans le monde entier.

Les produits particuliers au Canada sont fabriqués à l'étranger en lots destinés au Canada, ou au Canada même. Ce sont, par exemple :

- des vaccins;
- des produits pharmaceutiques dérivés du sang;
- des parties du corps destinées à la transplantation;
- du sperme;
- des produits biologiques – des médicaments fabriqués par des processus de fermentation et dont l'efficacité et l'innocuité dépendent en grande partie des conditions de fabrication.


Produits dérivés du sang

Les produits dérivés du sang montrent combien les autorités réglementaires doivent être vigilantes quand il s'agit de produits particuliers au Canada. Les problèmes liés à la réglementation des produits dérivés du sang ont provoqué, à la fin des années 1980, une crise majeure de la santé publique, dont les répercussions se font encore sentir aujourd'hui. Dans ce genre de crise, les gestionnaires responsables de la réglementation, de la surveillance et des activités travaillant dans des conditions très difficiles et essayant de contrôler des situations sur la foi de connaissances partielles. Les décisions doivent être prises rapidement et entraîner des conséquences majeures. Cela fait contraste avec les examens courants de produits pharmaceutiques, dont les systèmes et les procédures sont relativement bien compris.

La question du sang est un exemple des énormes répercussions qui se font

GRAPHIQUE 2

« Productivité » dans l'approbation des médicaments



Comparaison avec l'Union Européenne

Dans l'Union européenne, un système de collaboration a été institué par l'Agence européenne pour l'évaluation des médicaments (AEMA). L'Agence a établi des normes et des procédures d'examen pour les pays participants. Les nouveaux médicaments sont soumis à deux États membres qui effectuent indépendamment leurs examens et rapportent leurs constatations à l'Agence. Les résultats sont ensuite transmis à des fins d'examen et de décision à un comité de l'AEMA. Ce modèle diffère quelque peu de celui qui est proposé ici, mais il prouve que la collaboration entre organismes de réglementation est un objectif valable.

Stratégie d'accès aux produits thérapeutiques

La collaboration en matière de réglementation avec les États-Unis est depuis longtemps à l'étude⁴. Pourtant, des progrès semblent à portée de la main : un protocole d'entente avec la FDA a été signé. De plus, Santé Canada a élaboré une stratégie d'accès aux produits thérapeutiques et reçu 190 millions de dollars répartis sur cinq ans pour modifier le système. Il reste à savoir comment les fonds seront utilisés et quelles seront les ressources déployées pour la collaboration (HC, 2003b).

problèmes sont souvent révélés de façon anecdotique pour servir d'argument en faveur de l'indépendance de Santé Canada. Mais ils peuvent aussi bien servir à défendre la légitimité de la collaboration.

Les examens de la FDA, qui impliquent de fouiller profondément dans les données cliniques brutes, auront davantage une incidence sur l'efficacité plutôt que sur l'innocuité; autrement dit, leur force se trouve plutôt dans la capacité de déterminer si le médicament fait vraiment le travail qu'il est censé faire. En effet, la FDA est si sévère à cet égard que ses méthodes ont récemment été critiquées dans la page éditoriale du *Wall Street Journal* (2004). Le blâme portait sur la non-approbation d'un médicament anticancer, le Provenge, dont on a démontré, par une analyse rétrospective, qu'il avait fait effet dans un sous-ensemble de la population cible.

Si le Canada devait collaborer avec la FDA, les avantages se trouveraient surtout dans l'évaluation de l'efficacité des produits pharmaceutiques, bien que des progrès minimes puissent encore être réalisés dans l'évaluation de l'innocuité et de la qualité.

Sur quelles bases pouvons-nous travailler avec la FDA?

La FDA a déjà manifesté sa volonté de travailler avec le Canada (HC, 2003). Les autorités réglementaires canadiennes sont tenues en haute estime pour leur expertise et leur conscience professionnelle. D'ailleurs, des examens conjoints de médicaments ont déjà été effectués en tant que projets-pilotes. La collaboration va de soi car on peut la fonder sur le respect mutuel de l'expertise technique. En outre, notre réglementation constitue une barrière commerciale pour les sociétés pharmaceutiques innovatrices qui, aujourd'hui, sont majoritairement installées aux États-Unis⁵. La collaboration contribuerait à éliminer cet obstacle en raccourcissant les examens

des médicaments et serait, par conséquent, avantageuse pour les États-Unis.

Dans un cadre de collaboration, la répartition du travail entre les autorités réglementaires pourrait être déterminée en fonction de compétences actuelles reconnues de chacune. Les autorités canadiennes sont très respectées pour leur expertise en chimie et en fabrication. La FDA accepterait les contributions canadiennes, voire le leadership canadien, en évaluation de la qualité des produits pharmaceutiques, généralisant ainsi certaines pratiques déjà appliquées.

En contraste, la FDA paraît la plus compétente en matière d'évaluation de l'innocuité et de l'efficacité. Mais dans un cadre de collaboration, il est probable que ces évaluations soient divisées en plusieurs composantes réparties entre les deux organismes quand une expertise très spécialisée, p. ex., pour un type de maladie particulière, s'avère nécessaire.

Le partage du travail n'implique pas la reconnaissance mutuelle des décisions, qui nécessite la conclusion d'ententes au plan politique. Mais puisqu'il s'agit d'un cadre de collaboration, il est fort probable que les deux organismes tirent les mêmes conclusions de leurs analyses de données.

La réglementation fonctionne-t-elle comme elle le devrait?

Performance de Santé Canada

Santé Canada a pour responsabilité d'évaluer l'innocuité, l'efficacité et la qualité des nouveaux médicaments conçus par les entreprises pharmaceutiques. Ces substances chimiques nouvelles (SCN) ne peuvent être vendues au Canada qu'une fois l'examen réglementaire terminé. Les experts techniques de Santé Canada examinent les données recueillies par les entreprises pharmaceutiques durant les essais pré-cliniques et cliniques. Ils examinent également les caractéristiques chimiques et les procédés de fabrication des médicaments¹.

Santé Canada a généralement pris d'avantage de temps à examiner les médicaments que les États-Unis et d'autres pays imposant des normes réglementaires strictes (Anderson et coll., 2002). Cette lenteur irrite les compagnies pharmaceutiques, car elle est synonyme de pertes de ventes. Cette position est facile à comprendre. Puisque le Canada représente environ 2 % du marché des produits pharmaceutiques, et qu'un nouveau médicament populaire peut facilement réaliser des ventes mondiales de 1 milliard \$US, le retard pris par Santé Canada dans l'approbation d'un médicament peut coûter à l'entreprise concernée 75 000 \$CDN par jour en pertes de ventes.

Productivité dans l'examen des médicaments

L'exactitude des données sur les examens de médicaments a été abordée dans la littérature. Les comparaisons internationales précitées ont été utilisées dans un rapport préparé pour Santé Canada en 2003 (Caruthers, 2003). Rawson et Kaitin ont procédé à une analyse indépendante de la situation et sont arrivés aux mêmes conclusions.

Même si Santé Canada a fait l'objet de critiques pour ne pas avoir aussi bien fait que les États-Unis, il semble que sa productivité est assez bonne si l'on compare le nombre d'approbations par employé par année (Rx&D, 2003). Ce résultat est surprenant, car la FDA américaine a été louée pour ses méthodes de gestion et les Américains sont généralement aussi productifs que les Canadiens.

d'aussi bonne qualité.

La FDA américaine emploie dix fois plus de personnes à l'examen des médicaments que Santé Canada. Nous aurions donc tort de croire que nous pouvons effectuer des examens

- La différence est presque certainement attribuable au fait que les examens effectués aux États-Unis sont beaucoup plus approfondis qu'ailleurs². Tout simplement, la FDA consacre davantage d'efforts à chaque examen. À la FDA, les examinateurs reprennent les données brutes recueillies pendant les essais cliniques et les analysent une nouvelle fois. Au Canada et ailleurs, les examinateurs ont tendance à travailler avec les analyses statistiques et les données sommaires fournies par l'entreprise pharmaceutique.
- La FDA américaine emploie dix fois plus de personnes à l'examen des médicaments que Santé Canada. Nous aurions donc tort de croire que nous pouvons effectuer des examens d'aussi bonne qualité. Cette différence soulève trois questions :
- Un examen moins approfondi a-t-il une incidence sur l'innocuité?
- Pouvons-nous et devrions-nous travailler avec la FDA pour avoir accès à son expertise?
- Quels avantages et inconvénients la collaboration offrirait-elle au Canada?

Les rares médicaments qui se rendent aux essais cliniques et qui présentent des effets indésirables graves chez certaines cohortes de patients sont généralement retirés par leurs promoteurs. Au-delà des enjeux éthiques, le risque de poursuites judiciaires est, aux États-Unis, suffisamment grand pour décourager les entreprises de conserver des produits relativement dangereux. Enfin, les effets indésirables ressentis chez d'innombrables pourcentages de patients ne sont généralement découverts qu'après la mise sur le marché d'un médicament et sa prescription à un très grand nombre de patients. Actuellement, la surveillance après la mise en marché tend à s'internationaliser et les mécanismes de mise en commun des données sur les effets indésirables sont déjà en place.

Les Canadiens sont d'une certaine façon protégés par la lenteur de Santé Canada, car la FDA peut répéter et rendre publics les défauts d'innocuité avant que les examens canadiens ne soient terminés. De temps à autre, les autorités réglementaires canadiennes détectent elles-mêmes des problèmes ayant échappé à la FDA. Ces

Un examen moins approfondi a-t-il une incidence sur l'innocuité?

Il est peu probable que les examens effectués au Canada aient une incidence majeure sur l'innocuité. Les normes applicables aux essais pré-cliniques et aux premières étapes des essais cliniques sont aujourd'hui si strictes que les médicaments dangereux sont assez rapidement éliminés

La collaboration en matière de réglementation peut-elle améliorer la sécurité des systèmes de santé?

David Griller
SECOR Conseil

David Griller
est le partenaire principal
qui travaille pour SECOR Conseil.

Ces dernières années, l'examen réglementaire des nouveaux produits pharmaceutiques au Canada a fait l'objet d'une vive controverse. L'industrie a critiqué Santé Canada pour sa lenteur comparative-ment à la FDA des États-Unis. Par contre, Santé Canada n'a que le dixième des ressources dont dispose son équivalent américain.

Récemment, Santé Canada a accepté officiellement de partager des données et des constatations avec la FDA. Compte tenu de ce développement, nous devrions nous poser quelques questions-clés :

- La lenteur de l'examen réglementaire des médicaments a-t-elle vraiment une incidence sur la santé des citoyens Canadiens?

Par cet article, nous tenterons de répondre à ces questions et de déterminer à quel point la collaboration avec les États-Unis sera risquée ou sûre.

- Si Santé Canada collabore avec la FDA dans l'examen des produits pharmaceutiques, l'innocuité sera-t-elle améliorée ou détériorée?
- Si nos ressources de réglementation sont limitées, à quoi devrait-on les consacrer en particulier?
- Jusqu'à quel point pouvons-nous profiter de la reconnaissance réciproque des décisions réglementaires entre les États-Unis et le Canada? S'agit-il d'un objectif réaliste?

GRAPHIQUE 1



Le temps requis, entre 1999 et 2001, pour mettre les nouveaux médicaments à la disposition des patients varie d'un marché à l'autre. Les patients américains ont accès aux nouveaux médicaments avant ceux des autres marchés principaux, et les patients japonais doivent attendre en moyenne deux fois plus longtemps que les patients américains.

Source : CMR International

Atelier d'experts sur la mesure du capital social pour les politiques publiques

Le 8 juin 2004

Cet atelier a réuni les experts afin d'examiner les différentes stratégies empiriques et les outils de mesure utilisés dans la recherche sur le capital social. On a mis l'accent sur la capacité d'évaluation des ressources générées par le capital social. Cet atelier s'est appuyé sur les connaissances des chercheurs canadiens et les mesures réalisées par les spécialistes d'outremer en vue d'identifier les éléments essentiels d'une « boîte à outils » visant à mesurer le capital social aux fins d'élaboration et d'évaluation des politiques et programmes gouvernementaux.

Pour plus de renseignements sur l'atelier, communiquez avec Catherine Demers au 613.943.1997 ou par courriel à c.demers@prs-srp.gc.ca.

Instrumentés économiques pour la gestion de l'eau douce au Canada

Colloque du PRP

Les 14 et 15 juin 2004

Cette rencontre invitation a réuni des experts canadiens et d'ailleurs dans le monde afin d'examiner les avantages et les inconvénients d'un plus grand usage des instruments économiques pour gérer et conserver les ressources en eau douce au Canada. Parmi les sujets discutés notons : revue des meilleures pratiques au Canada et ailleurs, l'utilisation des forces du marché pour gérer l'accès à la ressource, les facteurs désincitatifs à une plus grande adoption d'instruments marchands, et, assurer la complémentarité des instruments de politique, marchands ou non, pour mieux conserver les ressources en eau douce.

Pour plus de renseignements, communiquez avec Ian Campbell au 613.992.3704 ou par courriel à i.campbell@prs-prp.gc.ca.

Intégration nord-américaine : Émergence de régions frontalières

Table ronde de recherche sur les politiques

du PRP-CRSHC

Les 21 et 22, 2004

Cette table ronde sur invitation a réuni les experts canadiens et internationaux en vue d'examiner les dimensions infranationales de l'intégration économique nord-américaine. Les sujets suivants ont été abordés : reconstitution territoriale des activités économiques et émergence de régions frontalières, dynamiques institutionnelles des relations province/état, et reconfiguration des valeurs et de l'espace culturelle depuis une décennie marquée par une interdépendance croissante. En particulier, on a insisté sur les incidences sur les politiques publiques pour le gouvernement du Canada.

Pour plus de renseignements sur cette table ronde, veuillez communiquer avec André Downs au 613.995.3655 ou par courriel à a.downs@prs-srp.gc.ca.

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Notes

1 Cet article fait partie d'un document de recherche beaucoup plus grand. Dans cette étude, nous considérons que deux régimes réglementaires convergent lorsqu'ils imposent le même fardeau économique à leurs économies respectives, c'est à dire qu'ils imposent les mêmes restrictions à l'activité économique des pays ou des régions concernées.

2 Les dépenses comprennent le coût administratif, le coût d'observation, et le coût associé à l'activité politique en matière de réglementation.

3 Pour construire cet indice, on attribue un numéro de 1 à 6 à chaque règlement, les numéros plus élevés étant attribués aux règlements plus stricts. L'index total représente la moyenne pondérée des indices réglementaires individuels. Les coefficients de pondération sont établis à partir d'analyse de facteurs et sont proportionnels à la contribution d'une réglementation donnée à la variance globale dans les données.

4 Voir Ndayisenga 2004 pour un examen détaillé de la recherche sur les effets de la réglementation.

investissements supplémentaires. De plus, la réglementation des taux de rendement modifie le coût relatif du facteur capital et du facteur travail et peut mener à une substitution entre ces facteurs de production. Plus précisément, si l'on fixait un plafond au taux de rendement de l'investissement, le stock de capital augmenterait afin de maximiser la base à partir de laquelle on calcule le retour sur investissement. En éliminant le plafond sur le taux de rendement, on diminuerait les nouveaux investissements. La déréglementation des entreprises publiques mènerait sans doute également à une baisse des investissements, en raison des changements de la structure des incitatifs et du passage de ces entreprises d'un environnement à la fois économique et politique ainsi que public et privé à un environnement uniquement économique et privé. Par conséquent, l'incidence des politiques réglementaires sur l'investissement est une question empirique.

Dans le cadre d'une étude sur les liens entre l'investissement et la réglementation, Alesina et coll. (2003) concluent que la réglementation stricte des marchés de produits des pays de l'OCDE a eu un effet très néfaste sur l'investissement. Les restrictions relatives à la propriété n'ont pas un effet aussi significatif que les obstacles à l'entrée. Alesina et coll. n'ont pas trouvé de lien statistiquement significatif entre l'investissement et les restrictions relatives à la propriété; la réglementation des obstacles à l'entrée est celle dont l'incidence est la plus forte. En outre, l'étude montre que l'augmentation de l'investissement est moindre lorsque le degré de restriction baisse, c'est-à-dire qu'il devient de moins en moins rentable de déréglementer.

Nicholetti et coll. (2003) ont étudié l'incidence de la réglementation des marchés de produits sur le commerce des biens et des services, ainsi que sur l'investissement étranger direct. Ils ont conclu que la réglementation des produits qui freine la concurrence

a un effet négatif et important sur l'investissement étranger direct. Ils ont trouvé que le plus important, dans le cas des capitaux intrants des FDI bilatéraux, ce n'est pas tant la réglementation du pays d'accueil ou du pays d'origine, que le ratio des indicateurs de réglementation des deux pays. La conclusion politique de ce constat est que, pour attirer de l'investissement, il ne suffit pas que le pays d'accueil dispose d'une bonne réglementation; il faut également que sa réglementation soit meilleure, c'est-à-dire moins restrictive, que celle du pays d'origine.

Nicholetti et coll. concluent que l'alignement de la réglementation des pays les plus libéraux de l'OCDE aurait pour résultat de faire augmenter l'investissement direct de l'étranger de plus de 10 %. Ils en viennent également à déterminer qu'une convergence générale de la réglementation de l'OCDE avec celle des pays les plus libéraux permettrait de faire augmenter les exportations de plus de 10 %. Les retombées seraient encore plus positives dans le secteur tertiaire, puisque l'on prévoit que le volume d'échanges commerciaux augmenterait d'environ 30 % grâce à une réglementation plus libérale.

Les études sur les conséquences de la réglementation économique, administrative et sociale sur l'innovation sont peu nombreuses. Dans une étude nationale des effets de la réglementation sur l'économie et sur l'emploi, Bassanini et Ernst (2002), en utilisant le ratio de la recherche et du développement des entreprises sur la production pour mesurer l'innovation, concluent qu'il existe une relation négative évidente entre l'innovation et la réglementation économique et commerciale restrictive. Les auteurs proposent que la réglementation sévère du marché de l'emploi pourrait se traduire par une baisse de la recherche et du développement dans les industries de

Les réglementations et l'innovation

Renvois

haute technologie. Par contre, la protection étroite des droits de propriété intellectuelle tend à avoir une influence positive sur l'intensité des activités de R-D.

Koch et coll. (2003) ont étudié l'incidence des politiques réglementaires sur l'innovation dans les pays de l'OCDE. Ils estiment que la réglementation est responsable du tiers de la différence en intensité de R-D qui existe entre le Canada et les États-Unis.

Les réglementations et l'investissement

Des preuves attestent que dans les pays commerçants comme le Canada, la réforme réglementaire accroît les avantages d'une libéralisation du commerce. Dans une étude récente, Bolaky et Freund (2004) ont constaté que dans les pays très réglementés, l'accroissement du commerce n'a pas d'effet sur la croissance. Une réglementation excessive limite la croissance, car les entreprises et les secteurs les plus productifs ne peuvent pas accéder aux ressources. De plus, dans les économies très réglementées, il y a des chances qu'un accroissement des échanges commerciaux se produise au niveau des biens où il n'y a pas d'avantage comparatif.

Alesina, Alberto, Silvia Ardagna, Giuseppe Nicoletti, et Fabio Schiantafani. 2003. *Regulations and Investments*, document de travail de l'OCDE, ECO WP(2003).

Bassanini, A. et E. Ernst. 2002. « Labour Market Institutions, Product Market Regulations and Innovation: Cross-Country Evidence », document de travail du Département des Affaires économiques de l'OCDE, n° 316.

Bolaky, Bineswaree et Caroline Freund. *Trade, Regulations, and Growth*, document de travail n° 3255, la Banque mondiale, 24 mars 2004.

Centre de droit et de politique commerciale, 2004. « Canada-United States Networks of Cooperation », document de discussion.

Golub, S. 2003. « Measures of restrictions on inward foreign direct investment for (OECD) countries », document de travail du Département des Affaires économiques de l'OCDE, n° 357.

La réglementation et la performance économique

Analyse documentaire

industries, suscitent un plus grand besoin de règlements (en matière de santé, sécurité, environnement). Deux-
ièmement, avec l'élimination des tarifs protectionnistes, les pays sont
susceptibles de recourir à des mesures
moins transparentes, tels que les règle-
ments qui leur permettent de se

protéger contre la concurrence interna-
tionale. Enfin, un accroissement de la
concurrence dans les marchés interna-
tionaux et des investissements directs
étrangers font que la réglementation
canadienne doit tenir compte des
cadres réglementaires de ses princi-
paux partenaires commerciaux, surtout

ceux des États-Unis. Quatřiemement,
pour un pays commerçant comme
le Canada, ce sont l'efficience et
l'efficacité de son régime réglemen-
taire par rapport à ses principaux
partenaires commerciaux, en l'occu-
rence les États-Unis, qui sont les
plus importantes.

L'évaluation des avantages de la
convergence étant axée sur l'im-
portance des liens entre la règle-
mentation et les divers indicateurs de
la performance économique, ce qui
suit constitue une brève revue des
résultats empiriques dans ce domaine,
consacrée uniquement aux études liées
aux pays de l'OCDE.

Les réglementations et la productivité

Historiquement, l'incidence des
régimes réglementaires sur la produc-
tivité, surtout la productivité plurifac-
torielle, a toujours suscité beaucoup
d'intérêt. Le ralentissement de la pro-
ductivité aux États-Unis dans les
années 1970 a coïncidé avec une aug-
mentation des activités de réglemen-
tation. La vague de règlements en
matière d'environnement, de santé et
de sécurité adoptés au cours de cette
période a suscité de nombreuses études
de leurs effets sur la productivité.

De manière générale, l'envergne des
effets de la réglementation sur la pro-
ductivité varie grandement, en fonc-
tion du secteur industriel, du genre
de règlements et des variables utilisées
pour quantifier ces règlements (leur
nombre, les dépenses en régimenta-
tion, la taille du personnel chargé de
la réglementation, etc.). Cependant,
globalement, la majorité des études
démontrent des répercussions néfastes
de la réglementation sur la producti-
vité et la croissance de cette dernière⁴.
Les résultats des études récentes
fondées sur de meilleures données
et une plus large couverture de pays
mènent tous à la même conclusion.
Par exemple, Nicoletti et Scarpetta
(2003) concluent que la réglementa-
tion qui s'applique à toute l'économie
et qui vise à freiner la concurrence et
la gouvernance prive mine la produc-
tivité, dans la mesure où elle freine le

Il faut se montrer prudent lorsqu'on
interprète l'incidence de la régimenta-
tion sur la performance économique
pour deux raisons. Tout d'abord, il
s'agit du manque d'information sur
les produits de la réglementation tels
qu'une meilleure situation sur le plan
de la santé et de la sécurité, meilleures
pratiques commerciales, un environ-
nement plus propre, et ce, même si
les entreprises et les gouvernements
doivent supporter des coûts pour la
production de ces biens publics. Dans
ces conditions, l'incidence de la règle-
mentation sur la productivité et le PIB
sera biaisée à la baisse, car il apparait
que le même nombre de biens voire
moins seront produits avec plus d'in-
trants une fois la réglementation
appliquée. Enfin, les études écono-
métriques visant à mesurer l'incidence
globale de la réglementation sur la
performance économique se heurtent
à un sérieux problème de données,
car en général il n'y a pas de mesure
sommaire par ordre chronologique
du degré de restriction de la règle-
mentation imposé aux activités
économiques.

La réglementation et l'investissement

La réglementation des marchés nuit
à l'investissement d'au moins trois
façons. D'abord, elle peut imposer
l'utilisation d'un certain type de tech-
nologie. Deuxièmement, les obstacles
à l'entrée qui résultent de la régimen-
tation peuvent nuire à la majorité
des prix au-delà du coût marginal et
donc déterminer le nombre d'entre-
prises et le volume d'investissement
dans un secteur donné. Troisiè-
ment, la réglementation et les coûts
de mise en application de celle-ci
peuvent avoir une influence sur le
coût d'ajustement du stock de capital
et, par conséquent, empêcher certains

progrès technologique. C'est-à-dire que
la réglementation a tendance à faire
diminuer le taux d'adoption par les
entreprises de meilleures technologies
provenant des entreprises des pays
technologiquement plus avancés.
Stephano et Tresselt (2002) mettent en
évidence les effets néfastes indirects
sur la productivité dans le cas de règle-
ments conçus pour interagir avec une
variable d'écart technologique. Ils con-
cluent que plus le pays est éloigné de
la frontière technologique, plus les
effets d'une réglementation stricte sont
néfastes. En gros, la réglementation
diminue l'ampleur des débordements
de connaissances en restreignant l'en-
trée des nouvelles entreprises ou en
modifiant la structure des incitatifs
des entreprises concernées.

Les avantages d'une convergence réglementaire entre le Canada et les États-Unis

En utilisant une estimation moyenne de l'OCDE de l'incidence de la réglementation sur le taux d'investissement (investissement/stock de capital), nous avons calculé que, si le Canada était soumis au même degré de restriction réglementaire que les États-Unis de 1976 à 1998, il y aurait une augmentation moyenne d'investissement d'environ 1 milliard US\$ par an. Si le régime réglementaire canadien avait changé au même rythme que celui des États-Unis, l'investissement total dans l'économie canadienne serait plus élevé et atteindrait environ 400 millions US\$ par an, en moyenne. Autrement dit, le Canada aurait obtenu en moyenne plus de 30 % d'investissement par an au cours de cette période.


Utilisant les mêmes mode de calculs, nous estimons que la part de R-D du produit intérieur brut aurait été 6 % plus élevée s'il y avait eu convergence totale entre le Canada et les États-Unis (Ndayisenga et Downs, 2004) ce qui représente plus de 367 millions de dollars supplémentaires par an en moyenne investis en R-D. De plus, nos estimations semblent indiquer que l'écart entre l'indice du Canada et celui des États-Unis, mis en évidence par le travail l'OCDE, est responsable d'environ 17 % de l'écart d'intensité en R-D entre les deux pays à l'étude.

Quelles conclusions tirer?

Un examen des études pertinentes et des prévisions canadiennes sur les effets économiques de la réglementation nous permet de tirer des leçons utiles (Voir l'analyse pour plus de détails). D'abord, la majeure partie des études fait état d'une relation statistiquement significative entre l'investissement, la productivité, le développement, et les exportations. Deuxièmement, la convergence réglementaire entre le Canada et

FIGURE 2


Les restrictions à l'IED



Source : Golub (2003).

FIGURE 3

Indice général du degré de restriction de la réglementation : moyennes de 1980, 1990 et 2000



Source : Golub (2003).

les États-Unis comporte des avantages économiques évidents. Troisièmement, nous manquons grandement de données sur la réglementation, ce qui nuit à la recherche sur l'incidence de la réglementation sur la performance économique. Pourtant, ce genre de données seront des éléments essentiels pour éclairer le processus politique et évaluer les effets de la réglementation, et ce, pour trois raisons. Premièrement, l'augmentation des revenus et l'émergence de nouvelles

Indice du degré de restriction de la réglementation : Canada-E.-U., 1975-1998



Source : Base de données sur la réglementation de l'OCDE.

fardeau réglementaire entre ces pays peuvent refléter les différences d'efficacité de leurs régimes réglementaires respectifs.

Un certain nombre d'études de l'OCDE démontrent que, par rapport à beaucoup d'autres économies de cette organisation, le régime réglementaire canadien est, dans son ensemble, concurrentiel à l'échelle internationale. Cependant, il y a plusieurs types de réglementations (les cadres juridiques, les règlements économiques, sociaux et administratifs), chacun de ceux-ci visant des objectifs distincts et imposant des contraintes différentes sur l'économie. Une comparaison des régimes réglementaires doit refléter cette diversité et il s'agit de trouver un outil de mesure qui permette d'évaluer correctement le degré de restriction que chaque régime impose à l'économie et de l'intégrer à l'indice du poids économique total.

L'OCDE a créé tel un indice de réglementation³ et l'a utilisé pour étudier l'incidence économique de la réglementation sur les différents pays membres de l'OCDE et pour comparer la réglementation des différentes autorités nationales (Nicoletti et coll., 2003). Dans le présent article, nous avons eu recours à cet indice pour comparer le poids que les régimes réglementaires américain et canadien exercent sur leurs économies respectives.

L'indice de l'OCDE est axé sur deux catégories de règlements qui peuvent avoir des conséquences importantes sur la gouvernance, la concurrence des marchés et la compétitivité internationale : d'une part, les contrôles exercés par les États et d'autre part les obstacles à l'entrée. Les règlements sont traduits en un indicateur du degré de restriction qui s'applique à toute l'économie.

L'indice du degré de restriction global qui permet de déterminer dans quelle mesure la réglementation est un fardeau pour l'économie confirme ce que les tendances réglementaires semblent déjà montrer. Entre 1975 et 1998, période pour laquelle nous disposons de données, le Canada et les États-Unis sont tous les deux passés par une réforme de leur régime réglementaire. Le résultat de cet exercice (figure 1) a été le déclin continu du poids de la réglementation sur chaque économie. Les règlements adoptés dans les années 1990 étaient nettement moins contraignants pour les deux économies qu'ils ne l'ont été au début des années 1970.

Cependant, il apparaît qu'au cours de cette période d'analyse, le régime réglementaire canadien, malgré la réforme, a été plus contraignant pour l'économie que celui des États-Unis. Cet écart, qui était à son maximum au début des années 1980, a ensuite diminué au milieu et à la fin de cette décennie. Or, les données montrent qu'il a augmenté depuis 1991. La figure 1 soulève une question de recherche importante : si la valeur de l'indice canadien était égale à celle de l'indice américain, (c'est-à-dire, si la convergence était totale), la croissance de la productivité serait-elle plus rapide et plus importante? Le cas échéant, dans quelle mesure? Quelle proportion de capitaux, de main-d'œuvre et de biens intermédiaires supplémentaires serait utilisée?

La compétitivité réglementaire du Canada par rapport à la plupart des pays de l'OCDE ne s'étend pas jusqu'à l'investissement direct étranger (IDE). Même si le degré de restriction de son régime réglementaire a diminué avec le temps, le Canada accuse du retard par rapport au pays moyen de l'OCDE et aux États-Unis, et ce à la fois dans chacun des secteurs et dans l'ensemble de ceux-ci.

Date	Objectif suite	Orientation de la réforme suite	Mécanisme suite
2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Des résultats pour les Canadiens et les Canadiennes • proposer une approche de gestion axée sur : <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. les citoyens, 2. des valeurs claires, 3. la concrétisation des résultats, 4. des dépenses responsables 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gouvernement en Direct • fonction de contrôle moderne • amélioration des rapports au Parlement • intégrité des programmes • milieu de travail exemplaire 	Promotion d'initiatives clés : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • prestation de services axée sur les citoyens • Couverture en Direct • fonction de contrôle moderne • amélioration des rapports au Parlement • intégrité des programmes • milieu de travail exemplaire
2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • réglementation intelligente 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • conception d'une stratégie de réglementation adaptée au XXI^e siècle • mettre en évidence les secteurs prioritaires et les domaines qui exigent un examen réglementaire et fournir une perspective extérieure sur les questions d'actualité mises de l'avant par ministères et intervenants 	Cinq principes : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • efficacité • souplesse • transparence • reddition de comptes • coopération

Sources : OCDE/PUMA et révisé par le Projet de recherche sur les politiques (PRP)

une Politique de réglementation claire a été publiée en 1986, puis révisée en 1992, 1995 et 1999. Les deux autres politiques, *Une réglementation canadienne adaptée aux réalités de l'heure*, de 1993 et *Des résultats pour les Canadiens et les Canadiennes*, de 1997, n'étaient pas des politiques de réglementation en tant que telles mais ont eu des effets tout aussi importants sur l'approche du gouvernement en matière de réglementation.

Les tendances du degré de restriction de la réglementation au Canada et aux États-Unis

et sa part de produit intérieur brut n'a pas changé outre mesure². En effet, si l'on se fie à une méthode d'estimation en particulier, cette part est restée proche de 12 ou 13 % pendant un certain temps, et a même diminué par rapport aux niveaux de 1980, date à laquelle elle atteignait son maximum. Cependant, dans une économie mondiale intégrée, ce sont les fardeaux relatifs de la réglementation des différentes économies concurrentielles qui sont les plus pertinents. À ce stade, il convient de noter qu'il est raisonnable d'assumer que les pays à revenu élevé de l'OCDE ont les mêmes exigences concernant les produits et services issus des réglementations. Autrement dit, ces pays recherchent plus ou moins les solutions réglementaires semblables. Auquel cas, les différences dans la restriction réglementaire signifient simplement que ces pays ont réalisé leurs objectifs réglementaires par l'entremise des instruments réglementaires et des niveaux de coût différents. Les grandes différences au niveau des coûts et du

La réforme réglementaire au Canada, qui a duré plus de 25 ans, a eu pour résultat de mettre fin à l'inflation de la réglementation. Au cours de cette période, le nombre de règlements provinciaux en vigueur a beaucoup diminué et, ces dix dernières années, le nombre de règlements fédéraux est resté le même. La diminution générale du nombre de règlements a également été accompagnée de changements importants des objectifs, de la conception et de la gestion du processus réglementaire, de plus en plus axé sur la souplesse, la reddition de compte, les résultats et les conséquences économiques (Voir tableau 1.)

De plus, si le fardeau absolu de la réglementation à l'égard des consommateurs, producteurs et gouvernements (Mihail, 1996) a augmenté, son taux de croissance a diminué,

Dans ce document, nous nous appuyons tout d'abord sur une base de données des indicateurs de réglementation récemment élaborée par l'OCDE pour évaluer l'envergure de la convergence de la réglementation entre les États-Unis et le Canada¹.

TABLEAU 1

L'évolution des politiques de réglementation au Canada

Date	Objetif	Orientation de la réforme	Mécanisme
1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• s'assurer que la réglementation sociale soit justifiée étant donné ses incidences	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• évaluation ex ante de la réglementation sociale• participation du secteur privé à la création de la réglementation sociale	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• analyse obligatoire, dans 13 ministères désignés, de l'incidence socio-économique des règlements importants en santé, sécurité et équité
1983	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• faire participer d'avantage le public au processus consultatif	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• fournir un préavis des changements proposés à la réglementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• État des projets de réglementation publié deux fois par an
1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• équité et efficience• réglementer plus intelligemment• réduire la réglementation lorsque possible	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• réforme de certains aspects du processus de réglementation (consultation publique, préavis et contrôle politique des décisions en matière de réglementation, par ex.)• coopération fédérale-provinciale• rendre les programmes de réglementation existants plus efficaces et efficients	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• dix principes clés• Code d'équité• nomination d'un ministre responsable des affaires réglementaires; création d'un secrétariat• projet de réglementation• publication préalable des ébauches de règlements• résumés de l'étude d'impact de la réglementation• examen systématique des programmes de réglementation tous les sept ans
1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• les meilleurs bénéfices nets pour les Canadiens et les Canadiennes• innovation et souplesse• rentabilité• marché national unique• compétitivité	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• questions à l'échelle du système, telles que l'observation et la compétitivité• nouvelles options	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Politique de réglementation du gouvernement du Canada approuvée par le Cabinet fédéral, en vertu de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques
1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Une réglementation canadienne adaptée aux réalités de l'heure pour rendre le régime réglementaire plus souple, plus responsable et plus adapté	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• satisfaire aux exigences réglementaires• améliorer la capacité d'adaptation administrative• ententes d'équivalence et ententes opérationnelles avec les autres ordres de gouvernements	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• cadre de gestion des risques• changements apportés au Plan de réglementation fédéral pour y inclure de l'information sur les coûts et les avantages
1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• les meilleurs bénéfices nets pour les Canadiens et les Canadiennes• allègement du fardeau réglementaire des petites entreprises	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• surveillance• consultation et partenariat avec les intervenants• politiques d'application et d'observation• nouvelles stratégies de conformité• coordination intergouvernementale	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• normes de gestion du processus réglementaire
1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• mettre en évidence les liens entre les politiques (notamment les règlements) et les résultats concrets	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• évaluation de la performance de la réglementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Dans le cadre du Projet d'amélioration des rapports au Parlement, on exige des ministères qu'ils déposent au Parlement, une fois par an, les documents suivants : 1. Les rapports sur les plans et les priorités, 2. Les rapports ministériels sur le rendement
1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• améliorer le système de gestion réglementaire et renforcer son observation par les ministères	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• consolidation des responsabilités suivies avant à un comité du Cabinet unique : politique de réglementation, processus et prise de décisions• appuyer ces responsabilités dans une seule agence centrale• lier clairement la politique de réglementation aux autres directives du Cabinet	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• la politique de réglementation ne relève plus du Secrétaire du Conseil du Trésor mais du Comité spécial du Conseil du Cabinet (CSC)• création de la Division des affaires réglementaires du Bureau du Conseil Privé pour appuyer le processus réglementaire, la politique de réglementation et le mémoire du CSC

Les incidences économiques de la convergence entre le Canada et les États-Unis en matière de réglementation

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Fidèle Ndayisenga
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Projet de recherche sur les politiques

Introduction

Selon sa définition habituelle, la réglementation publique est un moyen d'intervenir dans la prise de décision des consommateurs et des producteurs pour corriger des lacunes du marché, ce qui a pour conséquence d'améliorer l'allocation des ressources et de renforcer le bien-être social. Les réglementations représentent un élément essentiel de la gouvernance économique et sociale. En fait, dans son étude sur la réforme en matière de réglementation au Canada, l'OCDE a observé que la qualité de la gouvernance réglementaire du Canada et ses efforts continus afin d'améliorer ses réglementations ont certainement contribué à sa réussite en ce qui a trait à sa performance économique et à la réalisation d'objectifs sociaux. L'importance de la réglementation d'un pays pour le bien-être de ses citoyens est indiscutable.

Néanmoins, il existe de mauvaises réglementations. Elles découlent de réglementations inutiles, de l'utilisation des règlements comme obstacles techniques au commerce, du manque de coordination entre les principaux partenaires économiques en matière de réglementation, de mauvais mécanismes d'application de bons règlements, ou de règlements plus stricts que nécessaire pour les objectifs établis. Elles pervertissent la structure des incitatifs de l'économie, et entraînent une diminution du bien-être.

Les préoccupations relatives aux effets économiques de la réglementation occupent une place importante du programme réglementaire du gouvernement depuis un certain temps. En 1992, dans le cadre de son *Programme pour la prospérité*, qui visait à assurer la compétitivité du Canada sur le marché mondial, le gouvernement canadien a entrepris un examen réglementaire exhaustif. Cet examen était justifié, notamment, par l'inquiétude du fait que la réglementation imposait des coûts inutiles aux entreprises et aux consommateurs et qu'elle nuisait donc à la compétitivité. En 1994, le

gouvernement, dans *Les emplois et la croissance*, a fait valoir que l'on créait trop de règlements sans évaluer leur incidence sur la compétitivité, et qu'ils minaient la productivité canadienne. Ces dernières années, la persistance des écarts de productivité et des revenus entre le Canada et les États-Unis a ramené à l'avant-plan la question de savoir si ces écarts pouvaient être partiellement attribués aux réglementations plus strictes du Canada. Ce phénomène est né en partie de la recherche, qui montre que la réglementation a grandement contribué au ralentissement de la productivité américaine dans les années 1970. Des études plus récentes font aussi état de liens forts et presque toujours négatifs entre la performance économique et le poids de la réglementation. Par ailleurs, des études de partout au Canada montrent également que les différences réglementaires entre les pays expliquent les différences internationales de performance économique. La proximité du Canada ainsi que ses nombreux liens commerciaux avec la plus grande puissance économique mondiale, les États-Unis, ont fait de notre pays un précurseur mondial dans l'élaboration et la gestion réglementaire. Ces facteurs ont aussi exercé une influence sur les changements récents du système de réglementation canadien, tel que le rapprochement entre celui-ci et le système américain et la coopération de ces deux pays dans différents secteurs (entier for trade Policy and Law, 2004). Dans la mesure où la réglementation a une incidence sur la compétitivité internationale d'un pays par le biais de la productivité, de l'investissement ou de la recherche et du développement, c'est l'efficacité et l'efficacité du régime de réglementation d'un pays par rapport à celles de ses partenaires commerciaux principaux qui sont les plus importantes. Dans le cas du Canada, des lacunes persistantes du fardeau réglementaire vis-à-vis des États-Unis engendreront l'érosion de la compétitivité du Canada sur le marché américain.

des provinces et des États, les municipalités et le secteur privé). Cette recherche, présentée dans l'article d'Abgrall dans ce numéro d'*Horizons*, donne à entendre qu'il y a eu une multiplication de ces mesures institutionnelles, notamment entre les gouvernements des provinces et des États. Cette intensification concerne surtout le domaine économique (p. ex., les transports, les ressources énergétiques et l'environnement), ce qui reflète l'augmentation des échanges commerciaux entre les régions canadiennes et américaines.

Cette tendance à la création de liens institutionnels à l'échelle infranationale a sans doute un impact sur le contexte des politiques du gouvernement canadien. Les recherches potentielles de cette évolution sur les politiques.

Une quatrième option

Le maximum des occasions présentes sur le marché nord-américain. Si les entreprises et les travailleurs canadiens sont capables de défendre leurs intérêts sur les marchés voisins, ils seront en meilleure position pour connaître le succès à l'échelle mondiale.

Par conséquent, on peut définir cette quatrième option comme une approche politique qui vise à maximiser l'accès au marché américain – et son succès sur ce marché –, ce qui établirait le fondement économique nécessaire pour devenir une force concurrentielle sur la scène économique mondiale. Cette approche exige d'entreprendre, entre autres, les démarches nécessaires pour élargir notre rôle en tant que porte d'accès au vaste marché américain.

La prise de mesures pour établir une union douanière au sens plein du terme ou s'en rapprocher graduellement constitue un pas dans cette direction, car ces mesures élimineraient un des obstacles restants aux échanges commerciaux entre le Canada et les États-Unis et rehausserait considérablement l'attrait du Canada en tant que point d'accès au marché américain. Trouver les moyens de réduire les différences réglementaires entre le Canada et les États-Unis donnerait également du poids à cette option. De plus, en tirant profit des ressources réglementaires beaucoup plus vastes des Américains et en coordonnant mieux les approches réglementaires des deux pays, nous contribuons nettement à augmenter la compétitivité des entreprises canadiennes sur le marché américain, condition préalable pour être compétitif sur le plan international et augmenter l'attrait du Canada pour les investisseurs étrangers.

Renvois

manoeuvre des divers intervenants et institutions est amplement suffisante pour assurer des relations harmonieuses entre les deux pays. Bien que le gouvernement canadien ne puisse déclencher et orienter les nombreuses interactions entre les acteurs des nombreux paliers infranationaux, il peut tout de même s'assurer du bon déroulement de ces échanges en fournissant un cadre d'orientation et un support logistique tout en profitant du potentiel de ces liens afin de mieux comprendre le processus des politiques américaines et de mieux l'influencer.

Les initiatives stratégiques examinées par le PRR ne constituent pas l'ensemble des conditions suffisantes afin de maximiser les avantages découlant de l'intégration nord-américaine mais elles sont nécessaires. Les mesures menant à l'établissement d'une union douanière, l'approfondissement de la collaboration réglementaire et le rôle de plus en plus important des institutions infranationales doivent faire partie d'une prise de position politique cohérente. Il faudra également faire place à d'autres initiatives globales portées à d'autres questions relatives à la défense, à la sécurité, aux ressources énergétiques et à l'environnement. Les recherches récentes donnent à penser qu'il est possible d'atteindre ces objectifs sans compromettre les valeurs essentielles des Canadiens.

Ces prochains mois, la recherche du PRR aidera les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques à cerner certaines initiatives potentielles visant à maintenir et à renforcer la position concurrentielle du Canada en Amérique du Nord et dans le monde.

Santé Canada, 2004. « La réglementation des matériaux médicaux », Rapport de la vérificatrice générale à la Chambre des communes, chap. 2 : 2.

L'émergence de régions transfrontalières

d'origine sur la performance économique du Canada. Le PRP et ses partenaires de recherche examinent ces questions afin d'éclaircir les débats d'orientation politique.

Le gouvernement canadien a reconnu l'importance de l'existence des liens entre les gouvernements des provinces et des États en annonçant la création du nouveau secrétariat à l'ambassade de Washington qui permettent aux représentants des provinces et des territoires de partager les locaux de l'ambassade, en accordant toujours plus de place aux gouvernements provinciaux lors des négociations commerciales et en demandant aux gouvernements de mettre à profit leurs liens au sud de la frontière pour améliorer notre compréhension de la société complexe des États-Unis.

Cette considération correspond aux tendances observées, qui donnent à penser que les provinces, les régions et les municipalités canadiennes établiront des liens profonds et complexes avec leurs homologues américains sur les plans économique, politique et institutionnel. Ces liens modifieront graduellement la nature de la fédération canadienne et doivent être pris en considération dans le cadre de l'élaboration de politiques nationales.

Le PRP a entrepris des recherches afin de mieux saisir la nature de ces liens transfrontaliers. La recherche s'articule autour de trois axes pour offrir une perspective de l'intégration nord-américaine à plusieurs volets : économique, socio-culturel et institutionnel. Dans le volet économique, la recherche vise à évaluer les répercussions de l'intégration nord-américaine sur diennes et américaines, le degré de spécialisation des régions canadiennes et l'émergence de grappes industrielles de pointe à l'échelle nationale et nord-américaine. Cet aspect de la recherche exige l'évaluation des forces d'impul-

sion vers une reconfiguration géo-graphique des activités économiques nord-américaines, l'identification des grappes clés – canadiennes ou transfrontalières – leur répercussion sur la croissance régionale ainsi que l'élaboration de propositions politiques favorisant la compétitivité des régions (voir l'article de Proulx dans ce numéro d'*Horizons*).

Les recherches existantes et en cours donnent à penser que les régions canadiennes sont de plus en plus dépendantes des événements économiques survenant aux États-Unis, ce qui n'est pas étonnant compte tenu de la part croissante du PIB provincial correspondant aux exportations aux États-Unis. Bien que ce phénomène ait permis d'accroître le degré de spécialisation et d'augmenter les gains de productivité, il a aussi aggravé la vulnérabilité des cycles économiques des provinces aux changements des conditions économiques des régions américaines, tel que le confirme l'article de Chen dans ce numéro. Ce phénomène rend l'élaboration des politiques économiques nationales, telles que les politiques monétaires, fiscales et budgétaires, encore plus difficile en raison des conflits potentiels autour des positions politiques nécessaires, du moment choisi pour agir et des répercussions régionales. Cette dépendance aura également des conséquences importantes sur l'élaboration des politiques régionales. L'intégration nord-américaine ajoute donc des difficultés supplémentaires en ce qui a trait à l'élaboration des politiques économiques. Une des questions clés des observateurs du processus d'intégration nord-américaine consiste à savoir si l'intégration économique conduit à une convergence des valeurs et des convictions entre les sociétés canadienne et américaine. La première étape de notre recherche sur cette question, résumée dans l'article de Boucher dans ce numéro d'*Horizons*, donne à penser que cette convergence n'apparaît pas à l'échelle nationale. Au cours des deux dernières décennies, les valeurs

et les convictions des Canadiens et des Américains ont présenté autant de divergences que de convergences, selon l'angle sous lequel on les examine. Par exemple, il semble y avoir eu convergence sur le plan des valeurs d'ordre politique (p. ex., la confiance dans les institutions, la fierté nationale et le choix des priorités) mais non sur celui des valeurs économiques, sociales et morales, où la société américaine semble plus conservatrice.

Les valeurs et les convictions sont différentes sur le plan statistique; toutefois, ces différences présentent peu d'importance en raison des similitudes qui existent entre les deux sociétés si nous comparons leur relation à celle de n'importe quels autres pays semblables. En outre, lorsqu'il y a convergence, ce sont autant les valeurs et les convictions des Canadiens qui sont adoptées par les États-Unis que l'inverse, résultat intéressant compte tenu des craintes que l'intégration économique ne pousse les Canadiens à ressembler de plus en plus aux Américains.

Cette question ne représente qu'une dimension de l'analyse. Au stade actuel de notre recherche, nous testons l'hypothèse selon laquelle il y a plus de convergence entre les régions transfrontalières qu'entre les deux nations. Cette hypothèse serait cohérente avec l'émergence de régions qui chevauchent les frontières canado-américaines sur le plan économique ou autre, phénomène observé au sein de l'Union européenne. Cette hypothèse peut également remettre en question la thèse de l'imprévisibilité de la convergence des valeurs, selon laquelle l'intégration économique ne mène pas à une convergence des valeurs.

Dans une autre initiative de recherche, le PRP examine les mesures institutionnelles (tels que les accords, les protocoles d'ententes (PE) et les associations) qui existent entre les entités économiques, sociales et politiques infranationales, des deux côtés de la frontière (p. ex., les gouvernements

importante, ce qui permet aux pays membres de l'ALENA de fixer leurs propres droits tarifaires sur les produits en provenance de pays tiers. Par conséquent, les règles d'origine empêchent l'importation de produits dans la zone de libre-échange en passant par le pays qui a les droits tarifaires. Cette règle oblige les importateurs et les exportateurs à établir l'origine des biens échangés, ce qui entraîne des coûts d'observation pour les entreprises et des dépenses administratives pour les gouvernements. De plus, les règles d'origine entraînent une mauvaise répartition des ressources en forçant les producteurs canadiens à s'approvisionner davantage à l'échelle locale plutôt que sur des marchés tiers où les prix sont moins élevés afin de répondre aux exigences de contenu nord-américain. Pour toutes ces raisons, les règles d'origine sont considérées comme des mesures protectionnistes qui réduisent considérablement les avantages économiques du libre-échange.

Comme l'écrivait Bob Kunimoto et Gary Sawchuk, les règles d'origine de l'ALENA sont les plus restrictives du monde et les coûts d'observation assumés par les entreprises sont parfois très élevés, notamment pour les petites et moyennes entreprises, qui n'ont pas toujours d'expertise intérieure et comptent souvent sur les services d'entreprises extérieures afin de s'assurer de respecter les règles.

L'établissement d'une union douanière exigerait l'harmonisation (ou l'élimination) des droits tarifaires que le Canada et les États-Unis imposent aux importateurs de pays tiers (c.-à-d., essentiellement les tarifs des nations les plus favorisées). Cette union permettrait d'éliminer les besoins créés par ces règles d'origine préférentielles puisque la détermination de l'origine serait effectuée une fois que le bien pénétrerait l'intérieur de la zone et il serait ensuite inutile de fournir des prescriptions d'origine supplémentaires pour permettre les échanges canado-américains.

L'harmonisation des tarifs entre le Canada et les États-Unis semble une solution facile dans la plupart des secteurs économiques car les droits tarifaires sur les importations des pays tiers sont déjà similaires dans les deux pays. Cependant, dans le secteur de l'agriculture et des textiles, où les protections tarifaires et non tarifaires sont très élevées et très différentes dans les deux pays, l'harmonisation des tarifs présenterait un obstacle du moins jusqu'à ce que la protection soit réduite ou harmonisée par l'enlèvement d'initiales commerciales multilatérales. Pour cette raison, certains analystes préfèrent adopter une approche progressive et sectorielle face à l'harmonisation des tarifs. Dans le cadre d'une telle approche, l'élimination des règles d'origine permettrait au Canada et aux États-Unis de ne « considérer que les fruits mûrs » et de revenir ultérieurement aux questions plus épineuses.

Les avantages découlant de l'harmonisation des tarifs et de l'élimination des règles d'origine entre le Canada et les États-Unis sont séduisants : environ 1 % du PIB pour l'harmonisation des tarifs et plus de 2 % pour l'élimination des coûts d'observation lorsqu'on tient compte de l'incidence sur la composition des intrants.

Toutefois, comme l'ont remarqué les participants à la table ronde du PRC-CRSHC sur l'« Évolution vers une union douanière », bien que l'établissement d'une union douanière puisse entraîner des gains éventuels appréciables, nous devons admettre également que sa négociation présenterait de grandes difficultés et exigerait certains coûts d'ajustement. Premièrement, comme nous l'avons vu plus tôt, il sera peut-être difficile de résoudre les questions relatives à l'agriculture et aux textiles. Deuxièmement, l'instauration d'une union douanière obligerait le Canada et les États-Unis à harmoniser leurs politiques commerciales visant les pays tiers, essentiellement sur le plan des tarifs et des procédures douanières mais potentiellement sur le plan des droits

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Les trois gouvernements membres de l'ALENA admettent que les règles d'origine entraînent des dépenses injustifiées pour les entreprises. De plus, ils ont consulté les groupes intéressés de leur pays afin d'obtenir leur point de vue sur l'harmonisation des tarifs et l'élimination des règles d'origine. Il reste à voir si ces consultations soutenus déboucheront sur une volonté manifeste de s'orienter vers une union douanière.

Entre-temps, d'autres recherches s'imposent sur plusieurs questions politiques connexes, notamment le degré d'utilisation du statut conféré par l'ALENA qui permet aux exportateurs d'accéder au marché américain, les structures de régie qui pourraient être mises sur pied dans le cadre d'une union douanière, les répercussions éventuelles de l'abandon de certains leviers de politique commerciale et les conséquences dynamiques à long terme de l'élimination des règles antidumping et des droits compensateurs. De toute évidence, les deux pays doivent se préparer à assumer les coûts de l'instauration de mesures précises afin de permettre certaines exceptions dans le cadre d'une union douanière. Celle-ci exigerait notamment des pays membres qu'ils renégocient leurs ALB afin de s'assurer que les partenaires des ALB de l'autre partie aient accès au régime d'admission en franchise. Troisièmement, elle obligerait les pays à négocier certains arrangements visant la perception des droits de douanes au périmètre de l'union douanière ainsi que la mise en place d'une structure de régie ou une structure institutionnelle destinée à régler les conflits potentiels entre les parties. Enfin, les règles d'origine assureraient par définition une certaine protection aux producteurs locaux et ont par conséquent créé une forme de rentes et d'intérêts privés dévolus. Les parties qui tirent profit de ces rentes s'opposeraient certainement à tout changement majeur qui viendrait compromettre leurs positions privilégiées.

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Le PRP a abordé la question de la collaboration réglementaire sous trois angles complémentaires. Premièrement, nous avons examiné les résultats de plusieurs accords bilatéraux de coopération réglementaire qui touchaient divers pays et cette analyse nous a confirmé que la réussite d'une coopération internationale :

- repose sur des relations économiques solides;
- exige un engagement politique au plus haut niveau; et
- demande du temps et des efforts soutenus afin d'acquiescer le degré de confiance et de connaissance mutuelle nécessaires.

La deuxième étape consistait à mener des recherches empiriques et à examiner la documentation portant sur l'impact potentiel des réglementations et de la collaboration réglementaire sur la performance économique. À ce point de la recherche, il est devenu évident que les réglementations peu vent avoir une incidence considérable sur la productivité, la compétitivité, les échanges commerciaux, l'investissement intérieur et l'investissement étranger. Par exemple, les estimations de l'OCDE donnent à penser que la réduction des entraves résultant des réglementations canadiennes à un degré comparable à celui des États-Unis pourrait considérablement dynamiser la croissance de la production. Il s'agit d'une considération politique importante dans un contexte où la performance canadienne est inférieure à celle des États-Unis sur le plan de la productivité et où il existe un important écart entre les niveaux de vie des deux pays (voir l'article de Ndayisenga dans ce numéro d'*Horizons*).

Troisièmement, nous examinons actuellement les secteurs particuliers qui pourraient tirer profit d'une collaboration réglementaire ainsi que certaines initiatives visant à approfondir les liens de coopération. On

pense généralement à la réglementation sur l'approbation des produits (p. ex., les médicaments, les matériels médicaux et les substances chimiques nouvelles); toutefois, on a réalisé très peu de progrès jusqu'à présent. L'acceptation de l'approbation des produits par les organismes de réglementation américains (p. ex., la Food and Drug Administration), de façon unilatérale ou par le biais d'un accord d'acceptation mutuelle, est désignée comme une étape importante pour réussir à accroître l'efficacité du système réglementaire canadien.

À ce jour, la recherche sur la collaboration réglementaire menée par le PRP donne à penser qu'un pays aussi petit que le Canada peut en tirer des avantages remarquables, même s'il ne peut se mesurer à des entités économiques plus vastes telles que les États-Unis ou l'Union européenne compte tenu des ressources allouées au processus de réglementation. La recherche et surtout le bon sens donnent à penser que le Canada doit tirer profit des ressources affectées aux décisions réglementaires dans les pays mieux dotés et concentrer ses ressources réglementaires relativement limitées dans les secteurs où elles peuvent lui conférer un avantage comparatif (p. ex., les nouvelles biotechnologies) ou encore, dans les secteurs où les risques potentiels sont les plus élevés pour les Canadiens, tels que les produits sanguins, les tendances de consommation de médicaments et la production de vaccins (Voir l'article de Griller dans ce numéro d'*Horizons*).

Simultanément, il nous faut reconnaître que la collaboration réglementaire est une entreprise d'ordre public complexe. Certains sont d'avis que le Canada risque de perdre une partie de sa souveraineté en matière de réglementation s'il approfondit sa collaboration avec les États-Unis, alors que d'autres estiment que la collaboration n'est pas toujours avantageuse, il n'est pas toujours évident d'avoir des objectifs communs. Si l'existence de réglementations

L'évolution vers une union douanière

Les universités et les centres de recherche d'Amérique du Nord et d'ailleurs mènent de plus en plus de recherches sur les répercussions des barrières non tarifaires sur les échanges commerciaux. Depuis que la protection tarifaire s'est estompée, après de multiples rondes de négociations commerciales multilatérales et la libre-échange (ALÉ), l'attention se porte davantage sur d'autres barrières commerciales telles que les quotas, les différences réglementaires et les règles d'origine, qui compromettent manifestement les échanges commerciaux. Les règles d'origine de l'ALÉNA assurent que le régime d'admission en franchise s'applique à tous les produits originaires d'Amérique du Nord, ou qui y sont modifiés de façon

distinction distincte.

Beaucoup de ces questions ont été abordées lors de la table ronde sur la collaboration réglementaire canado-américaine. Plusieurs exposés portaient sur les avantages éventuels d'une collaboration réglementaire accrue avec

les États-Unis.

Dans l'ensemble, la plupart des observateurs seraient prêts à affirmer que, en matière de collaboration réglementaire, chaque cas doit être examiné attentivement afin d'évaluer les avantages nets de l'évolution dans ce sens. Toutefois, la recherche donne à penser que les Canadiens peuvent tirer des avantages considérables si les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques ne confondent pas de petites différences et les éléments essentiels de l'identité et de la souveraineté du Canada.

Intégration nord-américaine enjeux et solutions

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En mars 2003, le Projet de recherche sur les politiques (PRP) a publié un article intitulé *North American Linkages: Focusing the Research*. Cet article proposait quatre initiatives de recherches visant à résoudre certaines questions fondamentales sur les relations canado-américaines, et à comprendre les enjeux et les avantages associés à l'évolution de l'intégration économique nord-américaine.

- Quelles raisons pousseraient le Canada à approfondir sa collaboration réglementaire avec les États-Unis et de quelle façon procéderait-il?
- Quels sont les avantages et les coûts qu'entraînerait l'élimination des règles d'origine de l'ALENA pour le Canada et pour les États-Unis?
- Quelles sont les incidences politiques de l'émergence de régions transfrontalières?
- De quelle façon pouvons-nous accroître la mobilité de la main-d'œuvre dans un contexte nord-américain?

Au cours de la dernière année, le PRP a mené une recherche sur les trois premiers projets, en collaboration avec divers ministères du gouvernement fédéral et de chercheurs de l'extérieur. Les résultats des recherches préliminaires ont été présentés et analysés lors de plusieurs forums dans le but de comprendre les enjeux de politique et de trouver les options éventuelles qui s'offrent au Gouvernement du Canada.

Ce numéro d'*Horizons* reprend les résultats clés de cette recherche et présente de l'information contextuelle permettant d'examiner quelques-unes des options politiques visant à maximiser les avantages qui découlent de la relation économique unique que nous entretenons avec les États-Unis.

La coopération canado-américaine en matière de réglementation

Lorsqu'il est question des relations canado-américaines, nous prenons de plus en plus conscience du besoin d'avoir des frontières intelligentes et une réglementation intelligente. Au fil des ans, les recherches ont démontré que les différences entre les réglementations peuvent représenter des obstacles importants sur le plan des échanges commerciaux et de l'investissement, pour les petits pays en particulier. Par exemple, des recherches empiriques extensives de l'OCDE ont clairement établi le lien entre les cadres de réglementation nationale des pays membres et leur performance économique en matière d'échanges commerciaux, d'investissement et de productivité. Pour le Canada, dont le marché restreint est en bonne partie dépendant de la colossale économie américaine, il est important d'évaluer les avantages et les coûts découlant des différences réglementaires.

Le gouvernement canadien prend note de ces considérations. Plusieurs ministères ont participé avec plus ou moins de succès à des initiatives de collaboration réglementaire internationale sur une base bilatérale et multilatérale. On s'attend à ce que le Comité consultatif externe sur la réglementation intelligente formule plusieurs recommandations concernant le besoin pour le gouvernement canadien de renforcer sa collaboration réglementaire internationale, en particulier avec les États-Unis. Plus tôt cette année, dans le cadre d'une révision du Programme de matériels médicaux, la vérificatrice générale a également recommandé de s'en remettre davantage à la collaboration réglementaire internationale et a terminé sur ces mots : *[Traduction]* « les ressources humaines et financières limitées et la lente progression de l'évolution de la collaboration réglementaire empêchent Santé Canada d'exécuter

Politique sociale et perspective du cycle de vie l'Université Queen's (QIISP)

Les 23 et 25 août 2004

Le Projet de recherche sur les politiques se joint de nouveau au QIISP pour vous présenter un atelier d'été annuel rassemblant les hauts fonctionnaires et des responsables de l'élaboration de politiques en vue d'examiner les résultats des recherches récentes ainsi que les grandes orientations en matière de politique sociale. Le QIISP, dirigé par l'école d'étude des politiques de l'Université Queen's, en partenariat avec Social Development Canada, a comme principal objectif le transfert des connaissances. Le programme de cette année met l'accent sur la nécessité d'envisager une perspective du cycle de vie dans l'analyse de l'exclusion sociale, l'équilibre entre travail et vie professionnelle, et d'autres enjeux de la politique sociale.

Tables rondes de recherche sur les politiques du PRP-CRSHC pour 2004-2005

Septembre-décembre 2004

Comment assurer un dialogue efficace entre les acteurs qui génèrent les connaissances et les intervenants qui s'en inspirent dans leurs efforts pour assurer le bien-être des Canadiens?

Pour répondre efficacement à cette question, le Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada (CRSHC) et du Projet de recherche sur les politiques (PRP) ont mis sur pied une série de discussions en table ronde. Ces tables rondes, qui en est maintenant à sa deuxième année, visent à augmenter la qualité de l'échange de connaissances entre les experts du milieu universitaire et ceux responsables de la conception et de la mise en œuvre des politiques et programmes du gouvernement fédéral.

Le programme d'automne comprendra les sessions portant sur l'économie sociale, politiques de logement, les travailleurs à faible revenu, etc. Les renseignements pertinents seront affichés sur le site Internet du PRP à l'adresse suivante : <www.policyresearch.gc.ca>.

Exploration de nouvelles approches en matière de politique sociale : Leçons tirées de la conférence du Projet de recherche sur les politiques (PRP)

Les 13 et 15 décembre 2004

Ottawa (Ontario)

Le PRP met actuellement sur pied une importante conférence de deux jours et demi, prévue en décembre 2004. Celle-ci aborde les incidences de la recherche récente dans le domaine de la politique sociale en vue de comprendre les défis et les ressources susceptibles d'influencer la politique sociale à moyen terme. La conférence s'appuiera sur la recherche interministérielle provenant des trois projets portant sur la politique sociale du PRP qui vont être achevés à l'automne 2004.

transfrontalière dans les domaines des politiques environnementales et sociales. Shenjie Chen, pour sa part, démontre que les cycles économiques canadiens et américains sont de plus en plus synchronisés.

Ce numéro d'*Horizons* offre, dans l'ensemble, une large perspective sur le contexte des politiques et les défis auxquels le Gouvernement du Canada est confronté dans la gestion de ses relations complexes et exigeantes avec les États-Unis.

Jean-Pierre Voyer
Directeur exécutif
Projet de recherche sur les politiques

L'équipe Horizons du PRP

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sur les politiques (PRP) à l'intention des

chercheurs en politiques du gouvernement

fédéral. L'objectif premier du PRP est

d'approfondir, de rassembler et d'intégrer

les connaissances sur des questions de

recherche intersectorielles pertinentes pour

la planification des politiques à moyen terme

du Gouvernement du Canada. *Horizons*

présente les travaux de chercheurs de

ministères fédéraux et d'experts externes

sur des sujets liés aux activités de recherche

du PRP. Pour de plus amples informations

sur le Projet ou pour consulter les anciens

numéros d'*Horizons*, veuillez visiter

www.recherchepolitique.gc.ca.

Tous les sites web cités dans le présent

numéro ont été consultés le 4 juin 2004.

Pour les commentaires, les questions, les

demandes d'abonnement et les change-

ments d'adresse, voici nos coordonnées :

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nécessairement celles de tout orga-
nisme lié à l'auteur ou à *Horizons*.

INTRODUCTION (suite)

nord-américains ont aujourd'hui un
peu plus d'un an d'existence, et ce
numéro d'*Horizons* représente l'occa-
sion de mesurer les progrès accomplis
sur certains aspects des dilemmes poli-
tiques auxquels fait face le gouverne-

ment du Canada.

Depuis la publication, en mars 2003,
du document de travail sur le Projet
sur les liens nord-américains, intitulé
North American Linkages: Focusing

the Research on a assisté à une poussée
soudaine d'activités au sein du Projet
de recherche sur les politiques (PRP) et
de la collectivité de la recherche sur les
politiques. Les résultats s'accumulent,
et on a tenu de nombreuses activités
afin de les diffuser et d'en examiner
les implications sur les politiques.

Dans ce numéro d'*Horizons*, le lecteur
trouvera une série d'articles offrant un
aperçu des principaux résultats obtenus
à ce jour et des orientations futures de
la recherche. L'article-vedette signé
André Downs, directeur principal de
projet responsable des projets relatifs
aux liens nord-américains, renferme
une synthèse des recherches effectuées
jusqu'à présent et examine leurs impli-
cations éventuelles sur les politiques.
En particulier, M. Downs avance que
pour espérer développer les marchés de
pays tiers, une condition nécessaire est
de tirer le maximum des possibilités
économiques de l'économie nord-
américaine et d'y être compétitif.

On considère souvent le renforcement
de la coopération économique avec
les États-Unis, tout en faisant un usage
plus efficace des ressources réglemen-
taires canadiennes, comme une étape
importante vers un meilleur accès au
marché américain. Fidèle Ndayisenga
se penche sur la recherche empirique
portant sur les liens entre la réglemen-
tation et la performance économique,
et propose une évaluation des gains
potentiels d'une coopération en
matière de réglementation entre le

Canada et les États-Unis. David Griller
examine, quant à lui, les projets poten-
tiels de coopération réglementaire avec
les États-Unis dans le domaine de la
santé humaine, tandis que Doug Blair
présente une synthèse des communica-
tions et des discussions qui ont eu lieu
lors d'une table ronde du PRP et du
CRSHC sur la coopération réglementa-
taire canado-américaine.

Un certain nombre d'économistes
ont proposé la création d'une union
douanière entre le Canada et les États-
Unis dans le cadre de l'évolution vers
l'intégration économique des deux
pays, soutenant que les règles d'origine
actuelles sont contraignantes et con-
stituent un obstacle coûteux aux
échanges commerciaux. Dans l'article
qu'ils consacrent à ce sujet, Bob
Kunimoto et Gary Sawchuk évaluent
l'évidence empirique de la nature
restrictive du système de règles d'ori-
gine de l'ALENA, ainsi que les carac-
téristiques et les gains potentiels
inhérents à la création d'une union
douanière. Madanmohan Ghosh et
Someshwar Rao résument les résultats
d'une analyse d'équilibre général des
gains économiques d'une éventuelle
union douanière, et nous résumons les
principaux points d'une table ronde
PRP-CRSHC sur l'évolution vers une
telle union avec les États-Unis.

Autre sujet qui suscite de plus en plus
d'intérêt : les dimensions régionales
des relations canado-américaines.
Pierre-Paul Proulx se penche sur cer-
tains des principaux éléments détermi-
nants de la recomposition régionale
de l'activité économique. Christian
Boucher compare les tendances qui
ont marqué les valeurs américaines
et canadiennes au cours des deux
dernières décennies, et Jean-François
Abgrall présente une typologie des
liens institutionnels transfrontaliers
à l'échelon infranational. Gerry
Boyчук et Debora VanNijnatten
examinent la convergence politique

HORIZONS

PROJET DE RECHERCHE SUR LES POLITIQUES

Liens nord-américains entre Charybde et Scylla

Tel Ulysse, qui dut naviguer entre Charybde et Scylla lors de son retour de Troie à Ithaque, en matière de politiques publiques, le Canada doit trouver sa voie entre deux périls et chercher l'équilibre entre le risque de se trouver englouti par son colossal voisin, au cas où l'intégration

nord-américaine ne ferait pas l'objet d'une réflexion suffisante, et celui de perdre des avantages économiques s'il renonçait à cette intégration. Les relations canado-américaines ne cessent d'évoluer et exigent une attention constante de la part des

responsables de l'élaboration des politiques canadiennes. Ces dernières années, le milieu des politiques canado-américaines a encore gagné en complexité, ce qui fait de la recherche en politiques un élément encore plus essentiel de la gestion de nos relations. Les projets de recherche sur les liens

LIENS NORD-AMÉRICAINS

- 4 Intégration nord-américaine : Enjeux et solutions
André Downs, PRP
- 9 Les incidences économiques de la convergence entre le Canada et les États-Unis en matière de réglementation
Fidèle Ndayisenga, PRP
- 17 La collaboration en matière de réglementation peut-elle améliorer la sécurité des systèmes de santé?
David Griller, SECOR Conseil
- 23 Vers l'union douanière : une analyse de la situation
Robert (Bob) Kunimoto, Gary Sawchuk, PRP
- 32 Répercussions économiques d'une éventuelle union douanière canado-américaine
Madanmohan Ghosh, Someshwar Rao, Industrie Canada
- 35 Régions économiques en Amérique du Nord
Pierre-Paul Proulx, PRP
- 42 Le Canada, les États-Unis et leurs valeurs : situations distinctes, copies conformes ou fierté nationale reposant sur d'infimes différences?
Christian Boucher, PRP
- 50 Les dynamiques régionales des relations États-provinces : le Canada et les États-Unis
Jean-François Abgrall, PRP
- 55 Intégration économique et convergence transfrontalière des politiques
Gerard W. Boychuk, Université de Waterloo
- 61 L'évolution de la diversité industrielle des villes canadiennes
Debra L. VanNatten, Université Wilfrid Laurier
- 64 De l'influence du commerce international sur le synchronisme des phases du cycle économique en Amérique du Nord
Shenjie Chen, John M. Curtis, Commerce international Canada

APERÇU DE LA RECHERCHE SUR LES POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES

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ISSN 1487-7090
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Customer no 7000274

- 69 L'effet frontière, le rôle de l'État-nation, et les relations économiques canado-américaines
TÉMOINS
- 73 Accroître la coopération internationale en matière de réglementation avec les États-Unis
Conférence nationale canadienne et Forum sur la politique en matière d'eau potable
- 77 DONNÉES ET OUTILS POUR LA RECHERCHE SUR LES POLITIQUES
- 79 Lacune dans les données dans les secteurs des services
Analyse de l'environnement

A1
PR
156



Policy Research
Initiative

Projet de recherche
sur les politiques

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Publications

HORIZONS

P O L I C Y R E S E A R C H I N I T I A T I V E

Poverty and Exclusion

New Perspectives, New Approaches

Poverty rates in Canada have improved significantly over the last few years. Nevertheless, they stand little improved from 20 years ago. Internationally, when it comes to dealing with poverty, Nordic countries, such as Sweden, Norway and Finland, as well as several European countries, including the Netherlands, France and Germany, best Canada. According to the United Nations' Human Poverty Index,¹ Canada ranked 12th among 17 rich countries in 2004 in dealing with poverty issues.

There are many good reasons for developing effective policies to address problems related to poverty and social exclusion. The issue goes to the heart of the kind of society we want and the levels of inequality we are willing to tolerate. More than this, and perhaps less obviously, it is also about generating economic wealth for all Canadians.

Shaping this debate are new conceptual bases for how we think about poverty. No longer is the idea of poverty confined to a narrow conceptualization related

POVERTY AND EXCLUSION

- 4 **Poverty, Thy Name is Hydra**
Jean Lock Kunz and Jeff Frank, Policy Research Initiative
- 9 **Income Inequality and Low Income in Canada**
Garnett Picot, Statistics Canada
John Myles, University of Toronto and Statistics Canada
- 19 **Vulnerability to Persistent Low Income**
Michael Hatfield, Social Development Canada
- 27 **Exclusion from Acceptable Housing: Canadians in Core Housing Need**
John Engeland and Roger Lewis, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
- 34 **Poverty and Exclusion: Normative Approaches to Policy Research**
E. Pearl Eliadis, The J.W. McConnell Family Foundation
- 40 **Precarious Jobs and Social Exclusion: Key Issues and New Policy Directions**
Andrew Jackson, Canadian Labour Congress
- 45 **Poverty and Inner-City Education**
Ben Levin, University of Manitoba

ARTICLES ON OTHER TOPICS

RESEARCH BRIEFS

- 51 Canada's Working Poor
- 58 Elderly Immigrants

REVIEWS

- 66 Relating Homelessness to Education, Employment and Income Support
- 72 The OECD
Jobs Strategy Review
- 75 Social Inclusion as Policy

EYEWITNESS REPORTS

- 78 Adequate and Affordable Housing for All
- 80 The Policy Research Needed to Support the Social Economy
- 82 A Life-Course Approach to Social Policy
- 85 Using Market-Based Instruments for Water Demand Management

DATA AND TOOLS FOR POLICY RESEARCH

- 88 Community Social Data Strategy

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The Policy Research Initiative (PRI) produces *Horizons* as a liaison publication for the federal government policy research community. The primary objective of the PRI is to deepen, collect, and integrate research on crosscutting issues that are highly relevant to the Government of Canada's medium-term policy agenda. *Horizons* highlights the work of policy researchers from across federal departments, and from external experts, on issues that relate closely to PRI horizontal research projects and activities. For more information on the Initiative or to consult previous issues of *Horizons*, please visit <www.policyresearch.gc.ca>.

All web sites referred to in this issue were confirmed as of November 15, 2004.

Any comments or questions? Requests for subscription or change of address?

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INTRODUCTION (CONTINUED)

to point-in-time income. Instead, a more comprehensive definition focuses on the intersection of low income and other dimensions of social exclusion, including access to essential goods and services, adequate and affordable housing, good health and well-being, and participation in social networks. Broader interpretations of poverty incorporate notions of dignity and capabilities to achieve one's potential. Still, others speak in terms of citizen rights to social and economic participation.

Enhancing the position of the least advantaged in society also makes good economic sense. Given that Canadians with low skill levels are most likely to find themselves in situations of poverty, equipping these individuals with the skills that would allow fuller participation could reap great benefits not just for them, but also for society as a whole. For example, recent evidence demonstrates that differences in average skill levels among OECD countries explain significant differences in economic growth.² In particular, increasing literacy rates, especially among adults with the lowest skill levels, has a significant impact on the labour productivity and economic performance of countries. So, the way we deal with poverty and exclusion becomes not only a question of the values reflected in our laws, public policies, and programs, but also how we can increase economic growth and the overall well-being of our citizenry.

We know more today about the economic and social realities associated with poverty. Results from longitudinal surveys provide new insights into the dynamics of poverty, its depth, and its consequences. There is a great deal of heterogeneity, for example, in the

life courses of individuals. And although poverty is often a transient state, certain population groups seem to have a persistently high incidence of low income.

How should social and economic policies adapt to these new perspectives and realities? What emerging approaches show the most promise and warrant the careful attention of policy makers? Answers to these questions will require effective collaboration among federal departments, other orders of government, and key stakeholders. For more than a year now, the PRI has been conducting an inter-departmental project, *New Approaches for Addressing Poverty and Exclusion*. The goal is to assess the potential role of new policy approaches to address poverty emerging worldwide, with an emphasis on possible medium-term implications for Canadian federal policies.

This issue of *Horizons* features several contributions from our departmental partners and from PRI policy research staff involved in this project. The articles range from descriptions of how poverty has evolved and the groups affected to literature reviews and analytical pieces touching on tools and policies.

Responsibility for reducing poverty and exclusion does not rest solely with governments. The non-profit sector plays a significant role as well and, therefore, the issue also includes pieces from academics and non-governmental organizations that share our interest in finding solutions to problems of economic and social exclusion.


The release of this issue coincides with the PRI conference, *Exploring New Approaches to Social Policy*, to be held

in Ottawa on December 13-15. We hope this publication will serve as a useful complement to the presentations and deliberations featured at the conference, and that, together with outputs from the conference, it will contribute to the identification of more effective approaches and policies for addressing issues of poverty and exclusion.

Jean-Pierre Voyer
Executive Director


Notes

- 1 United Nations' Human Development Reports. <<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en>>.
- 2 Coulombe, S., J.F. Tremblay, and S. Marchand. 2004. *Literacy Scores, Human Capital and Growth Across Fourteen OECD Countries*. Statistics Canada, catalogue no. 89-552-XPE, no.11. See also, "Counting Heads: A Breakthrough in Measuring the Knowledge Economy". *The Economist*. August 28, 2004, Vol. 372, Issue 8390: 70.




Poverty and Exclusion: Normative Approaches to Policy Research

The understanding of equality issues that informed our current social policy infrastructure predated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Case law dealing with human, equality, and international rights has evolved significantly in the interim. Moreover, Canada's adherence to several international human rights agreements has not, by and large, been reflected in Canadian law or in domestic policy making. This report examines these normative shifts, and makes a case for the systematic, front-loaded integration of legal norms into horizontal policy development.



Canada-US Regulatory Co-operation: Charting a Path Forward

This interim report presents the PRI's research to date on the potential benefits of expanding regulatory co-operation between Canada and the United States, and the approaches available to Canada. The report presents options for a more strategic and concerted effort to improve regulatory co-operation with the United States in order to secure greater economic benefits, while simultaneously safeguarding and improving the integrity of the regulatory system.



Experts Workshop on the Measurement of Social Capital for Public Policy

This document is a synthesis report from the Expert workshop on measuring social capital for public policy purposes, held on June 8th, 2004. It provides an outline of the presentations and discussions held by the experts. The exercise was to identify essential elements of a "toolbox" for analyzing social capital for purposes of developing and assessing government programs and policies.

Poverty, Thy Name is Hydra

**Jean Lock Kunz and
Jeff Frank**
Policy Research Initiative

Both developed and developing countries around the world have made great progress in reducing poverty and its corollary of human suffering. Over the past decade, new thinking has emerged in terms of research and policy relating to poverty. Among OECD countries, the focus of research on poverty has shifted from describing the poor to understanding the process and consequences of poverty (Øyen, 2003). There has been a great deal of literature devoted to the measurement of poverty, income inequality, income security, and more recently, the dynamics of poverty.

Traditionally, poverty has often been synonymous with a lack of financial resources at one point in time. New research findings have provided insights into the pathways in and out of poverty. Researchers and policy practitioners have come to view poverty not simply as a lack of financial resources, but as the cause and consequence of social exclusion. That is, a lack of money prevents individuals from fully participating in the social and economic activities of the society in which they live. Broader interpretations of poverty incorporate notions of dignity and capabilities to achieve potential.

This new understanding has led to a broader definition of poverty to include aspects other than income. The United Nations, for example, describes poverty as a human condition characterized by the sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security, and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights.¹ Following this definition, the United Nations'

Human and Income Poverty Index (UNHPI) includes a wider range of indicators. In addition to low income measured as the proportion of the population below 50% of median income, the UNHPI includes measures, such as life expectancy, the literacy rate, and long-term unemployment.² Using this approach, poverty can be seen as a hydra, the many-headed serpent that was the object of the second labour of Hercules.

When measured against the UNHPI, Canada does not fare particularly well, especially compared to other developed nations. In 2004, for example, Canada ranked 12 out of 17 on the UN Human Poverty Index for 17 developed nations, ahead of other predominately English-speaking countries, such as the United States, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Australia, but well behind non-English-speaking countries, especially Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands. Picot and Myles report a similar pattern on income inequality in this issue of *Horizons*. Further, as shown by Picot and Myles, income inequality has risen in Canada even in times of economic prosperity.

Poverty Is a Transient State for Most People

With the availability of longitudinal data, researchers are able to identify social factors contributing to the dynamics of income mobility. It has been shown that low income is often not a permanent state (Finnie, 2000). Rather, being poor is a fluid and often temporary process. While individuals may experience low income at some point, many get out of it within a couple of years. Some may re-enter poverty, while others escape from the

Jean Lock Kunz is an Associate Project Director and Jeff Frank is a Project Director, both with Policy Research Initiative.

situation completely. Entry and exit from low income are often associated with events and transitions over one's life course, such as a change in family or employment status, as well as a change in place of residence.

That being said, there remains a small percentage of individuals and families who are particularly vulnerable to being persistently poor. As demonstrated by Hatfield in this issue, five groups in particular are more vulnerable to long-term poverty than the general population: lone-parent families, unattached older individuals, persons with work-limiting disabilities, Aboriginal peoples living off reserves, and recent immigrants. These groups share a number of things in common. Each group carries an identity marker defined by an event occurring over the course of life, ranging from a change of family status or a lack thereof, a change in health status, or a change in place of residence. Individuals experiencing multiple changes are particularly at risk, such as being older, single, and disabled, or being an Aboriginal lone parent, living off the reserve. Conversely, departure from some of these characteristics reduces the risks of long-term poverty.

Poverty Is Multi-Faceted

Low income is one aspect of social exclusion. As Sen argues: "Income may be the most prominent means for a good life without deprivation, but it is not the only influence on the lives we can lead" (2000: 3). Indeed, it is the nexus of poverty and exclusion, to quote Eliadis in this issue, that is of policy interest. As mentioned, the many aspects of poverty bring to mind the hydra, the many-headed serpent that terrorized the countryside of Lerna until being defeated by Hercules.

Low-income individuals and families are often excluded from many aspects of life including access to an adequate level of goods and services, meaningful employment opportunities, affordable housing and well-provisioned neighbourhoods, and civic, social, and political participation.

Low income is one aspect of social exclusion, and low-income individuals and families are often excluded from many aspects of life.

Low-income individuals and families are often deprived of opportunities to develop their capabilities. Lack of financial resources means making choices regarding necessities of life. This may deprive individuals of opportunities to develop their capabilities. Children from lower-income families are less likely to have a computer at home or to participate in extra-curricular activities (Ross and Roberts, 1999). Women with lower incomes are less likely to be able to afford paid child care. Housing and food are the major expenses, especially for low-income families.

Low-income individuals are marginalized in the world of work. Labour market attachment is usually weak among the poor. The persistently poor are likely to be unemployed or working part time (again, see Hatfield's article in this issue). This could be due to a lack of education and employment opportunities. Moreover, for those who are employed, many are trapped in jobs that offer little security and low pay. Individuals in precarious jobs are less likely to receive on-the-job training. Nor can they afford skills-upgrading courses that could help them escape their predicament.

Low-income households are in need of adequate and affordable housing. Adequate housing, to some extent, is defined by a well-provisioned neighbourhood. Poor-quality housing is generally found in low-income neighbourhoods. Individuals usually pay a premium for living in a good neigh-

bourhood, because of the quality of community services, schools, better infrastructure, and a vibrant economy. The poor are less likely to be able to afford quality housing and, consequently, are excluded from access to quality services. Engeland and Lewis show in this issue that households with low attachment to the labour market and low income are more likely to have core housing needs.

Low-income people often lack the social capital, or networks, that are key to getting ahead in life. Networks are critical in enabling individuals to get by and get ahead over the course of life. There are two kinds: bonding networks that help individuals get by, such as close family and friends of the same social and economic background, and more diverse bridging networks that can help individuals get ahead. It has been argued that the poor and socially excluded are strong in bonding networks, but weak in bridging networks (Perri 6, 1997). While strong ties represented by bonding networks are essential, it is the weak ties mostly found in bridging networks that are critical, for example, in finding jobs and advancing in one's career.

Poverty in a Life-Course Perspective

Poverty and exclusion do not occur overnight. These states evolve from circumstances affecting the entire life of an individual (Giddens, 2000). Hence, we need to apply a life course lens to the analysis of poverty and social exclusion. Broadly speaking, the life course consists of four trajectories: family, learning, employment,

Governments have to balance between teaching individuals to fish and providing them with fish when they are unable to provide for themselves.

and community. Events and transitions along each trajectory change an individual's role responsibilities. There will invariably be setbacks and opportunities. Individuals usually have a set of resources at their disposal including personal characteristics, social relations, human and financial resources, and government support. When facing setbacks, such as family breakdown, health problems, or employment disruptions, these individual resources act as buffers (Room, 2000). If these buffers are not strong enough to overcome life's calamities, then, individuals risk being at the margin of society. Through the lens of the life course, we can examine the critical points where exclusion likely occurs.

Equality of Opportunity vs Equality of Outcome

What is the role of governments in effectively addressing poverty and exclusion? To use a much-quoted Eastern proverb: Give a man some fish, you feed him for a day; teach him to fish, you feed him for life.

Governments have to balance between teaching individuals to fish and providing them with fish when they are unable to provide for themselves.

On the one hand, governments can enable individuals to participate fully in the social and economic activities in the society in which they live by empowering them with the capability necessary to take hold of the social and economic situations. This includes

providing opportunities that allow individuals to build up various forms of assets, such as the capability of saving for the future, the capacity to learn, and the ability to own a home.

On the other hand, equality of opportunity does not guarantee equality of outcomes. Individuals may be unemployed due to an economic downturn. Some may not be able to work full time due to health or family reasons. Others may work hard, but still cannot make ends meet. This population can be termed the working poor, and is discussed in articles by Jackson and by Fortin and Fleury in this issue.

Reducing Poverty Requires the Efforts of All

Hercules did not conquer the hydra by himself. One person alone could not defeat the monster: as soon as one head was struck, two others would burst out. Hercules had the assistance of his nephew Iolaus. After his uncle chopped off one of the heads of the hydra, Iolaus ensured that it would not grow back while Hercules tackled

the remaining heads. In a similar spirit of assistance, all sectors of society, governments, community, and the family, in addition to the individual, play a role in reducing poverty and exclusion (Maxwell, 2003).

Governments provide income support and programs to ease life course transitions. Early childhood education and development measures ensure that children have a good start in life. Student loans, scholarships, and long-distance education could improve the affordability and accessibility of post-secondary education. Employment insurance, welfare-to-work and job training programs can help the unemployed to get back on their feet more quickly. Legislation is in place to ensure fair labour market standards and equal access to jobs.

Non-government sectors, such as community organizations, also contribute to the well-being of individuals. Social economy enterprises offer ways to combat poverty and distressed neighbourhoods. The voluntary sector is critical in supporting efforts to reduce poverty and exclusion. This issue of *Horizons* includes two examples of how non-governmental organizations can support and mobilize communities to bring greater inclusion. (See pieces in this issue from the Laidlaw Foundation and the Canadian Council on Social Development.)

Employers, through hiring and corporate practices, are key to the labour market integration of workers. Education and skills clearly improve one's likelihood of finding and maintaining meaningful employment and job security. Getting a foothold in the world of work is not without perils for young people entering the labour market for the first time, as well as for those

The PRI Project: New Approaches for Addressing Poverty and Exclusion

In the spring of 2003, the PRI launched an interdepartmental project called New Approaches for Addressing Poverty and Exclusion (see *Horizons*, volume 6, number 2). Significant progress has been made since then in understanding the dynamics of poverty and its link to other forms of social exclusion.

Early on, the project developed a conceptual framework outlining the intersections between income, poverty, and exclusion. Next, we worked with our departmental partners to identify the aspects of life from which low-income people are often excluded. By autumn, a compendium had been compiled of the most recent research undertaken by participating federal departments and researchers outside of government. Drawing from the research compendium, the project team developed a diagnostic that examined issues of poverty and exclusion using multiple lenses, and reviewed current and emerging approaches worldwide. These activities were discussed at the November 2003 PRI-SSHRC roundtable, Implications for Policy-Making of Current Research on Poverty and Exclusion. At the roundtable, departmental officials and experts recommended that we apply a life-course lens to poverty and exclusion, and that more attention be turned to the working poor who are at risk of exclusion.

In December 2003, the PRI organized a conference on asset-based approaches to addressing poverty. Over 150 experts, researchers, and practitioners in various

sectors from Canada and abroad took part in the event. Through the resulting exchange, participants were able to understand and discuss the merits, as well as the limits, of this emerging approach.

A life-course perspective will inevitably prove useful in how we make various kinds of social investments to address issues of poverty and social exclusion. To this end, the PRI has proposed a life-course framework for social policy analysis that will help to target our efforts more effectively. First presented this past August at the 2004 Queen's International Institute on Social Policy, the framework considers the kinds of resources to which people can turn for various forms of support (i.e., financial, physical, human, and social capital, as well as information), the possible sources of these supports (i.e., markets, governments, arm's-length institutions, communities, families, and social networks), and the potential substitutability of these resources and their sources.

In addition to examining the trajectories of stages and key events over people's life course, the framework also emphasizes the importance of significant and sometimes multiple transitions that represent the critical points where individuals may need to rely on various forms of support. This life-course framework serves as a practical backdrop for much of the work the PRI is conducting in the course of its social policy projects.

starting anew in a foreign country. Employers determine the value of the education and experience of job applicants and workers.

As active players, individuals navigate through the course of life using the social and economic resources at their disposal. The life course is fluid and multi-dimensional, encompassing gender, ethnicity, marital status, health, immigration status, and economic resources. These markers have an impact on the type and

amount of resources one is able to accumulate over each life course trajectory. Dempsey's analysis in this issue of elderly immigrants demonstrates the impact on earnings of migration later in one's life course.

Family, friends, and acquaintances offer support in times of need. Strong family support is critical in ensuring that children grow up in a loving and stimulating environment. Intergenerational support includes both financial and other contributions.

Of course, the market environment also plays a role. Economic tides affect employment prospects, as well as income and wealth accumulation. As workers, consumers, and investors, an individual's fortune is intimately linked to the market in terms of the financial return to human capital, job opportunities, and the amount of income and assets he or she accumulates. During an economic downturn, jobs are more difficult to come by, and the value of one's savings and assets

decreases. Yet, even when the economic tides are rising, not everyone will share the benefits. For example, housing may be more unaffordable for those in low-income jobs, especially in places where the local economy is booming.

Conclusion

We have established that combating poverty is a Herculean effort. Yet, even Hercules could not completely eliminate the hydra, as one of its heads was immortal. In some sense, poverty and exclusion will likely remain a fact for all societies rich or poor. But the faces of poverty and the manifestations of exclusion will continue to change. Innovation and partnership are key to managing the associated social risks and capitalizing on emerging opportunities.

In the context of its project on New Approaches to Poverty and Exclusion (see accompanying text box), the PRI has undertaken conceptual and diagnostic work that has laid the groundwork for the assessment of new approaches to combating issues of poverty and exclusion. The current issue of *Horizons* provides an excellent indication of the directions this body of work is taking.

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Notes

- 1 See <<http://193.194.138.190/development/poverty-02.html>>.
- 2 United Nations' Human Development Reports. See <<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en>>.

PRI-SSHRC Roundtable Series

In order to address effectively the multifaceted problems facing contemporary society, governments are increasingly required to rely on the knowledge and expertise that are found in the work of academia, research institutions, and other authoritative sources. Nonetheless, the integration of available research, analysis, and empirical evidence into the policy development process remains a significant challenge. How do we ensure that knowledge producers are effectively connecting with those who, in their efforts to promote the well-being of Canadians, can make best use of their knowledge?

The PRI-SSHRC Policy Research Roundtables is a joint effort by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council and the Policy Research Initiative. Its objective is to improve the quality of knowledge transfer between experts from academia and those responsible for the design and development of federal policies and programs.

The PRI-SSHRC Policy Research Roundtables series provides a unique venue for informed discussions on key emerging policy priorities and policy research issues. In addition, it will contribute to the development and maintenance of networks between key policy researchers and senior policy personnel.

The autumn 2004 season of the PRI-SSHRC Roundtable series is now complete, and a number of eyewitness reports from the season appear in this issue of *Horizons*. Information regarding upcoming Roundtable activities will be posted on the PRI web site, at <www.policyresearch.gc.ca>, as it becomes available.

Income Inequality and Low Income in Canada

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Trends in low-income levels and income inequality in Canada are two of the more closely watched indicators of economic well-being. In this paper we review recent evidence regarding these trends in Canada.

Family Income Inequality in Comparative Perspective

For cross-national comparative purposes, our selection of countries is based on a well-established body of comparative research. Reflecting long-standing institutional and

political differences, these clusters include the Scandinavian/Nordic nations, represented here by Finland and Sweden, the countries of Continental Europe (Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands) and the predominantly English-speaking countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

Table 1 summarizes recent (1997-2000) results on cross-national differences in income inequality for these eight nations. Measured with the Gini index (the higher the Gini, the greater the inequality), family income inequality

TABLE 1

Measures of Family Income Inequality: An International Comparison^a

	After-Tax/Transfer (Disposable) Income Adult Equivalent Adjusted ^b			
	Gini	Ratio of High to Low Income (P90/P10)	Ratio of Low to Middle Income (P10/P50)	Ratio of High to Middle Income (P90/P50)
United States (2000)	0.37	5.43	0.39	2.10
United Kingdom (1999)	0.35	4.54	0.47	2.14
Canada (1997)	0.29	3.99	0.47	1.86
The Netherlands (1999)	0.25	3.27	0.53	1.75
Germany (2000)	0.25	3.17	0.55	1.73
Belgium (1997)	0.25	3.19	0.53	1.70
Sweden (2000)	0.25	2.95	0.57	1.68
Finland (2000)	0.25	2.90	0.57	1.64

Notes:

- a The Gini coefficient varies between 0 and 1.0: the higher the Gini, the greater the level of inequality. The results in Table 1 are based on family disposable (after-tax and transfer) income, where the unit of analysis is the individual, and each individual is attributed the family "adult-equivalent adjusted" family income.
- b Adult equivalent adjusted income is a per capita measure of income that accounts for the economies of scale associated with larger families. It is computed by dividing family income by the number of "equivalent adults" in the family. A family of four may have two equivalent adults, based on the assumption that four people in one household is the equivalent of two people living on their own.

Source: Smeeding (2003).

TABLE 2

Income Inequality (Gini) From the Late 1970s to the End of the 1990s in Eight Nations

	Late 1970s	Mid-1980s	Mid-1990s	Most Recent
United States	0.30	0.34	0.36	0.37
Canada	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.29
United Kingdom	0.27	0.30	0.34	0.35
Germany	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.25
Netherlands	na	0.26	0.25	0.25
Belgium	na	0.23	0.22	0.25
Finland	na	0.21	0.22	0.25
Sweden	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.25

Source: LIS key figures.

was remarkably similar among the Central European and Nordic nations by the end of the century. Canada's position (Gini = .29) as more egalitarian than the United States (Gini = .37), and the United Kingdom (Gini = .35), but less equal than the countries of Central and Northern Europe, replicates a familiar pattern found in many earlier cross-national comparisons.

Comparing percentile ratios provides a more intuitive understanding of these differences. In the United States, family incomes near the top of the distribution (the 90th percentile) are over five times higher than family incomes near the bottom of the distribution (the 10th percentile). In Canada, the ratio is about four to one, while in Sweden and Finland the ratio is about three to one. Relative to families in the middle of the distribution (at the 50th percentile), low-income persons in the Nordic countries have incomes that are 57% of the median, compared to 47% in Canada and the United Kingdom, and 39% in the United States.

In Table 2, we show how inequality has evolved in these countries since the late 1970s. Perhaps the most remarkable feature is the stability in the relative ranking of countries despite change. Countries with higher levels of family income inequality (including Canada) at the beginning of the period also had higher levels at the end of the period. The Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden) retained their distinctively low levels of inequality through the mid-1990s, at which point they began to move toward Central European levels. Canada's position relative to the United States and the United Kingdom, however, has changed quite dramatically since the 1970s. At the beginning of the period, the difference between Canada and the United States was quite modest, and Canadian inequality was higher than in the United Kingdom. By the end of the period, however, Canadian inequality was well below US and UK levels, a result of relative stability in the Canadian distribution compared to a long-term rise in inequality in both

the United States and the United Kingdom. The relative stability in the Canadian income distribution through the 1980s and early 1990s has been well documented (Beach and Slotsve, 1996; Wolfson and Murphy, 1998; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997) and reflects the fact that, through the 1980s and early 1990s, increases in market-based inequality among families were offset by rising social transfers. As we show in the following section, however, new evidence from recent studies indicates that income inequality in Canada deviated from this long-standing stable trend and increased moderately during the 1990s.

Is Family Income Inequality Rising in Canada?

The data in Table 2 show that income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, changed little between the late 1970s and the late 1990s. These results are based on a survey that was terminated in 1997 in favour of a new survey. However, to assess recent trends one should analyze comparable points in the business cycle, and employ more recent data. To do so, we turn to two sources: the census, and a series that is a combination of the terminated Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and its replacement, the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID). We focus on 1990 and 2000, roughly the last two business cycle peaks.¹

The survey data (SCF plus SLID) registered a 6% increase in the Gini coefficient between 1990 and 2000, based on after-tax and transfer income (i.e., disposable income²), the most appropriate income measure. However, the census does not collect taxes paid

data, so we turn to a slightly different definition of family income: income after government transfers and pre-tax. On that basis, the survey data again suggest a 6% increase in the Gini between 1990 and 2000, and the census data registered a 5% increase. Thus, these two sources indicate a moderate increase in income inequality over the 1990s.

Perhaps a more intuitive interpretation of the increase can be gained using top to bottom ratios. Based on survey (SCF and SLID) data, after taxes and transfer income among families in the top decile (the 10% of families with the highest incomes) was 7.5 times that of the income of families in the bottom decile in 1990. By 2000, this had increased to an estimated 8.7 times greater,³ an increase of 15% in the top to bottom ratio. Census data suggested a similar 14% increase in this ratio (based on pre-tax, after transfer income).


Figure 1 indicates the rise in inequality was primarily the result of faster rising incomes at the top of the income distribution. Census data suggest little change in family incomes among lower-income families between 1990 and 2000, while higher-income families saw increases between 7% and 16%.

Low Income

Measures of income inequality indicate changes in relative distribution of income over the entire population. Low-income statistics, in contrast, provide a more focused view of changes at the bottom end of the income distribution. The low-income rate measures the proportion of people below a low-income cut-off, while the low-income gap is a measure of the

FIGURE 1

Percent Change in Total Family Income by Vingtyle,^a 1990-2000, Census Data



Note:

^a Ordering families by their total family income (after transfer, before taxes), from the bottom vingtyle (the 5% of families with the lowest total family income) to the top.

Source: Statistics Canada, Census.

depth of low income among those who fall below the cut-off.⁴ Analysts concerned with economic exclusion typically focus on both measures, as we will see when we turn to our review of Canada-specific trends. Because of measurement problems, however, the cross-national comparisons in the section below only consider differences in low-income rates.

Low Income in Comparative Perspective

a. Levels and Trends

For cross-national comparisons, we follow conventional practice and measure low income as including all persons in families with incomes less than 50% of the national median (Table 3). Our results are based on Smeeding (2003).

The low-income rate for all persons, using the 50% threshold, varies from 5.4% in Finland to 17.0% in the United States. Higher rates are found in predominately English-speaking nations, countries that also have higher levels of overall inequality. While overall rates in Canada and the United Kingdom (12%) remain well below those of the United States, Canada's relative position varies substantially among sub-groups. At 5%, the low-income rate among Canadian seniors is now among the lowest of the affluent democracies. In contrast, until the late 1990s, low-income rates among Canadian one-parent families (39%), and childless households (12%) were close to or above US levels. As we highlight below, however, these

TABLE 3**Relative Low-Income Rates in Eight Countries**

Nation (year)	Overall	Families with Children		Childless	Elders
		1 Parent	2 Parents		
United States (00)	17.0	41.4	13.1	11.1	28.4
United Kingdom (99)	12.3	31.3	8.9	7.7	24.6
Canada (97)	11.9	38.9	9.5	12.1	5.2
Netherlands (99)	8.9	26.8	7.9	9.5	3.2
Germany (00)	8.2	31.6	2.8	9.0	12.2
Belgium (97)	7.9	12.5	6.6	7.3	13.1
Sweden (00)	6.4	11.3	2.1	9.7	8.2
Finland (00)	5.4	7.3	2.2	7.6	10.1

Source: Smeeding (2003).

TABLE 4**Percent Reduction in Low-Income Rates, Income Before Taxes/Transfers Compared with Income After Transfers and Taxes, All Persons**

	Smeeding (2003) Percent Reduction	Corak et al. Percent Reduction
United States	28	28
United Kingdom	61	53
Canada	52	52
Netherlands	59	na
Germany	71	64
Belgium	75	na
Sweden	78	na
Finland	70	na

historically high levels of low income among Canadian lone-parent families moved down sharply after 1997.

b. The Role of Transfers and Taxes

The extent to which income transfers (and taxes) redistribute income to the benefit of the least advantaged varies significantly among advanced

economies. It is worth noting that countries differ in the extent to which services, such as education or health care, are provided publicly or privately so estimates, such as those presented below (i.e., based on cash benefits alone) do not capture the full range of government redistribution.

The standard approach to measuring the effect of transfers and taxes, as employed here, is to compare the low-income rate on a pre-transfer/tax basis (market income) with the low-income rate after transfers and taxes (disposable income).⁵

Table 4 summarizes the overall impact of taxes and transfers (including those for retirees) on low-income levels from Smeeding (2003) and Corak et al. (2003). Despite differences in data sources, the results are remarkably consistent.⁶ Among the eight countries, the cash tax/transfer system in the United States reduced low income the least. Reductions were somewhat higher in Canada and the United Kingdom than in the United States, but generally less than in the European countries.

Low-Income Rates in Canada**a. Changes in Canadian Low-Income Levels during the 1990s**

In this section, the low-income rate is the proportion of people below Statistics Canada's after-tax and transfer low-income cut-off (LICO). As shown in Figure 2, the low-income rate typically tracks the unemployment rate. Rates tend to rise during recessions and fall again as recovery sets in; however, in the 1994 to 1997 period, the low-income rate in Canada rose despite improving economic conditions. Two papers (Osberg, 2000; Picot et al., 2003) concluded that this deviation was related to the fact that, despite recovery, earnings did not increase to any great extent among poorer families, while social transfers (social assistance, Employment Insurance benefits) fell. By 2001, though,

Figure 2 suggests the low-income rate and the unemployment rate had resumed their historical relationship.

Strikingly, after years of relative stability, low-income rates among lone-parent families fell substantially in the latter part of the 1990s. Statistics Canada calculations show that the low-income rate among lone parents fell 10 percentage points (from 42% to 32%) between 1997 and 2000.⁷


Though still not well understood, this change was at least in part the result of increased earnings. Average market income among female lone-parent families rose 46% between 1996 and 2001, a trend that appears to be primarily the result of higher labour force participation. About 82% of female lone-parent families had earnings in 2001, while in 1993 the corresponding figure was 67%. This increase may reflect changes in child tax benefits (the National Child Benefit), which reduced employment disincentives, and certain “re-investments” of transfers from social assistance to cash and non-cash programs for children. In effect, earnings trends among lone-parent families were a significant and important exception to the patterns reported for all low-income families described earlier.

The low-income gap provides additional information on the well-being of low-income families. Sometimes referred to as the depth of low income, it is the difference between the low-income cut-off and the average income of low-income families expressed as a ratio of the cut-off.

The change in the low-income gap is shown in Figure 3 by indexing the gap to 100 in 1980. Despite falling

FIGURE 2

Low-Income Rate^a and Unemployment Rate (Left Axis), Canada, 1980 to 2002



^a Based on Statistics Canada's after tax/transfer LICO.

Source: Statistics Canada, Census.

FIGURE 3

The Low-Income Gap,^a 1980 to 2001 Index, 1980=100



Note:

a. The gap is measured as $(I-C)/C$


where I = average family income for among families in low-income

C = the dollar value of the low-income cut-off

(Statistics Canada after tax/transfer LICO).

FIGURE 4

Low-Income Rates of Immigrants Relative to Non-Immigrants, by Five-Year Period of Immigration, 1980 to 2000



Source: Picot and Hou (2003).

employment earnings among low-income families during the 1980s, the low-income gap fell as a result of rising transfers (Picot et al., 2003). From 1993 to 1998, in contrast, average real incomes among low-income families fell resulting in a rising low-income gap.⁸ As a result, unlike the trend in the low-income rate, the low-income gap did not return to the levels observed at the end of the 1980s.

b. Low-Income Trends Among Recent Immigrants

Low-income trends among the population as a whole tend to mask an underlying divide that has opened up between the native-born and immigrants to Canada. The decline in earnings among successive groups of immigrants entering Canada through

the 1980s and 1990s has been well documented (Bloom and Gunderson, 1991; Reitz, 2001; Green and Worswick, 2002; Frenette and Morissette, 2003; Aydemir and Skuterud, 2004).

This rising earnings gap between recent immigrants and the native-born is reflected in a growing divide in low-income rates. For most major groups among the native-born, low-income rates have been falling through the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, low-income rates among immigrants (net of business cycle effects) have been rising. Between 1980 and 2000, two years of business-cycle peaks, the low-income rate among recent immigrants rose from 25% to 36%, while falling among the Canadian-born from 17% to 14%.⁹ Even among traditionally

vulnerable groups of the Canadian-born, such as seniors, lone parents, and young families, low-income rates either fell, or remained constant (Picot and Hou, 2003). Among very recent immigrants (in Canada five years or less), the low-income rate was 1.5 times that of the Canadian-born in 1980, rose to 2.7 times the native-born rate in 1995, and declined marginally to 2.5 times the native-born rate in 2000.

Low-Income Dynamics

With the advent of longitudinal household surveys, analysts are now able to establish levels and trends in the low-income rate and gap, and patterns of entry and exit from low income, the duration of low-income spells, and the movement of individuals within the income distribution. Income dynamics analysis is concerned with the fluidity of movement among various income states and the determinants of these flows.

a. Low-Income Dynamics in a Comparative Context

For many, low income is a transient condition. Corak et al.'s analysis of low-income dynamics in Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States shows that between one third and one half of all people who enter low income exit after one year (Table 5).¹⁰ At the other extreme, between 20% and 30% of all people who enter low income find themselves still in that state after five years. Though limited in its comparative scope to only four countries, the results of Corak et al.'s study indicate that national differences in persistent low income are correlated with higher inequality and low-income levels. Of

those entering low income in the United States, 31% were still in the state after five years, compared to 24% in Canada, and 18% in Germany and the United Kingdom. Since the number of people persistently in low income depends on how long they remain in that state and how many enter, a somewhat better indicator of long-term exclusion is the percentage of the total population in low income over an extended period. During the six years analyzed by Corak et al., 5.4% of the population was in low income in all six years in the United States, 4.4% in the United Kingdom, 2.9% in Canada, and only 1.9% in Germany.

b. The Most Vulnerable:

The Concentration of Persistent Low Income in Canada

If persistent low income is highly concentrated among a few groups, then research focusing on the outcomes of these groups will be useful. Entering and exiting low income is not a simple matter of finding or losing jobs. Family formation patterns (divorce, separation, marriage, common-law unions) often play a major role. And regarding employment outcomes, the underlying barriers to improved outcomes may vary tremendously among groups. These barriers and underlying causes of poor employment outcomes are almost certainly very different for, say, recent immigrants, than for single parents or persons with work disabilities.

Based on SLID, Michael Hatfield and his colleagues at Human Resources Development Canada attempted to identify those groups that account for a disproportionate share of persistent

TABLE 5

Low-Income Dynamics Statistics Over a Six-Year Period During the 1990s^a

	Canada %	Germany %	United Kingdom %	United States %
A. Leaving low income after one year	38.4	46.6	41.1	36.4
B. In low income after five years	24.4	17.8	18.1	31.1
C. Of the population in low income at least once	24.1	19.5	29.7	35.1
D. Of the population in low income in all six years	2.9	1.9	4.4	5.4

Note:

a. 1993 to 1998 (1990 to 1996 for the United States).

Source: Corak et al. (2003), based on the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics for Canada, the British Household Panel Survey, the German Socio-Economic Panel, and the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics in the United States.

TABLE 6

Percent of Low-Income Population Accounted for by Five Groups

	Percent of Population 16-64 %	Low-Income in 2000 %	Low Income Measured Over Five-Year Basis (persistent) 1996-2000 %
Members of at least one of the five groups	25.9	56.2	62.1
<i>By group:</i>			
Lone parents	3.7	10.3	13.1
Unattached 45-64	5.5	19.0	16.6
Recent immigrants (10 yrs)	5.5	11.7	16.6
Work – limiting disability	10.7	22.6	26.3
Off-reserve Aboriginal people	3.1	5.1	5.5
Others not in the five groups	74.1	43.8	37.9

Source: Hatfield (2003), based on Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.

TABLE 7**Low-Income Rates Among Five Groups: All and Persistent Low Income**

	% of Group in Low Income	
	2000	Persistent over 1996-2000
Lone parents	30.2	25.6
Unattached 45-64	37.1	33.7
Recent immigrants (10 yrs)	22.8	24.2
Work-limiting disabilities	22.8	23.3
Self-identified Aboriginal people (off-reserve)	17.4	17.2
Others	6.4	4.2

Source: Hatfield (2003), based on Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.

low income (Hatfield, 2003). They found that while accounting for only 26% of the population, 62% of all persons in persistent low income over the 1996-2000 period were in one of five groups (Table 6): lone-parents, unattached persons aged 45 to 64, recent immigrants (in Canada 10 years or less), persons with work-limiting disabilities, and Aboriginal people living off reserves.¹¹ Persons with work-limiting disabilities constituted the single largest group (26%) of those persistently in low income over the period, followed by recent immigrants and unattached individuals aged 45 to 64.

It would be incorrect to think that all persons in these five groups find themselves at the bottom of the income distribution for extended periods. Even among these groups, a minority is exposed to low income on a long-term (or even transient) basis (Table 7). Roughly a quarter to a third of the members of these groups found themselves in persistent low income over a five-year period.¹² Though not in the majority, persistent low income in these populations is

about eight times the average of 4.2% found in the rest of the population.

There is a substantial debate regarding the extent to which the concentration of persistent low income should translate into a strategy of targeting policies. Focusing policies on specific groups could, by definition, exclude many others who may be in exactly the same economic position, but who would not be eligible for program assistance. Furthermore, broad support for redistributive programs may become problematic when eligibility is determined in part by group membership rather than by some measure of need. Using the information on group concentration to determine underlying causes of persistent low income, and developing policy strategies that are then made available to the entire population may be the most fruitful approach.

Summary and Conclusion

The standard conclusion of the research literature on Canadian incomes through the mid-1990s was

that, despite some worrying developments, Canada had largely avoided the sharp rise in income inequality evident in both the United States and the United Kingdom since the mid-1970s. The worrying developments included the declining earnings of younger adults (under 35), particularly males, the corresponding impact of this development on young families, and falling earnings among recent immigrants and less educated males. Changes in earnings combined with changing patterns of labour market participation and family structure produced a rise in inequality in market incomes (earnings) among families. However, through to the mid-1990s, most if not all of this change was offset by rising income transfers.

Recent evidence indicates this trend began changing in the 1990s. The gains associated with the economic expansion of the '90s went mainly to higher-income families while the earnings of poorer families stagnated and social transfers fell. The result was a moderate increase in family income inequality.

At any point in time, persistent low income is concentrated among five groups. When focusing on increases in low-income rates, the focus shifts squarely to recent immigrants. While low-income rates have been falling among most Canadian-born groups, rates have been rising rapidly among recent immigrants. This deterioration in family welfare is related to the declining earnings of recent immigrants during the 1980s and 1990s despite their very high educational qualifications.

In contrast to these bad news stories, there are a few good news stories to report. The dramatic decline in low-income levels among Canadian seniors since the 1970s, a result of the maturation of legislative changes introduced in the 1960s, has been evident and well documented for some time. The recent and substantial decline in low-income rates among lone-parent families is less well understood. The decline appears to be the result of higher rates of labour force participation among lone parents, possibly reflecting changes in the family benefit system aimed at breaking down the work disincentives built into traditional social assistance schemes. Why this shift occurred and its future evolution are topics deserving considerable attention. Other good news stories relate to the rising earnings of women (particularly the highly educated), older workers, and higher-income (and education level) families.

In comparative terms, the mid-Atlantic metaphor – somewhere between the United States and Europe – has often been used to describe Canadian levels of income inequality, low income, and social spending. In the 1970s, the metaphor was somewhat misleading since Canadian levels of low income and inequality left Canada anchored in close proximity to the American shoreline. Indeed prior to the mid-1970s, low-income rates among children and seniors were higher in Canada than in the United States. Since then, the metaphor has become somewhat more accurate, not so much because Canada has moved closer to Europe, but because the United States, now joined by the United Kingdom, has moved further away from Europe.

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Notes

- 1 More precisely the business cycle peaks were 1989 and 2000, but census data are not available for 1989.
- 2 This includes all earnings, investment income, income from government transfers, pension income, income from other sources, and deductions of income taxes paid.
- 3 The actual top to bottom ratio in SLID in 2000 was 9.3. However, the move from the SCF data to SLID data in 1996 resulted in the top to bottom ratio artificially increasing by 0.6. Hence, to make the 2000 ratio comparable to the 1990 ratio, we estimated that the 2000 ratio would have been 8.7 (9.3-0.6) had there been no change in data sources.
- 4 That is, the income difference between the low-income cut-off and the average income among low-income families.
- 5 Such comparisons only measure the direct effects of income transfers however, and possible behavioural (i.e., indirect) responses are not considered. For example, reductions in transfer benefits may be an incentive for people to seek employment, thus raising earnings levels.
- 6 Corak et al. (2003) drew on longitudinal data to study income dynamics, and the Smeeding paper (2003) relied on cross-sectional data from the Luxembourg

Income Study, an organization dedicated to obtaining comparable income data for numerous western industrialized countries.

- 7 To maintain consistency with the low-income concept used in the comparative tables, figures are reported based on the LIM low-income cut-off (i.e., persons in families whose adjusted income is less than 50% of median income). Results based on the more usual LICO-based measures, however, tell an identical story.
- 8 The low-income cut-off used in this analysis is the Statistics Canada after-tax/transfer LICO, but it is held constant (except for adjustments to account for changes in inflation) over this period. Hence, an increasing gap means average real family incomes were falling among low-income families.
- 9 The low-income rate among recent immigrants fell between 1995 and 2000 from 47.0% to 35.8%, but this was primarily associated with the significant improvement in economic conditions that caused the low-income rate for all groups to decline. Abstracting from business cycle effects (rates rise in recessions and fall in recoveries), the low-income rate among recent immigrants has been increasing.
- 10 As in other cross-national comparisons, the low-income cut-off is one half the median income.
- 11 The data were not available to include Aboriginal people living on reserves.
- 12 Excluding self-reported Aboriginal people living off reserves, where the proportion tends to be lower. If the population on reserves were included, this proportion would certainly be higher.

The Face of Low Income In Canada's Metropolitan Areas

Across the nation, businesses, policy makers, and Canadians from all walks of life share a heightened interest in, and awareness of, the state of Canada's metropolitan areas. They are concerned about renewing community life in urban centres. This means, among other things, addressing poverty, providing new opportunities to learn and work for all Canadians, including new immigrants and Aboriginal people, and enhancing the business climate.

Recently, Statistics Canada released the first in a series of reports examining trends and conditions in Canada's largest urban areas. Using census data, *Low Income in Census Metropolitan Areas* examines income and low income in Canada's 27 urban centres between 1980 and 2000. The report observes that, while the low-income rate did not rise in most of Canada's large urban centres between 1980 and 2000, there was a dramatic change in the demographic make-up associated with a low income.

For more information on this topic, please see the Statistics Canada report, *Low Income in Census Metropolitan Areas: 1980 to 2000*, by Andrew Heisz and Logan McLeod. The full report is available on-line at <www.statcan.ca> catalogue number is 89-613-MIE, No. 001. Other reports in this series, covering demographics, immigration, housing, health, labour markets and industrial structure, work location and commuting mode, Aboriginal people, and culture, are now, or soon will be, available.

Vulnerability to Persistent Low Income

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Experiencing low income over several years can mean exclusion from meaningful participation in community life, long-term mental and physical health risks, living in bad housing, and restricted opportunities for the children whose parents must cope with inadequate incomes on a persistent basis.

As many of the findings in this article indicate, exclusion and persistent low income often reinforce one another.¹ Many of the factors associated with persistent low income reflect absent, disrupted, or ineffective social networks, particularly those types of networks that enable access to earnings from stable paid employment.

This article focuses on five large groups among the non-elderly population that were highly vulnerable to persistent low income over the 1996 to 2001 period. It begins by defining persistent low income and introducing the five high-risk groups. It then summarizes the main findings of recent published and unpublished research studies of these groups with the following questions in mind.

- Why are members of the high-risk groups so disproportionately

vulnerable to persistent low income?

- Why do most members of those groups avoid persistent low income while large minorities within each group experience it over several years?²


Persistent Low Income in the Context of Overall Low Income

There are three dimensions of low income: incidence, depth, and duration. The low-income rate is the percentage of a population experiencing low income in a specified period of time (e.g., one year). The depth of low income measures how far below the low-income threshold the income of a low-income household falls. The persistence of low income, the focus of this article, tells us what percentage of the population experiences low income over a period of years.

In 1996, 14.7% of the total population under age 65 was considered to be in low income using Statistics Canada's post-transfer, post-income tax low-income cut-offs. However, using the definition of persistent low income described in endnote one, 8.0% of

FIGURE 1

Percentage of Population 0-59 in 1996 Experiencing Persistent Low Income between 1996 and 2001




* Aged 45-64 between 1996 and 2002.

Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics Main File.

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FIGURE 2

Percentage of Persons Aged 0-64 in Low Income in 1996 – Group Membership Based on Main Income Recipient



Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics Main File.

Persons over age 65 are also not on this list of those most susceptible to persistent low income. The annual low-income rate for the elderly group as a whole in 2002, the latest year for which data are available, was relatively low (6.9%, as opposed to 9.7% for persons aged 18-64 and 10.2% for children under age 18).⁵ Even the worst-off sub-group, elderly unattached persons, had a 1996 low-income rate 13.9 percentage points lower than for unattached persons aged 45-64 (24.0%).

Other groups one might have expected to find on such a list include young people, women, persons who have not graduated from high school, and persons belonging to a visible minority group.

One category of youth – full-time, post-secondary students – experiences disproportionate rates of persistent low income. However, these youths are not considered a high-risk group in this article. Full-time, post-secondary students are not likely to continue to experience long-term low income once they complete their studies. Moreover, there is good reason to believe their incidence of low income while full-time students is inflated by the fact that two of their main sources of income – student loans and gifts from their parents – are not counted as income in the SLID. While youths who have completed their education may have high rates of low income in any given year, the vast majority experience steady growth in their earnings and soon escape from low income.

The other groups either did not experience a disproportionate rate of persistent low income over the 1996 to 2001 period or experienced it, because they also belong to one of the high-risk

the population aged 0-59 in 1996 experienced low income persistently over the years from 1996 to 2001.³

Some groups in the non-elderly population were far more vulnerable to low income both on an annual and on a persistent basis. As shown in Figure 1, the five groups among the non-elderly population most vulnerable to persistent low income between 1996 and 2001 were⁴:

- unattached individuals aged 45-64;
- persons with a work-limiting disability;
- recent immigrants;
- lone parents; and
- Aboriginal people living off reserves.

Persons in at least one of these five groups accounted for 23.8% of the total population aged 0-59 in 1996 but for 67.6% of those experiencing persistent low income over the next six years.

Over this period, members of these groups were 4.6 to 8.6 times more likely to experience long-term low income than the rest of those aged 0-59 in 1996.

As Figure 2 shows, these five groups also had very high annual rates of low income in 1996, but those rates were only 3.7 to 5.4 times those of the rest of the non-elderly population, and they accounted for only 57.6% of the total non-elderly low-income population. Thus, persistent low income was more concentrated among the five groups than annual low income.

A few paragraphs are now in order to explain why the high-risk groups are defined as they are.

Statistics Canada does not estimate low-income cut-offs for reserves, and their Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, the source of income data for this article, does not survey Aboriginal people living on reserves. Thus, it is not possible to make a meaningful estimate of persistent low income for all Aboriginal people or for Aboriginal people living on reserves. Those Aboriginal people living on reserves almost certainly have a higher incidence of persistent low income than self-identified Aboriginal people living off reserves. According to 2001 Census data, Registered Indians living on reserves had median individual incomes 20% lower than those living off reserves.

groups already identified. For example, persons who have not graduated from high school have high rates of persistent low income. But the less well-educated among the non-elderly who do not belong to a high-risk group do not have excessively high rates of persistent low income.⁶

The 30% of visible minority Canadians who were born in Canada do not experience disproportionately high rates of persistent low income. However, those who are recent immigrants (33.7% of all visible minority Canadians in 2001) are much more likely than other recent immigrants to do so.⁷ This article thus considers them as a sub-group of recent immigrants, rather than as visible minorities.

Recent Studies of the High-Risk Groups and Key Findings

While many important studies of members of the high-risk groups have been published and are available to the public, others remain unpublished. One purpose of this article is to bring key findings of both sets of studies to a wider audience.

Two important recently published studies of these groups are by analysts at Statistics Canada: *The Rise in Low-Income Rates Among Immigrants in Canada* by Garnett Picot and Feng Hou (June, 2003), and “Groups at High Risk of Being in Low Income” in *Low Income in Census Metropolitan Areas, 1980-2000* by Andrew Heisz and Logan McLeod (April, 2004). A third study, *Economic Performance of Off-Reserve Aboriginal Canadians: A Study of Groups at Risk of Social Exclusion*, authored by Dominique Fleury of the Social Policy Research Group in Social Development Canada, was published

in 2002 in the Applied Research Branch working paper series.

Challenging Some Myths About the Rise in Low Income Among Recent Immigrants

The Picot-Hou paper uses census data to document a secular rise in low-income rates among recent immigrants between 1980 and 2000 and 1990 and 2000.⁸ All three years were at or near peaks in the business cycle.

Exclusion and persistent low income often reinforce one another. Many of the factors associated with persistent low income reflect absent, disrupted, or ineffective social networks.

It had been commonly believed that this trend resulted from changes in the source countries, official language skills, and suitability for the Canadian labour market of more recent immigrant cohorts. But Picot and Hou found that the increase was only partially explained by such factors. Most of it resulted from a rise in low-income rates among recent immigrants from all age groups, family types, language groups, education levels, and most source regions.

Two possible explanations require further research. The first is that a progressively lower value has been placed on the work experience abroad of highly educated immigrants by Canadian employers. The second is that the large numbers of highly educated Canadian-born women who entered the paid labour market after 1980 may have reduced the employer demand for recent immigrants. Picot and Hou point out that the education levels of recent immigrants rose rapidly in the 1990s, and that they were increasingly likely to enter Canada as

members of the economic immigrant class, the group that traditionally has had the best labour market outcomes.

A sharp decline in low-income rates among almost all recent immigrant sub-groups was registered during the economic recovery between 1995 and 2000, but this only partly offset the sharp rise in low-income rates for all categories of recent immigrants between 1990 and 1995.

Trends Are Diverging for Immigrants and Lone Parents in Large Urban Centres

The Heisz-McLeod paper confirmed that the low-income rate among recent immigrants in Canada's 27 census metropolitan areas (CMAs consist of the largest cities and their suburbs) rose from 23.1% in 1980 to 35.0% in 2000, while it fell for all other residents of these areas from 18.0% to 16.0%.⁹ The low-income rate among persons in lone-parent families living in Canada's large urban centres moved in the opposite direction falling from 54.2% in 1980 to 46.6% in 2000.

Steady Paid Employment the Key Factor for Off-Reserve Aboriginal People in Avoiding Persistent Low Income

The Fleury study examined why Aboriginal people living off reserves, of all the high-risk groups, had the lowest rate of annual and persistent low income. Using data from the first longitudinal panel (1993-1998) of the Survey of Labour and Income

TABLE 1**Factors Associated with Low Income**

High-Risk Group	1998 Low-Income Rate – No Paid Work %	1998 Low-Income Rate – Any Paid Work* %	1998 Low-Income Rate – All Persons 16-64 %
Lone parents	79	22	36
Persons with Work-limiting disabilities	Not Available	Not Available	27
Unattached 45-64	70	12	38
Recent immigrants	49	16	28
Aboriginal people living off reserve	43	13	23
Comparison			
All persons 16-64	Not Available	Not Available	12

* Any paid work means at least one hour of paid work in the year.

Source: Kapsalis and Tourigny, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b.

Dynamics, she investigated four potential explanations for this outcome. Three of these explanations – higher educational levels, higher exit rates from their high-risk group, and membership in only one high-risk group – had to be rejected because Aboriginal people living off reserves did no better or worse than the other high-risk groups in these areas.

However, Fleury found that off-reserve Aboriginal people were more likely than all other high-risk groups to have stable paid employment. This single advantage explained their lower incidence of persistent low income.

The main sources for the following analysis are a series of detailed studies on each of the high-risk groups using regression analysis done by Constantine Kapsalis and Pierre Tourigny under contract to the Income Security and Labour Market Studies group of the Applied Research Branch at Human Resources Development Canada.¹⁰

Avoiding Persistent Low Income

a) Have Steady Attachment to Paid Work

Not surprisingly, as Table 1 illustrates, Kapsalis and Tourigny confirmed Fleury's finding that the most important factor associated with avoiding low income for members of all the high-risk groups was attachment to paid work.

With the exception of lone parents, the low-income rate for persons in the high-risk groups examined by Kapsalis and Tourigny who had any paid work in 1998 was similar to that for all persons. Even among lone parents, the low-income rate for those who had at least 750 hours or more of paid work during the year was only 15%.

Low hourly wages for the primary adult earner in a household are also a significant factor in explaining the low income of many households. Nevertheless, Kapsalis and Tourigny

demonstrated that for the lone-parent group, low or no annual hours of paid work are the predominant explanation for high annual low-income rates. Low hourly wages and low annual hours of paid work are also correlated. Most low-paying jobs are precarious, part-time, temporary, or part-year. Overall, members of the high-risk groups with a steady attachment to paid work were no more likely to experience persistent low income than other Canadians.

This naturally leads to investigation of other factors correlated with persistent low income that might be connected to the lack of steady paid employment among significant minorities of each high-risk group. These are examined later in the article.

b) Exit from the High-Risk Group

Another important way of reducing the odds of experiencing persistent low income is to leave one's high-risk group. As Table 2 illustrates, members of some high-risk groups between 1996 and 2001 were more likely to be able to do this than were others.

c) Draw on a Spouse for Support

Having at least two potential adult earners in a family is clearly an advantage in avoiding persistent low income. By definition, this is not possible for lone parents and the unattached aged 45-64. Having a second potential adult earner is particularly important for persons with work-limiting disabilities. On a cross-sectional basis in 1998, persons with a work-limiting disability had a low-income rate of 8% if they were not the main income recipient in their family and 43% if they were.

Adults aged 16-64 without a work-limiting disability had a low-income rate of 10%. Among Aboriginal people living off reserves, those who were

unattached or lone parents had a predicted probability of being in low income in 1998 of over 60% compared to a probability of 24% for all persons in that group.¹²

Other family status characteristics associated with limited or disrupted family networks were also associated with persistent low income for groups not living with a spouse. Among lone parents, those with a dependent child under age five or who were not a partner in a marriage or a common-law union at the time of the birth of their first child were much more likely (4.4 times and 2.2 times respectively) to experience persistent low income than other lone parents. Among the unattached aged 45-59, those who had been in a union in the past were 28% more likely to experience low income than those who had never married or been in a common-law union.

d) *Belong to Only One High-Risk Group*

As would be expected, persons who belong to more than one high-risk group are extremely vulnerable to annual and persistent low income. Among off-reserve Aboriginal people in 1998, for example, the predicted incidence of low income (holding all other factors constant) was 56% if the person had a work-limiting disability and 60% if a lone mother. For all Aboriginal people living off reserves, the predicted incidence was only 24%. Similarly, among unattached individuals aged 45-59 in 1993, the incidence of persistent low income was 66% for those who also had a work-limiting disability in that year, but only 23% for those who did not.

e) *Graduate from High School*

Within all high-risk groups (except for Aboriginal people living off reserves),

TABLE 2
Percentage of 1996 Population in Same High-Risk Group
All Years 1996-2001

High-Risk Group	
Aboriginal people living off-reserve	100
Unattached 45-64	71.1
Recent immigrants	48.0
Lone parents	41.3
Persons with work-limiting disabilities	20.4 ¹¹

Source: Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics Main File.

not graduating from high school was a very important variable identified by regression analysis as being correlated with persistent low income over the 1993-1998 period.¹³ (This finding is consistent with what we know about the growth in demand for high-skilled workers.)

f) *Live in a Region with a High Employment Rate*

Living in an economic region with a lower than average employment rate was a significant variable associated with persistent low income among lone parents and recent immigrants, but not for the other groups.

Factors Important for Specific High-Risk Groups

Several significant factors associated with persistent and annual low income were unique to individual groups. Being an older unattached person (55 and over as opposed to 45-54) was a significant variable associated with persistent low income within the older unattached group. Being a member of a visible minority (particularly being of Arab origin) among recent immigrants and being a Registered Indian among the Aboriginal population living off

reserves were also significant factors associated with being in low income in 1998 among those groups.

Conclusions

What insights do these findings provide in response to the two key questions posed at the beginning of this article?

The answers appear to be strongly linked to factors that encompass absent, disrupted, or ineffective social networks. Those most vulnerable to persistent low income in Canada are those most likely to belong to a group whose circumstances have sharply reduced their potential for extensive social relationships. Being a member of a high-risk group, in itself, does this. But some persons within each group are more likely than others to have supports through which they can obtain access to stable earnings from the labour market. For example, as previously noted, being married or in a common-law union gives many persons with work-limiting disabilities access to earned income through their spouse. In one way or another and, in many cases, in several ways simultaneously, the members of the five

TABLE 3**Progress of High-Risk Groups**

High-Risk Group	Incidence of Market Low Income ¹⁵ 1996 %	Incidence of Market Low Income 2002 %	Incidence of Post-Income Tax Low Income 1996 %	Incidence of Post-Income Tax Low Income 2002 %
Lone parents	59.6	48.6	45.8	31.4
Unattached	46.1	35.1	37.9	29.0
Recent immigrants	46.7	31.4	34.5	25.0
People with a disability	52.0	36.7	34.2	21.4
Aboriginal people living off reserve	43.6	29.4	31.8	17.0
Non-high risk	12.9	8.6	8.5	5.2

Source: SLID Main File.

high-risk group in persistent low income lack such social support and networks.

The factors statistically correlated with a disproportionate incidence of persistent low income within each group all relate to absent, disrupted, or ineffective social networks.¹⁴ Persons who belong to multiple high-risk groups, persons with a disability who live alone, older unattached individuals who were once in a union, lone parents who had their first child outside a union, those off-reserve Aboriginal people most likely to have grown up on a reserve, and recent immigrants who are members of a visible minority group and from countries with cultures most distinct from that of Canada are the persons within the high-risk groups most likely to experience persistent low income.

This is also the case for off-reserve Aboriginal people and recent immigrants living in depressed local labour

markets. Those within the high-risk groups who do not have such characteristics and have established and maintained family and community networks are much more likely to avoid low income on both an annual and persistent basis.

A Final Note – How Each High-Risk Group Has Been Doing

Persons in households where the main income recipient belongs to a high-risk group have benefited from the strong labour market conditions prevailing in Canada since 1996, experiencing sharp reductions in their annual low-income rates. However, these rates remain well above those for persons aged 0-64 in households where the main income recipient does not belong to one of the five groups.

Among all groups, except for lone parents, the percentage point decline in the low-income rate based on

market income is greater than the decline experienced once transfer payments and the income tax system are taken into account. The impact of the introduction and enrichment of the National Child Benefit Supplement after 1996 is reflected in the larger percentage point decline in post-income tax low income for lone parents over this period (14.4 percentage points) than in market-income-based low income (11.0 percentage points).¹⁶

The percentage point gap in low-income rates between each of the high-risk groups and the non-high-risk group also declined over this period. We would expect to see such a trend during a period of tightening labour markets and strong economic growth. However, it must also be underlined that these groups suffer disproportionately during periods of recession and rising unemployment.

A more important question and, unfortunately, one which data constraints make much more difficult to answer is whether these groups have experienced structural improvement between the two most recent peaks in the business cycle between 1989 and 2000. The picture is most clear, in opposite directions, for lone parents and recent immigrants. The former group's incidence of low income fell from 39.0% to 29.5% over this period while the latter's rose. Changes to the definitions of Aboriginal persons and persons with work-limiting disabilities over the period make it impossible to make valid comparisons for these groups. The incidence of low income among unattached persons under age 65 changed little over the 1989 to 2000 period. This probably also applies to those aged 45-64 within that group.

What has changed is the share of the population living in households where a member of one of these groups is the main income recipient. Of those persons under age 65 in households where the high-risk status of the main income recipient could be established, the share in households where the main income recipient was a member of a high-risk group increased from 25.2% in 1996 to 29.0% in 2002. This indicates that these groups may be increasing in numbers faster than the rest of the population. Over the same period, their share of the low-income population whose high-risk status could be identified rose from 57.6% to 63.3%.

Thus, the members of the high-risk groups and their dependants appear to be at the centre of the struggle against annual and persistent low income from both a demographic and a socio-economic perspective.

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- 4 Persons are considered to be members of a group if the main income recipient in their economic family was a member of a group. In Figure 2, unattached indicates persons 45-59 who lived alone or with non-family members. Disabled indicates persons who, in 1996, had a long-term physical or mental condition that restricted the type and amount of work for pay they were capable of doing. Recent immigrants indicates persons who first came to live in Canada in the 10 years prior to 1996. Lone parents were persons raising at least one child under age 18 in a residence in which no other parent was present. Aboriginal off-reserve indicates Canadians who self-identified as a member of an Aboriginal group (Registered Indians, Inuit, Métis, or non-status Indians) and did not live on a reserve in 1996. Non-high risk designates all other persons aged 0-59 in 1996 who did not live in a household where a member of one of the five groups described above was the main income recipient.
- 5 The lower low-income rate among the elderly as compared to other age groups in part reflects the generosity and effective targeting of Canada's public pension programs.
- 6 Similarly, among lone parents, female lone parents have higher rates of annual and persistent low income than males. But male lone parents are also disproportionately vulnerable to persistent low income.
- 7 At the time of the 2001 Census, 73.4% of recent immigrants (those coming to Canada after 1991) were members of a visible minority group. Only 13.4% of all Canadians were members of a visible minority group.
- 8 In their study, low-income rates are calculated using Statistics Canada's pre-income tax low-income cut-offs or LICOs.
- 9 Over 90% of Canada's recent immigrants reside in a CMA. Heisz and McLeod also use the pre-income tax LICOs.
- 10 These studies were done between November 2002 and May 2004 and were based on cross-sectional data from Statistics Canada's Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) for 1998, and from the 1993-1998 longitudinal panel of that survey.

Notes

- 1 In this article, a person is considered to experience *persistent low income* if the cumulative income of the economic family over the period 1993-1998 or 1996-2001 fell short of the cumulative amount of that family's post-transfer, post-income tax low-income cut-offs for those periods as measured by Statistics Canada.

This definition of persistent low income incorporates dimensions of incidence and depth of low income.

An *economic family* is either an unattached individual living alone or with others to whom he or she is unrelated, or a group of two or more persons who live in the same dwelling and are related to each other by blood, marriage, adoption, or a common-law union.

- 2 In attempting to answer these questions, the article draws heavily on recent and largely unpublished studies on each of these groups prepared by Constantine Kapsalis and Pierre Tourigny for Human Resources Development Canada. Any conclusions drawn from these findings are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the authors of the studies cited or of the Government of Canada.
- 3 Different age groups are cited in different parts of this article. The main group examined is the population under age 65. However, to ensure all persons in this group remained under age 65 throughout the 1993-1998 and 1996-2001 periods, the sample for longitudinal analysis must be those aged 0-59 in the first year of the panel. In some cases, the article cites annual data from other authors who analyze only that part of the 0-64 population aged 16-59 or 16-64.

- 11 Note that only one in five persons aged 16-64 with a work-limiting disability in 1996 remained in that state for every year between 1996 and 2001.
- 12 The sample of Aboriginal people living off-reserve in the SLID was too small to do a proper regression analysis of the factors associated with persistent low income within this group.
- 13 Having less than a high school education is an important determinant of having a work-limiting disability. Kapsalis and Tourigny found that this is not because the onset of the disability reduced opportunities to graduate from high school. Even considering only persons who became disabled at age 30 or later, persons with less than a high school diploma were more than twice as likely to become disabled as the rest of the population. Two plausible explanations are that the percentage of persons with a healthy lifestyle increases with the level of education, and persons who have not graduated from high school are more likely to have to earn their living doing hazardous work.
- 14 Note that low levels of education are not a significant factor correlated with low income for Aboriginal people living off reserves. These individuals speak at least one official language fluently and have lived all their lives in Canada. They have social connections through their families and are not geographically isolated from healthy local labour markets. In at least one of these respects they have more extensive and useful social networks than members of each of the other disadvantaged groups. These factors appear to offset lower levels of educational attainment in finding and maintaining stable paid employment.
- 15 Market low income is calculated based on an economic family's income from earnings and sources of income other than government transfer payments.
- 16 Note that these numbers are based on Statistics Canada's post-income tax LICOs and thus are not comparable to the statistics based on pre-income tax low-income cut-offs cited in the studies by Picot and Hou, and Heisz and McLeod.

Combating Exclusion by Enhancing Financial Capability

Individuals with a good knowledge of economic and financial basics can make more informed decisions – to their benefit and to the benefit of the entire economy. Not only can they manage their personal affairs and their households better, they can be more effective and productive members of society. They can also be better citizens, capable of making reasonable judgments on public policy issues that have a bearing on their personal prospects and those of the nation (David Dodge, Governor of the Bank of Canada, 2003).

Ample evidence suggests that low financial capability (or financial literacy) is widespread. As yet, however, there is no comprehensive public policy framework in Canada for enhancing financial capability – even though there are many reasons for making such a framework a priority. A complete discussion of financial literacy and financial capability, including a review and evaluation of activities to enhance these attributes in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, can be found in the discussion paper, *Financial Capability and Poverty* (2004), prepared for the PRI by Social and Enterprise Development Innovations (SEDI).

The paper is available on the PRI web site at <www.policyresearch.gc.ca>.

Exclusion from Acceptable Housing Canadians in Core Housing Need

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Housing influences many facets of the lives of Canadians. It provides a foundation for obtaining employment, for raising children, and for building relationships with neighbours and the broader community. Dwelling units that are well maintained and suited to the needs of occupants contribute to general health, well-being, and social interaction. Housing that is affordable leaves households with sufficient financial resources to participate fully in the community at large. Households unable to access good housing are potentially at a disadvantage from a variety of perspectives.

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) defines acceptable housing as housing that is adequate in condition, suitable in size, and affordable.

- *Adequate* dwelling units are those reported by their occupants as not requiring major repairs.¹
- *Suitable* dwelling units have enough bedrooms for the size and make-up of resident households, according to National Occupancy Standard requirements.²
- *Affordable* dwelling units cost less than 30% of before-tax household income.³

When households live in housing that is below one or more of the adequacy, suitability, or affordability standards, and have incomes that are too low to allow them to rent alternative local market dwellings that meet acceptable standards for less than 30% of their before-tax income, CMHC considers them to be in core housing need. By definition, these households are excluded from acceptable housing and from the benefits such housing confers.

This article draws on data derived from the 2001 Census to explore the nature of the difficulties faced by Canadians in core housing need.⁴ It links exclusion from acceptable housing to factors, such as low incomes and weak labour force ties. It also identifies groups most at risk of falling into core housing need and describes the characteristics of neighbourhoods in which core housing need is prevalent. The notion of exclusion underlies all these pieces – exclusion from acceptable housing, from neighbourhoods, and more generally from full participation in the economy and society at large.

Core Housing Need, Labour Force Ties, and Income from Government

Unlike everyday purchases of food, clothing, and other basic goods, accessing housing generally requires households to make long-term financial commitments. To enter into such commitments, all households, other than those with assets they can draw down, require a minimum stable monthly income. Households experiencing prolonged or repeated bouts of unemployment can be expected to pay high fractions of what income they do have on shelter.

There is, in fact, a strong association between core housing need and labour force ties. Households with weak ties to the labour force have lower incomes, are more likely to rent, and are much more likely to be in core housing need than other households.⁵ In 2001, 15.8% of households in Canada were in core need. By contrast, 45.6% of working-age renter households whose maintainers had weak ties to the labour force were in core housing need (see Table 1).⁶ These

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TABLE 1**Household Income and Core Housing Need, Canada, 2001¹**

	Owners				Renters			
	Not in Housing Need		In Housing Need		Not in Housing Need		In Housing Need	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
A) Working-age ² households								
All households	5,150,330	92.4	420,760	7.6	2,105,100	72.5	797,380	27.5
Average income	\$84,090		\$22,812		\$50,893		\$16,835	
Average STIR ³	15.9%		48.9%		18.9%		49.0%	
Households with weak labour force ties ⁴	1,178,775	85.8	195,580	14.2	568,225	54.4	476,725	45.6
Average income	\$68,980		\$18,720		\$40,550		\$14,432	
Average STIR ³	15.2%		48.2%		21.2%		51.0%	
B) Senior households								
All households	1,456,830	87.8	201,750	12.2	383,710	57.0	289,755	43.0
Average income	\$50,555		\$18,866		\$35,014		\$16,371	
Average STIR ³	13.2%		39.8%		22.6%		44.7%	
Major source of income								
Gov't income	698,620	79.5	180,630	20.5	233,645	46.4	270,380	53.6
Non-gov't income	758,205	97.3	21,120	2.7	150,075	88.6	19,380	11.4

Notes:

- 1 Data exclude farm, band, and reserve households; households with incomes of zero or less; and households whose shelter costs equal or exceed their incomes.
- 2 Working-age households are those with primary maintainers aged 15 to 64.
- 3 Shelter-cost-to-income ratio = shelter costs/before-tax household income.
- 4 Households with weak labour force ties are those with primary maintainers who are either not in the labour force or in the labour force but unemployed or employed part-time.

Source: CMHC (census-based housing indicators and data).

households spent more than half of their very low incomes on shelter.

Working-age households accounted for seven out of ten households in core housing need in 2001. The remaining three in ten households in core need comprised those maintained by seniors. Senior households whose major source of income is independent from

government are much less likely to fall into housing need than those dependent on government for the bulk of their income. Over half of senior renter households whose major source of income was government lived in housing need in 2001 compared to just 11.4% of those whose incomes were derived primarily from other sources (see Table 1).

Households at High Risk of Exclusion from Acceptable Housing

A number of specific groups of Canadian households are at high risk of falling into core housing need. They include:

- Aboriginal households,⁷ especially renters;

TABLE 2**Core Housing Need by Household Type, Canada, 2001¹**

Household type	All Households #	Households in Core Housing Need			
		Number in Need #	In Need (%)	Average Income (\$)	Average STIR ² (%)
All households	10,805,615	1,709,650	15.8	18,467	47.1
Aboriginal households	297,285	73,850	24.8	17,712	45.5
Owners	148,170	17,510	11.8	21,518	41.6
Renters	149,115	56,335	37.8	16,530	46.7
Non-Aboriginal households	10,508,330	1,635,800	15.6	18,501	47.2
Renters	3,426,835	1,030,800	30.1	16,721	47.9
Seniors living alone	456,335	243,385	53.3	15,319	45.4
Non-seniors living alone	1,003,495	326,785	32.6	13,572	51.0
Lone-parent households	483,200	204,320	42.3	17,819	47.9
Recent immigrant households ³	225,055	75,025	33.3	21,503	51.1
Owners	72,385	16,660	23.0	27,868	54.1
Renters	152,675	58,360	38.2	19,686	50.2

Notes:

- 1 Data exclude farm, band, and reserve households; households with incomes of zero or less; and households whose shelter costs equal or exceed their incomes.
- 2 Shelter-cost-to-income ratio = shelter costs/before-tax household income.
- 3 Recent immigrant households are households whose primary maintainers became landed immigrants during the period from 1996 through May 15, 2001 (the date of the 2001 Census of Canada).

Source: CMHC (census-based housing indicators and data).

- three groups of non-Aboriginal renters (recent immigrant households,⁸ people living alone, and lone-parent households).

Aboriginal households fall into housing need 1.6 times more often than non-Aboriginal households (see Table 2) and, when in housing need, are about 2.5 times more likely than non-Aboriginal households to live in dwellings that are crowded or in need of major repairs. They have lower

incomes than non-Aboriginal households and are 1.4 times more likely to have weak labour force ties. In 2001, almost half of Aboriginal households and consequently almost half of those in need (around 35,000 households) resided in Canada's census metropolitan areas (CMAs). In these centres, the percentage of Aboriginal renters in core need was highest in Regina (45.5%), followed by three other western CMAs: Saskatoon

(44.5%), Vancouver (42.3%), and Winnipeg (40.1%).


Recent immigrants – the first of the three groups of non-Aboriginal renters that experience high rates of housing need – usually attempt to find housing in Canada's biggest cities. Most immigrants settle in large urban centres where there are established immigrant communities and opportunities for employment.⁹ In 2001, over 90% of

Canada's 225,000 recent immigrant households lived in CMAs – more than 70% in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montréal alone. In Toronto, 43.5% of recent immigrant renter households were in housing need. The percentages of recent immigrant renters in need in Vancouver and Montréal were 39.2% and 33.3%, respectively. In Canada as a whole, 38.2% of recent immigrant renters were in housing need. In 2001, these households spent half of their average before-tax incomes of just under \$20,000 on shelter. Although finding affordable housing is clearly the biggest housing challenge for these households, recent immigrants, like Aboriginal people, are much more likely than other groups to be in need, because they live in housing that is crowded or in need of repair.

Like recent immigrant renters, non-Aboriginal renters who live alone are particularly prone to being in housing need. Over half of seniors and about a third of non-seniors who lived alone and rented in 2001 were in core housing need (see Table 2). Over four in ten renting lone-parent households also lived in housing need. Together, these three groups of non-Aboriginal renters in need totalled over three quarters of a million households in 2001. Not only were a great many of these households in housing need, but many spent 50% or more of their before-tax income on shelter. In 2001, for example, 26.5% of lone-parent households maintained by 15 to 24 year olds were in need and spending 50% or more of their average incomes of just under \$12,000 on shelter. Well over half of all working-age renters living alone and in housing need, and of working-age lone-parent renters in housing need, had weak ties to the labour force. Among senior

FIGURE 1

Children, by Household Income Bracket, Showing Those Living in Core Housing Need, Canada, 2001



Source: CMHC (census-based indicators and data).

renters living alone and in housing need, more than 90% relied on government for the major part of their income.

Children in Housing Need

Most Canadian children live in two-parent families, less than one in ten of which are in core housing need. Still, in 2001 this placed 400,000 children of two-parent families in housing need. When four in ten children of lone parents living in housing need are added, the total number of Canadian children in housing need in 2001 swells to over three quarters of a million. With almost one in three living in core housing need, Aboriginal children are, on average, 2.3 times as likely as non-Aboriginal children to live in housing need, a result of the lower incomes of Aboriginal households (see Figure 1).

The households to which children in housing need belonged in 2001 had average before-tax incomes of just under \$22,000, of which they spent 48% on shelter alone. Despite spending almost half of their low incomes on shelter, 25.5% of these households lived in dwellings that were too small, subjecting their children, particularly Aboriginal children, to crowded conditions. Furthermore, 17.4% of these households and their children in need lived in dwellings in need of major repairs, again with Aboriginal children growing up in such dwellings more often than non-Aboriginal children.

There is preliminary evidence that the quality of the housing and of the neighbourhoods in which these children will grow up could play an important role in their development. Research demonstrates a link between

TABLE 3

**Average¹ Characteristics: High-Need² Neighbourhoods and Other Neighbourhoods
All Census Metropolitan Areas, 2001**

Characteristic		All Census Tracts ³	High-Need Census Tracts	Other Census Tracts
Households tested for core housing need ⁴	% of households in core need	16.2	33.2	14.3
	% crowded (below suitability standard)	7.1	14.1	6.4
	% in need of major repair (below adequacy standard)	7.2	10.8	6.8
	Average STIR ⁵	22.0	28.4	21.3
	% of households in core need that rent	57.0	84.4	53.9
All households	% of all households that rent	36.6	71.6	32.7
	Average monthly gross rent (\$)	727	601	741
	Median household income (\$)	53,509	28,570	56,294
	Unemployment rate (%)	6.9	11.7	6.3
	% of income from transfer payments	11.8	20.6	10.8
	% Aboriginal people	1.8	3.9	1.6
	% recent immigrant	4.3	8.4	3.9
	% one-person households	25.4	40.2	23.8
	% lone-parent families	17.1	26.9	16.0
	% of dwellings that are single-detached	50.7	17.9	54.4
	Density - persons/km ²	3,658	6,804	3,306

Notes:

- 1 Averages are simple, unweighted averages computed from summary data for each census tract. As such, averages represent values for a typical census tract in each group of tracts.
- 2 "High-need" refers to the 10% of tracts in each CMA with the highest incidence of core housing need.
- 3 Data exclude tracts for which Statistics Canada suppressed data to preserve confidentiality.
- 4 Households tested for core housing need exclude farm, band, and reserve households; households with incomes of zero or less; and households whose shelter costs equal or exceed their incomes.
- 5 Shelter-cost-to-income ratio = shelter costs/before-tax household income.

Source: CMHC (census-based housing indicators and data) and Statistics Canada (Census of Canada – Community Profiles data (95F0495XC01005)).

behaviour problems in Canadian children and the physical condition of their housing and neighbourhoods.¹⁰ In addition, research has shown that Canadian children living in housing that is both crowded and in need of major repair score lower on various development measures, such as academic performance and general health, than other children (CMHC, nd). Although preliminary, these studies support the contention that exclusion from acceptable housing deprives Canadians of important benefits.

Neighbourhoods and Core Housing Need

The concentration of core housing need among certain groups has parallels at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods where core housing need is prevalent account for a disproportionate share of housing need in Canada's major cities. In such high-need areas, the percentage of households in core housing need is typically more than double that in other neighbourhoods (see Table 3). The majority of these

high-need districts are located in or near the centre of Canada's 27 CMAs, although many CMAs also have pockets of core housing need in suburban areas.¹¹

Neighbourhoods in which the incidence of core housing need is relatively high exhibit distinct physical, economic, and demographic characteristics. The central location of many of them translates into population densities that are, on average, double those of other neighbourhoods. Elevated

densities, in turn, reflect a predominance of multiple-unit rental housing in these areas.

The extent of differences in the physical make-up of high-need and other neighbourhoods is just one indication of how different they are. The residents of these neighbourhoods are disproportionately drawn from demo-

the typical high-need neighbourhood was nearly double that in other neighbourhoods, and the proportion of income derived from transfer payments was twice that of other neighbourhoods.

Of course, such summary statistics cannot possibly capture the multitude of qualities that characterize individual

The central location of many neighbourhoods in which core housing need is high translates into population densities that are, on average, double those of other neighbourhoods.

graphic groups at risk of falling into core housing need. Aboriginal people, recent immigrants, one-person households, and lone-parent families are all far more common in the typical high-need neighbourhood than in other neighbourhoods.

Reflecting the high incidence of core housing need in these areas, housing in high-need neighbourhoods is much more likely to be crowded or in need of major repair than housing in other parts of Canada's CMAs. In 2001, one out of seven dwellings was crowded and one out of nine in need of major repair. In addition to the difficulties posed by unsuitable or inadequate housing, households in these neighbourhoods spent high proportions of their before-tax incomes to procure shelter – 28% on average compared to just 21% in other neighbourhoods.

The high proportion of income spent on shelter reflects the limited incomes of households in these neighbourhoods. In 2001, median household incomes were, on average, only half those of other neighbourhoods. In the same year, the unemployment rate in

neighbourhoods. They do however suggest that high-need neighbourhoods are quite different from other neighbourhoods. As noted previously, research has linked differences in neighbourhood quality to variations in the incidence of behaviour problems in children. Other research has reported a relationship between neighbourhood socio-economic status and health outcomes (Pickett and Pearl, 2001). While this list is hardly comprehensive and some of the research is preliminary, such findings suggest that the benefits that are lost to households when they are excluded from acceptable housing (i.e., when they are in core housing need) are likely not limited solely to the services provided by housing itself but would also include advantages intrinsic to the kinds of neighbourhoods in which high concentrations of acceptable housing tend to be found.

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Notes

- 1 Census respondents rank the condition of their dwelling units with the aid of criteria provided in the census questionnaire.
- 2 The National Occupancy Standard dictates that the maximum number of persons per bedroom should be two, with parents eligible for a bedroom separate from their children; members 18 years of age and older eligible for a separate bedroom unless married or cohabitating as spouses; and dependants aged five or more required to share a bedroom only with siblings of the same sex.
- 3 For renters, shelter costs include rent and any payments for electricity, fuel, water, and other municipal services. For owners, shelter costs include mortgage payments (principal and interest), property taxes, and any condominium fees, along with payments for electricity, fuel, water, and other municipal services.

- 4 Further information on acceptable housing and on core housing need can be obtained from CMHC (2004). The series is available on the CMHC web site <www.cmhc.ca>.
- 5 Households with weak labour force ties are those with primary maintainers who are either out of the labour force, unemployed, or employed part time. The primary maintainer of a household is the first person in the household listed by census respondents as responsible for major household payments (e.g., rent or mortgage).
- 6 Working-age households are those with primary maintainers aged from 15 to 64.
- 7 Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation defines an Aboriginal household as any family household in which at least one spouse, common-law partner, or lone parent self-identified as Aboriginal, or at least 50% of household members self-identified as Aboriginal; or any non-family household in which at least 50% of the household members self-identified as Aboriginal.
- 8 Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation defines recent immigrant households as households whose primary maintainers became landed immigrants during the period from 1996 through May 15, 2001 (the date of the 2001 Census of Canada).
- 9 The Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada found that the presence of family and friends was the most important reason recent immigrants chose to settle in a given census metropolitan area. Job prospects were the second most important reason. See Statistics Canada (2003: 13-15).
- 10 Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (2003). The study assessed the behaviour, and the housing and neighbourhood quality of a sample of children in Victoria and in Québec City.
- 11 In this paper, "high-need" neighbourhoods comprise the 10% of census tracts in each CMA with the highest proportion of households in core housing need. For a more detailed account of the distribution of core housing need within CMAs, see Chapter 6 of Engeland and Lewis (2004).

Housing Research: Policy and Practice in the Context of Poverty and Exclusion

We have begun to consider resources and situations over the life course that contribute to a persistent lack of income or undermine the ability of those living in poverty to participate in the mainstream economy and society. Housing, as a fundamental component of physical capital, plays a unique role within this model of poverty and exclusion. As a place that should offer a sense of physical security, as well as physical and mental stability, housing can provide an individual with the constancy required to establish and nurture key assets and relationships that are vital in avoiding marginalization.

As a result of these special characteristics, housing issues have been identified as being inextricably linked to notions of poverty, both as a determinant and an outcome, requiring specific consideration within the PRI project, *New Approaches for Addressing Poverty and Exclusion*. To explore the dimensions of this relationship, the PRI, in partnership with the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, held a roundtable event to engage experts on the relationships that exist between housing issues, poverty, and exclusion. To capture and disseminate the key points of these discussions, the PRI is preparing a thematic primer based upon the presentations and contributions made during this roundtable. This paper will be available in the near future.

For more information on the work of the PRI on housing issues as they pertain to poverty and exclusion challenges, please contact Jeff Frank, Project Director, at 613 947.3905 or at j.frank@prs-srp.gc.ca.

Poverty and Exclusion

Normative Approaches to Policy Research

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Foundation¹

A contemporary view of policy development posits that legal policy perspectives should function as policy drivers rather than as policy outcomes (Eliadis, 2004). In Canada, this is not generally done, because the norms that underpin horizontal policy initiatives are frequently implicit. Many of these norms were, however, set in a different era and are being overtaken by domestic and international law. That is, the legal policy approach to norms shifts over time, and thus needs to be part of an ongoing process of analysis and front-loading into government policy making at the centre. This article adopts this approach and applies it to policy issues related to poverty and exclusion.

In early 2002, the Quebec government introduced Bill 112, *An act to combat poverty and social exclusion*.² Bill 112 was the result of eight years of social activism following the Bread and Roses protest march of the Quebec Federation of Women in 1995, and it brings together several anti-poverty initiatives in a single integrated legislative framework.

No federal or provincial jurisdiction in Canada has ever targeted poverty directly or comprehensively in legislation. Rather, the traditional approach has been to use distinct initiatives aimed at the component parts of poverty – temporary low income, lack of housing, and job skills – to raise income at a point in time. Bill 112 sparked an inquiry into Canada's approach to poverty and gave rise to the research project that is the source of this article. A joint initiative of the Policy Research Initiative and Justice Canada (Quebec Regional Office), the project investigated the following questions.

- Does it matter that poverty is addressed in a more integrated way?
- Are rights relevant to poverty-oriented policy?
- Is there a policy-relevant link between exclusion and poverty?
- What does legal policy offer to the equation?

The first part of this article addresses these questions through guidance from the courts and international law as a support for policy makers. The second part offers practical suggestions for designing policy from the poverty-exclusion nexus. This includes recommendations for policy makers to integrate legal policy more explicitly in the policy development process, and to ensure policy development in this priority area is responsive to, and informed by, the needs of persons living in poverty.

A Shifting Landscape

Poverty is generally described in terms of its primary feature, namely inadequate income. However, academics and other professionals, both in Canada and abroad, are recasting poverty in terms of capabilities and power as much as income or financial resources.

Bill 112 defines poverty as follows.

2. [Definition]: For the purposes of this Act, "poverty" means the condition of a human being who is deprived of the resources, means, choices and power necessary to acquire and maintain economic self-sufficiency and favour active inclusion in Quebec society.

The United Nations and its agencies approach poverty from a more integrative perspective, expressed in

¹ Pearl Eliadis is Chief Knowledge Officer at The J.W. McConnell Family Foundation. Much of the work underlying this article was done when Ms Eliadis was a Senior Research Director with the Policy Research Initiative.

terms of social features as well as in economic terms.

[A] human condition characterized by the sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, *choices, security and power* necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights (UNOHCR, 2003, emphasis added).

Fundamental changes are occurring to the definition of poverty itself. It is increasingly understood that it is closely bound up with exclusion, and these social aspects are fundamental to understanding both the concept and its real-life impacts on people. A more integrated approach also subsumes many other indicators – illiteracy, increased ill health, gender inequality, environmental degradation, and racialized impacts – all of which can be aspects of being poor.

Benchmarking Canada's Policy

How does Canada's policy framework on poverty and exclusion fare when assessed against the evolving conceptual basis of poverty discussed in the preceding section?

The first observation is that there is no federal-level, comprehensive policy framework to address poverty and exclusion. Instead, the goals are typically seen as raising people above a low-income cut-off line to address needs at times when people are without sufficient earnings. In terms of actual results, these policies and programs, operating through various levels of government, have been largely successful, and form a strong social safety net. That said, there are concerns for the future.

When the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST)³ was introduced in 1996, the federal government's contributions decreased and were substantially lower than they would have been under the previous system. These reductions were passed on to the provinces and then to citizens

Poverty is closely bound up with exclusion, and its social aspects are fundamental to understanding both the concept of poverty and its real-life impacts on people.

through tighter eligibility criteria and a range of programs, such as work-for-welfare schemes.⁴ Canada does not fare as well as many OECD countries, and the economic well-being of certain vulnerable groups, such as recent immigrants, has slipped (CCSD, 2004). Recent community-level studies show that low-income, working-age adults are falling behind in income security and net wealth, and many cannot find stable employment or accumulate enough assets to stay off welfare. In addition, many Canadians – in the general public and among those in receipt of social assistance – are dissatisfied with the income security system (St. Christopher House, 2004).

How poverty is perceived and sustains itself is viewed as a function of social phenomena, such as a lack of power and choice, and the vicious circle between lack of income and other complex social indicators. One of these is exclusion.

Exclusion from What? The Equality Rights Test

There is no explicit right of freedom from poverty in Canada. But when one looks at poverty from a broader definition, there is a group of

associated rights that, when combined with a test of membership and exclusion from Canadian society, can make some claims justiciable before the courts on the basis of protected rights. Persons receiving social assistance, for instance – a large group of persons living in poverty in Canada –

are now entitled to section 15 Charter equality rights (regardless of province of residence).⁵

In the course of research for this paper, decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and courts of appeal that dealt with equality rights were examined to assess whether judicial consideration was given to the relationship between exclusion and equality. On analysis, 10 of these cases made explicit reference to exclusion as a marker of equality rights, and half of those occurred within the context of social assistance or social security programs. (See the accompanying textbox.)

The role exclusion plays in equality rights thus appears reasonably well established in Canadian case law under section 15 of the Charter. The link to poverty is only one step removed. A Canadian example of how the nexus between poverty and exclusion played out in an equality rights case under the Charter is illuminating. The Alberta Court of Appeal struck down a social assistance scheme for poor, widowed, older women in *Gwinner v. Alberta (Human Resources and Employment)*. The Court held that the scheme failed to consider the assets

of beneficiaries when assessing their need for the program. The program was alleged to be both over-inclusive, in that it benefited women who were asset rich, and under-inclusive, because it excluded women who are similarly situated, that is, who are older and have lost the financial support of a former spouse. The scheme was struck down, because it was considered by the Court to infringe constitutional equality rights under section 15 of the Charter.

While policy makers do not have to demonstrate a precise fit between a program and the targeted group, policy design does have to be rational and evidence-based. Distinctions must not violate human dignity. In a case called *Falkiner*, Ontario courts struck down a “spouse in the house” regulation that focused on income as the marker of poverty. Policy makers believed that the real income of welfare recipients was kept artificially low if there was cohabitation with another person, not technically a spouse, and thus whose income was not taken into account. In these circumstances, the other person was deemed to be a spouse. This assumption may or may not have been accurate, but by failing to consider the impact of the regulation on the capabilities and life choices of persons on social assistance (especially single women, according to the evidence in the case), the government had effectively diminished their capacity to enter into stable relationships, thus creating a form of exclusion that existed for no one else in society. (*Falkiner* has been appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.)

Designing Policy from the Poverty–Exclusion Nexus

The focus of this article is the intersection of the concepts of poverty and exclusion, and the implications for policy makers of that intersection. While income-based measures remain important, they should be placed in an overall context or framework based on a broader, context-sensitive definition of poverty. The first specific strategy is against poverty.

The courts have rendered several decisions that have substantively changed our understanding of equality and its relationship to exclusion and the rights of persons in vulnerable or at-risk groups.

A National Strategy Against Poverty

There is no comprehensive policy framework to address poverty and exclusion at the federal level. This is particularly challenging in Canada, because of the federal structure. As a result of the jurisdictional complexity of poverty issues across federal and provincial lines, a comprehensive strategy against poverty is more likely to succeed if located within the framework of co-operative federalism and section 36 of the *Constitution Act*.⁶ The federal-provincial Social Union Framework Agreement provides a good model, despite the perception that it may not have lived up to its potential in the past (especially in light of the recent creation of the Canada Social Transfer).

In developing a national strategy, policy makers need to consider the broader impacts of interventions on the life choices and circumstances of poor people, as well as the possibility that policy measures (especially those

that remove or restrict benefits) may create unfair exclusions, as occurred in the *Falkiner* case. Policy-relevant research on poverty targeted to vulnerable groups experiencing exclusion therefore should also be sensitive to the interactions of interventions (stacking), and to wider indicators of actual resources (protecting asset accumulation). More proactive measures would include ensuring better financial tools appropriate to low-income

persons and looking at access to certain health benefits (e.g., drug and dental) for persons who are working poor (St. Christopher House, 2004).

Integration of Legal Norms

As noted above, the legal policy framework changes over time. As well, the concepts of exclusion and poverty are being understood in tandem, and together are being seen to invoke equality rights. These developments are critical for horizontal policy making, but have not been generally or explicitly accepted or integrated in federal policy-making circles. This is the case even though aspects of the capabilities framework may be implicit in certain sectors of policy research in law-based departments such as Justice Canada.

Consideration of an updated normative framework, particularly one that incorporates the legal policy side of the equation, should be integrated very early in the process, ensuring that appropriate, policy-relevant research

Overview of Relevant Case Law

In *Corbière v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs)*, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the exclusion of off-reserve Aboriginal band members from band governance.

In *Egan v. Canada*, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the exclusion of persons from old age social security legislation because of sexual orientation.

In *Falkiner v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services, Income Maintenance Branch)* (2000), 49 O.R. (3d) 564 (C.A.). [Leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2000] S.C.C.A. 297], the Ontario Court of Appeal considered the constitutionality of a social assistance regulation that limited access to benefits when a person cohabited with another person of the opposite sex.

In *Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, the court considered the exclusion from supplementary payments under a welfare scheme on the basis of age.

In *Gwinner v. Alberta (Human Resources and Employment)* [2002] AJ 1045, the Alberta Court of Appeal considered the exclusion of divorced and separated women from a social assistance scheme designed for older widows.

In *Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, 2000 SCC 28, the court stated that "exclusion and marginalization (of persons with disabilities) are generally not created by the individual with disabilities but are created by the

economic and social environment and, unfortunately, by the state itself."

In *Halpern v. Canada* (2003), 225 D.L.R. (4th) 529 (Ont. C.A.), the Court held that because same-sex couples are excluded from the institution of marriage, this exclusion perpetuates the view that same-sex relationships are less worthy of recognition than opposite-sex relationships.

In *Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)*, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the exclusion of a younger person from the Canada Pension Plan.

M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, dealt with the exclusion of gays and lesbians from the operation of family law legislation.

In *Polewsky v. Home Hardware Stores Limited* (2003), 60 O.R. (3rd) 600 (Div. Court), the court considered the legality of the fee to file a claim in Small Claims court where the applicant was poor.

In *Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v. M.N.R.*, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 10, the Court examined whether the denial of charitable status to a community-based organization constituted "exclusion from membership and participation in Canadian society."

In *Vriend v. Alberta*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, the Court considered the exclusion of gays and lesbians from provincial human rights law protections in Alberta.

is informed by legal developments. It should be emphasized that this consideration would not necessarily be in the form of a legal opinion requested of a departmental legal services branch. Nor would it replace the legal assessment of Charter compliance that occurs at the back end of the policy process. Rather, it would be a front-end integration of legal policy considerations.

Charter and Human Rights Norms

Front-loading legal norms is not as wide ranging or onerous an endeavour as might appear at first glance. The number of grounds in the Charter and in human rights laws is finite (at least at any given point in time), and the known or likely consequences of a policy can be taken into consideration as a function of policy objectives.

At the domestic level, the courts have rendered several decisions that have substantively changed our understanding of equality and its relationship to exclusion and the rights of persons in vulnerable or at-risk groups. When people are excluded from government programs in a manner that constitutes exclusion from membership and participation in Canadian society, courts are willing to wade into social policy

areas to redress the balance using equality rights. The research link between who is identified as vulnerable and which groups are considered to be discrete and insular minorities for the purposes of section 15 of the Charter are thus closely connected, and this includes groups of persons living in poverty.⁷

International Law and Domestic Law: Bridging the Gap

As part of a national strategy to address poverty, Canadian policy makers need to deal with the integra-

negotiated rule making), policy makers are simply encouraged to consider the effects of international obligations (Canada, PCO, 2001). Given the burgeoning number of new instruments, and the active encouragement by the PCO and other central agencies to use law making as an instrument of last resort, a change to these guidelines is especially appropriate.

Conclusion

The conceptual and normative foundations of poverty and exclusion have shifted considerably over the past

the world with respect to addressing poverty, none of these arguments is especially persuasive.

First, parallel research in this PRI project shows that the changing fabric of our society requires new approaches to address new problems and new aspects of traditional problems. A related legal development is the trend to viewing poverty in relation to exclusion, in particular using a judicial test of exclusion from membership and participation in Canadian society, which has evolved as a litmus test for determining whether government policies violate equality rights. The exclusion test ensures that government policies respect the rule of law, are consistent with the values expressed in the Charter, and reflect the values contained in international instruments Canada has ratified. Much of the case law on this point has been rendered over the past decade.

Second, the courts should be a venue of last resort. Compliance with the rule of law and sensitivity to emerging norms is as much the business of the policy maker as it is of the judiciary. The issue of accountability for compliance with international norms is, in particular, a matter of concern. If international instruments are not intended for Canada then, of course, Canada should not sign them. As a matter of principle, the courts have repeatedly stated that adherence to international instruments signals Canada's intent to comply. As a matter of practice, adherence to standards that Canada has promoted and adopted should be a basic feature of the development of policy across legislative and non-legislative instruments.

The exclusion test ensures that government policies respect the rule of law, are consistent with the values expressed in the Charter, and reflect the values contained in international instruments Canada has ratified.

tion of international human rights standards and domestic law and policy. A proposed approach uses an international law filter. When policy proposals are being researched in their early stages, researchers would, as a matter of course, review applicable international treaties and covenants to which Canada is a party, assessing the compliance of the proposal with international law. This process would apply to policy proposals being implemented through legislative instruments (as is now the case) and to other kinds of policy instruments.

In its guidelines to the federal public service, the Privy Council Office directs policy makers to ensure conformity with international obligations in the law-making process, but as regards other instruments (e.g., policies, guidelines, partnerships, and

two decades. These changes have not been fully integrated into social policy development across the federal government's policy research agendas.

It may be difficult to see the need for reorientation of policy approaches in Canada because, for the most part, current approaches seem to work well in terms of broad averages. In comparison to other countries whose poverty levels are much worse, there seems to be little cause for concern. If a law or policy violates a person's rights or freedoms, there are legal recourses. Further, international instruments that address human rights and freedoms may be perceived by some to be directed at developing countries where the poverty situation is much worse. While Canada undoubtedly remains one of the best countries in

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Notes

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2 *An Act to combat poverty and social exclusion*. R.S.Q. c. 61.

3 Now divided into the Canada Health Transfer and the Canada Social Transfer.

4 See the discussion in SRDC (2002 at ES-5).

5 Section 15(1) of the Charter came into force in 1985 and provides:

15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

6 36. (1) Without altering the legislative authority of Parliament or of the provincial legislatures, or the rights of any of them with respect to the exercise of their legislative authority, Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to

- a promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
- b furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and
- c providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians.

(2) Parliament and the government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.

7 Recent case law suggests that the principal bar to a finding of poverty as an analogous ground under section 15 of the Charter may be more the result of the fact that no one has brought a convincing factual and historical record to court, as opposed to an inherent prohibition against poverty as ground for equality rights (see the recent decision from Ontario in the *Polewsky* decision).

Precarious Jobs and Social Exclusion

Key Issues and New Policy Directions

Andrew Jackson
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Social exclusion is often thought of primarily as an issue of low income, and there is no doubt that precarious jobs – low-wage jobs that carry a high risk of termination – are a major cause of low family incomes and poverty. However, good jobs are also important to social inclusion in the wider sense of contributing to an individual's ability to develop her or his talents and capacities, to participate actively in society and to enjoy a broad equality of life chances with fellow citizens. Precarious work is a key challenge for Canadian policy makers, because it condemns a significant proportion of citizens to lifelong exclusion from progressive job ladders and opportunities for skills development, and because these risks are concentrated among defined groups who face multiple sources of disadvantage, such as recent immigrants and lone parents. Precarious work is also highly gendered and undermines the goal of labour market equality between women and men (Vosko et al., 2003).

This article argues that precarious jobs are a key cause of social exclusion, and flags some policy directions based on European experience that may improve job quality at the bottom of the labour market. The first part of the article describes some of the major characteristics of precarious work in Canada today and the links to social exclusion. The second part outlines broad lessons that Canadians might draw from the social democratic labour market model found in some smaller European countries. These countries have achieved high rates of employment with low levels of precarious work. The final part offers concluding comments.

Precarious Work in Canada

By some measures, Canada did well on the job front over the whole cycle of recession and recovery from 1989 to today. The proportion of the adult population with jobs reached an all-time high in 2003, and was one of the highest in the world. Talk of a knowledge-based new economy is overblown, but there is indeed an ongoing shift toward jobs requiring higher levels of education and skills. These types of jobs, in turn, usually provide higher pay and greater job satisfaction, and have promoted more equal opportunities for women. However, the overall job picture is marred by serious flaws. Most notably, Canada has a high and rising incidence of precarious jobs, and such low-paying, unstable jobs have contributed to a significant increase in inequality that threatens social inclusion.

Over the past decade, real hourly wages and median annual earnings have been remarkably stagnant, especially for men. Gains in earnings at the middle and lower end of the income distribution have been meagre, and earnings inequality has increased significantly over the economic cycle. Statistics Canada data (2003) show that the top 20% of families, with average market incomes of \$145,580 in 2001, took 45.6% of all market income in that year, up from 42.4% in 1989. This reflects increased polarization of individual earnings. As Saez and Veall (2003) reported, the earnings of the very top 1% have grown fastest. Their share of all individual income as reported on tax returns rose from 9.3% to 13.6% between 1990 and 2000. Overall, the gains that have been made since the

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early 1990s are largely confined to the upper echelons of the income ladder, a group that already enjoyed a disproportionate share of earnings.

Rising market income inequality among families is partly driven by changes in the way people form families, but the main reason is increased inequality in the job market. Families down the income scale are more likely to be made up of people in lower-paid

service, and labouring occupations, even for full-time workers, while the high incidence of low pay in part-time and female-dominated private service jobs helps explain why women are at greater risk.

Data regarding precarious jobs are also of concern. Precarious jobs generally have a low hourly pay and a high risk of termination. Spells of unemployment in Canada average about four

Precarious jobs provide very limited, if any, access to progressive career ladders and workplace training.

jobs, and are also more likely to be hit by unemployment at some time in a year. Recent studies show a significant widening of longer-term earnings differentials and life chances for Canadians in the 1990s (Beach et al., 2003). Certainly, a significant minority of workers have very unstable and low paid jobs, and many remain trapped in these jobs for long periods of time (Finnie, 2000; Janz, 2004). Large inequalities in the job market continue to exist between women and men, and have grown sharply between recent immigrants and other Canadians.

Looking more closely at these developments, data from the Labour Force Survey show that about one in four Canadian workers – one in five men and one in three women – are low paid, defined as earning less than two thirds of the national median hourly wage, or less than about \$11 per hour in today's dollars. Of particular concern, about one in ten core working-age men age 25 to 54 and one in five core working-age women are low paid. Low-paid jobs are common in sales,

months and, in recent years, about one in eight workers has been unemployed at least once in the year. That risk is highly concentrated among persons with lower levels of education who normally earn lower than average wages when they are employed.

Precarious jobs also provide very limited, if any, access to progressive career ladders and workplace training. Dead-end jobs held by many women, recent immigrants, Aboriginal people, and persons with disabilities do not help people develop the skills and capacities they need to access better jobs, embark on lifetime career ladders, and better handle labour market risks, such as permanent layoffs due to economic change.

A precarious job does not necessarily mean poverty and exclusion. Some adult precarious workers are cushioned from poverty by the earnings of a spouse, and poverty is often the result of family breakdown and labour market exclusion rather than low earnings. However, precarious work is a significant and growing cause of Canadian

poverty today. Working-poor lone parents and families cycle in and out of poverty depending on how many weeks of work they get in a year and at what wage. A single person in a large urban centre has to work more or less full time in a full-year job and earn about \$10 per hour to escape poverty (i.e., be above the pre-tax, low-income cut-off line.) The threshold is obviously higher if a single earner has to support a child or a non-working spouse. A two-adult family with children has to put in about 75 weeks of work a year at \$10 per hour to get above the poverty line. Minimum wages are far too low in all provinces to put working poor families, even those with full-time, full-year jobs, above the poverty line, and even \$10 per hour, full-time, full-year jobs supplemented by government income supports leave most families in larger cities at risk (NCW, 2004).

Social programs and progressive income taxes can and do significantly lessen earnings-driven differences of family incomes. However, the redistributive role of taxes and transfers among the working-age population has been eroded by cuts to Employment Insurance and social assistance entitlements. Additionally, it will be very difficult to prevent increased income inequality and promote a more inclusive society if earnings inequality continues to increase.

From the perspective of social inclusion, it is disturbing that incomes in Canada after taxes and transfers became markedly more unequal between 1989 and 2001 after remaining stable over previous economic cycles. There can be no genuine equality of opportunity if there are very

large differences in family economic circumstances. Key outcomes, such as health, are closely linked to relative and not just absolute income. In relatively equal countries like Sweden, differences in life expectancy, health, literacy, education, and other key indicators of well-being between different sections of the population are much narrower than those in Canada, and gaps in Canada have hitherto been narrower than in the United States (Jackson, 2000). For all the talk of the United States as the land of opportunity, life chances, as measured by the chances of a child from a lower-income family climbing the income ladder, are lower than in Canada, and are highest in the more egalitarian Scandinavian countries (Fortin and Lefebvre, 1998). It is to those countries that we should pay greater attention.

Limiting Precarious Work: Learning from Social Democratic Models in Europe

As Smeeding (2002) noted, high-equality countries, such as Sweden, tend to be that way, because of generous social programs and because the primary distribution of income by the job market is fairly equal. There are limits in the extent to which social transfers can compensate for labour market-driven inequality, and changes to how the job market itself works must be part of the policy response to social exclusion.

The experience of Scandinavian social democracy in the 1990s suggests a combination of high employment, relatively equal wages, and real opportunities for workers in traditionally low-wage, dead-end jobs is possible. The International Labour Organization and the European Commission both recently highlighted the experience

of Denmark as suggestive of a labour market model which promotes high levels of socially inclusive employment, undermining the dismal view of many orthodox economists that there is an inevitable trade-off between job creation and higher quality jobs (Auer, 2000; ILO, 2003; EC, 2002).

Canadian policy makers should view higher minimum wages and policies to support the extension of collective bargaining to low-wage, private service workers in a much more positive light than is generally the case.

Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands all had good records of job creation and economic growth in the 1990s, with a very low incidence of low-wage work compared to North America. This suggests a different model is possible, even if it is not necessarily easy to create.

The relative success of these countries in creating higher-quality jobs and high levels of employment has been accomplished by:

- regulating the labour market to create a wage floor and a low level of wage inequality;
- keeping the non-wage costs of employment low by providing social and economic security primarily through public programs financed from general taxation;
- providing significant investment in active labour market policies to upgrade the skills of those at greatest risk of engaging in precarious employment; and
- building a distinct kind of post-industrial service economy, based on a large non-market sector and high productivity private services.

The results of this approach differ markedly from those in North America. In the mid-1990s, about one in four full-time workers in Canada (23.7%) as well as in the United States were low paid – defined as earning less than two thirds of the median national full-time wage – compared

to just one in twenty workers (5.2%) in Sweden, and only one in eight in Germany (OECD, 1996). The distribution of wages in many European countries is more compressed than in North America, mainly because the wages of even private-sector service workers in smaller firms are set by collective bargaining or by the extension of union wage agreements to all workers in a sector. Advanced industrial countries differ little in terms of the big structural forces shaping job markets, such as international competition and technological change, but labour market institutions still significantly shape outcomes for workers (OECD, 1996, 1997; Aidt and Tzannatos, 2003; Freeman and Katz, 1995).

At the micro-economic level, both individual workers and firms benefit. The conventional view is that imposing decent wages for lower-skilled workers destroys jobs but, in fact, higher wages can work in a positive way by raising productivity and job quality. The fact that employers are under pressure to pay good wages will lead them to invest more in capital equipment and in training than would otherwise be the case. Wage floors can

lower worker turnover and increase experience and skills, reducing employer costs. A common wage standard can also take wage costs out of the competitive equation. If all employers pay the same wage and benefit package, firms must compete with one another on the basis of non-labour cost issues, such as quality and customer service, which require more skilled workers.

For all of these reasons, Canadian policy makers should view higher minimum wages in Canada and policies to support the extension of collective bargaining to low-wage, private service workers (with current unionization rates of well under 10%) in a much more positive light than is generally the case.

Social democratic countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, have boosted job creation in ways that do not depend on low wages. Employers are expected to provide decent wages, working conditions and training but, unlike many high unemployment European countries such as Germany, they are not expected to fund social programs and benefits in a major way. Unlike Canada, pensions and extended health benefits are provided mainly through government programs. Paying for social programs and pensions from general taxes rather than from payroll taxes or from firm-level welfare plans keeps total labour costs under control. This approach also narrows differences between core workers with good benefits and precarious workers with no benefits. The lesson for Canada is to build gradually on medicare by extending the reach of public health plans and of public pensions.

The Scandinavian countries have long emphasized employment security

rather than job security, now termed “flexicurity.” This means firms can hire and lay off workers fairly easily, but governments have the responsibility to promote full employment. Additionally, governments with employers and unions have the joint responsibility to promote training and run meaningful and effective labour market policies. This means non-standard forms of employment are accepted, so long as wages and opportunities for training are non-discriminatory (as specified in the European Union directive on part-time work).

To support this approach, the Scandinavian countries invest heavily in public education, and in workplace training and active labour market policies to promote labour adjustment and lifelong learning. Remarkably, the Danish government spends five times more than Canadian governments on public training programs, even though the unemployment rate in the two countries is similar (Madsen, 2003). Training for the unemployed and workers in precarious employment helps equalize access to job opportunities and creates a base for higher-quality jobs. Training can be a real force for better jobs in normally low-wage private services by enabling employers to pursue business strategies requiring higher skills and lower-skilled workers to climb job ladders.

There has been scepticism in Canada about the effectiveness of skills training for vulnerable workers, but research increasingly shows that turning the rhetoric of lifelong learning into real opportunities for lower-paid workers yields major benefits in terms of job quality (ILO, 2003; Madsen, 2003; OECD, 2004). Applebaum et al. (2003) supported these positions through detailed case studies of jobs in traditionally low-wage sectors being

significantly improved through a combination of higher skills and employer strategies that take advantage of those skills. With these findings in mind, governments in Canada should re-evaluate their positions regarding the potential benefits of training for vulnerable workers.

Finally, differences among advanced industrial countries regarding the structure of post-industrial employment are informative. These differences largely depend on the extent to which child and elder care and other community services have been assumed by the market or by the state. When the option of state and not-for-profit service delivery is chosen over delivery by market actors, the result is often the creation of more skilled and well-paid jobs, particularly for women. The associated choice of higher taxes for public services also means households have less after-tax income for consuming private services, resulting in fewer low-quality service sector jobs (Esping-Anderson, 1999; Pierson, 2001). Strikingly, one in six of the total working-age population in Canada and the United States is employed in the normally low-wage retail trade, restaurants, and accommodation sectors combined, compared to just one in ten in Sweden and Denmark (Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000, Data Appendix, Vol. I). High wages may squeeze private consumer services, but not necessarily at the cost of total employment, a finding that demands a re-evaluation of current government policies.

Conclusions and Lessons for Canadians

The experience of a few European countries, such as Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, tells us it is possible to have high levels of

high-quality employment, and there is no inevitable trade-off between job quantity and job quality. In the Scandinavian countries examined, a high wage floor and a very low incidence of low-paying and dead-end jobs have not precluded strong job growth, even in private services. Subsequently, it is the position of Canadian labour and anti-poverty groups that a similar wage floor in Canada is part of the answer to precarious work. This floor will be most effective when combined with public policies that raise the skills of workers and encourage employers to pursue high-skill strategies. Last, high levels of social services, financed from general taxes, can also make a positive contribution to high-quality, post-industrial employment.

Canada is a diverse and rather individualistic society, but Canadians also take pride in having created a more inclusive society than in the United States. Many elements of the new European models, such as strong unions, a large social sector, and social partner involvement in policy making exist in Quebec and, to a lesser degree, in other provinces. Canada is highly integrated with the heavily deregulated United States labour market, but this does not make impossible political projects linked to values of equality, inclusion, and solidarity. Ultimately, the challenge is to show how elimination of precarious work will promote social inclusion and help build a more productive economy.

(The arguments of this paper are developed at much greater length in Andrew Jackson, *Work and Labour in Canada: Critical Issues*, forthcoming from Canadian Scholars' Press in Spring, 2005.)

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Poverty and Inner-City Education

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Numerous studies have consistently shown that the strongest single predictor of educational achievement and attainment is the socio-economic status (SES) of the student's family. Thus, children in inner-city areas, characterized by low SES, face significant obstacles to educational success, with concomitant threats to other important life outcomes: employment, income, health, longevity, and civic participation.

Concern about inner-city education is not new, yet this long-standing concern hides a range of ideas about the nature, causes, and potential remedies for the problems of education in our cities.

Causes of and Remedies for Poverty

Thinking about the nature and causes of poverty tends to fall into one of two broad camps. One sees poverty as a shortcoming of individuals who will not or cannot do what is required to maintain a reasonable life. In this view, poverty is often a moral failing, and measures to provide extra supports to poor people likely encourage slothfulness and a lack of initiative, thus making the problem worse. A second view holds broadly that poverty arises mainly from systematic inequities in the economy and society, and is largely the result of forces beyond the control of individuals, such as the lack of work, low wages, or discrimination. Alleviating poverty is, therefore, seen as requiring either or both (there is disagreement on this point) extra supports to families and individuals, or structural changes in the economy and society. Public opinion and government policy tend to oscillate between these two positions.

Ideas about solutions to, or strategies for, addressing issues of poverty are largely shaped by people's ideas about causes. The range of solutions or strategies falls into four broad categories. One set of policies provides some basic level of income and other supports for poor people through social assistance, minimum wages, tax credits, or a range of other vehicles. Many of these policies have little or no ameliorative element. They are simply designed to try and make life bearable, or at least possible, for people who are otherwise destitute.

Another set of strategies is intended to support greater individual effort by poor people. Examples include both positive incentives (e.g., support for training and education, savings plans, targeted programs) and negative incentives (e.g., denial of various benefits for non-employment). These strategies are based on a model of poverty as being largely the result of individual problems or incapacities.

A third, less frequently used set of strategies aims less at individuals and more at neighbourhoods or communities. Initiatives in this category derive from the belief that poverty is largely a result of structural factors rather than individual choices, and must therefore be addressed by trying to change structures, especially at the local level. Examples include economic development initiatives, neighbourhood action groups, school improvement, and employment creation.

Finally, anti-poverty strategies may be developed at the macro-social level. If the basic theory is that overall prosperity is the best way to reduce poverty – an idea that has been very powerful in mainstream thinking – then efforts to reduce unemployment or stimulate

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overall economic growth, even including tax cuts, could be seen as the primary policy levers to be used.

The Role of Education in Anti-Poverty Efforts

While more education is clearly linked to desirable life outcomes, these outcomes vary a great deal, even among those with similar levels of education. The last 20 years have shown that countries can simultaneously have

At the macro-policy level, the importance of education to overall economic growth and prosperity has become an article of faith among governments and other agencies. Whether the rhetorical commitment is matched by active educational policy is quite another matter. Many jurisdictions, including Canadian provinces, have actually reduced the level and proportion of public resources flowing to public schools and post-secondary

Longitudinal Study of Children and Youth (NLSCY) – all led to a similar conclusion that about 25% of students in Canada has some notable level of risk with about 10% to 15% likely to face serious challenges. However, these risk factors are not evenly distributed geographically. In high-poverty communities, the levels of challenge could be much higher. It is well known that Aboriginal school completion rates remain much lower than those for other Canadians.

Some argue that it is unreasonable to expect schools to overcome, to any significant extent, the powerful social and economic forces that create and sustain inequality.

increasing levels of education and increasing levels of economic and social inequality.

Still, efforts to encourage poor individuals to improve their situation often have the acquisition of more education as central to opening up other opportunities (though in practice many poverty support programs put substantial barriers in the way of people who want to return to education). Initiatives at the community level often involve efforts to improve education, whether in the schools or through extension into adult education or early childhood development. However, some community advocates see schools as part of the establishment that oppresses the poor, and are suspicious of school efforts given the evident failure of existing educational provisions to make large changes in patterns of inequality. Other research shows the ways in which schools sometimes support or even exacerbate social inequalities (e.g., Natriello et al., 1990).

education, while early childhood development and adult education remain marginal to the overall educational enterprise in terms of policy, institutional structures, and resources.

Inequities in Schooling: The Achievement Gap

How big a problem do we have in urban education in Canada? Levels of child poverty in Canada remain very high by international standards (Bradbury and Jäntti, 2001). The Campaign 2000 Coalition reported that despite the commitment by Parliament to end child poverty, between 1989 and 1999 the number of poor children in Canada rose by 39%, including a large increase in families with at least one person in full-time employment.

In an analysis of students at-risk in Canada, Levin (2004) concluded that several different measures – poverty, high school dropouts, and the vulnerability index created from the National

Evidence on student outcomes shows that gaps in achievement remain substantial in Canada, and socio-economic status is an important factor in those gaps. Willms' (2003) analysis of data from the NLSCY showed that socio-economic status has substantial effects on children's educational skills, and these effects are stronger in communities with high overall levels of poverty. The Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)² study also found large gaps between the top and bottom performing 15 year olds in Canada. Moreover, these gaps grow over time. Data from the Manitoba Centre for Health Policy (MCHP) showed huge disparities in results on the Grade 12 provincial examinations for students coming from the poorest parts of Winnipeg (Brownell et al., 2004).

An important issue is whether schools in poor neighbourhoods suffer systematically, as they do in many places in the United States, from poorer facilities, less qualified teachers, and generally weaker levels of resourcing. Impressionistic evidence would suggest this is not the case in Canada, because financing tends to be more equal across school districts.

How Much Can Schools Do?

Schools are often seen as vital contributors to efforts to reduce poverty and achievement gaps. Some argue that it is unreasonable to expect schools to overcome, to any significant extent, the powerful social and economic forces that create and sustain inequality. Another line of argument is that the target and demand must be for schools to do much more than they have in the past to equalize opportunities for poor children. Any other position is defeatist and allows schools to make excuses for poor performance. Advocates of higher expectations for schools point out that school results vary enormously even within similar SES communities, suggesting some schools are managing to produce much better outcomes.

How much improvement in student outcomes might reasonably be expected given sustained efforts by schools in high poverty areas? Teddlie and Reynolds (2001) suggested that 10% to 15% of the variation in pupil outcomes is attributable to all the things schools do (or do not do). However, this does not mean we can necessarily improve outcomes by this amount through changing school practices. Their estimate might be close to a ceiling on what is possible by way of school improvements.

Various studies examined schools that seem to be doing better than expected. These studies typically noted features of these successful schools, such as a common vision, high expectations for students, strong leadership focused on student success, use of data to guide planning, and strong ties with the community. However, schools making the greatest gains are, by definition, untypical. A reading of the literature

on various forms of deliberate school improvement work indicates gains in student outcomes are quite modest in most schools, even after extensive efforts over several years. Moreover, the improvement process will often be more difficult in schools in challenging circumstances, because such schools face higher staff and pupil turnover, lower levels of overt parent support, and a history of lack of success. Recent US evidence (Bracey, 2004) showed that sustained improvement over time in high-poverty schools is rare, despite claims by studies of exceptional schools.

Conceptualizing Strategies to Address High Levels of Poverty in Schools

Over the years, schools and school systems adopted a variety of measures to address equity concerns. Indeed, there is very little in the current lexicon of school supports that was not advocated in the 1960s and early 1970s, if not well before that. The measures taken can be thought of as falling into three categories. The first includes in-school changes in programming or supports, such as feeding or clothing students, mounting special programs, greater outreach to parents, and whole-school reforms in teaching and learning. The second category includes system measures designed to provide positive or negative incentives for better performance, such as testing of students and teachers, choice of schools, and extra funding or other financial incentives tied to performance. The third category includes measures to extend the scope of schooling into other areas, such as early childhood, adult education, and community economic development.

This kind of general categorization understates the importance of local context. The nature of poverty and the kinds of challenges it presents to schools vary from one community to another across Canada. These differences suggest that strategies and approaches by the schools also need to be different.

What do we Know about Efforts by Schools?

In all categories, most efforts at any level to address needs in high-poverty schools have been short term and on the margins of the basic enterprise of schooling. The same proposals reappear regularly, but do not seem to affect mainstream schooling processes. Ideas from 40 years ago, such as integrated services, community development, or parental involvement, are once again being advocated.

We do not have a good base of evidence as to the impact of these various measures. For example, there is very little evidence on the impact of initiatives, such as feeding children or providing additional counselling. It seems reasonable to think there would be effects from ensuring children eat properly, are dressed warmly, or have access to programs that give some recognition to their language or culture. The limitation of all these programs is that they do not directly address academic achievement so, while probably important, they are unlikely to make the necessary difference in outcomes.

Another common response of schools to poverty has been the development of a whole range of special or targeted programs. Many such programs create separate classes or teaching arrange-

ments for children and youth seen to be at risk. These approaches are adopted largely because they are the least disruptive to existing arrangements and, in many cases, are supported by specific funding programs.

Once again the empirical evidence on outcomes is weak but, on the whole, research evidence does not support segregated or withdrawal programs as effective interventions (Knapp et al., 1995).

Current thinking on effective school change tends to focus on basic approaches to teaching and learning, and to student-teacher relationships. Some researchers think changes in regular classroom practices are key.

[A]chievement in school is made more likely when: teachers teach for mastery; curricula are relevant to students' present and future needs; authentic assessment practices are used; democratic classrooms are created where students contribute to the rule-making and governance; rational, humane and consistent behaviour management techniques are adopted; teachers are warm, approachable, fair and supportive and a range of ways of being successful are made available to students (Howard et al., 1999, p. 316).

In the PISA 2000 study, more motivated students did better regardless of their background or the school's teaching.

Changing mainstream programs is a relatively new approach. The more popular changes include the creation of teacher advisory systems in secondary schools to try to ensure stronger adult-student connections and the use of new approaches to early literacy

in elementary schools including Reading Recovery and balanced literacy. Schools may also need to distribute resources differently in high-need communities. However, these changes in the everyday nature of school activities and, especially, in the work of teachers are not easy to do and may challenge current practices. Many studies evaluating large-scale efforts to improve schooling for at-risk students show how hard such changes are to make and sustain.

Some of what are known as whole school reform models offer evidence of positive effects, such as Success for All,³ the School Development Program, or Accelerated Schools, but are still controversial, partly because of their reliance on test score results as the main criterion, and partly because the number of truly independent evaluations of most programs remains small. A massive effort in England through the National Literacy Strategy and National Numeracy Strategy included additional funding, supports, incentives, and accountability pressures. Test scores improved rapidly in the first few years, but since then have stayed flat at levels below the targets, raising concerns about whether these strategies could raise achievement to desired levels (Earl et al., 2003a).

Extending the Scope of Schooling

Almost all the literature on education and poverty assumes that anti-poverty work should take place primarily in schools. Yet the discussion of the limits of school improvement raises the possibility that schools may not be the most efficacious sites for efforts to improve and equalize educational

outcomes. The most significant impact on student outcomes may come from other measures, such as reducing lead poisoning from substandard housing, reducing the incidence of fetal alcohol syndrome, or ensuring that children in isolated communities get an adequate diet.

There is at least some awareness in many inner-city settings of the need to take a broader approach as evidenced by efforts over many years to include early childhood, adult education, parental involvement, and community development in school programs.

Many intervention programs in inner cities have focused on the preschool years. Although there is a strong belief that early intervention will create significant improvements in outcomes, the evidence is actually not so straightforward (Bradley and Whiteside-Mansell, 1997). Preschool appears to be an important area for action, but not sufficient in itself. Canada lags behind many other countries in its effort and infrastructure to support very young children. On a per child per year basis, schools in Canada get about six times more public funding than do various programs for very young children. Moreover, the infrastructure that does exist for early childhood in Canada and many other countries is largely at ages three to five, whereas both need and impact appear greater when children are even younger.

Adult education is another promising area in high-poverty communities, especially for adults with low levels of formal education, because improving the skills of adults usually also improves the lives of the children in their care. The development of a

network of adult learning centres in Manitoba illustrates the extent to which adult participation is connected to desires to assist their children in being more successful in school. Although many school systems in Canada operate adult learning programs, support for such programs by provinces and school systems tends to be very modest, and pro-

education leads to what are called two generation programs (Dunst and Trivette, 1997). The US National Governors' Association,⁴ for example, advocates family literacy programs that involve parental support for children's literacy and school support for parent learning.

Schools may need to look at ways to participate in larger efforts to build

Schools may need to look at ways to participate in larger efforts to build strong communities by, for example, hiring local people, purchasing goods and services locally, and supporting community efforts to improve housing or create jobs.

grams often lack a solid base in policy that would promote wider accessibility and high quality.

Parental involvement has been recognized increasingly as an important element in building school success. Educators may tend to blame parents for children's problems and seek to counteract the influence of parents. The inability of such an approach to work should be evident based on its abject failure in Aboriginal education in Canada. The stresses in children's lives are intimately connected to the conditions of their parents, which means schools have no choice but to try to build strong connections with parents. We have learned a great deal more in recent years about how to build these connections, including how to work effectively with parents who may themselves be struggling. However, with very few exceptions, the development of parent involvement in schools in Canada is a poorly resourced, add-on activity that is well down on the priority list of schools. Combining early childhood and adult

strong communities by, for example, hiring local people, purchasing goods and services locally, and supporting community efforts to improve housing or create jobs. Such strategies have considerable promise, but are not often attempted for a range of reasons.

Another often-advocated strategy is the integration of various educational and social services through the school to make services more available to those requiring them. Efforts to implement integrated service models go back to the beginnings of public schools. While the idea has an intuitive appeal, like many institutional changes, it is very hard to do effectively and sustain over time (Volpe, 2000).

One should avoid developing an excessively pessimistic conclusion from all this information. In particular, the evidence reviewed does not suggest that spending money on efforts to improve high-poverty schools is a poor strategy. As one group of researchers put it:

The fact is that there is virtually no evidence of the consequences of colossal increases in the educational resources to which disadvantaged children are exposed, because this strategy has never been systematically adopted (Natriello et al., 1990, p.192).

Conclusion

Everything we know about poverty and education tells us that it has been very difficult to make any lasting change in the link between children in poverty and poor educational outcomes. Despite huge efforts by many people in schools, children who grow up in our inner cities are still at much higher risk for a whole series of adverse outcomes. We do not have enough evidence to know how schools might be able to compensate for these disadvantages. This paper has suggested that current expectations for schools are probably unrealistic, and our strategies may need re-examination. At the very least, we would benefit from a broader discussion about what steps might be most useful and most feasible.

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Notes

- 1 This paper is part of a larger research project on poverty and inner-city education, conducted by Ben Levin and Jane Gaskell, and funded by the SSHRC. Further details and references can be obtained by contacting either author.
- 2 <www.pisa.gc.ca>.
- 3 <www.successforall.net>.
- 4 <www.nga.org>.

Social Networks, Social Capital and Social Exclusion

"Policy-makers and practitioners have become aware over the years that the unit of their concern is neither the isolated individual nor a theoretically bounded group such as a household or a community. Themes of interdependence and interconnectedness have come to the fore in recent exchanges between researchers and policy-makers, especially in the investigation of social exclusion. The three terms 'social network', 'social capital' and 'social exclusion' (and 'inclusion') are linked in a variety of complex and interesting ways and all of the work reported here focuses, with different degrees of emphasis, on these interchanges."

"The chapters included bring together:

- an overview of the social network literature, summarizing the main sociological arguments and traditions;
- a review of the range of social phenomena which social networks seek to explain;
- examples of quantitative and qualitative studies using a broad network approach; [and]
- a discussion of the implications for social and public policy of a network perspective."

Chris Phillipson, Graham Allan, and David Morgan, eds. 2004. *Social Networks and Social Exclusion: Sociological and Policy Perspectives*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing. Quotes from the Introduction.

Canada's Working Poor

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Social Development Canada

Introduction

In industrialized countries, it is widely accepted that anyone with paid employment should be able to earn a decent living and support a family. But for some Canadians, having at least one employed person in the family is no guarantee against low income. By the 1960s, studies were already showing that a large percentage of low-income persons were in families with at least one worker exerting a significant work effort. For the past few years, the United States and several European nations have been trying to better understand the situation facing their low-income workers. In Canada, however, the few studies that have examined this subject have focused more on low-paid workers, thereby emphasizing labour market characteristics. However, there has been a renewed interest in low-income workers following the massive restructuring of social assistance in the 1990s and the accompanying reduction in the number of social assistance recipients (an average decrease of 40.6% between 1994 and 2002).² This article offers a look at the circumstances facing Canada's working poor.

The most striking observations are that low-paid workers face a very different situation from low-income workers, and that family circumstances have more to do with their low incomes than the labour market. In fact, most low-paid workers do not have a low family income. (In 2001, only 24% of low-paid workers lived in a low-income situation.) In general, family circumstances play a bigger role in determining low income than the fact that an employed person may not work many hours. (On average, low-income workers worked about the same number of hours as those who

did not have a low family income in 2001.) In Canada, in particular, a worker with a significant work effort is particularly vulnerable to low income if he or she is the only person meeting the family's financial needs, and this vulnerability increases with the number of dependent children. Consequently, possible policy options to assist low-income workers could vary greatly from those to assist low-paid workers.

Distinguishing Between "Low-Income Workers" and "Low-Paid Workers"

One of the main difficulties in studying low-income workers is defining who they are. It's not a simple matter since it involves the interplay of two usually distinct fields of study: work (which focuses on the individual) and low income (which focuses on the family). There is a great deal of confusion about low-paid workers and low-income workers. Low-paid workers are individuals whose work effort is high, but whose earnings are low. However, they are not necessarily low-income workers if their needs are met only through their own earnings as well as those of other family members. In Canada, a person who works full time throughout the year for minimum wage is considered a low-paid worker.³ However, if this person lives with a spouse who earns \$100,000 a year, for example, he or she is obviously not in a low-income situation and could not be considered a low-income worker. The data show that slightly more than three out of four low-paid workers did not have a low family income in 2001.⁴ A low-income worker, therefore, is a person whose work effort is high throughout the year, but whose family income is below the low income cut-off.⁵

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FIGURE 1

Number of Low-Income Persons and Low-Income Workers in the Target Population in 2001 (Aged 18-64, Non-Full Time Students)





FIGURE 2

Predicted Probability* of Low Income Among Workers, According to Type of Family and Numbers of Income Earners in 2001



Note:

* The predicted probabilities are derived from computerized regression outputs following estimations of the specific impact of each variable in the low-income probability model for workers.

Profile of Low-Income Workers in Canada – 2001

Number of Low-Income Workers and Dependants

In 2001, there were 653,000 low-income workers in Canada and 1.5 million persons directly affected by low income, more than one third of whom were children under the age of 18. This group of 1.5 million represented more than 50% of all low-income persons in Canada.

Work Effort of Low-Income Workers

In 2001, most low-income workers demonstrated a significant work effort: 76% of them stated they had had 1,500 hours or more of paid work during the year. This percentage is slightly lower than that of workers who were not in a low-income situation in 2001 (88%). However, the average number of hours of work by low-income workers was very close to that of other workers⁶ and even slightly higher (2,090 hours compared to 2,050 hours in 2001).

Labour Market Conditions for Low-Income Workers

On average, low-income workers had less favourable working conditions than other workers despite a similar work effort. The hourly wage of low-income workers was well below that of workers who did not have a low family income in 2001 (\$12/hour compared to \$19/hour). The average hourly wage of low-income workers was also much higher than the minimum wage in effect in all the provinces in 2001. Therefore, the minimum wage would have to increase substantially to have a significant impact on reducing the number of low-income workers in Canada.

In addition, low-income workers were much less likely to have access to a safety net through their employment (see tables 1 and 2). In 2001, low-income workers were about three times less likely than other workers to have access to various work-related benefits, such as union membership, disability insurance, and a family dental plan.

Low-income workers were also much more likely to be self-employed or to have non-standard working hours. Of the 653,000 low-income workers noted in 2001, 41% stated they had had at least one period of self-employment during the year, while only 13% of workers who did not have a low income that year stated they had been self-employed. Last, nearly 40% of the low-income workers in paid employment during the year did not have a standard day-time work schedule, whereas this percentage was significantly lower (25%) for other workers.

Given these less favourable work conditions, can current programs help low-income workers effectively and efficiently? For example, since low-income workers are more likely to be self-employed and have non-standard working hours, they have less access than other workers to income support programs such as Employment Insurance. Many of them also find that the current 9-to-5 schedule for subsidized day care is inadequate as well.

Main Determinants of Low Income Among Workers

Aside from wages, what makes some workers more likely to experience financial poverty than others? Low-income workers are a mixed group. However, certain characteristics

TABLE 1

Percentage of Workers with Access to Work-Related Benefits, by Low-Income Worker Status in 2001

	Low-Income Workers in 2001 %	Workers Who Did Not Have a Low Income in 2001 %
% with access to life or disability insurance	17.9	61.5
% who are union members	10.8	30.3
% whose employer offers a pension plan	15.1	48.7

(personal, family, or work-related) are more closely associated with low-income workers, making it possible to target the related risk factors.

Family plays the greatest role in determining the probability of a worker experiencing a period of low income. Workers who are the sole earners in the family are much more likely to have a low family income than other workers. Unattached individuals, lone parents, and workers whose spouse does not work are most likely to be low-income workers. In addition, the

more dependent children that workers have, the greater the probability of a low family income, whether they are the only earners in the family or not. As indicated in Figure 2, the probability of low income is only 2% if a worker is part of a childless couple or if both spouses work. This figure increases to 26% when the worker is the only earner and has more than two dependent children.

Table 3 shows the other characteristics that significantly increase the probability of being a low-income worker.

TABLE 2

Percentage of Family Members with Access to Work-Related Benefits,* by Low-Income Family Status in 2001

	Persons in a Low-Income Family with at Least One Worker in 2001 %	Persons in a Non-Low Income Family with at Least One Worker in 2001 %
% with access to a dental plan	25.6	74.6
% with access to a health or medical care plan	26.6	74.6

Note:

* It is assumed that the work-related dental or health plan covers all family members of the eligible worker.

They include being young, self-employed, a recent immigrant or an Aboriginal person living off reserve, or not working full time throughout the year, etc.

It is interesting to note that among the persons who work many hours (910 hours or more during the year), those who belong to certain high-risk groups are more likely to have a low income than those who do not belong to these high-risk groups.⁷

Low-Income Trends Among Workers, 1996 to 2001

By examining low-income trends among workers over several consecutive years, we can determine such issues as whether their low-income situation is temporary and how they emerge from it.

Percentage of Individuals Who Are Low-Income Workers

While a small percentage of individuals were considered low-income workers in 2001 (4%), a much larger percentage of Canadians experienced at least one period of low-income employment between 1996 and 2001. One out of ten persons aged 18 to 59 in 1996, and not a full-time student, was a low-income worker for at least one year between 1996 and 2001.

Labour Market Experiences of Low-Income Workers

At first glance, people may think low-income workers do not exert a significant work effort and tend to alternate between employment, unemployment, and inactivity based on choice or circumstances beyond their control. But what is the real story? Table 4 shows that very few of the low-income workers identified in 1996 left the labour market in

TABLE 3

Non-Family-Related Characteristics that Increase the Predicted Probability of Low Income Among Workers in 2001

	Difference in Predicted Probability of Low Income with the Category for which This Probability Is the Lowest* %
Is self-employed	8.3
Is a recent immigrant or Aboriginal person living off reserve	4.7
Has not worked full time through the year	4.5
Works for a small firm (< 20 employees)	3.8
Is young (18-24)	3.6
Lives in an area with an above-average poverty rate	3.5
Has not completed secondary school	3.3
Works in sales or service	3.1
Has work limitations	2.7
Has little work experience (< 3 years)	1.8
Note :	
* For example, if a worker has had at least one period of self-employment during the year, the percentage of probability that this person may have a low family income that year increases by 8.3 points compared with a worker who has never been self-employed.	

subsequent years. Between 1997 and 2001, only 15% of the low-income workers identified in 1996 experienced at least one year without any hours of work, and this percentage is only slightly lower among other workers (11%). However, while they remained in the labour market, these low-income workers were much more likely than others to slip under the threshold of 910 hours of work at least once during the five subsequent years (46% compared to 29%).

Long-Term Low-Income Status Among the Working Poor

Low-income workers do not often exit the labour market, but do they manage to exit low income? As may

be expected, employment is a determining factor (see Table 5). In fact, while 40% of low-income workers experienced persistent poverty between 1996 and 2001, they escaped poverty more often than low-income persons who were not working in 1996 (61% compared to 26%). In addition, between 1997 and 2001, 85% of the low-income workers identified in 1996 escaped poverty at least temporarily.

It is interesting to note that, between 1996 and 2001, persistent poverty rates and low-income exit rates were very consistent, whether the individuals had worked a little (between 1 and 909 hours) or a lot (910 hours and

TABLE 4

**Trajectory on the Labour Market (1997–2001) of
Individuals Identified as Workers in 1996, By Low-Income
Status in 1996**

	Low-Income Workers in 1996		Workers Who Did Not Have a Low Income in 1996	
	#	%	#	%
All	513,700	100.0	8,895,200	100.0
Worked at least 910 hours every year	199,400	38.8	5,265,100	59.2
Were consistently employed but had at least one year of < 910 hours of work	237,800	46.3	2,614,600	29.4
Experienced at least one year without any work hours	76,600	14.7	1,015,500	11.4

TABLE 5

**Long-Term Low-Income Statistics (1997–2001), by Labour
Market Attachment of Workers in 1996**

	Low-Income Workers in 1996 (910+ hours)	Worked 1,500+ Hours in 1996	Worked 1 to 909 Hours in 1996	Did Not Work at All in 1996
No. of persons in the group	513,700	358,200	227,600	708,500
% who exited LI at least once before 2002	85.3%	84.5%	85.4%	57.1%
% who were LI for one year only	26.1%	25.7%	29.4%	7.9%
% who were LI for 2 or 3 years	38.3%	37.7%	34.1%	20.6%
% who were LI for 4 or more years	35.6%	36.5%	36.5%	71.5%
Average no. of years in low income	2.99 years	3.03 years	2.98 years	4.44 years
% who have experienced persistent poverty*	39.3%	40.3%	38.4%	73.6%

Note:

* A person has experienced persistent poverty if the total disposable family income from 1996 to 2001 is lower than Statistics Canada's total after-tax low income cut-off for the same period.

more) in 1996. Over the long term, it seems that the number of hours worked has little to do with an individual's chances of exiting low income. The more determining factor is whether the individual had connected with the labour market.


Nevertheless, not all workers manage to exit low income in the short term. From 1996 to 2001, the low-income workers identified at the beginning of the period spent on average three years below the low income cut-off, and nearly 40% of them spent four years or more below the cut-off. More than one third (36%) of those who left low-income status quickly (in 1997) fell below the low-income cut-off in the short term (between 1998 and 2001). In summary, although the working poor generally do not stay in a low-income situation for as long as other low-income persons, most of them experience a period of financial uncertainty that is more than temporary.

Nearly half of the low-income workers who managed to exit poverty did so because of their family environment and not their advancement in the labour market (see Figure 3). Fifty-four percent of the low-income workers identified in 1996 who managed to exit low income before 2002 did so mainly because of an increase in their own earnings. Forty-six percent of them exited low income primarily because of a change in their family structure (14%) or an increase in the income of other family members (32%).

Even after they had left low income, former low-income workers had a family income well below that of the rest of the population. From 1996 to 2001, the average disposable family income

FIGURE 3

Main Reasons for Initially Exiting a Low-Income Situation Between 1997 and 2001 for Low-Income Workers Identified in 1996



of all persons who did not have a low income in 1996 was \$57,000. However, this figure was nearly 40% lower among low-income workers who had exited poverty (\$34,600).⁸

Use of Social Assistance and Employment Insurance by Low-Income Workers

It is easy to imagine that the boundary between low-income worker, social assistance recipient or Employment Insurance recipient can sometimes be tenuous. The more uncertain a job is, the fewer advantages it offers as (opposed to inactivity), and the more likely it is that the worker will quit the job or lose it. It is therefore worth examining the relationship between being employed and receiving social assistance or Employment

Insurance benefits among individuals identified as low-income workers at a certain point.

Low-income workers tended to use social assistance more than other workers. In 1996 as in 2001, low-income workers were much more likely than other workers to have received social assistance benefits during the year (13.5% compared to 1.5% in 1996, and 9.6% compared to 1.2% in 2001). While only 6% of the workers who did not have low incomes in 2001 had received social assistance in previous years, this figure rose to 30% among low-income workers and, for the majority of this group, social assistance benefits accounted for most (80% or more) of their family income. The low-income workers

identified in 1996 were also more likely to receive social assistance benefits in the five subsequent years than other workers (18% compared to 3%) although, in this case, very few of them counted on social assistance as a main source of income.

However, low-income workers did not make greater use of Employment Insurance than other workers. While 12% of low-income workers in 2001 drew Employment Insurance benefits in that year, this rate was 13% among other workers.

Conclusion

Despite efforts to combat low income and social exclusion, many Canadians still have difficulty integrating into the labour market. For the past few years, social policy has leaned heavily on employment in its fight against low income. While employment is an effective way to avoid low income, it is by no means a panacea. In Canada, as in other countries, there are people who enter the labour market and exert a significant work effort, but who find it difficult to make ends meet. These people are the working poor.

Very little research has focused on describing and understanding the circumstances facing the working poor in Canada. The purpose of this study is to shed light on some aspects of this poorly understood issue. The highlights of the study from which this article is taken are as follows.

- In 2001, about 50% of low-income Canadians had at least one earner in the family.
- Between 1996 and 2001, one out of ten persons who was able to work was a low-income worker.

- The work effort of low-income workers is significant. However, their work conditions are much less favourable than those of workers who do not have a low family income.
- Family circumstances are a major factor for low-income workers. In Canada, families with only one earner face a greater risk of poverty, and this risk increases with the number of children in the family.
- While employment helps people exit poverty, the situation in which low-income workers find themselves is more than temporary.

The study enabled us to gain a better understanding of low-income workers in Canada and to distinguish between them and low-paid workers. The next major step is to consider the types of policies and programs that could be developed to help low-income workers achieve greater self-sufficiency.

Notes

- 1 The present article summarizes the main findings of a broader in-progress research on the working poor in Canada. Results of this broader research have not been released yet. However, a draft of the first article entitled "A Profile of the Working Poor in Canada" is available at the following address: <<http://cerf.mcmaster.ca/conferences/June2004/fortin.pdf>>.
- 2 Karabegović, Amela (May 2003).
- 3 The Canadian Policy Research Networks define a low-paid worker as someone who works full time throughout the year but who earns less than \$20,000.
- 4 All statistical information in this article is based on the authors' calculations using the master files of the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, 2001.
- 5 For the purpose of this empirical study from which this article is drawn, the authors define low-income workers as follows.

Period analyses: Individuals aged 18 to 64 who are not full-time students, have worked a minimum of 910 hours for pay and who, using their disposable family income, cannot purchase the market basket of goods and services specified by the Market Basket Measure (MBM) during the year in question.

Longitudinal analyses: Individuals aged 18 to 64 who are not full-time students, have worked a minimum of 910 hours for pay and whose disposable family income does not exceed Statistics Canada's after-tax low income cut-off during the year in question.

For the purpose of the longitudinal analysis, the authors had to change the measurement of low income in order to identify low-income workers since the MBM thresholds are not available prior to 2000. However, they conducted tests to determine the soundness of results for 2001 and found that, although the number of low-income workers is higher when the MBM is used, the profile for low-income workers is very similar whether the MBM is used or the after-tax low income cut-off.

- 6 In this article, "other workers" refers to individuals aged 18 to 64 who are not full-time students and have worked at least 910 hours for pay during the year but do not have a low family income.
- 7 Research has led to the identification of certain groups who are particularly at risk of experiencing long periods of low income, exclusion from the labour market or social marginalization in Canada. These groups are lone parents, Aboriginal peoples, persons who have immigrated to Canada within 10 years prior to the year in question, persons with a long-term illness or a physical or mental condition that limits their ability to work, and persons aged 45 to 64 living alone.
- 8 The ratio between average disposable incomes ($[57,000/34,600] = 1.6$) remains fairly consistent even when adjusted to reflect family size ($[33,000/20,000] = 1.65$).

Cornerstones of Community

Non-profit and Voluntary Organizations have a significant economic presence, and engage millions of Canadians, who join them as members, donating their time and money. They are an integral part of Canadian life, serving as vehicles to involve millions of Canadians in efforts to address needs in their communities. They operate in a broad range of areas, often working locally to provide public benefits. While many operate on a shoestring and are driven solely by voluntary effort, some command substantial human and financial resources in pursuit of their missions. What they have in common is their goal to serve the public or their members, and an institutional form that does not allow profits to be distributed to owners or directors.

Findings from the National Survey of Non-profit and Voluntary Organizations provide the first portrait of non-profit and voluntary organizations in Canada. The study reveals a diverse set of organizations that touch virtually every aspect of Canadians' lives.

For more information, please see the Statistics Canada report, *Cornerstones of Community: Highlights from the National Survey of Non-profit and Voluntary Organizations*. The report is available as a free downloadable electronic publication from Statistics Canada's web site at <www.statcan.ca>. The catalogue number is 61-533-WPE.

Elderly Immigrants Income Sources and Composition

Colleen Dempsey
Citizenship and Immigration
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Introduction

This article examines the income experiences of elderly immigrants in Canada. The findings presented here are taken from a larger study under way in the Strategic Research and Statistics Division at Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The complete study investigates the demographics, labour market experiences, and income situations of elderly immigrants in Canada. It distinguishes between immigrants who come to Canada in an older age group and those who reach an older age group after spending time in Canada. The results presented here focus on the differences in income sources and composition between three groups of elderly immigrants: those who landed in Canada aged 40-49 years, 50-59 years, and 60 years or older.¹ Results are presented for each elderly group and for the largest immigration categories within each group.

Data and Definitions

Two general types of income are investigated in this analysis. The first is referred to as market income, which represents income available to the working age population. Market income includes income from employment earnings, self-employment earnings, investment, Employment Insurance, and social assistance. The second income type is referred to as retirement income, which represents income available exclusively to the elderly. Retirement income includes income from the Canada Pension Plan/Quebec Pension Plan (CPP/QPP),² Old Age Security (OAS), the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) and Allowance, Registered Retirement

Savings Plans (RRSPs), and private pension plans. A brief description of a few of the retirement income sources is required since eligibility requirements may affect immigrants' access to them.

Sources of Income

It is not feasible to present the results here for each category of immigrant in each of the three elderly groups. Thus, this discussion is limited to findings for the elderly groups as a whole and for the immigrant categories that represent the largest share of each elderly group.³ Table 1 presents the immigrant category composition of the elderly populations used in this analysis.

Figure 1 shows the percentages of the long-term elderly population with no income, market income, retirement income, or both market and retirement income.⁴ Although the percentage is decreasing with additional years spent in Canada, the majority of long-term elders rely solely on market income until 15 years after landing. The decline in the proportion relying exclusively on market income is paralleled by an increase in the proportion receiving either retirement income or both types of income. Over the observed period, the percentage of the long-term elderly population with only market income falls from about 70% to 30%, while the percentage receiving some or all of their income from retirement increases from 20% to 70%, with roughly 20% relying exclusively on retirement income in the 20th year.

These findings are very similar to those observed for long-term elders who landed in Canada as skilled principal applicants (25% of this

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population). The population of skilled principal applicants fully relying on market income exhibits a similar decline over the observed period, while the proportion relying on retirement income or both income types increases. However, throughout the entire period, the proportion of skilled principal applicants with only market income remains 10% higher than the proportion for all long-term elders. Correspondingly, the proportion of skilled principal applicants with only retirement income is 10% lower.

The results for the entire population of long-term elders are notably different from those observed for long-term elders who landed under the family class as parents or grandparents (25% of this population). The proportion of parents and grandparents relying solely on market income exhibits the same decline over the 10-year period; however, it is 20% to 25% below the proportion observed for all long-term elders. Coinciding with this, 15% to 20% more of the parents and grandparents rely fully on retirement income. Additionally, up until 15 years after landing, the proportion of parents and grandparents with no source of income is 10% higher than the proportion observed for all long-term elders.

Figure 2 presents the percentages of the short-term elderly population with no income, market income, retirement income, or both market and retirement income. During the first five years after landing, 70% of short-term elders rely exclusively on market income. After the five-year mark, this percentage begins to decrease as the percentage possessing retirement income increases. Ten years after landing, only 35% of short-term

TABLE 1

Disaggregation of Elderly Populations by Immigration Category

Immigration Category	Long-Term Elders (%)	Short-Term Elders (%)	Immediate Elders (%)
Economic – skilled principal applicant	24.6	9.2	3
Economic – skilled spouse or dependant	8.9	2.2	0.4
Economic – other	12.2	6.2	1.2
Family – parent or grandparent	25.3	61.7	76.6
Family – other	10.9	5.5	3.4
Refugee	16.8	6.5	3.8
Retired	1.2	8.1	11.3
Other	0.1	0.6	0.3
Total	100	100	100

Source: IMDB.⁵

FIGURE 1

Percentages of the Long-Term Elderly Population with No Income, Market Income, Retirement Income, or Both Market and Retirement Income in Tax Year 2000⁶




FIGURE 2

Percentages of the Short-Term Elderly Population with No Income, Market Income, Retirement Income, or Both Market and Retirement Income in Tax Year 2000




elders rely on market income alone. In the 10th year, 50% receive some or all of their income from retirement sources, and this percentage continues to increase. After 14 years, over 90% of the short-term elderly population is in receipt of some source of retirement income, with between 30% and 40% relying solely on retirement income. Also noteworthy is the decline in the proportion of short-term elders with no source of income. During the first seven years after landing, the proportion with no source of income is between 20% and 30%. After 11 years, this falls to less than 10% and after 20 years, all short-term elders are in receipt of income from at least one source.⁷

These results are nearly identical to those for the short-term elders who landed under the family class as parents or grandparents (62% of this population). One difference is that, during the first 10 years after landing, the proportion with no source of income is 5% higher for the parents and grandparents. The only other difference is observed at 10 to 12 years after landing where, for parents and grandparents, 10% less of the population relies solely on market income and 10% more relies on retirement income. These differences are partially explained by examining the income sources of the second and third largest components of the short-term elderly population.

The short-term elders who landed as skilled principal applicants (9% of this population) also exhibit similar findings to those of the entire population. However, there are a few notable differences. First, the skilled principal applicant population with no income during the first 10 years after landing is 10% to 20% lower than that

FIGURE 3

Percentages of the Immediate Elderly Population with No Income, Market Income, Retirement Income, or Both Market and Retirement Income in Tax Year 2000




observed for all short-term elders. Second, at 10 to 12 years after landing, the proportion of skilled principal applicants with market income is 10% to 15% higher than that for all short-term elders, and the proportion with retirement income is 10% lower.

The short-term elders who landed as retired immigrants (8% of this population) have income sources very similar to those observed for the skilled principal applicants. The only difference is that from the 10-year mark, the share of retired immigrants with only retirement income is even lower – 20% lower than that observed for the total population of short-term elders. This coincides with 10% more retired immigrants having both sources of income.

Figure 3 presents the percentages of the immediate elderly population with no income, market income, retirement income, or both market and retirement income. During the first seven years after landing, about half of the immediate elders receive income from market sources. This is the lowest proportion out of all three elderly groups. After seven years, this percentage begins to decrease as the percentage with retirement income or income from both sources begins to increase. By the 10-year mark, only 10% of immediate elders rely exclusively on market income. Eleven years after landing, three years earlier than is the case for short-term elders, over 90% of the immediate elderly population receive some or all of their income from retirement sources, with about 30% of the population relying solely on this source of income. Similar to short-term elders, immediate elders exhibit a decreasing proportion with no source of income within the first 10 years after landing. However,

FIGURE 4

Percentages of Average Annual Income from Private and Public Market Sources, and Contributory and Non-Contributory Retirement Sources, for Long-Term Elders in Tax Year 2000



during these years, this proportion ranges from 25% to 40%, about 5% to 10% higher than the proportion of short-term elders with no source of income.

These findings are identical to those observed for the immediate elders who landed under the family class as parents and grandparents, a result not surprising since parents and grandparents make up over three quarters of the population of immediate elders. In contrast to short-term elders, the differences in income sources experienced by immediate elders in other immigrant categories are not large enough to affect the results for the entire population. Immediate elders who landed as retired immigrants, for example, account for 11% of this population and show some differences in income experiences. During the first


10 years after landing, the proportion of retired immigrants with only market income is 15% to 20% higher than that of all immediate elders, and the proportion with no source of income is 15% to 20% lower. Additionally, following the 10-year mark, the proportion of retired immigrants with both sources of income is 5% to 10% larger than that of the total immediate elderly population and the proportion relying exclusively on retirement income is 5% to 10% lower. Despite these differences, the results for the entire population of immediate elders truly reflect the experiences of the parents and grandparents in this elderly group.

Composition of Income

Figures 4 to 6 present the composition of average income for long-term,

FIGURE 5

Percentages of Average Annual Income from Private and Public Market Sources, and Contributory and Non-Contributory Retirement Sources, for Short-Term Elders in Tax Year 2000



short-term, and immediate elders, respectively. In this analysis, average income is disaggregated into four components: private and public market income, and contributory and non-contributory retirement income. Private market income (M-Private) includes employment earnings, self-employment earnings, and investment income. Public market income (M-Public) includes income from Employment Insurance and social assistance. Contributory retirement income (R-Cont) includes income from CPP/QPP, RRSPs, and private pension plans. Non-contributory retirement (R-NonCont) income includes income from the OAS and GIS.

Figure 4 presents the disaggregation of average income for long-term elderly immigrants. In the first 15 years after landing, 80% or more of long-term elders' average income comes from private market sources. From years 16 through 20, this share decreases by 15 percentage points, while the share of income from contributory and non-contributory retirement sources increase by five percentage points each.

These results are similar to those of the skilled principal applicants in this population. The only differences are that, for the skilled principal applicants, the share of private market income is about 5% to 10% higher throughout the observation period

and the share of non-contributory retirement income is about 10% lower.

The parents and grandparents in this population illustrate different results. First, the share of private market income is remarkably lower than that for all long-term elders. It begins at 70% but quickly declines to 46% and 17% in the 15th and 20th years, respectively. Second, the share of public market income is roughly 10% higher in each year than it was for the entire long-term elderly population. Finally, the share of non-contributory retirement income is substantially higher than that for all long-term elders. After 12 years, it makes up 21% of average income and increases rapidly such that after 20 years, income from non-contributory retirement sources makes up 60% of the income parents and grandparents receive.

Figure 5 presents the disaggregation of average income for short-term elderly immigrants. In the first year after landing, short-term elders receive roughly 85% of their income from private market sources. However, this share decreases steadily and after 15 years, falls to 26%, 50% lower than the share observed for the long-term elderly population. Over the same period, the share of income from contributory and non-contributory retirement sources increases by 15 and 50 percentage points, respectively. The trend continues and after 20 years, the share of income from private market sources is 14%, while the shares from contributory and non-contributory retirement sources are 23% and 60%, respectively.

These results are generally similar to those of the parents and grandparents in this population, with only a few differences occurring after 10 years. From the 10-year mark and on, parents and grandparents have a 10% to 15% lower share of income from private market sources, a 5% to 10% lower share of income from contributory retirement sources, and roughly a 15% higher share of income from non-contributory retirement sources.

In contrast, over the same period, the skilled principal applicants in this population have a 10% to 15% higher share of income from private market sources, a 10% to 20% higher share of income from contributory retirement sources, and a 20% to 30% lower share of income from non-contributory retirement sources. The retired immigrants in this population experience income situations similar to the skilled principal applicants. However, they have a slightly lower share of income from private market sources offset by a higher share of income from contributory retirement sources.

Figure 6 gives the disaggregation of average income for the immediate elderly population. In the first year after landing, immediate elders receive roughly 60% of their income from private market sources, a share 25% lower than that observed for short-term elders. The lower share from private market sources is offset with a 20% higher share from public market sources. The share from private market sources continues to decrease each year and after 15 years, it has fallen to 17%. Over the same

FIGURE 6

Percentages of Average Annual Income from Private and Public Market Sources, and Contributory and Non-Contributory Retirement Sources, for Immediate Elders in Tax Year 2000





FIGURE 7

Number of Immediate, Short-Term, and Long-Term Elders Captured in the IMDB in Tax Year 2000



period, the share of income from non-contributory retirement sources increases by 40 percentage points. By the 20-year mark, the share of income from private market sources is 11 per cent, while the shares from contributory and non-contributory retirement sources are 23% and 63%, respectively.

These results are, again, much like those of the parents and grandparents in this population, with only a few differences occurring after 10 years. From this point forward, parents and grandparents have a 5% lower share of income from private market sources, a 10% lower share of income from contributory retirement sources, and a 10% higher share of income from non-contributory retirement sources. In contrast, during this period retired immigrants in this population have a 15% to 20% higher share of income from private market sources, a 20% to 25% higher share of income from contributory retirement sources, and 35% lower share of income from non-contributory retirement sources.

Conclusion

It is clear that differences in the sources and composition of income exist across the three groups of elderly immigrants. With respect to income sources, there is evidence of a relationship between the length of time spent in Canada and reliance on certain sources of income. Long-term elders rely on market income most heavily and for a longer period. Consequently, fewer long-term elders receive income exclusively from retirement sources. Short-term elders are less reliant on market income; however, they are still more reliant than immediate elders.

There also appears to be a relationship between immigration category and reliance on particular sources of income. For example, skilled principal applicants exhibit more reliance on market income, while parents and grandparents show more reliance on retirement income.

In the case of income composition, differences across the elderly groups and immigration categories are also observed. Similar to the results observed in the examination of income sources, there appears to be a relationship between the length of residency in Canada and the composition of income. Long-term elders receive a larger share of their income from private market sources than either of the other two elderly groups. This is especially true for skilled principal applicants within this group. Although, short-term elders have a lower share of income from private market sources, this share remains higher than that for the immediate elder population. The lesser degree of reliance on market income for the short-term and immediate elder groups may be partially explained by the larger component of parents and grandparents in these groups. Parents and grandparents in both groups were found to receive substantially larger shares of their average incomes from non-contributory retirement sources.

Further research is required to investigate the relationships observed in this analysis. A more in-depth look at the characteristics of elderly immigrants and the economic experiences of their families will allow for a better understanding of the income situations of elderly immigrants in Canada.

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Notes

- 1 Throughout this analysis, the elderly population is defined as those aged 60 years or older in a given tax year. The elderly immigrant population is divided into three groups: "long-term elders" who landed in Canada at age 40-49, "short-term elders" who landed at age 50-59, and "immediate elders" who landed at age 60 or older. Defining the elderly population as 60 years or older was done for a few reasons. First, this is the age that most Canadians can initiate their CPP/QPP, which is a common source of income for many elderly Canadians. Second, related literature has also chosen age 60 or older to define the elderly population; therefore, results found here may be compared (Baker and Benjamin, 2002; Basavarajappa, 1999). Third, a preliminary analysis on the employment behaviour of immigrants found very similar patterns between immigrants 60 and older and immigrants 65 and older. Choosing the 60 and older population increases the sample size for the analysis and thus, strengthens the statistical results.
- 2 The CPP/QPP is a contributory pension that is related to an individual's lifetime

earnings. Although there are no special provisions for immigrants, their benefits will be directly related to the length of time they have worked in Canada. To qualify, an individual must have made a minimum of one valid contribution to the Plan and be at least 65 years of age. It is possible to qualify for a reduced pension between the ages of 60-64 if a person stops working or earns less than the current monthly maximum CPP/QPP payment.

The OAS is a non-contributory pension related to an individual's years of residence in Canada. It is available to Canadians 65 years of age or older who have a minimum of 10 years of residence in Canada after reaching age 18. A full OAS pension is only available to those who have lived in Canada for 40 years or longer. A person who cannot meet the requirements for the full OAS pension may qualify for a partial pension. A partial pension is earned at the rate of 1/40th of the full monthly pension for each year an individual has lived in Canada after reaching age 18.

The GIS is another non-contributory pension and is available to residents of Canada who receive a full or partial OAS pension. Guaranteed Income Supplement benefits may begin in the same month as OAS benefits. To qualify for GIS, a person must be in receipt of an OAS pension and have an annual income not exceeding a specified amount. Sponsored immigrants from countries with which Canada has agreements are not eligible for GIS during their sponsorship period (up to a maximum of 10 years). The OAS and GIS are activated on approval of an individual's application, with GIS requiring individuals to reapply on an annual basis.

The Allowance is a non-contributory pension available to the spouse or common-law partner of a pensioner receiving the OAS and/or GIS, or to a survivor. Canadian citizens or permanent residents between the ages of 60 and 64 who have lived in Canada for at least 10 years are eligible to receive the Allowance. To qualify, the combined annual income of the couple, or the annual income of the survivor must not exceed the specified limits. The Allowance stops when the recipient reaches age 65 and becomes eligible for the OAS. Sponsored immigrants

wishing to apply for the Allowance face the same eligibility requirements as those applying for the GIS.

In addition to these retirement sources, the Guaranteed Annual Income System (GAINS) is available to residents of Ontario 65 years of age or older. More information on GAINS can be found on the Ontario Ministry of Finance's Web site: < <http://www.trd.fin.gov.on.ca> >. Similar programs may also exist in other provinces.

- 3 Findings for each immigration category will be presented in the larger report being produced by the Strategic Research and Statistics Division of Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The anticipated release date for this report is early 2005.
- 4 Individuals with no source of income may have filed taxes to receive certain tax credits (e.g., GST credit).
- 5 The primary source of data used in this analysis is the longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB). The IMDB is managed by Statistics Canada on behalf of a federal-provincial consortium led by Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The IMDB combines administrative records on immigration with taxation information to form a comprehensive source of data on the labour market experiences of the landed immigrant population. The IMDB covers the period 1980-2000, providing data on about 2.5 million immigrants in Canada. To be captured in this sample, an individual must have filed a tax return at least once during the period 1980-2000.
- 6 In figures 1 to 6, it is important to recognize that the size of the elderly cohorts examined changes across years since landing, as existing elders exit the population and new elders enter. Figure 7 presents the cohort sizes for each elderly group in tax year 2000 by years since landing. All information reported in figures 1 to 7 is taken from the IMDB.
- 7 Although long-term elders could not be observed until 11 years after landing, a similar pattern for the proportion with no income was seen from the 11-year mark.

Immigrant Integration

Immigrants are not fools: they leave their homes in the hope of finding something better, not just economic opportunity, but also freedom and a sense of belonging.

What happens when immigrants try to adjust to Canada? Neither the immigrants themselves nor Canadian society understand the daunting venture of giving up on one country in exchange for another.

Historical grievances, xenophobia, security concerns and cultural misunderstandings make it stressful for immigrants to adapt to Canada, and vice versa. Recently, fears of terrorism have complicated things further, especially for Canada's growing Muslim population.

More than just a personal memoir, Cherif Rifaat's book confronts both the immigrant's and society's misconceptions, describes Canada's uniqueness with respect to immigrant integration, and does not hesitate to recommend changes in policy that may be controversial in some circles.

Rifaat, Cherif. 2004. *Immigrants Adapt, Countries Adopt...Or Not: Fitting Into the Cultural Mosaic*. Montreal: New Canadians Press.

Relating Homelessness to Education, Employment and Income Support

A Review of Canadian Literature

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To support the development of effective measures to prevent and reduce homelessness, the National Research Program (NRP) of the National Secretariat on Homelessness has undertaken a review of print and electronic documents relating homelessness to education, employment, and income support.¹ The review indicates there is very little documented Canadian research exploring these themes.

A general point on which several authors agree is that homelessness is both affected by and affects education, employment, and income support, as well as related topics, such as health and addictions. However, concrete theoretical models relating education, employment, or income support to homelessness are rare in the Canadian literature. To rectify this situation, in-depth studies that use and document more rigorous research methods have recently been published. Such studies provide initial insights into the training and economic activities of people who are homeless. Further use of such empirical research methods is needed to direct future research and trial interventions in this domain.

Existing Knowledge

In examining existing Canadian literature, the following can be said with some certainty.

- Difficulties with education, employment, and income support can be related to difficulties with health, mental health, and addictions, and all of these factors both affect and are affected by homelessness.
- Specific sub-populations of homeless people, such as First Nations people and youth, face considerable

challenges in the areas of education and employment.

- Among homeless people, there are high rates of unemployment. Many have not completed high school, and income support is often difficult to access.
- There is agreement on the need for programs in education, training, and employment. Toward this end, several programs exist. However, information is lacking on the details of their operations, and objective evaluations of their performance are rare.

Homelessness as Cause and Effect

It has been known for some time that areas of concern, such as health, mental health, and addictions, are related to education, employment, and income support. In turn, these areas affect, and are affected by, homelessness (Smart and Ogborne, 1994). However, while correlations are evident, deeper studies of these associations are rare. As a result, it is difficult to understand causality when examining any of these factors and an individual's current life situation. Longitudinal research would be helpful in understanding these interactions.

Although it is easy to imagine how homelessness might impact attempts to secure education, employment, or financial stability, very little research exists that attempts to evaluate services to assist with these challenges. In a Toronto study, street youth participants noted that a lack of services to assist with difficulties regarding contacting and being contacted by employers, preparing résumés, and getting to work on time in clean clothes makes gainful employment

difficult to obtain (Dachner and Tarasuk, 2002). Homeless people also report the need for facilities to safeguard their money and identification (Bergeron et al., 2000).

The impact of health and mental health on education, employment, and income and, subsequently, homelessness has been studied directly in the United States by Zuvekas and Hill (2000). They surveyed 471 homeless adults, randomly selected from shelters, and found that a large number of them worked, but few were able to generate significant earnings from employment alone. Many had physical health problems and addictions that limited both their ability to work and to access assistance with their health. These findings suggest avenues for future Canadian research.

Sub-Populations with Specific Difficulties

In developing responses to the challenges identified above, it must also be recognized that access to education and employment can vary by identity and circumstance. Greater difficulties have been noted for First Nations people (Hull, 2000) and people coming from foster care (Fitzgerald, 1995). Descriptive research indicates many homeless youth are not on income support as they find it too difficult to access (Gaetz and O'Grady, 2002; Raising the Roof, 2001). Other barriers to income support include policies regarding youth aged 16-18 years (Fitzgerald, 1995).

The challenges faced by youth have been the subject of much of the work in this area. Gaetz and O'Grady (2002) completed significant research on the economic activity of youth from a sociological perspective. They found

that youth might be involved in several different income-generating activities in a week or even in a given day. The authors also found that 83.4% of young men and 87.8% of young women indicated they were interested in finding paid employment. Furthermore, contrary to some stereotypes, the youth were interested in employment in the formal economy. The researchers found, however,

Several authors agree that homelessness is both affected by and affects education, employment, and income support, as well as related topics, such as health and addictions.

that the ability of these youth to join the formal economy was influenced by the youth's abilities and aspects of their lifestyle, history, and social relationships. Therefore, the authors concluded that successful strategies to move young people off the street cannot rest simply on low-paying employment or the addition of hard and soft skills. Instead, various training and support services, combined with adequate income support are needed.

In a similar study, O'Grady and Greene (2003) explored the effect of legislation banning squeegee cleaning and the subsequent decrease in this source of economic activity for homeless youth. They found that the housing situation for youth eroded after this legislation was introduced.

One study of young women at risk of homelessness recommended more opportunities for education and employment for youth, as well as changes to the *Employment Insurance Act*, supportive educational programs, services within schools to prevent

homelessness, and access to education for homeless young women (Novac et al., 2002).

In summary, several authors have documented the specific challenges with regards to education, employment, and income support of several sub-populations. While much remains to be done, this research provides a starting point.

The Need for Education, Employment, and Greater Income Support

Many authors cited under-employment, the lack of training, and insufficient social assistance as causes of homelessness (e.g., Charette, 1991; Falvo, 2003). Indeed, it is common to find references to low levels of education and high unemployment in most surveys of homeless people (Aubry et al., 2003; Norman et al., 1993; Raising the Roof, 2001).

In contrast to the United States, research on homelessness and education, employment and income support in Canada has a short history with few large surveys based on data collected over several years. Nevertheless, while much remains to be determined, education appears to be a key factor: the percentage of homeless people without high school has been cited as ranging between 63% and 90% in Ottawa and Toronto (CMHC, 2001). As well, many homeless youth not in school express an interest in returning to school (Aubry et al., 2003). Some initial patterns between education and

employment have been observed. Tolomiczenko and Goering (1998) found that 64.3% of their sample of shelter users in Toronto did not finish high school (vs. 34% for all Canadians) and, when compared to information on employment, found a pattern in which those who did not drop out were more likely to be employed. In a sample of youth, it was also found that those with the least education were more likely to be involved in less stable or illegal economic activities, such as the drug trade or prostitution (Gaetz and O'Grady, 2002).

Aside from such descriptive statistics, little is known about the factors related to homeless people's education and the relationships among these factors. In general, very little information was located on how to address the education needs of homeless people in Canada. There is some initial qualitative evidence suggesting assistance with physical and learning disabilities would be a potentially important service as these have had a negative impact on schooling and employment among homeless people (Guirguis-Younger, Runnels, and Aubrey, 2003). However, much research remains to be done in this area.

In contrast, unemployment rates, inadequate income, and difficulties with income support have been well documented as causes and contributing factors to people cycling in and out of homelessness (Eberle et al., 2001). In a study of at risk homeless people, 21% reported being unemployed (GVRD, 2002). Among surveyed shelter users, 38% had no current income and only 20% were receiving any welfare support (Tolomiczenko and Goering, 1998).

Of 360 homeless Toronto youth, only 15% identified paid employment as their primary source of income and only 15% reported being on social assistance (Gaetz and O'Grady, 2002). In addition to documenting the rates of unemployment and poverty among homeless people, researchers have begun to explore the distribution of homelessness and contrast it with the distribution of services (Bunting et al., 2002).

Homeless people surveyed by the national charitable organization, Raising the Roof (2001), also described difficulties accessing social assistance. The Raising the Roof study, *From Street to Stability*, recommended that the welfare system be better designed to provide immediate assistance to those in crisis and to simplify the application process. It also recommended higher minimum wages, more job training, job seeking assistance, and apprenticeship programs. Unfortunately, the report is largely descriptive, and although it highlights themes of potential importance in future studies, it does not gather sufficient information to suggest how to best address areas of concern. Nor does such descriptive work allow for an examination of the relative importance of the proposed interventions.

Despite their limitations, the above-mentioned works have begun to define the severity of these issues. They point to areas requiring services and suggest possible types of interventions to address these program gaps.

Promising Practices

Several reviewed documents listed programs labelled as education, employment, and income support for homeless people (e.g., Raising the

Roof, 2001; CMHC, 1995). On close examination, however, very few of the projects offer well-developed programs that explicitly target education, employment, and income support. But there are exceptions.

Raising the Roof's Shared Learnings on Homelessness Web site identifies a few programs targeting these areas. For example, the Causeway Work Centre of Ottawa is designed to strengthen skills and develop the supports necessary to sustain, in the community, an individual with a severe mental illness.

Other studies look at more examples of educational programming. Although now somewhat dated, work by Love (1993) described a storefront school located in Winnipeg offering flexible and applied education to street youth. Another example is the Literacy and Homelessness project in Toronto (Trumpener, 1997). It offers literacy training to homeless adults at drop-in centres, trains service providers on literacy, and facilitates the sharing of experiences between literacy programs. In describing this and similar projects, Trumpener indicated a need to document projects in a more detailed manner.

As is common in the literature, descriptions of the above programs lack the details necessary to evaluate their success objectively. Project descriptions do not indicate if they are being evaluated or are collecting data for future evaluations. Bridgman (2001) and other authors noted this shortcoming in current literature, and stressed the need to move beyond simple descriptions of projects. They also noted, however, that the lack of funding, or the short-term nature of funding, often discourages such program evaluations.

A clear exception to the lack of detail is the work of Bridgman (2001), who used qualitative interviews and observations to describe the implementation of a project designed to develop housing and offer employment training for homeless youth. In the pilot project, youth who lacked stable housing were trained in construction. The author documented issues to consider in this type of project and a method

employment services for homeless people need to consider helping their clients find housing, emotional counselling, health care, and recreational opportunities.

- The Raising the Roof study (2001) identified the need for:
 - better information sharing regarding available programs;
 - attention to homelessness in the education system;

demonstrate the positive effects of the policy interventions recommended above through research design and objective measures.

Perhaps the most important lesson from the literature review is that sustained funding is needed for detailed and objective research to design interventions and examine their effectiveness. Related to this need, a number of policy-relevant research gaps were also identified.

This review confirms a lack of knowledge about education, employment, and income support among homeless people and those at risk of becoming homeless in Canada.

for conducting similarly detailed examinations of other projects. This work marks a significant step in this area of exploration.

Evaluation research on housing programs in other jurisdictions appears to be more extensive than that observed in Canada. American researchers documented the difficulties of evaluating education programs for homeless people (Penuel and Davey, 1998) and compiled a description of best practices for employment training for homeless people (Beck et al., 1997). British researchers conducted a comprehensive evaluation of a range of projects that provide specialist employment and training services to homeless youth (Randall and Brown, 1999).

Lessons Learned

In the limited Canadian research that exists, authors identified the following policy conclusions.

- Researchers from Vancouver (CS/RESORS, 1989) concluded that

- more social assistance programs;
- a higher minimum wage and better access to employment insurance;
- more assistance with finding employment and more opportunities for employment;
- more training opportunities and affordable and flexible post-secondary education; and
- greater access to support services to enable people to remain employed.

- Bridgman (2001) concluded that successful projects need to cross regulatory boundaries and ensure the co-operation of many different agencies and funding bodies. Indeed, such multi-agency research is beginning to provide examples of longitudinal data (e.g., Aubry et al., 2003). A difficulty with these observations is that many are based on opinions, reviews of others' opinions, and simple descriptive research. Although opinions and descriptions are important starting places, it would be helpful to

- Gaetz and O'Grady (2002) suggested that to better understand the dynamics of the education and employment of homeless youth, there is a need for a more thorough understanding of how young people end up on the streets and what keeps them there. As well, they indicated a need to understand the changes in "occupational identity" that occur in youth on the street. More research is needed on the degree to which the most marginalized of homeless people are restricted from entering the economic mainstream.
- In the area of homelessness and education, there is a need for research that examines the relationships among factors related to education and is not simply a description of levels of education.

Future Directions

This literature review confirms a lack of knowledge about education, employment, and income support among homeless people and those at risk of becoming homeless. Although there are numerous examples of research in the United States on job preparation, skill development, special employment arrangements, income

support programs, and access to education, there is very little written on these topics in Canada.

While statistics and observations exist in Canada of homeless people regarding their difficulties securing education, employment, and income support, research is required in a number of areas.

- Basic information is needed on the employment preferences of homeless people.
- Detailed accounts of the economic activities of adults and youth are needed, particularly outside of Ontario.
- Basic information on the educational needs and preferences of homeless youth and adults is needed.

The following efforts are required to obtain these sorts of data:

- research projects with a clear research design, valid method, and objective measures;
- detailed and objective evaluations of interventions to prevent and alleviate homelessness; and
- longitudinal and multi-site research examining education, employment, and income support for homeless people.

In the future, research needs to move beyond simple counts and descriptions to more in-depth explanations and the exploration of the relative importance of these factors. Such information will facilitate the design, implementation, and evaluation of effective interventions.

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
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
Note

- 1 The National Research Program (NRP) is one of Canada's leading research-funding agencies on homelessness. An initiative of the National Secretariat on Homelessness, the NRP's mandate is to increase understanding of the magnitude, characteristics and causes of homelessness through a call for proposals process.




Financial Capability and Poverty

This discussion paper, prepared by the Social and Enterprise Development Innovations (SEDI), focuses on developing financial literacy as a complementary strategy to asset building through a review of existing research and current initiatives in Canada and abroad.



Views on Life-Course Flexibility and Canada's Aging Population

This paper describes the methodologies used in, and the results coming out of, focus groups that were organized to better understand Canadians preferences concerning the allocation of time for work, care-giving, education and leisure, their preferences concerning the time at which they intend to retire. Canadians that participated to these focus groups were also ask for their opinions on policies that could support the reallocation of time over the course of life.



Pamphlet: A Fresh Look at Freshwater

Briefing Note: Integrated Water Resource Management

This pamphlet outlines the background and plans for the PRI's freshwater project.

This Briefing Note is the first in a new series designed for the senior decision-maker. Introducing the concept of Integrated Water Resources Management, this Note defines the concept, and gives examples of its practical application.

The OECD Jobs Strategy Review Old Wine in New Bottles or a Truly New Vintage?

Stuart Sykes and
Kaili Lévesque
Policy Research Initiative

Stuart Sykes and Kaili Lévesque
are Policy Research Officers with
the Policy Research Initiative.

By way of evidence-based policy discussions, the OECD significantly influences the conceptualization of socio-economic policy debates in both member and non-member states around the world. As such, the Organization's recently declared intention to re-evaluate the fundamental assumptions and principles that underpin its *Jobs Strategy*, a document that for the past 10 years has served as the foundation for its annual *Employment Outlook*, is cause to take notice.

The reassessment of core assumptions is largely driven by shifts within the labour markets of member states. A decade ago, the OECD *Jobs Strategy* was crafted with the intent of outlining reforms that would slash high and persistent unemployment in OECD member states. At that time, major structural reforms regarding employment protection legislation, pension systems, and employment supports (such as unemployment insurance and active labour market measures) were seen as vital. The *Employment Outlook* has provided annual reports on the implementation of these reforms and on labour market developments and trends in OECD member states.

Although traditional employment concerns, such as unemployment and economic stagnation, remain important, new challenges, such as population aging are becoming increasingly central policy considerations. Additionally, the implementation of many responses to previously identified challenges has led to structural changes that now require evaluation. For these reasons, the time has come for modernization of the OECD *Jobs Strategy*.

However, such socio-economic shifts are not the only drivers for change. For years, there has been concern among analysts that many international organizations, including the OECD, have failed to address gaps in their diagnostics or recognize negative socio-economic distortions that can result from their policy prescriptions. The narrow, market-based approaches frequently used by many international organisations have also increasingly come under scrutiny. As time has passed, these criticisms have become increasingly difficult to ignore.

Emerging Themes for the Review

The 2004 *Employment Outlook* identifies a number of issues for review. A key concern to be addressed by the new *Jobs Strategy* is the projected increase in dependency ratios that could result from an aging population. While the urgency of this challenge varies across countries, much of the OECD's focus in addressing this issue is aimed at increasing employment.

This concern was not entirely neglected in the current *Jobs Strategy* and previous issues of *Employment Outlook*. Groups targeted to effect reform in this area also remain largely unchanged from previous OECD documents, namely those most likely to be excluded from the labour market (women, lower-skilled workers, and youth), the employment of whom would support the costs of aging societies.

However, never before has this challenge been made so central to the analysis. Three other fundamental philosophical shifts are also apparent within the themes of the OECD's

review process, suggesting that the new *Jobs Strategy* could differ significantly from the current document.

Increased Appreciation of Demand-Side Issues

Whereas policy prescriptions in the current *Jobs Strategy* and past issues of *Employment Outlook* focused on managing the supply of labour (through education, more restrictive benefits,

many reforms made to employment protection legislation in OECD countries during the 1990s.

Different Policy Contexts Among Member Countries

In part reflecting the above two shifts, the OECD acknowledges that policy interactions and complementarities need to be better understood to determine why various countries,

Even as those outside the labour market remain the priority group of focus, there has been an alteration of the understanding of issues to be addressed, such as the supply of, and demand for, labour.

etc.), the 2004 edition of the *Employment Outlook* argues that issues of job quality (e.g., wage levels, benefits) must also be addressed. This acknowledgment of demand-side issues, which effectively increase the draw and value of employment as regards individuals, marks a significant break from past approaches.

The Relevance of Social Objectives

For perhaps the first time, the OECD explicitly acknowledges in the 2004 *Employment Outlook* that measures to improve employment must be reconciled with social goals, leading to concerns about job security, work-life balance and widening disparities in earnings. This shift reflects the dilemmas faced by states grappling with a wide array of social and economic challenges. With the addition of this new dimension, the OECD also acknowledges that some of its past policy recommendations, if imprudently or partially applied, could have deleterious social effects. For example, the OECD notes that the rise of precarious employment is in part due to the

despite different policy contexts and institutions, achieve similar employment outcomes. Subsequently, unlike the current *Jobs Strategy*, which effectively established a single set of institutional arrangements and targets for all states, it is now recognized that alternate policy packages that are sensitive to state-specific conditions and objectives may be more effective.

These themes did not develop overnight. They had been alluded to in a more cursory manner in 2003, suggesting an under appreciation of their relevance rather than a lack of awareness of their existence. Elevation of these themes in the 2004 *Employment Outlook*, however, has transformed the criteria against which past policies and future proposals must be measured. As a result, the 2004 edition reads very differently than its predecessors, and includes discussions touching on a number of social issues of importance to the issue of poverty, such as diverging wages, job quality, and making work pay.

Moving Forward: Issues and Options

In placing new emphasis on issues, such as population aging and the need for flexible work arrangements, the OECD must determine which conceptualizations of employment are still appropriate, and which require complete refurbishing to maintain their relevance. The OECD's success in doing this over the two-year review process will determine if the new employment strategy is truly fresh and responsive to the above-described challenges and issues.

In the 2004 *Employment Outlook*, labour market integration remains the key unit of analysis. Target groups remain unaltered, and activation policies remain central to the policy prescriptions aimed at addressing underemployment. This focus on activation appears still to be limited by the underlying assumption that those not engaged in the labour market choose not to be. Structural barriers to participation, such as a lack of available child care, remain marginal to the analysis. Despite the themes driving the review, much of the basic diagnostic and underlying approach of the report appears unchanged.

However, there are other signs that significant analytical shifts are taking place. Even as those outside the labour market remain the priority group of focus, there have been slight modifications to the definitional aspects of employment policies, and there has been an alteration of the understanding of issues to be addressed, such as the supply of, and demand for, labour. The role of training and education has also been recast. No longer portrayed

as a silver bullet for increasing individual employability, the role of education is being repositioned within a life-long learning approach. This approach, is intended to help mitigate the labour market effects of an aging work force, improve employment security (if not job security), make individuals less vulnerable to the pitfalls of precarious employment and address a number of other socio-economic challenges. In short, education is now portrayed as underpinning a multidimensional approach to addressing a number of societal needs rather than employability.

These are significant shifts that, in part, explain why the feel of the 2004 *Employment Outlook* is so different from its predecessors. However, two other philosophical shifts also warrant particular attention.

Job Quality Is About More than Earnings

Quality of employment in previous issues of *Employment Outlook* was based on two indicators: having a job, and the level of income earned in employment. However, there is now a clear awareness that this approach fails to take into consideration other factors, such as job satisfaction, work-life balance, and the role of employment in achieving individual and social goals. In the 2004 *Employment Outlook*, individuals are recognized as having many concurrent goals that are not mutually exclusive, such as achieving gainful employment while having a family and participating in community activities.

Not all of these goals are quantifiable, nor do they all contribute to a traditional understanding of employment benefits. They are, however, now recognized, and the OECD has pledged to place part of its strategy focus on making work more flexible and appealing to a broader segment of the population, including older individuals.

Quality of Life Is More than Having a Job

The role of employment within society and an individual's life has fundamentally shifted. Before, overall levels of employment and average income levels were seen as appropriate indicators of the overall performance of the employment market. The diagnostic in the 2004 *Employment Outlook* does not adopt this position. Instead, the labour market is viewed only as one aspect of a country's socio-economic structure, and a job is now only one part of a person's life. This fundamental shift results in past policy approaches often being cast in a completely new light.

For example, although a training program targeted at lone parents may not lead them directly into paid employment, it may lead to improvements in broader social goals, such as increases in social capital and community involvement. These have not been quantified as have traditional indicators, such as income and employment, but the OECD acknowledges the importance of understanding the achievement of broader social goals as policy successes in and of themselves.

Conclusions

There is no doubt the new diagnostic research themes identified earlier are beginning to assert themselves. Marked changes, especially regarding the underlying assumptions and approaches that ground much of the OECD *Jobs Strategy* and past issues of *Employment Outlook*, are apparent. While the 2004 *Employment Outlook* appears to retain much of the current *Jobs Strategy*, this is not conclusive evidence that this exercise is merely window dressing. No one should want to see solid diagnostic and analytical work abandoned just because it is no longer fashionable.

The key challenge within the review will be balancing new and old. Retained ideas will have to remain consistent with emerging diagnostic themes if the document is to be coherent. The OECD's success in doing this will determine if the *Jobs Strategy* that emerges in two years is truly new wine or whether it is the same old vintage in a shiny new bottle.

Social Inclusion as Policy Challenges and Opportunities

Ted Richmond
Laidlaw Foundation

How is the concept of social inclusion evolving in policy terms? Are we working from a common understanding or “definition” of the notion? What does social inclusion mean for issues like poverty, and the growing racialization of poverty? What theories and practices are most relevant in developing a made-in-Canada version of social inclusion that is policy relevant? These issues provide both challenges and opportunities for our Advisory Committee (Inclusive Communities for Children, Youth and Families) as Laidlaw Foundation further develops its work on social inclusion.¹

The Children’s Agenda Initiative of the Laidlaw Foundation started several years ago, with a focus on social inclusion as a tool for developing and testing social policy. It promoted the development of inclusive communities in the cities and neighbourhoods where children and their families experience various forms of exclusion, and was rooted in the Laidlaw commitment to promoting the well-being of children and families. The long-range goal was to promote improvements in child and family social policy in Canada.

It has been a few years since the Laidlaw Board took the courageous step of endorsing funding for what was basically an idea – social inclusion. Since then, our social inclusion work has not only developed and expanded, it has received a significant amount of attention and support. Laidlaw-sponsored activities included seminars and conferences as well as a series of working papers exploring different areas and aspects of social inclusion as theory and applied policy. Funding was also provided for partner organizations involved in projects, such as the

development of inclusive indicators as well as research and public education on the welfare of Canada’s children.

In the last year, we have expanded and renewed the program’s advisory committee, renamed our program, and begun addressing new challenges.

Issues and Challenges

First and foremost, we must recognize that the “definition” of social inclusion is in development; it is not fixed as a concept or theory. A progressive and policy-relevant version of social inclusion will be rooted in practice, and it will recognize and respect different interpretations.

The social inclusion work we want to develop must combine theory and practice. As well, it must exhibit three essential features: It must deal with the structural roots of exclusion, be rooted in community (self-) organization and mobilization, and be transformative. It must lead to real, applied policy changes transforming the structures that promote exclusion and limit inclusion.

To deal with these issues, we need to appreciate fully the social and economic impact of rapid demographic and economic changes in Canada. Immigrants – those born outside of Canada – form a growing percentage of the population in our major urban centres, and are increasingly from non-European countries. There is an increasing degree of coincidence therefore between “newcomer” and “visible minority” status, precisely at a time when these newcomers face systemic barriers to the recognition of internationally acquired education and skills.² The alarming process of the racialization of poverty in Canada is, in fact, a product of these trends.

Ted Richmond is the Program Co-ordinator of the Inclusive Communities for Children, Youth and Families Pilot Program at the Laidlaw Foundation.

Poverty is not just an issue for newcomers. There has been a general deterioration of labour market opportunities for vulnerable groups, such as newcomers, those with a disability, young families, lone parents, and urban Aboriginal people. The world of work in Canada is becoming more precarious; the low-paid segment of the labour force is growing as a portion of the total employed; and long-term poverty is becoming more associated with paid employment. From a social inclusion perspective, we need to ask why certain groups identified more by social or cultural characteristics rather than economic features are at such risk of long-term poverty. The answers should lead us away from neo-liberal economic policies, emphasizing the universal benefits of general economic growth, and into a deeper understanding of the social supports and policy reforms needed by specific excluded communities.³

Since poverty is not just an issue for newcomers, we must realize that diversity issues go well beyond the labour market or even general economic well-being. Increasing ethno-racial diversity in our major urban centres poses challenges from a social inclusion perspective, because both the process and the end result of this inclusion must be re-negotiated. Ethno-racial communities, as with other excluded groups, will no longer accept the paternalism of being invited, one by one, to enter existing institutions. Rather, they are demanding their rightful voice and role in reshaping these institutions to combat exclusion and promote a truly inclusive form of Canadian diversity.⁴

The notion of social capital is also important to our work on social inclusion. We believe that both “bonding” and “bridging” networks and linkages are vital for combatting exclusion with vulnerable groups; and while government cannot create social capital, government policies can facilitate its development. The role of non-governmental service and

We recognize that the social inclusion application projects we support will have an experimental nature (new theories lead to new practices, and further debates on specific issues).

One example of a project we currently support (along with the Ontario Trillium Foundation) is Closing the Distance for Children in Sudbury.

The Children's Agenda Initiative promoted the development of inclusive communities in the cities and neighbourhoods where children and their families experience various forms of exclusion.

umbrella organizations in public education and advocacy – increasingly threatened by funding restrictions – is, in this regard, an issue of great concern.⁵

In his Laidlaw-sponsored working paper, Anver Saloojee emphasized that the development of social inclusion is a political process that depends on locating and transforming specific forms of exclusion.⁶ In other words, an inclusive society identifies the historical and material basis of various forms of exclusion and works actively to overcome them. This leads to a process involving social citizenship, mobilization and community organizing, and transformation (resource sharing, institutional changes).

Examples from Our Work

Due to the various factors outlined above, our program is moving toward a focus on support for pilot projects as a means to further develop the theory of social inclusion through dialogue with our partners based on practice.

The Social Planning Council of Sudbury has been engaged, in the last 18 months, in a project designed to create more inclusive school and recreation environments from the perspective of Greater Sudbury's children. The project is being extended to neighbourhood schools and community recreation programs over the next two years to introduce the voices of children into how learning and recreation occurs in these two important social environments. The initiative addresses all children, but will also pay particular attention to the inclusion and participation of children at higher risk of being left out or unheard (e.g., children dealing with linguistic and cultural barriers in Sudbury, such as Francophone and Aboriginal children). We think this is a good example of a project with grass-roots mobilization that deals with the non-economic forms of exclusion for vulnerable communities. We believe, as well, that the emphasis on listening to the voices of children provides a good demonstration of inclusion in practice.⁷

Part of our work involves supporting the activities of partner organizations, whether financially or through publicity and networking. Campaign 2000, which receives financial support from Laidlaw, has been working very actively across Canada on public education and mobilization, which links child poverty to broader issues including housing and labour market problems, child care and early childhood education. Another example is St. Christopher House, which is developing a truly grass-roots policy initiative with its project Income Security for Working-age Adults in Ontario.⁸

The development of inclusive indicators is another aspect of our work, essential to bridging social inclusion theory with social inclusion practice. We provided funding (along with Health Canada) to the inclusive indicators project carried out by the Ontario Prevention Clearinghouse, and we played an advisory role in the Health Canada funded Alternative Social Audit carried out by the Social Planning Council of Toronto and the Alternative Planning Group.⁹ We are working to structure a useful dialogue among the various groups involved in developing alternative social indicators.

We also consider it vital to work with both community organizations and various concerned funders to halt the destructive trends in financing of the non-governmental organization sector. The transition to narrowly defined service contract funding as the dominant form of government support to the community sector cannot be allowed to destroy the social capital represented by these organizations.¹⁰

We also work to build community capacity (or social capital) by promoting healthy research partnerships between the community and the academic sector. Currently, we are partners in a Ryerson University proposal to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Community-University Research Alliances, on the situation of newcomers with less than full status. We are also hosting networking meetings of researchers concerned with immigrant women's issues, and participating in a Canadian Institutes of Health Research funded research project, Racialized Communities and Health Status, led by the Access Alliance Community Multicultural Health Centre.

Finally, we continue to contribute to the conceptual work in exploring, debating, and refining the meaning of social inclusion in Canada. We are preparing an edited publication of some of the best of the working papers commissioned by Laidlaw and are working with various partners to develop seminars and forums that will link the issues of inclusion to current public policy options.

All this leads to lots of experimentation and public discussion. We don't expect our work to go smoothly; the issues are too complex, and the challenges are too great! But we do expect that with the help of our many partners, supporters, and friends, we can make small but real progress in advancing the inclusion agenda in Canada over the next few years.

Notes

- 1 I want to acknowledge the contributions of Uzma Shakir to this update on our social inclusion work at Laidlaw. Uzma is Executive Director of the Council of Agencies Serving South Asians (CASSA), and President of the Board at the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI). Uzma is also a member of our program Advisory Committee.
- 2 For a discussion of these issues as well as extensive references, see the Laidlaw Working Paper *Immigrant Settlement and Social Inclusion in Canada* (Ratna Omidvar and Ted Richmond, 2003), <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1069.cfm>.
- 3 For recent reflections on these issues, see Cynthia Williams, "Policy Responses for Groups at Risk of Long-Term Poverty" <http://www.queensu.ca/sps/queens_international_institute_on_social_policy/qiisp_2004/Session_3.williams.pdf>.
- 4 See, for example, the paper "Social Inclusion and the City" by the Alternative Planning Group <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1213.cfm>.
- 5 See, for example, Ted Richmond's paper presented to the Metropolis immigration research conference in Montréal in March 2004 "Promoting Newcomer Civic Engagement: The Role of Umbrella Organizations in Social Citizenship." <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1213.cfm>.
- 6 "Social Inclusion, Anti-Racism and Democratic Citizenship" (2003), <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1069.cfm>.
- 7 More information about this project, and others funded by our pilot program, can be found on the Laidlaw web site.
- 8 More information is available on the organizations' respective web sites.
- 9 For further information, see the web sites of the respective organizations.
- 10 See, for example, Ted Richmond and John Shields, *Third Sector Restructuring and the New Contracting Regime: The Case of Immigrant Serving Agencies in Ontario*, in the CERIS series, Policy Matters. <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1222.cfm>.

Adequate and Affordable Housing for All

June 24-27, 2004
Toronto, Ontario

Lori Brooks
Policy Research Initiative

During the conference, Adequate and Affordable Housing for All, the housing situation in Canada was often presented in terms of a crisis of historic proportions. Toronto's affordable housing shortage was compared to a refugee camp, with a major difference being that a camp at least has a level of standards required under UN guidelines. Advocates have also adopted the term "man-made national disaster" in an effort to bring more attention to the housing situation in Canada. By framing it in this way, advocates hope governments will respond with the same sense of urgency as they do to natural disasters.

The challenge of improving government support for housing was directly linked to efforts to raise public awareness. Presenters characterized federal government involvement in housing over the years as having been sporadic and limited at best.¹ They noted that the government's role has shifted to that of a facilitator in supporting home-ownership schemes for first-

time buyers and lower-income people through the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). Other federal programs discussed included the Supporting Community Projects Initiative (SCPI) and Residential Rehabilitation Assistance Programs (RRAP), both under the mandate of the National Homelessness Secretariat.

In recent years, provincial governments have increasingly downloaded housing management to the municipal level. In the absence of accompanying funds, many municipalities have experienced difficulties in coping with the added responsibilities. As a result, the challenge of dealing with the housing crisis tops the current agendas of many municipal governments. Toronto Mayor David Miller addressed the conference in the opening plenary, describing the efforts initiated in 1998 under the Mayor's Homelessness Action Task Force. These have included eviction prevention, a high level of outreach support, and a controversial project to redevelop the Regent Park public housing community.

Adequate and Affordable Housing for All brought together over 350 delegates and researchers from 40 countries that have been working to develop an understanding of the challenges of housing and homelessness. Representatives from both developing and industrialized countries spoke on their regional as well as global housing issues. The conference was organized by the University of Toronto's Centre for Urban and Community Studies under the auspices of the International Sociological Association's Research Committee on Housing and the Built Environment, co-sponsors included Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, the City of Toronto, Social Housing Services Corporation, and the Toronto Community Housing Corporation.

The conference had a broad mandate including themes based on raising awareness, gaining understanding, and increasing the impact of housing programs and policies. Considerable focus was also placed on issues surrounding homelessness including a framework on episodic homelessness, presented by Uzo Anucha.

At the time this article was written, Lori Brooks was an Analyst with the Policy Research Initiative.

Improved government efforts to address affordable housing needs require a sound understanding of the complex challenges involved. The affordable housing picture is complex. One element is the stagnation, or even decline, of rental stocks, especially at the lowest end, at a time when the economic situation of the most vulnerable in society has failed to improve. Presenters argued that levels of rental stocks have stagnated, because the profit incentives for developers in recent years have been principally in the construction of new homes for ownership and converting old rental stock into new condo units. As a result, while demand is increasing for affordable rental units, the relative numbers available are declining. Due to the increasing demand and declining supply of rental units, Toronto rents increased by 31% between 1997 and 2002. The social housing waiting lists in urban areas continue to grow in the tens of thousands, and shelter use is becoming a more common form of housing, especially for families.²

Discussions about how governments might improve the housing situation in Canada are generally framed in terms of supply-side and demand/income-side policies. In other words, should policy focus on interventions that address the actual supply of affordable and adequate housing or on improving the purchasing power of housing consumers, by way of vouchers or allowances, in the market as it currently functions? Many would argue that the supply of housing should be left alone, because market mechanisms will find the equilibrium point to best reconcile supply and demand. It was also observed that although the market functions very well for those above a certain income level, if you are poor, the housing

market does little to address your needs. The general consensus at the conference was that addressing this gap is the responsibility of the public sector.

With the laissez-faire, non-intervention approach at one end of the spectrum, at the other is the actual construction by the government of units for occupancy by low-income tenants. This, however, often comes in the form of public housing projects that can result in the social isolation of low-income communities, which has occurred along racial lines in the United States.

Between the two extremes of doing not much and building actual units lie several possibilities discussed at the conference. One is a city by-law that requires that a certain proportion of new developments be reserved for affordable housing units. Also included in the spectrum of policy options is the development of transitional spaces, such as emergency shelters, building supportive housing for people with special needs, and partnerships with developers in the construction of affordable housing and co-op units.

From a demand or income-side perspective, policy options include those that will affect what a person can acquire by increasing the amount of money they have available for housing. While social assistance programs take into account housing costs as part of the calculation of benefits, these amounts have not been rising proportionately to the cost of housing, and have therefore become inadequate to meet the basic needs for which they are intended.

One of the most well known demand-side policies is the housing voucher for people meeting certain means tests. In some instances, these vouchers will go

directly to the landlord, which may consequently pose other problems regarding stigmatization and discrimination. Quebec has instituted an allowance scheme wherein people meeting certain criteria are directly given a cash allowance intended for housing. Such options can be effective when local vacancy rates are high.

Another option that is beneficial for the so-called best-off of the worst-off is home-ownership incentive schemes. Toward this end, CMHC has been developing new financing and borrowing regulations for first-time home-owners. In addition, more innovative programs in the asset-based family have surfaced such as Home\$ave by the Social Enterprise Development Incorporation. This program matches savings of program participants, and allows these matched grants plus personal savings to be used toward home-ownership or home improvement goals.

Overall, the main message from the conference was that the best solutions would consist of both supply-side and demand-side approaches. There is no magic bullet. Rather, it is imperative that policy makers recognize the complexity of housing and its inter-relationship with poverty, exclusion, work, and income if they are to address the housing needs of low-income Canadians effectively.

Notes

- 1 Housing is under provincial authority, thus making involvement in this policy area a challenge for the federal government. Nevertheless, the federal government has actively sought to build affordable housing in urban areas at different times.
- 2 City of Toronto. 2003. *The Toronto Report Card on Housing and Homelessness*. Toronto: City of Toronto.

The Policy Research Needed to Support the Social Economy

A PRI-SSHRC Roundtable

September 28, 2004
Ottawa

Alan Painter
Policy Research Initiative

Alan Painter
is a Senior Policy Research Officer
with the Policy Research Initiative.

The social economy is a fairly new label for a diverse collection of organizations that have been producing and delivering goods and services across Canada and the world for over a century, generally at the community level. These organizations are separate from governments and different from commercial enterprises in that they involve a diverse collection of stakeholders in decisions, and reinvest profits to advance the mission of the organization, instead of disbursing them to shareholders. Examples include co-operatives, non-profit organizations, and credit unions.

The social economy has received considerable policy attention over the past decade in Europe and in several provinces, especially Quebec. Interest has also increased in Ottawa. As a concrete example, the February 2004 Speech from the Throne cited the Roasted Cherry Coffee House, located a few blocks from Parliament Hill. This coffee shop with a difference offers employment and a welcoming environment to young Canadians, particularly those at risk.

The focus of the day was not on the specific initiatives announced in the March 2004 federal budget, but on the policy research needed to provide fact-based, high-quality advice regarding possible future initiatives. The Roundtable explored what policy researchers need to examine now in consultation with practitioners and policy makers to better support organizations like the Roasted Cherry Coffee House to help Canadians.

The proceedings opened with a presentation by the Honourable Eleni Bakopanos, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Social Development

with special emphasis on Social Economy. The Parliamentary Secretary provided background on the social economy and its evolving role in Canada's communities. She wants to see research collaboration that is policy relevant.

Janet Halliwell, Executive Vice President of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC), provided an overview of the process underway to transform the organization from a granting council to a knowledge council. She also described the ongoing development of the new SSHRC Community-University Research Alliance (CURA) program on social economy. It will link research with communities and not-for-profit organizations to work on social and community economic development issues.

There was considerable discussion regarding the importance of community-level action and the promotion of self-help for individuals and communities. These concepts are clearly an important part of Canada's evolving social economy.

Several senior officials offered views on ongoing policy and program development efforts. Identified themes included citizen-led community-based processes, social innovation, corporate social responsibility, and employer demand for skills, particularly hybrid skills. Several participants emphasized the need to avoid creating silos of information across organizations.

Three experts from outside government made well-received presentations on the scope of the social economy.

- Marguerite Mendell from Concordia University provided an overview of the paper she

prepared with Benôit Lévesque from l'Université du Québec à Montréal to support the development of the CURA program on social economy. Professor Mendell's presentation emphasized the diversity of the social economy, which has been defined in a variety of ways since the 19th century. She noted, for example, that social economy organizations have contributed to the transformation as well as to the delivery of health services.

- Nancy Neamtan, Executive Director of le Chantier de l'économie sociale, described the social economy as an integral part of a pluralist economy. She outlined an emerging model for managing development that integrates social, economic, cultural, and environmental goals in communities. She provided several examples of how the social economy has evolved in Quebec in diverse sectors, such as home care and forestry, as well as examples of how the social economy is supported in different jurisdictions. Ms. Neamtan suggested that policies and programs need substantial change in recognition of the emerging model.
- Brett Fairbairn from the University of Saskatchewan provided an overview of the social economy outside Quebec. He noted that while co-operatives, mutuals, and associations all play a significant role across Canada, the social economy as a whole has not yet been conceptualized much as a single entity outside Quebec. For many organizations that make up the third sector throughout Canada, key underlying themes place people

before profit and emphasize the importance of community orientation. Professor Fairbairn ended his presentation with several questions and observations concerning the development of effective policy regimes. For example, he noted that public policies can be any of destructive, neutral, supportive, participating, or controlling. Care is needed when supporting the social economy not to inhibit the effectiveness of organizations that tend to value highly their autonomy.

Alan Painter from the PRI provided an overview of an issues paper shared with participants in advance of the Roundtable. The paper applied welfare economics principles and findings from the social economy literature, and made some broad observations regarding whether and how governments should support the social economy. It also identified policy research issues that might be explored in the future. The general conclusion of the paper was that the development of the social economy is a promising approach rather than a solution to the problem of how to direct public money to increase well-being.

There was considerable discussion and significant agreement at the Roundtable concerning future policy research priorities, although views differed on whether further data collection should be a priority. Asking what are the necessary conditions for the success of the social economy was identified as a good way to think about research priorities. Answering this question helps identify best practices which, in turn, need to be communicated to those within and outside governments who will apply them. Examining specific sectors, such as child

care, was also identified as a possible way forward. Framework policies adopted in different jurisdictions and reporting and evaluation were among the policy research issues identified as possible priorities.

While there was considerable productive discussion and information exchange during the day, one clear point of contention emerged. The concern was that the PRI issue paper represented a viewpoint that was too narrow and placed too much emphasis on economic considerations. There would be merit in exploring how diverse perspectives can and should inform policy development concerning the social economy.

As a specific next step, the PRI is preparing a publication based on the background documents distributed in advance of the Roundtable, additional research, and the presentations and discussions of the day. The document will be designed as a reference tool to support future policy research on the social economy. It will identify and discuss key policy research issues, and further explore the perspectives that underlie the development of policy advice. The document will also include resources useful to policy researchers.

In addition, the PRI's December conference, *Exploring New Approaches to Social Policy*, will include a workshop on the social economy. It will explore the role of government and of policy research in supporting the social economy based on the underlying objective of increasing the well-being of Canadians, with speakers representing a variety of perspectives.

A Life-Course Approach to Social Policy

Queen's International
Institute on Social Policy

August 23, 2004

Ali Béjaoui
Policy Research Initiative

Starting in 2011, when significant numbers of baby boomers begin to leave the labour market, we will see a decrease in the total number of hours worked and, commensurately, in economic growth. Will keeping elderly workers in the labour market longer be enough to counteract this trend? That was the issue on people's minds following Jean-Pierre Voyer's (Policy Research Initiative) presentation, *A Life-Course Approach to Social Policy Analysis*. The presentation renewed the debate on this topic at a conference organized by the Queen's University International Institute on Social Policy, held August 23, 2004.

While the economic impacts of aging were only one aspect of the analytical framework presented by Voyer, they were a focal point for speakers at the conference. This was expected given the emphasis that most OECD countries place on the tax repercussions of aging, and the consequent need to reform the pension system.

Although they are significant, the life-course analytical framework looks at more than tax repercussions. The framework is based on the premise that the classic vision of a linear, three-stage life course (education-work-retirement) is no longer the societal norm. Increasingly, the three stages are overlapping, which affects how we allocate time to each one. While we have less time during our lives to combine work, education, and family responsibilities (caring for children and parents), we will have more time at retirement (given the increase in life expectancy). Thus, people need more flexibility so they can better allocate time throughout their life course. Giving more flexibility to senior citizens, so they can work longer and

enjoy a progressive retirement is only one aspect of a life-course analytical framework. Various surveys have already shown that Canadians want to work longer.

The benefits of the life-course framework were emphasized in Michael Wolfson's (Statistics Canada) presentation on the need for accurate simulation models to support the analytical framework, and in the presentation by Peter Hicks (Social Development Canada). Hicks used the analytical framework to highlight the periods in which people experience time crunches and how those periods affect their well-being throughout their lives. Empirical data show that these time crunches, are associated with marital status and caring for children. Hicks advocated an approach that links the under-used pool of time during the retirement years to the high demand periods of time during the active periods of a person's life.

While no direct link has been established, there seems to be a relationship between high demand time periods, personal well-being, and low income over the life course. Garnett Picot (Statistics Canada) presented the results of an analysis measuring low income over the life course in which family characteristics (marital status and children) play an important role. This relationship is one more argument in favour of a life-course approach to social policy.

Although there is a consensus on the need for a life-course approach, opinion is still divided on how to operationalize the analytical framework.

In this regard, John Myles (University of Toronto) warned conference participants against any social policy aimed

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solely at senior citizens. He maintained that this type of policy only increases intergenerational conflict. Unlike their counterparts in the 1960s and 1970s, recent retirees have accumulated enough wealth to enjoy a comfortable retirement. However, the outlook for future generations is not as rosy. Because of increased educational requirements and family responsibilities, the generation made up of the children and

However, the importance of a life-course approach that does not discriminate on the basis of age and reflects the characteristics of various socio-cultural groups did not help much to advance the debate on operationalizing the analytical framework. Anne-Marie Guillemard (Sorbonne) gave the proceedings a push in this direction in her presentation on how European countries have managed to counteract decreased employment

David Foot addressed the first issue in this regard: the current pension system does not give people the flexibility to work while receiving retirement income. In addition, contribution limits encourage employers to demand more from older employees rather than hire other workers. While pension reform is recognized as being essential to increased flexibility, another important factor is the availability of jobs that are flexible enough to interest not only senior citizens, but the population in general. The issues of flexibility and the availability of quality employment have not been explored in the Canadian context, but they relate back to the need for concerted and collaborative action among institutions (government and employers), as mentioned by Guillemard.

Aside from availability and flexibility, areas in which employers play a major part, progress has been made in realizing a life-course approach. Andrew Treusch added to the debate by presenting labour-force-based policies that affect continuous learning, which is an integral part of a life-course approach to policy. In his analysis, Michael Mendelson (Caledon Institute) pointed out the relationship between savings vehicles and provincial social assistance programs (usually people's savings must be exhausted before they can access the programs). Once again, the discussion came back to concerted action and dialogue among organizations (levels of government). To conclude the evaluation of these policies, Mendelson recommended that the objectives of labour-force-based policies be determined before their results are evaluated.

There seems to be a relationship between high demand time periods, personal well-being, and low income over the life course.

grandchildren of the baby boomers will begin working and accumulating wealth later in life. Social policy needs to focus on this generation. It requires more assistance in terms of access to continuous learning, post-secondary studies, and training. Myles added that, as the population ages, future generations will have to support the growing cost of pension systems.

In her presentation, Cynthia Williams (CPRN) echoed the warning about social policies that discriminate based on age. She stated that, of the five groups identified as being at greater risk of experiencing persistent poverty, only one is defined in terms of age: unattached persons aged 45 and older. The other groups are defined in terms of socio-cultural status (single mothers, Aboriginal people, those with a disability and recent immigrants). A policy that discriminates on the basis of age could increase intragenerational inequities (inequities within a single age group). Williams recognized the importance of a life-course approach since these groups are affected by poverty throughout their lives.

among senior citizens (in Sweden and Finland). These countries underwent a cultural change as they moved from a management style based on segmentation by age group to one based on diversity. At the same time, they introduced a new social policy that is age neutral and encourages people to remain active as they age. This cultural change was sparked by the creation of quality jobs to increase the flexibility and mobility that people need to work at any age. These policies bring together current employment programs, continuous learning programs, and a reformed pension system, with the goal of increasing flexibility. It is worth noting that this cultural change came about through the concerted effort and close collaboration of various stakeholders (different levels of government, communities, businesses and unions).

Guillemard's presentation brought the discussion to a more concrete level concerning the life-course approach to social policy: how to identify and overcome barriers to flexibility.

As with any federal initiative, as soon as we begin to translate policies into programs, we run up against funding problems and the perennial stumbling block of jurisdiction. Tom Kent (School of Policy Studies) reiterated the importance of considering and respecting provincial jurisdictions when developing programs. Hugh Segal (IRPP) supported Kent's call for caution, and advocated the use of tax credits to leverage action in sensitive areas, such as day care and social housing, which greatly influence the life-course of Canadians.

We can conclude that a consensus emerged on the life-course approach to social policy at the conference. In addition, reforming the pension system to create greater flexibility seems essential. This reform must be accompanied by the creation of quality jobs that offer increased flexibility, not only for seniors, but for all Canadians. While the creation of these jobs is outside the area of social policy, the federal government can still act as a catalyst. Launching a national debate on aging from a life-course perspective could help to introduce pension reform and bring the various socio-economic stakeholders together around such thorny issues as poverty, continuous learning, and work-family balance. The overall economic impact of aging, and the tax repercussions in particular, offer an opportunity to introduce this debate and strive for a social consensus.

Canada – United States Regulatory Cooperation

There is considerable evidence that NAFTA has generated substantial economic benefits for Canada. However, many argue that more regulatory cooperation with the United States can deliver greater economic benefits, all the while safeguarding, and even improving, the integrity of Canada's regulatory system.

This issue was addressed at a joint PRI-SSHRC symposium on Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation, held on October 29, 2004 in Ottawa. The purpose of the symposium was to discuss key research issues arising from the PRI's Interim Report, *Canada-US Regulatory Cooperation: Charting a Path Forward*.

By the end of the day, the discussions focused on how to move forward on this policy agenda with a clear, practical, and above all, politically achievable strategy. On balance, the discussions set out the following themes:

- There is a need to accelerate Canada-US regulatory cooperation.
- Political commitment and a practical plan are required.
- There is a need to develop a central or unifying theme to engage the Canadian public and US partners.
- Any strategy must be supported by a sound internal organizational framework, and provide a role for Parliament.

A report from the symposium is available on the PRI web site at <www.policyresearch.gc.ca>. For more information on the work of the PRI on Canada-US regulatory cooperation issues, please contact Doug Blair, Project Director, at 613 947.3912 or at d.blair@prs-srp.gc.ca.

Using Market-Based Instruments for Water Demand Management

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It is often suggested that Canada should make greater use of market-based instruments (MBIs) to support sustainable development. To explore this proposition, the Policy Research Initiative launched its new freshwater project with an experts' symposium on Canadian and international experiences with MBIs for water demand management.²

Market-based instruments depend on complex legislative and administrative arrangements, and so are a product of, and are constrained by, specific institutional contexts. For water demand management, the main MBIs reviewed were prices, taxes, or markets, applied with the intention of modifying the incentives to individuals, firms, or institutions regarding their decisions to use water. The symposium examined MBIs in the residential, agricultural, and industrial contexts, as well as experiences with the creation of markets to allocate water.

Understanding Water Use

Water is a very special resource that can meet very different needs. Water can be used for drinking or for cooling in industrial processes, two uses that do not need the same water quality. As David Brooks (Friends of the Earth) reminded us, the demand is often not for the water itself, but for the variety of services it provides.

We do not have a comprehensive knowledge of present water uses in Canada. The last industrial water use survey was done in 1996. In addition, we have limited knowledge of our groundwater resources and their relation to surface waters.

We do know three important facts.

- Although Canada is relatively well endowed with water, it is not always where we need it.
- There are signs of increasing water scarcity in a number of regions, often compounded by water pollution.
- Municipal water infrastructures are falling into disrepair even as growing urban populations demand increased supplies of treated water and place increased demand on wastewater treatment capacity.

Finding the Right Price

Using pricing to promote sustainable use of water involves taking into account environmental costs when charging users. In Canada, however, municipal and agricultural water use is generally subsidized, and most utilities do not recover all their treatment and distribution costs. In this context, some argue that the priority should be to make sure consumers receive the right signals on water use and thus make informed choices. Once this is done, one can begin including environmental costs in water prices.

But, finding the right pricing strategy to send the right signal is not a simple task. The cost of metering individual dwellings or farms, a prerequisite to knowing how much water they use and should pay for, is high. Studies also show that while price matters, it may not be very effective in the short run to modify water use patterns. A related problem is that utilities have limited understanding of consumers' concerns and preferences and face the

risk of actually losing revenues if price changes are too large. Diane Dupont (Brock University) thus argues that the regulatory environment faced by utilities should be modified so they have the incentive to better understand their client's view of their services, and meet pre-specified performance standards, which should simplify and legitimize the process of establishing realistic pricing strategies. She reviewed examples from Great Britain, noting that regulatory changes do not have to involve privatization.

Another important issue is to plan adequately for infrastructure needs. Utilities most often plan for peak demand, usually in the summer when people water their gardens and wash their cars. This leads to over-investment in infrastructure, which is only used at full capacity for a few days each year. An option reviewed by Jim Robinson (University of Waterloo) is to introduce peak use rates so consumers better plan their water use, and utilities can benefit from a reduced peak demand. Utilities could experiment with these rates with a sample of consumers to determine the effectiveness of this strategy. Phil Dick (Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food) presented another option to control infrastructure needs, with the experience of Leamington, Ontario, a municipality with a large number of heavy water users. Early in the history of the municipality, a large water user – Heinz – got involved in the planning process and helped design a system based on capacity management where large users shift their water consumption to times of non-peak use.

In the industrial sector, 90% of companies withdraw water directly from a lake or river. While they pay for their

own water infrastructure, these companies pay very little for accessing water, and thus for the environmental cost of withdrawing it. One option for governments is to implement a charge (or tax) for using water, which could reflect the actual quantity of water used. Steven Renzetti (Brock University) explained that although companies are sensitive to changes in the price of water, we do not know how

One option is to introduce peak use rates so consumers better plan their water use, and utilities can benefit from a reduced peak demand.

sensitive. To establish the right level of tax requires knowledge about the value firms give to water, which varies, and therefore requires extensive analysis and is costly. Furthermore, raising water prices through taxes could negatively affect exporting industries. Stefan Speck (Consultant) noted that European experience does not show a detectable impact of water taxes on industrial competitiveness, but this could be because a number of sectors in Europe have been shielded from these taxes. In fact, Pierre Strosser (Consultant) argued, European water taxes have been used mainly for revenue generation and not for environmental purposes.

Yacov Tsur (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) showed how to establish efficient pricing of water in the agriculture sector to reconcile supply and demand considerations. Reducing water use is crucial in this sector, which is the largest in terms of water consumption. (Thermoelectric power generation uses more water, but returns most to the river or lake from

which it is taken.) But efficient pricing has to be examined in light of the cost of implementing it, which can be high enough to offset the expected benefits. Two other important lessons are that:

- covering the fixed costs of water supply should be decoupled from farmers' water demand decisions; and

- water prices (without quotas) have limited distributional effects.

Looking at the broad picture when designing pricing schemes is important. In all countries, as Pierre Strosser and David Eaton (University of Texas, Austin) remarked, agricultural water use is subsidized. But price may not be the most important factor in explaining water consumption. Agricultural subsidies that promote particular water-demanding or dry-land crops play a more important role.

Prices and Markets

If it is difficult for utilities or governments to find the right price or tax, why not create water markets, where free exchanges between willing buyers and sellers would take care of the problem? Markets would ensure an efficient allocation of water, in the economic sense, since it would move from lower to higher value uses.

The examples of California and Texas, presented respectively by Richard Howitt (University of California, Davis) and David Eaton (University of

Texas at Austin), show mixed results. A first point to note is, as is the case with the Alberta allocation transfer system presented by Beverly Yee (Alberta Environment), trade accounts only for a fraction of water used, and appears to be mostly an adjustment mechanism to cope with uncertainty and annual changes in water flows. In that sense, then, markets can indeed foster more efficient allocation of water. Regulators of the California market, however, have had to develop other instruments to take into account environmental or third party effects (effects on users external to the trade), apparently with success. In Texas, while the market is functioning well, there are signs that less well-off communities and smaller farmers are disadvantaged. An important concern, at least in Texas, is that the creation of markets has provided more efficient water circulation but it has not led to more efficient water use.

More generally, David Zilberman (University of California at Berkeley) argued, experiences with the implementation of markets show that existing systems of water allocation and rights based on seniority rules, coupled with the relatively low price of water, can limit incentives for trading. In addition, implementing markets can be costly. Government intervention is required to set them up, and to ensure monitoring and enforcement of rules. The existence of transaction costs can also limit the efficiency of markets. These costs can be high, which means water markets may not become more attractive until the resource is really scarce.

According to Mike Young (CSIRO Land and Water, Australia), the Australian experience shows that markets can be

efficient to allocate water and to create new economic opportunities. However, one should look beyond them to find the appropriate tools to deal with social and environmental goals. From a policy standpoint, different goals should be pursued with different policy tools, which leads to the question of finding the appropriate instruments. For Young, the answer lies in history, with the knowledge acquired in applying specific instruments for specific goals, such as licensing to control access to a resource.

MBIs, Co-operation, and Sustainable Development

Preliminary conclusions suggest that MBIs can play a role to foster water demand management, but that role will depend on the location and institutional context in which they are applied. An important hurdle is the need to better understand and account for implementation costs, including transaction and institutional costs. A number of examples reviewed show also that co-operation can lead to a better appreciation for the need to use MBIs, and incidentally lower some of the implementation costs in designing and applying them. Co-operation requirements also apply to relevant federal and provincial agencies that have different, but complementary, responsibilities for water management. Co-operation could, in fact, extend to program evaluation and controlled experiments, as suggested by Theodore Horbulyk (University of Calgary).

Another important conclusion is that MBIs will not promote sustainable development on their own. While they can lead to more efficient water use or help recover costs, meeting

environmental or social objectives requires other, carefully designed, policy instruments. Depending on the type of water use, and the specific location, different approaches might have to be adopted.

Given this, it might be time to follow David Brooks' suggestion and start water soft path planning, that is, carefully analyze the bundle of services required from water resources, project an ideal future social setting, and back-cast from there. In this way, we clarify the contemporary decisions needed to meet a desired future outcome.

In other words, it might be time to determine more precisely where we want to go, before we select the appropriate policy tools to get there.

Notes

- 1 A complete synthesis report from this symposium is available on the PRI Web site at <www.policyresearch.gc.ca>.
- 2 The symposium was made possible by way of partnerships with Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, Environment Canada, and the Canadian Water Network. Over 60 experts, academics, and practitioners from Australia, Israel, the United States, and Europe, as well as policy makers from the Canadian federal, provincial, and municipal governments participated.

Community Social Data Strategy

Empowering the Local Level

**John Anderson and
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The Community Social Data Strategy (CSDS) is a new initiative from the Canadian Council on Social Development (CCSD), in partnership with Statistics Canada.¹ This participatory project democratizes access to social data at the community level. The result is improved research, policy and advocacy capacities at the local level. The adage that knowledge is power has been extended to community knowledge is community power, and is one of the foundations of this project.

The CSDS involves 13 communities across Canada, with more to join soon.² Each community builds a consortium to administer the project. It usually includes the city or municipality and organizations such as the Social Planning Council and the United Way. These consortia then access and share very large amounts of Statistics Canada social data on life in their communities.

These data are highly detailed and comprehensive. They paint a picture down to the neighbourhood level (census tract or dissemination area) and cover work, housing, low-income levels, and much more. The data are primarily from the 2001 Census, but also include all major Statscan products and the small areas administrative data gathered from tax files. A special run of data on low-income called the Urban Poverty Project is also provided to complete data sets at the neighbourhood level. Together, these data sources provide comprehensive information that cross-tabulates low-income neighbourhood status by family, visible minority, and Aboriginal status to name just a few themes.

The CSDS initiative is particularly well suited to examine issues of low income in our cities. The *Poverty by*

Postal Code report produced by the CCSD and the United Way of Greater Toronto showed that it is not enough to look at low-income changes or comparisons by city. The real story of deepening and growing concentrations of poverty is in the neighbourhoods. The CSDS is designed so communities can develop a set of indicators for what is happening in their own backyards.

Consortia targeting the issue of poverty have been established either around purchasing the complete package of data or just the urban poverty data. These projects provide a great opportunity to help build and strengthen the research and advocacy capacities of organizations in cities both large and small.

Developing a local consortium maximizes the use of Statscan data. It is also a highly effective tool for sharing administrative data from municipalities, health units, and many other non-profit organizations. In this way, these consortia can become real local hubs of information and empower municipalities, non-profits, and local citizenry.

It costs up to *two-thirds less* than what any city would pay to buy these data on their own. But even more important than the price, the initiative enables communities to share both the costs and the data with any number of non-profit organizations in their region.

Notes

- 1 For more information on the CCSD, please visit <www.ccsd.ca/subsites/socialdata/home.html>.
- 2 Regions already involved in the CSDS include Calgary, Edmonton, Halton Region, Hamilton, London, Ottawa, Peterborough, Red Deer, Region of Peel, Region of York, Toronto, Waterloo Region, and Simcoe County.

Stratégie d'accès communautaire aux statistiques sociales Pour une prise en charge au niveau local

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La Stratégie d'accès communautaire aux statistiques sociales (SACASS) est une nouvelle initiative du Conseil canadien de développement social (CCDS) prise en partenariat avec Statistique Canada¹. Ce projet participatif démocratise l'accès aux statistiques sociales au niveau de la communauté. Il se traduit par de meilleures capacités de recherche, d'élaboration de politiques et de défense des droits à l'échelle locale. L'adage selon lequel savoir c'est pouvoir est l'une des inspirations de ce projet.

Actuellement, treize communautés de partout au Canada participent à la SACASS, et d'autres s'y joindront bientôt². Chaque communauté forme un consortium pour administrer le projet. Ce consortium est générale-ment formé de la ville ou de la municipalité, ainsi que d'organismes comme les conseils de planification sociale et Centraide. Il peut ensuite utiliser et partager un volume considérable de données sur la réalité locale provenant de Statistique Canada.

Ces statistiques sont très exhaustives. Elles vont jusqu'à brosser le portrait d'un quartier (secteur de recensement ou aire de dissémination) et portent sur le travail, le logement, les niveaux de faible revenu et bien plus. La plupart de ces statistiques proviennent du recensement de 2001, mais aussi de tous les produits majeurs de Statistique Canada, et des données administratives régionales tirées des fichiers d'impôts. Un ensemble spécial de données sur les faibles revenus appelle Projet sur la pauvreté urbaine est également inclus pour compléter les statistiques de quartier. Prises ensemble, ces sources de statistiques fournissent une information exhaustive qui décompose le statut de quartier à faible revenu en données sur les familles, les minorités visibles et les Autochtones, pour ne nommer que quelques thèmes.

L'initiative SACASS convient particulièrement bien à l'étude des problèmes de faible revenu dans nos villes. Le rapport *Poverty by Postal Code* produit

par le CCDS et United Way of Greater Toronto (Centraide Toronto) montre qu'il ne suffit pas de s'arrêter aux variations ou aux comparaisons de faible revenu entre les villes. C'est dans les quartiers que s'observent les vrais problèmes d'aggravation et de concentration de la pauvreté. La SACASS est conçue pour que les communautés élaborent un ensemble d'indicateurs sur ce qui se passe chez elles. Des consortiums s'occupant de lutte à la pauvreté ont été formés pour acheter l'ensemble complet de statistiques ou seulement les statistiques sur la pauvreté urbaine. Pour les organismes des petites et des grandes villes, ces projets sont une excellente occasion de construire et de renforcer les capacités de recherche et de défense des droits.

La formation d'un consortium local optimise l'utilisation des données de Statistique Canada. C'est également un outil très efficace pour partager des données administratives provenant des municipalités, des services de santé et de divers organismes à but non lucratif. Ces consortiums deviennent ainsi de véritables plaques tournantes locales de l'information, et donnent de l'autonomie aux municipalités, aux organismes à but non lucratif et à la base citoyenne locale.

Le coût de ce système est parfois des *deux tiers* inférieur à ce que toute ville paierait pour acheter elle-même ces statistiques. Mais plus importante encore que le prix est la capacité qu'ont les communautés de partager aussi bien les coûts que les données avec des organismes à but non lucratif de leur région.

Notes

- 1 Pour de plus amples renseignements, veuillez visiter : <www.ccsd.ca/subsites/socialdata/home.html>.
- 2 Les régions participant déjà à la SACASS sont les suivantes : Calgary, Edmonton, région de Halton, Hamilton, London, Ottawa, Peterborough, Red Deer, région de Peel, région de York, Toronto, région de Waterloo, Comité de Simcoe.

Les exemples de la Californie et du Texas, présentes respectivement par Richard Howitt (Université de Californie, Davis) et David Eaton (Université du Texas à Austin), donnent des résultats contradictoires. D'abord, il convient de remarquer que, comme c'est le cas avec le système albertain de transfert des allocations, présente par Beverly Yee (Alberta Environment), les échanges commerciaux ne comptent que pour une fraction de l'eau utilisée, et équivalaient simplement à un mécanisme permettant de s'adapter à l'incertitude et aux fluctuations annuelles des débits. Vus de cette façon, les marchés peuvent être efficaces de l'eau. Les organismes de réglementation du marché californien ont cependant dû élaborer des instruments qui tiennent compte des effets sur l'environnement ou des tiers (utilisateurs externes au commerce de l'eau), avec succès semble-t-il. Au Texas, bien que le marché fonctionne bien, il y a des signes selon lesquels des communautés moins favorisées et des petits agriculteurs seraient désavantagés. Il convient de souligner que, à tout le moins au Texas, la création de marchés a permis une circulation plus efficace de l'eau, mais pas une utilisation optimisée.

De façon plus générale, explique David Zilberman (Université de Californie à Berkeley), les expériences de mise en place de marchés révèlent que les systèmes existants de distribution d'eau et les droits fondés sur l'ancien-neté, lorsqu'ils sont associés aux prix relativement bas de l'eau, n'incitent pas aux échanges commerciaux. En outre, la mise en place de marchés peut s'avérer coûteuse. Une intervention gouvernementale est nécessaire pour les mettre sur pied et assurer leur surveillance et l'application des règles. L'existence de coûts de transaction peut également limiter l'efficacité des marchés. Ces coûts peuvent être élevés, ce qui signifie que les marchés de l'eau ne deviendront intéressants qu'une fois la ressource devenue vraiment rare.

Selon Mike Young (CSIRO Land and Water, Australie) le cas australien montre que les marchés peuvent se montrer utiles pour distribuer l'eau et créer des occasions économiques. Cependant, il faut aller au-delà des marchés pour trouver les outils qui permettront d'atteindre les objectifs sociaux et environnementaux. D'un point de vue stratégique, pour chaque objectif il y a un outil différent, ce qui soulève la question de trouver cet outil. Pour Mike Young, la réponse se trouve dans l'histoire, avec toutes les connaissances que l'on acquiert dans l'application d'instruments précis à des objectifs précis, comme la délivrance de permis pour accéder à une ressource.

Les conclusions préliminaires laissent supposer que les IRMM peuvent favoriser la gestion de la demande d'eau, mais que cela dépendra du lieu et du contexte institutionnel dans lesquels ils seront appliqués. Un obstacle majeur est la nécessité de mieux comprendre les coûts d'application et d'en rendre compte avec précision, y compris les coûts de transactions et institutionnels. Certains exemples étudiés révèlent également que la coopération peut mener à une meilleure appréciation de la nécessité d'utiliser les IRMM, et par le fait même réduire certains coûts de mise en oeuvre relatifs à la conception et à l'application. Les exigences en matière de coopération s'appliquent également aux organismes fédéraux et provinciaux qui ont des responsabilités différentes, mais complémentaires, en matière de gestion de l'eau. La coopération pourrait même s'étendre à l'évaluation des programmes et à des expériences contrôlées, comme le suggère Theodore Horbulyk (Université de Calgary).

Notes

- 1 Un résumé complet de ce symposium est disponible sur le site web du PRP à <www.policyresearch.gc.ca>.
 - 2 Ce symposium a été rendu possible grâce à des partenariats avec Agriculture et Agroalimentaire (Canada, la fondation Walter et Duncan Gordon, Environnement Canada et le Réseau canadien de l'eau. Ont participé plus de 60 experts, universitaires et praticiens d'Australie, d'Israël, des États-Unis et de l'Europe, ainsi que des responsables de l'élaboration des politiques des gouvernements fédéral, provinciaux et municipaux du Canada.
- Une autre conclusion importante est que les IRMM ne favoriseront pas le développement durable par eux-mêmes. Même s'ils peuvent donner lieu à une utilisation plus efficace de l'eau ou aider à recouvrer des coûts, l'atteinte d'objectifs environnementaux ou sociaux nécessite d'autres outils d'intervention bien conçus. Selon le type d'utilisation de l'eau et le lieu d'utilisation, des approches différentes peuvent s'imposer.
- Ceci étant dit, il serait peut-être temps de suivre la suggestion de David Brooks et de commencer à planifier des « solutions douces pour l'eau », il s'agit d'analyser soigneusement l'ensemble des services que l'on attend des réserves d'eau, d'imaginer un milieu social futur que l'on considère comme idéal, puis de faire une analyse rétrospective à partir de là. Ainsi, nous clarifions les décisions qu'il faut prendre maintenant pour arriver à un résultat souhaité dans l'avenir.
- En d'autres mots, il serait temps de se faire une idée bien précise de la destination, avant de choisir l'outil d'intervention qui nous y mènera.

préférences des consommateurs, et qu'ils risquent de perdre des revenus si les changements de prix sont trop grands. Diane Dupont (Université de Brock) affirme que le cadre réglementaire des services publics devrait être modifié, pour inciter ces derniers à mieux comprendre le point de vue du client et à respecter des normes de rendement pré-établies, ce qui devrait simplifier et légitimer le processus d'établissement de stratégies de prix réalistes. Elle a donné des exemples pris en Grande-Bretagne, en soulignant que les changements réglementaires n'impliquent pas nécessairement la privatisation.

Il importe aussi de planifier adéquat-ment les besoins en infrastructures. Le plus souvent, les services publics sont planifiés en fonction des pointes de consommation, qui ont généralement lieu en été, lorsque les gens arrosent leurs jardins et lavent leurs voitures. Cette façon de faire conduit à un sur-investissement en infrastructures, qui sont utilisées à pleine capacité quelques jours seulement par année. Une solution envisagée par Jim Robinson (Université de Waterloo) consiste à introduire des tarifs de pointe, ainsi, les consommateurs planifieraient mieux leur utilisation d'eau et les services publics bénéficieraient d'une réduction de la demande de pointe. Les services publics pourraient tester ces tarifs sur un échantillon de consommateurs pour déterminer l'efficacité de cette stratégie. Phil Dick (Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Alimentation de l'Ontario) propose une autre solution, basée sur le cas de Leamington, en Ontario, une municipalité où il y a beaucoup de gros utilisateurs d'eau. Durant les premières années d'existence de la municipalité, un de ces utilisateurs (Heinz) a participé à la conception d'un système par lequel les gros utilisateurs faisaient correspondre leur consommation d'eau aux périodes hors pointe.

demande de pointe.

Une solution envisagée consiste à introduire des tarifs de pointe; ainsi, les consommateurs planifieraient mieux leur utilisation d'eau et les services publics bénéficieraient d'une réduction de la

Dans l'industrie, 90 pour cent des entreprises prélèvent leur eau directement dans un lac ou une rivière. Bien qu'elles assument les frais de leur propre infrastructure d'adduction, elles dépensent très peu pour leur accès à l'eau si l'on considère le coût environnemental de ce prélèvement. Les gouvernements ont la possibilité de lever une taxe sur l'eau, qui refléterait la quantité réelle d'eau utilisée. Selon Steven Renzetti (Université de Brock),

- la couverture des coûts fixes de l'approvisionnement en eau devrait être dissociée des décisions prises par l'agriculteur concernant la demande d'eau;

les entreprises sont sensibles aux fluctuations du prix de l'eau, mais l'on ne sait pas jusqu'à quel point. Pour déterminer le bon niveau de taxation, il faut connaître la valeur que les entreprises donnent à l'eau, et comme cette valeur n'est pas toujours la même, il faut procéder à des analyses approfondies et coûteuses. En outre, hausser le prix de l'eau par la taxation risquerait de pénaliser des industries exportatrices. Stefan Speck (consultant) souligne qu'en Europe, il n'y a pas d'effet mesurable des taxes d'eau sur la compétitivité industrielle, mais que cette situation serait attribuable au fait que certains secteurs sont protégés de ce genre de taxe. En fait, précise Pierre Strosser (consultant), les taxes d'eau européennes servent surtout à générer des revenus et non à protéger l'environnement.

Yacov Tsur (Université hébraïque de Jérusalem) montre comment établir une tarification efficace de l'eau en agriculture pour concilier les aspects de l'offre et de la demande. Il est primordial de réduire l'utilisation d'eau dans ce secteur, qui en consomme plus que tout autre (les centrales thermiques utilisent davantage d'eau, mais en retournent la plus grande partie dans

Prix et marchés

- les prix de l'eau (sans quotas) ont des effets redistributifs limités. Il est utile d'avoir une vision d'ensemble quand il s'agit d'élaborer des systèmes de tarification. Dans tous les pays, comme Pierre Strosser et David Eaton (Université du Texas, Austin) l'ont fait remarquer, l'utilisation agricole de l'eau est subventionnée. Mais le prix n'est peut-être pas le facteur le plus important de la consommation d'eau. Les subventions qui favorisent un type d'agriculture très exigeant en eau, l'agriculture en terre sèche par exemple, joueraient un rôle encore plus important.

Si les services publics ou les gouvernements ont de la difficulté à trouver le bon prix ou la bonne taxe, alors pourquoi ne pas créer des marchés de l'eau dans lesquels des acheteurs et des vendeurs concluraient de gré à gré des transactions qui régleraient le problème? Les marchés assureraient une distribution efficace de l'eau, du point de vue économique, car elle serait réorientée vers des utilisations à forte valeur ajoutée.

Les instruments reposant sur les mécanismes du marché dans la gestion de la demande d'eau

Les 14 et 15 juin 2004
Ottawa

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Où le Canada devrait faire plus souvent appel aux instruments reposant sur les mécanismes du marché (IRMM) pour appuyer le développement durable. Pour explorer cette proposition, le Projet de recherche sur les politiques a lancé son nouveau projet sur les eaux douces par un symposium d'experts qui ont étudié les expériences canadiennes et internationales liées aux IRMM de gestion de la demande d'eau.

Les IRMM sont établis par des dispositions législatives et administratives complexes, et sont, par conséquent, générés et encadrés dans des contextes institutionnels précis. En ce qui concerne la gestion de la demande d'eau, les principaux IRMM étudiés sont l'établissement des prix, les taxes ou les marchés, que l'on applique pour influencer les décisions des particuliers, des sociétés et des institutions concernant leur utilisation de l'eau. Le symposium s'est penché sur les IRMM dans les contextes domestique, agricole et industriel, ainsi que sur les expériences de création de marchés servant à répartir l'eau.

Le contexte – comprendre l'utilisation de l'eau

L'eau est une ressource très particulière qui peut répondre à des besoins très différents. Elle peut servir comme boisson ou pour le refroidissement dans des procédés industriels, deux utilisations qui n'exigent pas le même niveau de qualité. Comme l'a rappelé David Brooks (Les Amis de la Terre), il arrive souvent que la demande ne vise pas l'eau elle-même, mais les différents services qu'elle assure. Nous n'avons pas une connaissance approfondie des utilisations actuelles de l'eau au Canada. La dernière enquête sur l'utilisation industrielle de l'eau a été effectuée en 1996. En outre, nous connaissons peu nos ressources en eaux souterraines et les relations de ces dernières avec les eaux de surface.

- Par contre, nous savons trois choses importantes :
- même si le Canada est relativement riche en eau, cette eau ne se trouve pas toujours là où elle est nécessaire;
- il y a des signes de rareté de l'eau dans certaines régions, une rareté souvent aggravée par la pollution;
- les infrastructures municipales sont en train de se délabrer, alors que la croissance des populations urbaines nécessite un approvisionnement accru en eau traitée et une plus grande capacité de traitement des eaux usées.

Trouver le juste prix

Agir sur les prix de façon à promouvoir l'utilisation durable de l'eau exige de tenir compte des coûts environnementaux lorsqu'on fait payer les utilisateurs. Cependant, au Canada, l'utilisation domestique et agricole de l'eau est généralement subventionnée, et la plupart des services publics ne récupèrent pas tous leurs frais de traitement et de distribution. Dans ce contexte, certains affirment qu'il faudrait, en priorité, s'assurer que les consommateurs reçoivent les bons messages en matière d'utilisation de l'eau afin qu'ils fassent des choix éclairés. Une fois cette étape franchie, on peut commencer à inclure les coûts environnementaux dans les prix de l'eau. Cependant, il n'est pas simple de trouver la stratégie de prix qui enverra le bon message. Pour savoir combien consomme une habitation ou une exploitation agricole, et fixer les prix en conséquence, il faut mesurer la portance du prix, il ne sera peut-être pas très efficace à court terme pour modifier les habitudes de consommation. L'autre problème, c'est que les services publics ont une compréhension limitée des préoccupations et des dernières avec les eaux de surface.

Coopération réglementaire canado-américaine

On peut observer des signes manifestes que l'ALENA a engendré d'importantes retombées économiques pour le Canada. En fait, beaucoup soutiennent qu'une meilleure coopération réglementaire

Cette question a été abordée lors d'un symposium conjoint du PRR et du CRSJ sur la coopération réglementaire entre le Canada et les États-Unis, tenu le 29 octobre 2004, à Ottawa. L'objectif de cet événement était d'analyser des questions de recherche clés découlant du rapport intitulé *Coopération canado-américaine en matière de réglementation* : tracer la voie à suivre.

Au bout du compte, les discussions ont porté sur la façon de concrétiser ce programme de politiques, grâce à des stratégies claires, pratiques et surtout réalisables sur le plan politique. Pour résumer, ces discussions ont mis en évidence les thèmes suivants :

- Il faut accélérer la coopération réglementaire entre le Canada et les États-Unis.
- Il faut un engagement politique et des plans pratiques.
- Il faut développer un thème central et unificateur pour susciter la participation du public canadien et des partenaires américains.

- Toute stratégie doit être appuyée par un cadre organisationnel interne valable et doit donner un rôle au Parlement.

Le rapport du symposium est

accessible sur le site web du PRR au www.policymatters.gc.ca. Pour obtenir d'avantage d'information sur le travail du PRR en matière de coopération réglementaire canado-américaine, prière de communiquer avec Doug Blair, directeur de projet, au 613 947.3912 ou à l'adresse électronique suivante : d.blair@prs-sfp.gc.ca.

humaines Canada) a alimenté le débat en présentant les politiques basées sur les actifs qui touchent de près l'ap-prentissage continu, un ingrédient de base de la politique basée sur le parcours de vie. Ces politiques ont fait l'objet de la critique classique par Michael Mendelson (Institut Caledon), à savoir l'interaction des véhicules d'épargne avec les programmes provinciaux d'aide sociale, auxquels l'accès nécessite l'épousement préalable des économies. Une fois de plus, cette discussion rejoint la concertation et le dialogue entre les institutions (les différents paliers du gouvernement). En guise de conclusion sur l'évaluation de ces politiques, Mendelson recommande de déterminer d'abord les objectifs de politiques basées sur les actifs avant de tenter d'évaluer leurs résultats.

Comme toute initiative fédérale, dès qu'on commence à traduire des politiques en programmes, on se heurte au problème de financement et l'obstacle classique de partage de juridictions. Tom Kent (École des études politiques) a réitéré l'importance de tenir compte et de respecter les juridictions provinciales lors de la formulation des programmes. Hugh Segal (Institut de recherche en politiques publiques) appuie l'appel à la prudence de Kent et prône l'utilisation des crédits d'impôt comme un levier pour intervenir dans les domaines névralgiques comme les garderies et les logements sociaux, qui affectent profondément le parcours de vie des Canadiens.

En guise de conclusion, on peut affirmer que la conférence a permis de dégager un consensus autour de l'approche basée sur le parcours de vie des politiques sociales. De plus, la réforme du système de pension, dans une perspective de donner plus de flexibilité, semble être incontournable. Par ailleurs, cette réforme doit être faite de pair avec la création des emplois de qualité qui offrent une flexibilité accrue, non seulement pour

Dans cette perspective, John Myles (Université de Toronto) a mis en garde les conférenciers contre toute politique sociale qui viserait uniquement les personnes âgées. Il soutient que ce genre de politiques ne fera qu'augmenter le conflit *intergénérationnel*. En effet, contrairement aux années soixante et soixante-dix, les récents retraités ont accumulé assez de richesse pour se permettre une retraite aisée. Par contre, les perspectives d'avenir pour les

La relation entre les moments intenses en terme d'exigence de temps, le bien-être des individus et le niveau de pauvreté tout le long du parcours de vie semble se dessiner.

sont définis en terme de statut socio-culturel à savoir, les femmes monoparentales, les Autochtones, les personnes avec activités limitées et les récents immigrants. Une politique qui discrimine selon l'âge risque d'augmenter les inégalités intragénérationnelles (au sein même d'un groupe d'âge). Par ailleurs, Williams reconnaît l'importance de l'approche de parcours de vie, puisque la situation de pauvreté vécue par ces groupes

futurs générations sont sombres. À cause de l'augmentation des exigences en terme d'instruction et des responsabilités familiales, les individus appartenant à cette génération commenceront à travailler et accumuler des richesses plus tard dans leur vie. C'est cette génération, composée des enfants et des petits enfants des baby boomers, qui mérite une attention particulière des politiques sociales, en fournissant davantage d'assistance au niveau de l'accès à l'apprentissage continu, aux études post-secondaires et à la formation. Myles ajoute que, d'une façon ou d'une autre, ce sont les générations à venir qui supporteront les coûts croissants des systèmes de pensions à la suite du vieillissement de la population.

L'avertissement contre les politiques sociales qui discriminent selon l'âge a émergé aussi de la présentation de Cynthia Williams (Réseaux canadiens de recherche en politiques publiques). Elle soutient que, parmi les cinq groupes identifiés comme étant plus à risque de vivre une situation persistante de pauvreté, seulement un groupe est défini en terme d'âge, à savoir les personnes âgées de 45 ans et plus vivant seules. Les autres groupes

socioculturels n'est pas ponctuelle. C'est un passage qui affecte le parcours de vie des individus. Cependant, l'importance d'une approche basée sur le cycle de vie qui ne discrimine pas selon l'âge et tient compte de la particularité de certains groupes socioculturels n'a pas avancé substantiellement le débat sur l'opérationnalisation du cadre d'analyse. C'est Anne-Marie Guillemard (Sorbonne) qui a donné un coup d'élan vers cette direction en présentant l'expérience des pays européens qui ont réussi à contrecarrer la baisse de l'emploi chez les personnes âgées (en Suède et en Finlande). En effet, ces pays ont vécu un changement culturel marqué quant le passage d'un style de gestion basé sur la segmentation par groupes d'âge vers un modèle basé sur la gestion de la diversité. De plus, en congruence avec ce changement, ces pays ont instauré une nouvelle politique sociale neutre vis-à-vis de l'âge qui prône le vieillissement actif comme un nouveau style de vie. Ces changements culturels étaient motivés par la création des emplois de qualité dans une perspective d'augmentation de la flexibilité et la mobilité qui supporte le travail à n'importe quel âge. Ces politiques combinent des programmes

actifs d'emploi, des programmes d'apprentissage continue et une réforme du système de pensions qui visent l'augmentation de la flexibilité. Il faut l'admettre que ces changements culturels vécus par ces pays sont rendus possible grâce à une concertation et une collaboration étroite entre les différentes institutions (différents paliers du gouvernement, les communautés, les entreprises et les syndicats). L'intervention de Guillemard a amené le débat à un niveau plus concret de l'approche de politique sociale basée sur le parcours de vie, celui de l'identification des barrières à la flexibilité et les outils qui permettent de les surpasser.

La première réaction à cette interrogation a été adressée par David Foot à l'effet que le système actuel de pension ne permet pas la flexibilité de travailier tout en touchant les revenus de retraite. De plus, l'imposition des limites aux contributions incite les employeurs à exiger plus d'effort des employés plus âgés plutôt qu'engager d'autres travailleurs. Bien qu'il ait été reconnu que la réforme de système de pension est une condition incontournable pour augmenter la flexibilité, ce qui est aussi important, c'est la disponibilité des emplois qui offrent une certaine flexibilité qui intéresse-rait, spécifiquement les personnes âgées, et la population en générale. La question relative à la flexibilité et la disponibilité des emplois de qualité n'a pas été explorée dans le contexte canadien, mais néanmoins elle rejoint l'importance de la concertation et la collaboration entre les institutions (gouvernement et employeurs) soulevées par Guillemard. Mis à part la question de la disponibilité et de la flexibilité, où les employeurs jouent un rôle important, d'autres progrès ont été réalisés vers la concrétisation de l'approche basée sur le parcours de vie. Andrew Treusch (Développement des ressources

Une approche de la politique sociale fondée sur le parcours de vie

Queen's International Institute on Social Policy

Le 23 août 2004

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À partir de 2011, quand un grand nombre de baby boomers commenceront à se retirer du

marché du travail, nous assisterons à un déclin du nombre total d'heures travaillées ainsi qu'une baisse du taux de croissance économique. Suffit-il de garder les personnes âgées plus longtemps sur le marché du travail pour contrecarrer cette tendance? Telle était la problématique qui a captivé l'audience à la suite de la présentation de Jean-Pierre Voyer (Projet de recherche sur les politiques) sur « *L'approche fondée sur le parcours de vie des politiques sociales* ». Cette présentation a relancé le débat sur ce thème dans le cadre de la conférence organisée par Queen's International Institute on Social Policy le 23 août 2004.

Bien que les effets économiques du vieillissement ne soient qu'une des implications du cadre analytique présenté par Voyer, c'était le point qui a attiré l'attention des conférenciers. Cette réaction était en quelques sorte attendue étant donné l'accent mis, au sein de la plupart des pays de l'OCDE, sur les impacts fiscaux du vieillissement et la nécessité de réformer le système de pension pour y faire face.

L'impact fiscal du vieillissement est loin d'être négligeable, mais le cadre d'analyse basée sur le parcours de vie va au-delà de cette problématique. Il part des prémisses que la vision classique du parcours de vie linéaire basée sur trois stades (étude-travail-retraite) n'est plus la norme dans la société. On assiste de plus en plus à un chevauchement entre ces trois stades, affectant ainsi la manière dont notre temps est alloué. Alors qu'il y a une contrainte de temps durant la vie pour combiner travail, études et responsabilités familiales (soins des enfants et des parents), d'avantage de temps libre sera disponible à la retraite suite à l'augmentation de l'espérance de vie. Une plus grande flexibilité est donc requise pour permettre aux individus de mieux allouer le temps tout le

long du parcours de leur vie. Donner plus de flexibilité aux personnes âgées, qui choisiront de travailler plus longtemps et profiter d'une retraite progressive, n'est qu'une implication du cadre analytique basé sur le parcours de vie. D'ailleurs, le désir de travailler plus longtemps a été déjà exprimé par les Canadiens à travers différents sondages.

L'apport du cadre d'analyse basé sur le parcours de vie a été renforcé à la suite de la présentation de Michael Wolfson, sur la rigueur des simulations sous-jacentes aux implications du cadre d'analyse, et celle de Peter Hicks (Développement social Canada). Hicks a repris le cadre d'analyse pour mettre l'accent sur l'identification des moments intenses en terme de contrainte de temps et son impact sur le bien-être des individus tout le long du parcours de vie. Des données empiriques montrent que ces moments intenses sont reliés au statut matrimonial et la responsabilité des enfants. Hicks, préconise une approche qui intègre la sous-utilisation du temps vers l'âge de la retraite et les périodes où l'exigence de temps vécu durant la vie active est élevée.

Bien que le lien direct ne soit pas établi, mais la relation entre les moments intenses en terme de d'exigence de temps, le bien être des individus et le niveau de pauvreté tout le long du parcours de vie semble se dessiner. Garnett Picot (Statistique Canada) a présenté les résultats d'une analyse qui mesure la pauvreté tout le long du parcours de vie, où la structure familiale (statut matrimonial et présence d'enfants) joue un rôle important. Cette interdépendance est un argument de plus qui milite en faveur d'une approche de parcours de vie des politiques sociales. Bien qu'il y ait un consensus sur l'impératif d'une politique sociale basée sur le parcours de vie, des divergences persistent au niveau de l'opérationnalisation du cadre d'analyse.

à Montréal, pour appuyer le développement du programme ARUC sur l'économie sociale. L'exposé de Mme Mendell a mis l'accent sur la diversité de l'économie sociale, un concept ayant connu des définitions variées depuis le XIX^e siècle. Elle a souligné, par exemple, que les organisations de l'économie sociale ont contribué aussi bien à la transformation qu'à la prestation des services de santé.

Nancy Neamtan, directrice exécutive du Chantier de l'économie sociale, considère que l'économie sociale fait partie intégrante d'une économie pluraliste. Elle a décrit un modèle émergent de gestion du développement qui intègre les objectifs sociaux, économiques, culturels et environnementaux des communautés. Elle a donné plusieurs exemples de la façon dont l'économie sociale a évolué au Québec dans des secteurs comme les soins à domicile et la foresterie, ainsi que des exemples montrant comment les différents paliers gouvernementaux soutiennent l'économie sociale. Mme Neamtan a recommandé que des changements majeurs soient apportés aux politiques et aux programmes pour reconnaître le modèle émergent.

Brett Fairbairn, de l'Université de la Saskatchewan, a présenté une vue d'ensemble de l'économie sociale hors Québec. Il a fait remarquer que les coopératives, les mutuelles et les associations jouent toutes un rôle de premier plan à l'échelle du Canada, mais que l'économie sociale dans son ensemble n'a pas encore été vraiment conceptualisée en tant qu'entité unique à l'extérieur du Québec. Pour bon nombre des organisations qui composent le tiers secteur au Canada, il s'agit, à la base, de privilégier les gens plutôt que les profits, et d'insister sur l'importance des orientations communautaires. M. Fairbairn a terminé son exposé avec plusieurs questions

et observations sur l'élaboration de cadres stratégiques efficaces. Il a, par exemple, souligné que les politiques publiques peuvent être destructrices, neutres, positives, participatives ou restrictives. Il faut prendre garde, en soutenant l'économie sociale, de ne pas gêner des organisations qui tiennent beaucoup à leur indépendance.

Alan Painter, du PRR, a résumé un document de réflexion transmis aux participants en prévision de la table ronde. Ce document applique les principes et constatations de l'économie du bien-être provenant de la documentation en économie sociale, et fait quelques observations générales qui aident à déterminer quand et comment les gouvernements doivent soutenir l'économie sociale. En outre, il désigne, à des fins de discussion, des sujets de recherche sur les politiques susceptibles d'être explorés dans l'avenir. En conclusion, on y affirme que l'économie sociale est une approche prometteuse, faute d'être la solution parfaite à l'important problème de la répartition des fonds publics destinés aux mieux-être de la population.

Lors de cette table ronde, les futures priorités en matière de recherche sur les politiques ont fait l'objet de grands débats et l'on s'est entendu sur de nombreux aspects, mais les opinions ont divergé quelque peu à propos de l'importance de procéder à de nouvelles collectes de données. Selon les participants, s'interroger sur ce qui fait le succès de l'économie sociale est une bonne façon de réfléchir aux priorités de recherche. Cet exercice aide à cerner les pratiques exemplaires, qui doivent ensuite être transmises aux intervenants gouvernementaux et non gouvernementaux qui les mettront en application. Étudier des secteurs précis comme la garde d'enfants est une autre option envisagée pour aller de l'avant. Les politiques d'encadrement adoptées aux différents paliers gouvernementaux, de même que la production de rapports

et l'évaluation, sont des enjeux de recherche sur les politiques susceptibles de faire partie des priorités. Bien que les discussions et les échanges d'information soient demeurés très productifs toute la journée, il y a eu dissension sur un aspect. Le problème était que le document de réflexion du PRR présentait une vision trop restreinte et mettait trop l'accent sur les aspects économiques. On a reconnu qu'il vaudrait la peine de voir comment différentes perspectives peuvent et devraient éclairer l'élaboration des politiques d'économie sociale. Pour donner suite à la table ronde, le PRR prépare une publication basée sur des documents d'information distribués avant la table ronde, d'autres résultats de recherche, et les exposés et discussions de la journée. Ce document sera conçu comme un outil de référence qui appuiera de futures recherches sur les politiques en économie sociale. Il cernera et décrira les principaux enjeux en matière de recherche sur les politiques, et explorera plus à fond les perspectives sous-jacentes à l'élaboration de conseils stratégiques. Le document contiendra également des liens vers des ressources utiles aux chercheurs spécialistes des politiques.

Enfin, la conférence du PRR de décembre, intitulée Exploration de nouvelles approches en matière de politique sociale, comprendra un atelier sur l'économie sociale. On y étudiera le rôle du gouvernement et celui de la recherche sur les politiques dans le soutien à l'économie sociale, l'objectif fondamental étant d'améliorer le bien-être des Canadiens. Des conférenciers représentant différents points de vue y participeront.

Besoins en matière de recherche sur les politiques économiques pour soutenir sociale

Une table ronde PRP-CRSH

Le 28 septembre 2004
Ottawa

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Projet de recherche sur les politiques.

L'expression « économie sociale », relativement nouvelle, désigne de nombreuses organisations qui produisent des biens et assurent la prestation de services partout au Canada et dans le monde depuis plus d'un siècle, le plus souvent à l'échelle de la communauté. Ces organisations sont distinctes des gouvernements et diffèrent des sociétés commerciales, car elles font participer divers intervenants aux décisions et réinvestissent leurs profits pour faire avancer leur mission, au lieu de les distribuer aux actionnaires. Les coopératives, les organismes sans but lucratif et les coopératives de crédit en sont des exemples.

Ces dix dernières années, l'économie sociale a été l'objet d'un intérêt marqué de la part des milieux des politiques en Europe et dans plusieurs provinces, en particulier au Québec. Depuis quelques années, c'est au tour d'Ottawa de s'y intéresser. À titre d'exemple, le discours du Trône de février 2004 mentionne la Roasted Cherry Coffee House, située à quelques rues seulement de la colline du Parlement. Ce café-restaurant assez particulier offre des emplois et un milieu accueillant à de jeunes Canadiens, surtout ceux qui sont à risque.

La journée n'a pas porté sur les projets spéciaux annoncés dans le budget fédéral de mars 2004, mais plutôt sur ce qu'il faut faire en matière de recherche sur les politiques pour donner des conseils judicieux et éclairés sur de possibles projets futurs. Les participants à la table ronde ont exploré ce qui doit être étudié en priorité par les chercheurs spécialistes des politiques, en consultation avec les praticiens et les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques, de façon à soutenir des organisations aidant les Canadiens, comme la Roasted Cherry Coffee House.

Les travaux ont débuté par un exposé de l'honorable Eleni Bakopanos, secrétaire parlementaire du ministre du Développement social particulierement chargée de l'économie sociale.

Mme Bakopanos a donné des notions générales sur l'économie sociale et l'évolution du rôle de cette économie dans les communautés du Canada. Selon elle, la collaboration en matière de recherche doit être pertinente au plan des politiques.

Janet Halliwell, vice-présidente exécutive du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada (CRSH), a fait le survol d'un processus en cours au CRSH, par lequel cet organisme subventionnaire sera transformé en organisme du savoir. Elle a aussi décrit le développement de l'Alliance de recherche universités-communautés (ARUC) en économie sociale du CRSH. Il s'agit d'un nouveau programme qui mettra les communautés et les organismes sans but lucratif en relation avec la recherche, pour leur permettre d'étudier des questions sociales, économiques et communautaires.

On a beaucoup discuté de l'importance d'agir au sein de la communauté et de la promotion de l'entraide chez les simples citoyens et dans les communautés. De toute évidence, ces concepts font partie intégrante d'une économie sociale canadienne en pleine évolution.

Plusieurs cadres supérieurs ont donné leur avis sur les efforts actuels de conception de politiques et de programmes. Les thèmes mentionnés sont les processus communautaires dirigés par des citoyens, l'innovation sociale, la responsabilité sociale des entreprises et la recherche par les employeurs de travailleurs qualifiés, notamment de travailleurs aux qualifications multiples. Plusieurs participants ont insisté pour que l'on évite de cloisonner les organisations. Trois experts non gouvernementaux ont présenté des exposés sur la portée de l'économie sociale, qui ont reçu un bon accueil :

- Marguerite Mendell, de l'Université Concordia, a résumé un document qu'elle a réalisé avec Benoit Lévesque, de l'Université du Québec

de logements locatifs, surtout dans le bas de gamme, alors que la situation économique des plus vulnérables de la société ne s'est pas améliorée. Les intervenants ont expliqué cette stagnation par le fait que, ces dernières années, il était plus lucratif pour les promoteurs de construire des maisons pour des propriétaires-occupants et de convertir des immeubles locatifs en condominiums. La conséquence, c'est que la demande pour des logements locatifs augmente alors que le nombre relatif d'unités disponibles est en baisse. À cause de ce déséquilibre, les loyers ont augmenté de 31 % à Toronto entre 1997 et 2002. Les listes d'attente pour des logements sociaux dans les zones urbaines continuent de croître, les inscriptions ayant atteint les cinq chiffres, et l'utilisation des refuges est de plus en plus courante, surtout chez les familles².

Le débat sur la façon dont les gouvernements peuvent améliorer la situation du logement au Canada est axé sur les politiques visant à renforcer l'offre, d'une part, et la demande/le pouvoir d'achat, d'autre part. Autrement dit, faut-il prendre des mesures pour régler les problèmes de disponibilité des logements abordables, ou faut-il des mesures pour renforcer le pouvoir d'achat des consommateurs par des bons ou des allocations, de sorte qu'ils trouvent leur compte sur le marché tel qu'il fonctionne actuellement? Beaucoup affirment qu'il ne faudrait pas intervenir dans l'offre de logements, puisque la dynamique du marché équilibrera d'elle-même l'offre et la demande. On a fait cependant remarquer que le marché fonctionne très bien pour ceux dont le revenu dépasse un certain niveau, mais qu'il ne fait pas grand-chose pour les personnes pauvres. Le consensus qui se dégage de la conférence est qu'il appartient au secteur public de combler ce manque.

Une possibilité d'intervention pour le secteur public est la construction de logements destinés à des locataires à faible revenu. Cette approche peut cependant entraîner l'exclusion sociale des communautés à faible revenu, une exclusion qui s'est faite sur fond de tensions raciales aux États-Unis. Entre le laisser-faire et l'approche interventionniste se trouvent plusieurs possibilités qui ont été discutées lors de la conférence. L'une d'entre elles est un règlement municipal qui impose aux promoteurs de prévoir un certain pourcentage de logements abordables dans leurs projets. Parmi les autres possibilités, il y a le développement des espaces de transition comme les refuges d'urgence, la construction de logements adaptés destinés aux personnes ayant des besoins spéciaux, les partenariats avec des promoteurs pour la construction de logements abordables, et les coopératives d'habitation. Du point de vue de la demande ou de revenu disponible, une possibilité d'intervention est d'influencer le pouvoir d'achat du consommateur en augmentant son budget consacré au logement. Même si les prestations d'aide sociale sont calculées en fonction des coûts du logement, elles n'ont pas augmenté au même rythme que le coût du logement, et par conséquent ne font pas ce à quoi elles sont destinées, satisfaisant les besoins fondamentaux.

L'une des politiques axées sur la demande les mieux connues est celle du bon de logement, qui s'adresse à des personnes sélectionnées après examen des ressources. Dans certains cas, ces bons vont directement au propriétaire, ce qui risque d'entraîner des problèmes de stigmatisation et de discrimination. Le Québec a mis sur pied un système par lequel des gens répondant à certains critères reçoivent directement une allocation en espèces

Notes

destinée au logement. Ces options peuvent se révéler efficaces lorsque les taux d'occupation sont élevés. Une autre option intéressante pour ceux que l'on appelle les mieux nantis des moins nantis se trouve dans les incitatifs à l'accès à la propriété. La SCHL a conçu à cet effet des règles de financement et d'emprunt pour les accédants à la propriété. En outre, des programmes plus innovateurs ont émergé dans la famille des instruments reposant sur l'actif, comme HomeShare, une initiative de Social and Enterprise Development Innovations. Les participants à HomeShare reçoivent un montant équivalent à leurs économies personnelles qui peut servir à des projets d'accès à la propriété ou de rénovation domiciliaire.

Dans l'ensemble, le message-clé de la conférence est que les meilleures solutions comprennent des approches fondées autant sur l'offre que sur la demande. On a beaucoup insisté sur le fait qu'il n'y a pas de solution miracle. Par contre, il est absolument essentiel que les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques reconnaissent la complexité du monde du logement et ses liens avec la pauvreté, l'exclusion, le travail et le revenu, s'ils ont l'intention de répondre efficacement aux besoins des Canadiens à faible revenu.

1 Selon la Constitution, le logement est de compétence provinciale, ce qui ne favorise pas la participation du gouvernement fédéral à ce secteur de dépenses. Il n'en demeure pas moins que le gouvernement fédéral s'est efforcé à différentes reprises de construire des logements sociaux dans des zones urbaines.

2 Ville de Toronto, 2003. *The Toronto Report Card on Housing and Homelessness*.

Un logement convenable et abordable pour tous

Du 24 au 27 juin 2004
Toronto, Ontario

Lori Brooks
Projet de recherche
sur les politiques

Le présent article a été rédigé par
Lori Brooks lorsqu'elle était analyste au
Projet de recherche sur les politiques.

Pendant la conférence *Adequate and Affordable Housing for All*, la situation du logement au Canada a souvent été qualifiée de crise aux proportions historiques. On compare la pénurie de logements abordables sévissant à Toronto à un camp de réfugiés, à la différence notable qu'un camp de réfugiés respecte des normes minimales imposées par les Nations Unies. Des militants ont été jusqu'à adopter l'expression « catastrophe nationale causée par l'homme » dans l'espoir d'attirer l'attention sur la situation du logement au Canada. En présentant ainsi la situation, on espère que les gouvernements répondront avec le même sentiment d'urgence que dans les cas de catastrophes naturelles. Les intervenants ont fait un lien direct entre l'objectif d'améliorer le soutien gouvernemental au logement et les efforts de conscientisation du public. Ils considèrent que ces dernières années, la participation fédérale au logement a été sporadique et, au mieux, limitée¹. Ils ont fait remarquer que le gouvernement joue maintenant un rôle d'aide aux acheteurs d'une première maison et aux personnes à revenu modeste par l'intermédiaire de la Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement (SCHL). Les autres

programmes fédéraux discutés ont été l'Initiative de partenariats en action communautaire (IPAC) et le Programme d'aide à la remise en état des logements, qui relèvent tous deux de l'Initiative nationale pour les sans-abri. De plus en plus ces dernières années, les gouvernements provinciaux se sont délestés de la gestion du logement aux dépens du palier municipal. Faute d'un financement correspondant, bien des municipalités ont eu de la difficulté à assumer ces nouvelles responsabilités. C'est ce qui explique pourquoi la crise du logement est actuellement au cœur des préoccupations de bien des administrations municipales. À la plénière d'ouverture, le maire de Toronto, David Miller, a décrit aux participants les mesures prises en 1998 par son groupe de travail sur l'itinérance. Ces mesures comprenaient la prévention des évictions, un soutien accru sur le terrain, et un projet controversé de revitalisation du complexe de logements publics de Regent Park. Pour que les gouvernements répondent mieux à la demande de logements abordables, il est nécessaire de bien comprendre les problèmes en cause. La situation du logement abordable est complexe. Un de ces problèmes est la stagnation, voire le déclin, du stock

La conférence *Adequate & Affordable Housing for All* a rassemblé plus de 350 délégués et chercheurs de 40 pays, qui ont travaillé à une vision commune des enjeux du logement et de l'itinérance. Des représentants des pays en développement et des pays industrialisés ont parlé aussi bien de leurs enjeux nationaux que des enjeux mondiaux. Cette conférence a été organisée par le Centre for Urban and Community Studies de l'Université de Toronto, sous les auspices du comité de recherche sur le logement et l'environnement bâti de l'Association internationale de sociologie. Les coparticipants sont la Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement, la Ville de Toronto, la Société des services de logement social et la Toronto Community Housing Corporation. Cette conférence proposait des thèmes très variés, comme la conscientisation, l'adoption d'une vision commune et l'amélioration des programmes et politiques de logement. Une attention particulière a également été accordée aux enjeux de l'itinérance, notamment par une typologie de l'itinérance épisodique, qui figure dans ce numéro d'*Horizons*, présentée par Uzo Anucha.

Notes

- 1 Je souhaite remercier Uma Shahr pour sa contribution à cet article sur les travaux de la Fondation sur l'inclusion sociale. Uma est directrice exécutive du Council of Agencies Serving South Asians (CASSA) et présidente de conseil de l'Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI). Elle est également membre du conseil consultatif de notre programme.
- 2 Pour une analyse de ces questions, ainsi que des nombreuses références, voir le document de travail de la Fondation « Immigrant Settlement and Social Inclusion in Canada » de R. Omidvarand et T. Richmond, 2003. <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1069.cfm>
- 3 Pour des réflexions récentes sur ces questions, voir Cynthia Williams, « Policy Responses for Groups at Risk of Long-Term Poverty ». <http://www.queens.ca/sps/queens_international_institute_on-social_policy/qtlisp_2004/session_3.williams.pdf>
- 4 Voir par exemple le document « Social Inclusion and the City », du Alternative Planning Group. <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1213.cfm>
- 5 Voir par exemple le document de Ted Richmond présenté à la conférence de la Métropolis immigration research tenue à Montréal en 2004 : « Promoting New-citizen Civic Engagement: the Role of Umbrella Organizations in Social Citizenship ». <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1213.cfm>
- 6 Social Inclusion, Anti-Racism and Democratic Citizenship, 2003. <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1069.cfm>
- 7 Pour obtenir d'avantage de renseignements sur ce projet et sur d'autres projets financés par notre programme pilote, voir le site web de la Fondation Laidlaw.
- 8 Pour plus d'information, voir les sites web respectifs des organismes mentionnés.
- 9 Pour plus d'information, voir les sites web respectifs des organismes mentionnés.
- 10 Voir par exemple, T. Richmond et J. Shield, « Third Sector Restructuring and the New Contracting Regime in Ontario », dans la série Policy Matters du CERIS. <http://www.laidlawfdn.org/page_1222.cfm>

On ne peut pas laisser le passage au financement dans le cadre de contrats pour des services étroitement définis devenir la principale forme d'aide gouvernementale au secteur communautaire et détruire le capital social que représentent ces organismes¹⁰.

Une autre façon de créer de la capacité communautaire (ou du capital social) consiste à encourager des partenariats de recherche sains entre les secteurs communautaires et universitaires. Nous sommes actuellement partenaires à un projet de l'Université Ryerson (par le biais de l'ARUC du CRSH) sur la situation des nouveaux arrivants qui n'ont pas un plein statut. Nous organisons également des réunions de réseautage pour les chercheurs qui s'intéressent aux questions relatives aux femmes immigrantes. En outre, nous participons à un projet de recherche financé par l'IRSC sur les « Racialized Communities and Health Status », mené par le Access Alliance Community Multicultural Health Center.

Enfin, nous poursuivons nos efforts pour contribuer au travail conceptuel d'exploration, de discussion et de raffinement de la définition de l'inclusion sociale au Canada. Nous allons publier certains des meilleurs documents de travail commandités par la Fondation et travaillons avec divers partenaires à organiser des séminaires et des tribunes qui établiront des liens entre les questions d'inclusion et les politiques publiques actuellement envisageables.

Tous ces travaux déboucheront sur de nombreuses expériences et des débats publics. Nous ne nous attendons pas à ce que notre parcours soit sans embûches – les questions en jeu sont tant! Par contre, nous nous attendons à ce qu'avec l'aide de nos nombreux partenaires, soutiens et amis, nous arrivions à des progrès, modestes mais concrets, sur le front de l'inclusion au Canada dans les prochaines années.

Nous sommes d'accord que ce projet est un bon exemple de projet impliquant la mobilisation des collectivités et traitant des formes d'exclusion sociale autres qu'économiques. Nous pensons également que l'accent mis sur l'écoute des enfants est une bonne démonstration de l'inclusion sociale dans la pratique⁷.

Soutenir les activités d'organismes communautaires, que ce soit financièrement ou par la publicité ou le réseautage, fait également partie de notre travail. Campagne 2000, qui bénéficie d'une aide financière de notre programme à la Fondation, a déployé beaucoup d'efforts partout au Canada pour éduquer et mobiliser le public sur les liens entre pauvreté infantile et des questions plus vastes telles que le logement, les difficultés sur le marché du travail, les garderies et l'éducation de la petite enfance. St. Christopher House est un autre de ces organismes. Par le biais de son projet intitulé « Income Security for Working-age Adults in Ontario⁸ », il crée une initiative politique qui vient réellement des collectivités.

La création d'indicateurs d'inclusion est un autre aspect de nos travaux, un aspect essentiel au lien entre la théorie de l'inclusion sociale et la pratique. Nous avons participé (de concert avec Santé Canada) au financement du projet d'indicateurs d'inclusion mené par le Centre ontarien d'information en prévention, et avons joué un rôle consultatif dans l'Alternative Social Audit, financé par Santé Canada et mené par le Alternative Planning Group⁹. Nous travaillons actuellement à l'établissement de dialogue fructueux entre divers groupes participant à l'élaboration d'autres indicateurs sociaux. Selon nous, il est également vital de travailler à la fois avec les organismes communautaires et les bailleurs de fonds concernés pour mettre fin aux nouvelles tendances destructrices dans le financement du secteur des ONG.

Des exemples de nos travaux

Étant donné les différents facteurs énumérés plus haut, notre programme tend à mettre l'accent sur le soutien aux projets pilotes qui nous permettent de concevoir une théorie de l'inclusion sociale, par le biais d'un dialogue avec nos partenaires, fondé sur la pratique. Nous reconnaissons que les projets d'application de l'inclusion sociale

Le projet Children's Agenda encourageait le développement de collectivités inclusives dans les villes et les quartiers où les enfants et leurs familles souffrent de diverses formes d'exclusion.

existantes. À l'inverse, elles réclament une voix et un rôle légitimes dans la réforme de ces institutions, pour lutter contre l'exclusion et encourager une forme de diversité canadienne réelle-ment inclusive⁴. La notion de capital social est également importante dans nos travaux. Nous sommes d'avis que des réseaux et des liens affectifs et relationnels sont

vitaux pour lutter contre l'exclusion des groupes vulnérables; et si les gouvernements ne peuvent créer le capital social, les politiques gouvernementales peuvent faciliter son développement. À cet égard, le rôle des services non gouvernementaux et des organismes d'encadrement dans l'éducation du public et la promotion des droits – de plus en plus menacé par des restrictions de financement – nous préoccupe beaucoup⁵.

Dans ses travaux parrainés par la Fondation, Anver Saloojee souligne que le développement de l'inclusion sociale est un processus politique qui exige que l'on localise et que l'on transforme certaines formes précises d'exclusion⁶. Autrement dit, une société inclusive met en évidence la base historique et matérielle des différentes formes d'exclusion et s'efforce de les surmonter. Cela nous mène à un processus qui comprend :

- la citoyenneté sociale;
- la mobilisation et l'organisation des collectivités;
- la transformation (de la façon de partager les ressources, des changements institutionnels.

que nous encourageons seront de nature expérimentale (les nouvelles théories mènent à de nouvelles pratiques et à d'autres débats sur des questions précises). Par exemple, nous appuyons actuellement (de concert avec la Fondation Trillium de l'Ontario) le projet « Closing the Distance for Children in Sudbury ». Le Conseil de planification sociale de Sudbury participe depuis dix-huit mois à un projet conçu pour créer des écoles et des terrains de jeu plus inclusifs pour les enfants du Grand Sudbury. Aujourd'hui élargi, ce projet s'appliquera aux écoles de quartier et aux programmes communautaires récréatifs dans les deux prochaines années, afin d'inclure la voix des enfants dans la réflexion sur l'apprentissage et les loisirs dans ces deux environnements sociaux importants. Ce projet s'adresse à tous les enfants, mais portera une attention particulière à l'inclusion et à la participation des enfants qui risquent d'être tenus à l'écart ou de ne pas être écoutés (comme ceux qui sont confrontés à des barrières linguistiques et/ou culturelles à Sudbury, tels les enfants francophones ou

Evidemment, la pauvreté n'est pas un problème propre aux seuls nouveaux arrivants. Nous avons observé ces derniers temps une détérioration générale des possibilités qui existent, sur le marché du travail, pour les groupes vulnérables – les nouveaux arrivants, les personnes handicapées, les jeunes familles, les parents seuls et les Autochtones vivant en milieu urbain. Le monde du travail au Canada devient plus précaire; la proportion de travailleurs à faible revenu s'accroît par rapport à l'ensemble de la main-d'œuvre et les travailleurs rémunérés sont de plus en plus confrontés à la pauvreté à long terme. Du point de vue de l'inclusion sociale, il nous faut nous demander pourquoi certains groupes, qui se distinguent par des caractéristiques sociales ou culturelles plutôt qu'économiques, courent un tel risque d'être exposés à la pauvreté à long terme. Les réponses à cette question pourraient nous détourner des politiques économiques néo-libérales, souligner les avantages universels de la croissance économique en général et nous permettre de mieux comprendre les aides sociales et les réformes des politiques dont certaines collectivités exclues précises ont besoin⁷. Si la pauvreté n'est pas uniquement un problème lié aux nouveaux arrivants, il nous faut comprendre également que les questions de diversité vont bien au-delà du marché du travail ou même du bien-être économique en général. Le fait même d'augmenter la diversité ethnique et raciale de nos plus grands centres urbains pose des problèmes d'inclusion sociale, parce que le processus et le résultat final de cette inclusion doivent être renégociés. Les collectivités ethniques et raciales, à l'image d'autres groupes exclus, n'accepteront plus d'être invitées, l'une après l'autre, de manière paternaliste, à profiter des institutions

Politiques d'inclusion sociale

Défis et possibilités

Ted Richmond
Fondation Laidlaw

Ted Richmond est coordonnateur de programmes, Inclusive Communities for Children, Youth and Families Programme pilote Fondation Laidlaw.

Comment, sur le plan des politiques, le concept d'inclusion sociale évolue-t-il? Partons-nous d'une idée ou d'une « définition » commune de cette notion? Quel rôle joue l'inclusion sociale dans les questions comme la pauvreté et la racialisation croissante de celle-ci? Quelles théories, quelles pratiques sont les plus pertinentes, quand il s'agit de créer une version propre au Canada de l'inclusion sociale, qui soit efficace sur le plan politique? Telles sont les questions qui alimentent en défis et en possibilités notre comité consultatif (Inclusive Communities for Children, Youth and Families), alors que la Fondation Laidlaw poursuit ses travaux sur l'inclusion sociale¹.

Le projet Children's Agenda de la Fondation Laidlaw, axé sur l'inclusion sociale comme outil pour concevoir et tester les politiques sociales, a été lancé il y a plusieurs années. Il encourageait le développement de collectivités inclusives dans les villes et les quartiers où les enfants et leurs familles souffrent de diverses formes d'exclusion, et était ancré dans l'engagement de la fondation à promouvoir le bien-être des enfants et des familles. L'objectif à long terme de ce travail était d'améliorer les politiques sociales canadiennes relatives aux enfants et aux familles.

Cela ne fait que quelques années que le conseil de Laidlaw a pris la décision courageuse de participer au financement de ce qui n'était encore qu'une idée – l'inclusion sociale. Depuis lors, nos travaux en matière d'inclusion sociale ont évolué et pris de l'expansion; ils ont également attiré une attention et un soutien considérables. Les activités commanditées par la Fondation comprennent divers séminaires et colloques, ainsi que la publication d'une série de documents de travail portant sur différents domaines et aspects de l'inclusion sociale, sur le plan à la fois pratique et théorique. La Fondation a également accordé du financement à des organismes partenaires impliqués dans des

projets tels que la création d'indicateurs d'inclusion, la recherche et l'éducation du public sur le bien-être des enfants au Canada.

Cette dernière année, nous avons élargi et renouvelé notre comité consultatif, rebaptisé notre programme et commencé à tenter de surmonter certains nouveaux défis.

Certains problèmes et défis

Avant tout, il nous faut reconnaître que la « définition » de l'inclusion sociale évolue encore aujourd'hui; elle n'est pas figée, comme un concept ou une théorie. Une version progressive et pertinente sur le plan des politiques de l'inclusion sociale devra être fondée sur la pratique; elle devra également reconnaître et respecter les différences interprétations de cette idée.

Les travaux que nous voulons réaliser devront donc combiner théorie et pratique. Ils doivent également comprendre trois éléments essentiels : s'attaquer aux racines structurelles de l'exclusion, venir de l'auto-organisation et de la mobilisation des collectivités, être transformateurs et mener à de vrais changements politiques pratiques aux structures qui permettent l'exclusion ou qui restreignent l'inclusion.

S'attaquer à ces questions exige que l'on comprenne à fond l'incidence sociale et économique des changements démographiques et économiques au Canada. Les immigrants – ceux qui sont nés en dehors du Canada – forment une part croissante de la population dans nos plus grands centres urbains et viennent de plus en plus de pays autres qu'euro-péens. Par conséquent, « nouveaux arrivants » et « minorité visible » coïncident de plus en plus, au moment précis où ces niveaux aux arrivants font face à des barrières systémiques à la reconnaissance de la formation ou des compétences acquises à l'étranger². Le processus alarmant de racialisation de la pauvreté que l'on observe au Canada est en réalité un résultat de ces tendances.

plus perçue comme une solution miracle pour augmenter l'aptitude individuelle au travail, au sein d'une approche d'apprentissage permanent. Cette approche vise à contribuer à l'atténuation de la précarité de l'emploi et à répondre à un certain nombre d'autres défis socio-économiques. En bref, l'éducation est désormais perçue comme une approche multidimensionnelle destinée à combler un certain nombre de besoins socio-économiques plutôt que strictement destinée à l'employabilité. Ce sont là des virages importants, qui expliquent en partie pourquoi la perception de la version 2004 des *Perspectives* est si différente de celle des éditions précédentes. Toutefois, deux autres virages philosophiques méritent également qu'on s'y attarde.

La perception de la qualité de l'emploi va désormais au-delà des gains

Dans les éditions antérieures des *Perspectives*, la qualité de l'emploi reposait sur deux indicateurs : l'occupation d'un emploi et le niveau de revenu qu'on en tire. Il est cependant devenu évident que cette approche ne tient pas compte de facteurs comme la satisfaction à l'égard de l'emploi, l'équilibre travail-famille et le rôle de l'emploi pour atteindre des objectifs individuels et sociaux. Dans l'édition 2004 des *Perspectives*, on reconnaît l'existence de nombreux objectifs individuels concurrents qui ne sont pas mutuellement exclusifs, comme arriver à occuper un emploi rémunérateur tout en ayant une famille et en prenant part à des activités communautaires.

Tous ces objectifs ne sont pas quantifiables, pas plus qu'ils ne contribuent tous à la compréhension traditionnelle des avantages tirés d'un emploi. Néanmoins, ils sont désormais reconnus et l'OCDE s'est engagée à ce que sa stratégie vise partiellement à rendre le travail plus souple et attrayant pour une plus grande partie de la population, notamment les aînés.

La qualité de vie signifie davantage qu'occuper un emploi

Le rôle de l'emploi au sein de la société et dans l'existence d'une personne a connu un virage fondamental. Si, autrefois, on considérait les niveaux globaux d'emploi et les niveaux moyens de revenu comme des indicateurs valables de la performance globale du marché de l'emploi, le diagnostic posé dans l'édition 2004 des *Perspectives* ne va pas dans ce sens. Le marché de l'emploi est plutôt perçu comme un aspect de la structure socio-économique d'un pays parmi d'autres, et un emploi comme une partie seulement de l'existence d'une personne. Ce virage fondamental entraîne une perspective souvent entièrement nouvelle des anciennes approches des politiques.

Par exemple, bien qu'un programme de formation destiné aux parents seuls ne les amène pas directement à occuper un emploi rémunéré, on reconnaît aujourd'hui que cela peut déboucher sur des améliorations sur le plan d'objectifs sociaux plus vastes, comme des gains en matière de capital social et de participation à la vie communautaire. À l'heure actuelle, on ne peut quantifier ces objectifs de la même manière que les indicateurs traditionnels comme le revenu et l'emploi, mais l'OCDE est consciente de l'importance

de comprendre que l'atteinte d'objectifs sociaux plus vastes est en soi une réussite sur le plan des politiques.

Conclusions

Il ne fait aucun doute que les nouveaux thèmes de recherche diagnostique mentionnés plus haut commencent à prendre de l'importance. On constate des changements manifestes, surtout concernant les hypothèses et approches en grande partie sous-jacentes à la *Stratégie de l'OCDE pour l'emploi* et aux éditions antérieures des *Perspectives de l'emploi*. Si l'édition 2004 des *Perspectives* semble retentir de nombreux aspects de la *Stratégie* actuelle, il ne faut pas y voir une preuve concluante qu'il ne s'agit que de jeter de la poudre aux yeux. Personne ne devrait souhaiter la mise au rancart des travaux diagnostics et analytiques solides uniquement parce qu'ils sont passés de mode. La grande difficulté de la révision résidera dans l'équilibre à trouver entre l'ancien et le nouveau. Si le document doit conserver sa cohérence, les idées retenues devront demeurer en harmonie avec les thèmes diagnostics émergents. Jusqu'à quel point l'OCDE y parviendra-t-elle? Cela déterminera si la *Stratégie de l'emploi* sera publiée dans deux ans sera véritablement un nouveau cru ou s'il ne s'agira que du même vin dans de toute nouvelles bouteilles.

Aller de l'avant : enjeux et options

En insistant davantage sur des questions comme le vieillissement de la population et la nécessité de modalités de travail souples, l'OCDE doit décider quelles conceptualisations d'emploi exigent une révision en profondeur pour conserver leur pertinence. La mesure dans laquelle l'OCDE y parviendra au cours du processus de révision s'étendant sur deux ans sera déterminante pour l'originalité et la pertinence de sa nouvelle stratégie de l'emploi par rapport aux défis et enjeux décrits ci-dessus.

Dans l'édition 2004 des *Perspectives*, c'est l'accès au marché de l'emploi qui demeure le principal élément d'analyse.

Les groupes cibles demeurent les mêmes et les politiques d'activation demeurent un élément essentiel des prescriptions de politiques visant à résoudre le problème du sous-emploi. Cette importance conférée à l'activation semble encore limitée par l'hypothèse sous-jacente selon laquelle l'exclusion du marché de l'emploi est une question de choix individuel. Les obstacles structurels à la participation, comme le manque de garderies, demeurent des éléments marginaux de l'analyse. En dépit des thèmes motivant la révision, le diagnostic fondamental et l'approche sous-jacente au rapport semblent demeurer essentiellement les mêmes.

Il existe cependant d'autres signes de l'existence de grands changements analytiques. Même si les personnes exclues du marché de l'emploi demeurent le groupe cible prioritaire, on a apporté de légères modifications à la définition des politiques de l'emploi et un changement de perspective relativement aux questions à aborder, comme l'offre et la demande d'emploi. On a aussi repensé le rôle de la formation et de l'éducation. On a reposi-

tionné le rôle de l'éducation, qui n'est la qualité de l'emploi et le fait de rendre le travail plus payant.

entre les politiques afin de comprendre pourquoi, en dépit de contextes et d'institutions politiques différents, de nombreux pays obtiennent des résultats semblables sur le plan de l'emploi. Par la suite, à l'encontre de l'édition actuelle de la *Stratégie*, qui propose, dans la pratique, un ensemble unique de modalités et d'objectifs institutionnels pour tous les États, on reconnaît désormais que d'autres trains de mesures tenant compte de la situation et des objectifs propres à chaque État pourraient se révéler plus efficaces.

Ces thèmes ne sont pas survenus du jour au lendemain. On y a fait brève-ment allusion en 2003, ce qui semble indiquer un manque d'appréciation de leur pertinence plutôt qu'une ignorance de leur existence. Le fait que ces thèmes figurent dans l'édition 2004 des *Perspectives* témoigne toutefois d'une modification des critères de mesure des anciennes politiques et des propositions futures. L'édition 2004 diffère donc fortement des précédentes et renferme des analyses portant sur un certain nombre d'enjeux sociaux importants pour la question de la pauvreté, notamment, les écarts salariaux, la qualité de l'emploi et le fait de

Même si les personnes exclues du marché de l'emploi demeurent le groupe cible prioritaire, on a apporté de légères modifications à la définition des politiques de l'emploi et un changement de perspective relativement aux questions à aborder, comme l'offre et la demande d'emploi.

plus restreints, etc.), les auteurs de l'édition 2004 des *Perspectives* soutiennent qu'il faut aussi s'occuper de la qualité des emplois (les niveaux de salaires, les avantages sociaux, etc.). Cette reconnaissance des enjeux propres à la demande, qui a pour effet réel d'accroître l'attrait et la valeur de l'emploi pour les particuliers, constitue un revêtement majeur par rapport aux anciennes approches.

Une meilleure compréhension de la pertinence des objectifs sociaux

Pour la première fois peut-être, l'OCDE reconnaît explicitement dans l'édition 2004 des *Perspectives* qu'il faut concilier les mesures visant à améliorer l'emploi avec des objectifs sociaux, liés à des préoccupations concernant la sécurité d'emploi, l'équilibre travail-famille et l'écart grandissant du revenu. Ce virage est le reflet des dilemmes auxquels font face des États aux prises avec un large éventail de problèmes sociaux et économiques. En ajoutant cette dimension, l'OCDE reconnaît également qu'une partie des recommandations de politiques qu'elle a faites dans le passé pourrait avoir des effets sociaux néfastes. Ainsi, l'OCDE note que la hausse de la précarité des emplois est en partie attribuable aux

Une étude plus poussée des enjeux du côté de la demande

Alors que les prescriptions de politiques contenues dans l'édition actuelle de la *Stratégie* et les éditions antérieures des *Perspectives* étaient centrées sur la gestion de l'offre de main-d'œuvre (par le biais de l'éducation, d'avantages

l'emploi pourrait s'écarter sensiblement du document actuel.

l'emploi pour

nombreuses réformes apportées à la

législation sur la prestation de l'emploi

dans ses pays membres au cours des

années 1990.

L'accroissement de la sensibilité aux

différents contextes économiques au

sein des pays membres

Refletant en partie les deux virages

notés ci-dessus, l'OCDE reconnaît la

nécessité de mieux comprendre les

complémentarités et les interactions

Ré-évaluation de la Stratégie de l'emploi de l'OCDE Du vieux vin dans de nouvelles bouteilles ou un tout nouveau cru?

Stuart Sykes

Kaïli Lèvesque
Projet de recherche
sur les politiques

Stuart Sykes et Kaïli Lèvesque
sont agents de recherche
en politique au Projet de
recherche sur les politiques.

Par ses analyses des politiques reposant sur des données probantes, l'OCDE exerce une profonde influence sur la conceptualisation des débats sur les politiques socio-économiques dans les États membres et non membres dans le monde entier. Il importe donc de relever l'intention, dévoilée dernièrement par l'Organisation, de ré-évaluer les hypothèses et principes fondamentaux qui sous-tendent sa *Stratégie de l'emploi*, un document sur lequel s'appuient depuis dix ans ses *Perspectives de l'emploi* annuelles.

Cette ré-évaluation des hypothèses de base est essentiellement motivée par les changements d'orientation qu'ont connus les marchés de l'emploi de ses États membres. Il y a dix ans, la *Stratégie de l'emploi de l'OCDE* a été conçue dans le but de mettre en évidence des réformes destinées à réduire radicalement le chômage persistant au sein des États membres de l'OCDE. À l'époque, on considérait comme essentiel d'apporter d'importantes réformes structurelles concernant la législation sur la protection de l'emploi, les régimes de pension et les aides à l'emploi (comme l'assurance-emploi et les mesures d'intervention sur le marché du travail). Les *Perspectives de l'emploi* font annuellement le point sur la mise en œuvre de ces réformes et sur l'évolution et les tendances du marché de l'emploi au sein des États membres.

Bien que les préoccupations habituelles relatives à l'emploi, comme le chômage et la stagnation de l'économie, demeurent importantes, il faut aujourd'hui tenir compte, dans l'orientation des politiques, de nouvelles difficultés, notamment le vieillissement de la population. De surcroît, la mise en œuvre de nombreuses ripostes à des défis relevés antérieurement a donné lieu à des changements structurels qui exigent aujourd'hui qu'on les évalue. C'est pourquoi le moment est venu de moderniser la *Stratégie de l'emploi* de l'OCDE.

Ces revirements socio-économiques ne sont cependant pas les seuls éléments motivant le changement. Depuis des années, les analystes se préoccupent du fait que de nombreux organismes, dont l'OCDE, ne parviennent pas à combler les lacunes de leurs diagnostics ni à prendre bonne note des perturbations socio-économiques négatives pouvant résulter des politiques qu'ils prescrivent. Par ailleurs, les approches fondées sur une vue étroite des lois du marché, adoptées fréquemment par de nombreuses organisations internationales sont de plus en plus remises en cause. À mesure que le temps passe, il devient de plus en plus difficile d'ignorer ces critiques.

Des thèmes émergents à examiner

L'édition 2004 des *Perspectives* signale un certain nombre d'enjeux préoccupants. Une des grandes préoccupations que la *Stratégie* doit examiner est l'augmentation prévue des rapports de dépendance susceptibles de résulter du vieillissement de la population. Si l'urgence de cet enjeu varie d'un pays à l'autre, l'OCDE met principalement l'accent sur la hausse de l'emploi pour résoudre ce problème.

L'édition actuelle de la *Stratégie de l'emploi* et les éditions antérieures des *Perspectives* n'ont pas complètement négligé cet enjeu. Les groupes sur lesquels concentrent les réformes dans ce domaine demeurent essentiellement les mêmes, soit les personnes actuellement exclues du marché de l'emploi (les femmes, les travailleurs peu spécialisés et les jeunes), dont l'emploi pourrait compenser les coûts du vieillissement des sociétés.

Jamais auparavant, cependant, n'a-t-on donné autant de poids à cette entreprise difficile dans l'analyse. Trois autres changements de philosophie fondamentaux ressortent également des thèmes du processus de révision de l'OCDE, qui donnent à


Capacité financière et pauvreté

Ce papier, préparé par *Social and Enterprise Development Innovations (SEDI)*, porte sur l'éducation en matière de finances et de consommation comme stratégie complémentaire pour la constitution d'actifs. Il comporte un examen de la recherche existante et des initiatives en cours au Canada et à l'étranger.



Vues sur la flexibilité des parcours de vie et le vieillissement de la population du Canada


Ce document décrit les méthodologies adoptées ainsi que les résultats issus de groupes de discussion qui ont été organisés afin de mieux comprendre les préférences des Canadiens à l'égard de l'allocation du temps pour le travail, l'éducation, les soins et les loisirs tout au cours de la vie, ainsi que leurs préférences à l'égard du moment de leur retraite. On a aussi demandé aux participants à ces groupes de discussion d'exprimer leurs opinions à l'égard de politiques qui appuieraient une réallocation du temps au cours de la vie.



Pamphlet : Un regard neuf sur la gestion de l'eau douce

Note d'information : Gestion intégrée des ressources en eau

Ce pamphlet introduit le contexte et les plans pour le projet de l'eau douce du PRR. Cette note d'information est la première d'une nouvelle série destinée aux décideurs seniors. Cette note introduit et définit le concept de la Gestion intégrée des ressources en eau et présente des exemples d'application pratique.



Note

- 1 Le Programme national de recherche (PNR) est un des principaux organismes de financement de la recherche au Canada pour les sans-abri. Le mandat du PNR, une initiative du Secrétariat national pour les sans-abri, est de favoriser la compréhension de l'itinérance, de ses caractéristiques et de ses causes grâce à un processus d'appel d'offres.

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Il ressort de cet examen qu'il y a un manque de connaissance en matière d'éducation, d'emploi et de soutien du revenu chez les sans-abri et les personnes à risque de le devenir. S'il existe aux États-Unis un grand nombre de travaux sur la préparation à l'emploi, le développement des compétences, les modalités d'emploi particulières, les programmes de soutien du revenu et l'accès à l'éducation, au Canada, on a très peu abordé ces questions. On trouve bien des statistiques et des observations sur la difficulté qu'ont les sans-abri à concrétiser dans leur vie l'éducation, l'emploi et le soutien du revenu, mais il faudra poursuivre la recherche dans un certain nombre de domaines pour obtenir notamment : des renseignements de base sur les emplois de prédilection des sans-abri ; des descriptions détaillées des emplois rémunérés des adultes et des jeunes sans-abri, particulièrement ailleurs qu'en Ontario ; des renseignements de base sur les besoins en matière d'éducation et sur la prédilection des jeunes et des adultes sans-abri. Il faudra effectuer d'autres études si l'on veut obtenir le genre de données suivantes :

- des projets de recherche présentant une méthodologie claire, des approches validées et des mesures objectives ;
- des évaluations détaillées et objectives des interventions visant la prévention et la réduction de l'itinérance ;
- des recherches longitudinales ou à emplacements multiples sur l'éducation, l'emploi et le soutien du revenu pour les sans-abri. À l'avenir, il faudra, non plus se pencher sur de simples dénombrements et descriptions de cas, mais sur des explications plus approfondies et

sur l'étude de l'importance relative de ces facteurs. L'information qui en découlera facilitera la conception, la mise en œuvre, ainsi que l'évaluation d'interventions efficaces.

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Les leçons retenues

- Des chercheurs de Vancouver (CS/RESORS, 1989) ont conclu que les services d'emploi pour les sans-abri doivent examiner l'aide à apporter à leurs clients pour se trouver un logement, recevoir des conseils au plan affectif et des soins de santé et trouver des possibilités récréatives.

Il ressort de cet examen qu'il y a un manque de connaissance en matière d'éducation, d'emploi et de soutien du revenu chez les sans-abri et les personnes à risque de le devenir au Canada.

aider les jeunes à se loger tout en leur offrant de la formation à l'emploi. Dans le projet pilote, des jeunes qui n'avaient pas de domicile fixe recevaient une formation dans le domaine de la construction. L'auteur rassemble des données sur plusieurs questions d'intérêt propres à ce genre de projet et étaye une méthode permettant de mener des recherches détaillées semblables sur d'autres projets. Ses travaux marquent un tournant dans ce domaine de recherche.

Ailleurs qu'au Canada, il semble qu'il existe davantage d'études d'évaluation à grande échelle sur des programmes de logement. Des chercheurs américains ont recueilli des données sur les problèmes relatifs à l'évaluation des programmes d'éducation pour les sans-abri (Penuel et Davey, 1998) et ont compilé une description des pratiques optimales favorisant la formation à l'emploi des sans-abri (Beck et coll., 1997). Des chercheurs britanniques ont réalisé une évaluation globale de projets offrant de l'emploi spécialisé et des services de formation aux jeunes sans-abri (Randall et Brown, 1999).

qu'il faut aller au-delà de la simple description des projets. Cependant, ils remarquent également que le manque de financement ou le fait que ce dernier soit à court terme contribue souvent à ce que les évaluations de programmes ne se fassent pas.

Les travaux de Bridgman (2001) sur les jeunes sans domicile fixe représentent toutefois une exception à ce manque de précision. Bridgman exploite entretiens et observations qualitatifs en vue de présenter la mise en œuvre d'un projet conçu pour

- L'étude Chez Toit (2001) a également fait le constat des besoins suivants :
 - un meilleur partage de l'information concernant les programmes actuellement disponibles;
 - une attention particulière aux sans-abri à l'école;
 - des programmes d'aide sociale accrus;
 - des salaires minimum plus élevés et un meilleur accès à l'assurance-emploi;
 - une aide accrue pour se trouver un emploi et des possibilités d'emploi plus nombreuses;
 - davantage d'occasions de formation accessibles financièrement et un enseignement postsecondaire plus souple;
 - un meilleur accès aux services d'aide favorisant la stabilité d'emploi.
- Bridgman (2001) a conclu que les projets réussis devaient transcender les limites de la réglementation et veiller à ce que les nombreux
- En ce qui concerne l'itinérance et l'éducation, il faudrait étudier le rapport entre des facteurs connexes à l'éducation et non se contenter d'une description des niveaux d'éducation.
- Afin de mieux comprendre la dynamique de l'éducation et de l'emploi chez les jeunes sans-abri, Gaetz et O'Grady (2002) ont laissé entendre qu'il fallait comprendre à fond le phénomène des jeunes de la rue et les raisons qui les poussent à y rester. Ils ont également fait voir la nécessité de comprendre les transformations dans « l'identité professionnelle » propres aux jeunes de la rue. Il faudrait étendre les recherches pour savoir jusqu'à quel point les plus marginalisés des sans-abri n'arrivent pas à entrer dans le flux de l'activité économique.

organismes de financement et agences collaboreront. En réalité, la recherche multi-organismes commence à fournir des exemples de données longitudinales (p. ex., Aubry et coll., 2003). Le problème, c'est que beaucoup d'observations elles reposent sur des opinions, des analyses d'opinions d'autrui et de simples études descriptives. Bien qu'au départ les opinions et descriptions présentent un certain intérêt, il faudrait démontrer les conséquences positives des politiques d'interventions proposées ci-dessus grâce à une méthodologie de recherche et des évaluations objectives.

La leçon la plus importante à tirer peut-être de l'étude de la documentation est le besoin d'un financement soutenu pour faire des études détaillées et objectives en vue de mettre au point des interventions et d'étudier leur efficacité. En plus de ce besoin particulier, nous avons également constaté un certain nombre de lacunes dans la recherche concernant les politiques.

(1998) ont montré que 64,3 % de l'échantillon de sans-abri de Toronto dépendant d'un refuge n'avaient pas terminé leur secondaire (contre 34 % pour l'ensemble des Canadiens) et, lorsqu'ils ont comparé ce pourcentage à celui de l'emploi, ils y ont vu une tendance selon laquelle les jeunes sans-abri qui ne décrochaient pas au secondaire étaient plus portés à se trouver un emploi. Un échantillonnage de jeunes a également permis de constater que les moins éduqués étaient davantage portés à accepter des emplois instables ou à s'engager dans des activités illicites leur rapportant de l'argent, telles que la vente de drogue ou la prostitution (Gaetz et O'Grady, 2002).

À l'exception de ces statistiques descriptives, on en sait très peu sur les facteurs liés à l'éducation des sans-abri et les rapports entre ces facteurs. En général, il existe très peu d'information sur la façon de régler ce problème au Canada. Certains éléments de preuve qualitatifs initiaux donnent à penser qu'une aide aux cas de déficience physique et de troubles d'adaptation physique pourrait constituer un service important, puisque, pour les sans-abri, ces handicaps ont des répercussions négatives sur l'école et l'emploi (Guiguis-Younger, Ruane et Aubry, 2003). Cependant, il reste encore beaucoup de recherche à effectuer dans ce domaine.

En revanche, on a effectué de nombreuses études sur le taux de chômage, l'insuffisance des revenus et les problèmes liés au soutien du revenu comme causes et facteurs contribuant aux entrées et sorties dans le cycle de l'itinérance (Eberle et coll., 2001). Dans une étude sur les personnes à risque de devenir sans domicile fixe, 21 % ont répondu être sans emploi (Greater Vancouver Regional District, 2002). Chez les personnes sondées dépendantes d'un refuge, 38 % n'avaient pas de revenus au moment de l'enquête et seulement 20 % rece-

vaient de l'aide sociale (Tolomizzenko et Goering, 1998). Des 360 jeunes de Toronto sans domicile fixe, seulement 15 % ont dit avoir un emploi rémunéré comme première source de revenu et seulement 15 % ont affirmé obtenir de l'aide sociale (Gaetz et O'Grady, 2002). En plus d'accumuler des données sur le taux de chômage et de pauvreté des sans-abri, les chercheurs ont commencé à analyser la distribution de l'itinérance et à comparer leurs données avec la répartition des services (Bunting et coll. 2002).

Les sans-abri sondés par l'organisme national de bienfaisance Chez Toi (2001) ont également relaté des difficultés d'accès à l'aide sociale. L'étude de Chez Toi, intitulée *From Street to Stability*, proposait que le système d'aide sociale soit mieux adapté à la situation afin de secourir immédiatement ceux qui traversent une crise et de leur faciliter la procédure de demande d'aide. Cette étude propose également des salaires minimums plus élevés, davantage de formation reliée à l'emploi, une aide pour trouver du travail et des programmes d'apprentissage. Malheureusement, le rapport est trop descriptif et, bien qu'il mette en lumière des thèmes potentielle-ment intéressants pour les prochaines études, il ne contient pas assez d'information sur la manière dont on pourrait régler le problème. De plus, il ne prévoit pas d'analyse des interventions proposées les unes par rapport aux autres.

Malgré leurs failles, les travaux sus-mentionnés ont commencé à décrire la gravité de ces questions et cernent les domaines nécessitant des services; de plus, ils préconisent des modèles d'interventions possibles pour combler les lacunes des programmes.

Des pratiques prometteuses

Divers documents à l'étude énuméraient des programmes dont les titres faisaient allusion à l'éducation, à

l'emploi et au soutien du revenu pour les sans-abri (p. ex., Chez Toi, 2001; SCHL, 1995). Cependant, après étude minutieuse, très peu de ces projets proposaient des programmes suffisamment approfondis dans ces domaines. Il y a toutefois des exceptions. Liaison-Itinérance, le site de Chez Toi, mentionne quelques programmes qui visent les domaines en question. Par exemple, le programme offert par le Causeway Work Centre of Ottawa a été conçu dans le but de consolider les compétences et d'élaborer les mesures d'appui nécessaires pour assurer la subsistance d'une personne aux prises avec de graves problèmes de santé mentale, et assurer son maintien dans la communauté.

D'autres exemples de programmes éducatifs sont proposés ailleurs. Bien que l'étude de Love (1993) date un peu, elle présente une école de première ligne située à Winnipeg offrant une éducation souple et adaptée aux jeunes de la rue. Un autre exemple de projet porte sur l'alphabétisation et les sans-abri à Toronto (Trumpener, 1997). Ce projet propose un programme d'alphabétisation aux sans-abri d'âge adulte dans des centres d'accueil; il offre de la formation aux fournisseurs de services et favorise le partage d'expériences d'un programme d'alphabétisation à l'autre. Dans l'explication qu'il donne de ce projet et de projets semblables, Trumpener recommande de recueillir des données plus précises.

Comme il est fréquent dans la documentation, les descriptions des programmes mentionnés ci-dessus manquent des précisions nécessaires pour évaluer objectivement leur succès. On n'explique pas si les programmes sont soumis à une évaluation ou s'ils procèdent à la cuelle de données en vue d'évaluations futures. Bridgman (2001) ainsi que d'autres auteurs ont noté cette lacune dans la documentation existante et soulignent

Plusieurs auteurs sont d'avis que l'itinérance est en interdépendance avec l'emploi, le soutien du revenu, ainsi que la santé et la dépendance aux drogues.

Le besoin d'éducation, d'emploi et de plus grand soutien du revenu

La prévention de l'itinérance dans les écoles et l'accès à l'éducation pour les jeunes femmes sans domicile fixe, en plus d'apporter des changements à la Loi sur l'assurance-emploi (Novac et coll., 2002). En résumé, plusieurs auteurs ont documenté les enjeux propres à l'éducation, à l'emploi et au soutien du revenu des différents groupes. S'il reste encore beaucoup à faire, ces recherches fournissent un point de départ.

De nombreux auteurs ont invoqué le sous-emploi, le manque de formation et des mesures insuffisantes d'aide sociale comme causes de l'itinérance (p. ex., Charette, 1991; Falvo, 2003). À vrai dire, on trouve facilement des références aux faibles niveaux d'éducation et au taux élevé d'inactivité dans les enquêtes portant sur les sans-abri (Aubry et coll., 2003; Norman et coll., 1993; Chez Toit, 2001).

À la différence des États-Unis, au Canada, la recherche sur l'itinérance et l'éducation, l'emploi et le soutien du revenu est récente et repose sur quelques grandes enquêtes dont les données ont été recueillies sur plusieurs années. Cependant, bien qu'il reste encore beaucoup à explorer l'éducation semble un facteur important : le pourcentage de sans-abri n'ayant pas fréquenté l'école secondaire va de 63 à 90 % à Ottawa et à Toronto (SCHL, 2001). De nombreux jeunes sans-abri manifestent également le désir de retourner à l'école (Aubry et coll., 2003). On a aussi commencé à explorer l'interaction entre l'éducation et l'emploi. Tolomiczenko et Goering

sont venus à la conclusion que les jeunes pouvaient combiner toutes sortes d'emplois rétribués au cours d'une même semaine voire d'une même journée. Ils ont également rapporté que 83,4 % de jeunes hommes et 87,8 % de jeunes femmes se sont dits intéressés à trouver un emploi rémunéré. De plus, contrairement à certains stéréotypes, les jeunes étaient intéressés par des emplois dans l'économie formelle. Cependant, les chercheurs ont rapporté que le fait que ces jeunes pouvaient se tourner vers

un emploi formel découlait de leurs compétences, de leur mode de vie, de leurs antécédents personnels et de leurs relations sociales. Par conséquent, les auteurs ont conclu que la réussite des stratégies visant à sortir les jeunes des rues ne peut dépendre uniquement de emplois à faible revenu ou de l'ajout de compétences spécialisées et non spécialisées. Il faut plutôt offrir une diversité de services de formation et d'aide, conjugués à un soutien du revenu suffisant.

Dans une étude semblable, O'Grady et Greene (2003) ont analysé l'impact des mesures législatives interdisant la présence des squagees et le déclin économique subséquent dans ce secteur d'activité pour les jeunes sans-abri. Ils sont arrivés à la conclusion que la situation des jeunes aux prises avec des problèmes de logement s'est détériorée après la promulgation de cette loi.

Dans une étude portant sur les jeunes femmes à risque d'itinérance, on a recommandé d'offrir davantage de possibilités d'éducation et d'emploi pour les jeunes, des programmes d'enseignement de soutien, des services de

Les problèmes particuliers à certains groupes

présenter à l'heure dans des vêtements appropriés (Dachner et Tarasuk, 2002). Les sans-abri ont également affirmé avoir besoin de dispositions pour mettre leur argent en sécurité et valider leur identité (Bergeron et coll., 2000). Aux États-Unis, Zuvekas et Hill (2000) ont étudié les répercussions de la santé physique et mentale sur l'éducation, l'emploi et le revenu et subséquemment sur l'itinérance. Ils ont réalisé un sondage auprès de 471 adultes sans-abri, pris au hasard dans des refuges. Le sondage a révélé qu'un nombre important d'entre eux travaillaient, mais que peu tiraient un revenu suffisant de leur emploi. Bon nombre d'entre eux ont révélé avoir des problèmes de santé et de dépendance à la drogue, ce qui réduisait à la fois leur capacité à travailler et à obtenir de l'aide pour se soigner. Ces résultats permettent de penser à des pistes de recherche au Canada dans l'avenir.

Lorsqu'on s'efforce de trouver des réponses aux questions soulevées ci-dessus, il faut prendre en compte que l'accès à l'éducation et à l'emploi varie selon le profil et la situation des personnes. On a observé des difficultés plus grandes chez les autochtones (Hull, 2000) et chez les personnes provenant de familles d'accueil (Fitzgerald, 1995). Des recherches descriptives rapportent qu'un bon nombre de jeunes sans domicile fixe ne bénéficient pas du soutien du revenu parce qu'ils trouvent l'accès à ce service trop difficile (Gaetz et O'Grady, 2002; Chez Toit, 2001). Parmi d'autres obstacles au soutien du revenu, il faut noter les politiques sur les jeunes de 16 à 18 ans (Fitzgerald, 1995).

Bon nombre de travaux portent sur les difficultés que rencontrent les jeunes. Gaetz et O'Grady (2002) ont réalisé d'importants travaux de recherche sur une perspective sociologique. Ils en

Itinérance et emploi et soutien du revenu

Une analyse de la documentation canadienne

Gordon J. Josephson
Secrétariat national pour
les sans-abri (SNSA)

Le Secrétariat national
pour les sans-abri a demandé à
Gordon J. Josephson,
consultant indépendant
de rédiger un rapport d'analyse
de la documentation.

Pour faciliter l'élaboration de mesures efficaces de prévention et de réduction de l'itinérance, le Programme national de recherche (PNR) du Secrétariat national pour les sans-abri a entrepris un examen de l'ensemble de la documentation imprimée et électronique établissant un rapport entre l'itinérance et l'éducation, l'emploi et le soutien du revenu¹. Cet examen nous a permis de conclure qu'il existe très peu d'études canadiennes sur ces sujets.

Une idée générale sur laquelle bon nombre d'auteurs s'entendent est le fait que l'itinérance est en interdépendance avec l'emploi, le soutien du revenu, ainsi que la santé et la dépendance aux drogues. Cependant, les modèles théoriques concrets établis-sant un rapport entre ces facteurs et l'itinérance sont rares dans la documentation canadienne. Afin de remédier à cette situation, on a publié récemment des études importantes qui utilisent des méthodes de recherche plus rigoureuses et qui fournissent de la documentation. De telles études permettent d'offrir quelques pistes de départ sur la formation et les emplois rémunérés des sans-abri. À l'avenir, il sera nécessaire de s'appuyer sur de telles méthodes de recherche précises et objectives pour poursuivre la recherche et mener à bien les interventions pilotes sur cette question.

L'état actuel des connaissances

L'étude de la documentation actuelle au Canada permet de tirer les conclusions suivantes :

- Les problèmes d'éducation,

d'emploi et de soutien du revenu sont liés aux problèmes de santé physique et mentale, ainsi qu'à la dépendance aux drogues; et tous ces facteurs sont en étroite interdépendance avec l'itinérance.

L'itinérance : à la fois cause et effet

ment.

lutions objectives sur leur rendement.

On s'entend sur les besoins en matière de programmes d'éducation/de formation et d'emploi. Il existe quelques programmes qui visent ces objectifs. Cependant, on manque à la fois de renseignements sur leur fonctionnement et d'évaluations objectives sur leur rendement.

- Des groupes spécifiques, par exemple, les Premières nations et les jeunes, ont des difficultés énormes en matière d'éducation et d'emploi.
- Le taux de personnes sans emploi est élevé chez les sans-abri; plusieurs d'entre eux n'ont pas terminé l'école secondaire et l'accès au soutien du revenu leur est souvent difficile.
- On s'entend sur les besoins en matière de programmes d'éducation/de formation et d'emploi. Il existe quelques programmes qui visent ces objectifs. Cependant, on manque à la fois de renseignements sur leur fonctionnement et d'évaluations objectives sur leur rendement.

On sait depuis quelque temps que, parmi les questions d'actualité, la santé physique et mentale et la dépendance aux drogues sont liées aux questions d'éducation, d'emploi et de soutien du revenu. En revanche, ces facteurs sont en interrelation avec l'itinérance (Smart et Ogborne, 1994). Cependant, si les liens semblent évidents, les études plus approfondies cherchant à le démontrer sont rares. Ainsi, il est difficile de comprendre les causes lorsqu'on étudie l'un ou l'autre de ces facteurs en rapport avec la situation actuelle d'une personne. Il serait utile de faire une recherche longitudinale pour comprendre ces liens.

Bien qu'on imagine facilement de

quelle façon l'itinérance peut faire obstacle aux tentatives pour garantir l'éducation, l'emploi ou la stabilité financière des sans-abri, il existe trop peu de recherches consacrées à l'évaluation des services d'aide pour résoudre ces questions. Des jeunes de la rue qui participaient à une étude effectuée à Toronto ont fait remarquer le manque de services pour les aider à surmonter leurs difficultés à trouver des employeurs, à les rencontrer, à rédiger un curriculum vitae et à se

Intégration des immigrants

Immigrer n'est pas un acte irréfléchi. Les immigrants quittent leur pays dans l'espoir d'améliorer leur sort. Ils sont certes à la recherche de meilleures conditions économiques, mais aussi d'une plus grande liberté et d'un sentiment d'appartenance au pays qui les accueille.

Comment les immigrants s'adaptent-ils au Canada? Ni les immigrants eux-mêmes, ni la société canadienne ne mesurent l'ampleur du défi que représente le fait d'abandonner son pays pour un autre.

Les rancunes historiques, la xénophobie, les problèmes de sécurité et les incompréhensions culturelles rendent difficile le processus d'adaptation des immigrants au Canada, et réciproquement. Récemment, la crainte du terrorisme est venue compliquer encore davantage la situation, plus particulièrement pour la population croissante des musulmans.

Bien plus qu'un simple récit personnel, l'ouvrage de Cherif Rifat compare les idées fausses tant des immigrants que de la société canadienne, décrit la spécificité du Canada au regard de l'intégration des immigrants et n'hésite pas à recommander certaines modifications des politiques susceptibles de soulever des controverses dans certains milieux.

Rifat, Cherif, 2004. *Immigrants Adapt, Countries Adopt... Or Not: Fitting Into the Cultural Mosaic*, Montréal, New Canadian Press.

En plus de ces revenus de retraite, les

résidents de l'Ontario âgés de 65 ans au moins sont éligibles au régime de revenu

annuel garanti (RAG). Des renseignements complémentaires concernant

le RAG sont disponibles sur le site Web du ministère des finances de

l'Ontario : <http://www.trd.fin.gov.on.ca/userfiles/HTML/cma_3_10892_2.html>.

Des programmes similaires peuvent exister dans d'autres provinces.

3 Les résultats concernant chaque catégorie d'immigration seront présentés dans

le rapport plus élaboré que prépare le service de la recherche stratégique et des

statistiques de Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada. Ce rapport devrait paraître

au début de 2005.

4 Les personnes n'ayant aucune source de revenus peuvent avoir fait une déclaration d'impôts afin d'obtenir certains

crédits d'impôt (crédit de TPS, par exemple).

5 La Banque de données longitudinales sur les immigrants est la principale source des

données citées dans la présente analyse (BDM). La BDM est gérée par Statistique

Canada au nom d'un consortium fédéral-provincial dirigé par Citoyenneté

et Immigration Canada. La BDM combine les registres administratifs de l'immigration et l'information fiscale, créant

ainsi une source de données exhaustive offrant une vision globale de la situation

des immigrants reçus et de leur expérience sur le marché du travail. À l'heure

actuelle, la BDM couvre la période de 1980 à 2000, et dans cet exemple pour

être enregistré, un individu doit avoir fait au moins une fois une déclaration

d'impôts durant la période en question.

6 Dans les figures 1 à 6, il est important de remarquer que la taille des cohortes

d'âmes change avec les années, certains âmes quittant la population et d'autres

y faisant leur entrée. La figure 7, dans l'annexe, présente la taille, pour l'année

fiscale 2000, des cohortes de chaque groupe d'âmes relativement aux années

écoulées depuis leur arrivée. Les figures 1 à 7 proviennent de la BDM.

7 Bien qu'il n'ait pas été possible d'étudier les aînés à long terme avant 11 années

suivant leur arrivée, on observe la même proportion de personnes sans revenus à

partir de la onzième année.

contribué au moins une fois au plan de

retraite et est âgé d'au moins 65 ans. Il est possible de percevoir une retraite

réduite entre 60 et 64 ans à condition d'avoir cessé de travailler ou de percevoir

un revenu inférieur au versement mensuel maximum de RPC/RRQ ayant cours.

La SV est une retraite non contributive liée au nombre d'années de résidence au

Canada. Elle est destinée aux Canadiens de 65 ans ou plus ayant résidé au moins

dix ans au Canada après l'âge de 18 ans. L'intégralité de la SV n'est attribuée qu'à

des personnes résidant au Canada depuis 40 ans au moins. Une personne ne

répondant pas aux critères déterminant le versement de la pension intégrale

peut néanmoins percevoir une pension partielle. Cette dernière est calculée au

barème de 1/40e de la mensualité totale de pension par année de résidence de la

personne au Canada au-delà de sa 18e année.

Le SRG est une autre pension non contributive destinée aux résidents du

Canada qui perçoivent une SV partielle ou complète. Les prestations du SRG

peuvent être perçues dès le premier mois d'allocation de la SV. Pour être admissible

au SRG, une personne doit percevoir une SV et son revenu annuel doit être

inférieur à un montant donné. Les immigrants parrainés, en provenance de

pays avec lesquels le Canada a conclu des accords, ne sont pas admissibles au SRG

durant leur période de parrainage (jusqu'à dix ans). La SV et le SRG sont

octroyés après approbation de la demande présentée par la personne

concernée, celle-ci devant réitérer sa demande annuellement pour ce qui

est du SRG.

L'allocation est une pension non contributive destinée au conjoint ou à la

conjointe, marié ou en union libre, ou au survivant d'un bénéficiaire de la SV et/ou

résidents permanents âgés de 60 à 64 ans ayant vécu au Canada au moins 10 ans

sont admissibles à l'allocation. Pour répondre aux critères d'admissibilité, les

revenus combinés du couple ou le revenu annuel du survivant ne doivent pas

dépasser les limites établies. L'allocation cesse d'être versée à une personne

lorsqu'elle atteint l'âge de 65 ans et devient admissible à la SV. Les critères

d'admissibilité des immigrants à l'allocation sont les mêmes que ceux du SRG.

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Notes

1 Dans la présente analyse, la population

âgée est constituée des personnes âgées de 60 ans et plus au cours de l'année fiscale concernée. On a divisé les immigrants âgés en trois groupes : « les aînés à long terme », qui sont arrivés au Canada âgés de 40 à 49 ans, « les aînés à court terme », qui sont arrivés âgés de 50 à 59 ans et les « aînés immédiats », arrivés à 60 ans ou plus. Plusieurs raisons président au choix de 60 ans et plus comme point de référence pour définir la population âgée. Premièrement, c'est l'âge auquel la plupart des Canadiens peuvent commencer à toucher leur RPC/RRQ, source commune de revenus pour nombre de Canadiens âgés; deuxièmement, la documentation afférente avait déjà pris ce même point de référence, ce qui facilite les comparaisons avec les données du présent document (Baker et Benjamin (2002) et Basavarajappa (1999)); troisièmement, on a remarqué, lors d'une analyse préliminaire sur les comportements des immigrants, des schémas très similaires entre les immigrants de 60 ans et plus et ceux de 65 ans et plus. Prendre 60 ans comme point de référence permet d'augmenter la taille de l'échantillon et de consolider ainsi les résultats statistiques.

2 Le RPC/RRQ est une retraite contributive liée aux revenus de toute la durée d'une vie. Aucune condition particulière ne s'applique aux immigrants dont les prestations dépendront directement du temps de travail au Canada. Une personne peut devenir bénéficiaire si elle a

grands-parents ont tendance à provenir de plans de retraite.

On observe également des différences dans la composition des revenus en fonction des groupes d'aînés et des catégories d'immigration. Tout comme

pour les résultats observés en ce qui concerne les sources de revenus, il semble qu'il existe une relation entre la durée de résidence au Canada et la composition des revenus. Les revenus des aînés à long terme proviennent dans une plus grande proportion du marché privé que ceux des deux autres groupes d'aînés. Ceci est particulièrement vrai pour les requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés au sein de ce groupe. Bien que les aînés à court terme affichent une proportion de revenus provenant du marché privé inférieure, elle reste supérieure à celle des revenus de la population des aînés immédiats. Le fait que les aînés à court terme et les aînés immédiats dépendent moins du revenu du marché s'explique en partie par la présence d'une population de parents et de grands-parents plus importante dans ces groupes. Les parents et les grands-parents de ces deux groupes perçoivent des proportions substantiellement plus grandes de leur revenu moyen provenant de plans de retraite non contributifs.

Des recherches complémentaires sont nécessaires pour confirmer les relations observées dans la présente analyse. Une étude en profondeur des caractéristiques des immigrants âgés et des situations économiques de leurs familles permettra d'obtenir une meilleure compréhension de la situation financière des immigrants âgés au Canada.

Renvois

Baker, M. et D. Benjamin, 2002. « Are Elderly Immigrants a Burden? », préparé pour la conférence, *Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century*, Kingston, Ontario, octobre 2002.

Basavarajappa, K.G., 1999. Distribution, inégalités et concentration des revenus chez les immigrants âgés au Canada, 1990, Direction

20 ans, la portion de revenus provenant de sources privées est de 11 %, alors que les proportions de revenus provenant de retraites contributives et non contributives sont respectivement de 23 et 63 %.

Ici encore, ces résultats ressemblent fort à ceux des parents et grands-parents de cette population, quelques différences se manifestant au bout de dix années. À partir de là, les parents et les grands-parents perçoivent une proportion de revenus provenant du marché privé inférieure de 5 %, et une proportion de revenus provenant de retraites contributives inférieure de 10 % alors que leur proportion de revenus provenant de retraites non contributives est plus élevée de 10 %. En revanche, sur la même période, les immigrants retraités de cette population perçoivent une proportion de revenus provenant du marché privé de 15 à 20 % plus élevée, une proportion de revenus provenant de retraites contributives de 20 à 25 % plus élevée et une proportion de revenus provenant de retraites non contributives de 35 % inférieure.

Conclusion

Il est clair qu'il existe des différences entre les sources et la composition des revenus de ces trois groupes d'immigrants âgés. En ce qui concerne les sources de revenus, il existe une relation évidente entre la durée de résidence au Canada et la provenance des revenus. Les aînés à long terme dépendent plus largement et pour une plus longue période du revenu du marché. De ce fait, un plus petit nombre d'aînés à long terme perçoit des revenus provenant exclusivement de plans de retraite. Les aînés à court terme sont moins dépendants du revenu du marché; ils le sont toute-fois plus que les aînés immédiats. Il semble exister aussi une relation entre la catégorie d'immigration et la provenance des sources de revenus. Ainsi, les requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés dépendent davantage des revenus du marché, alors que les revenus des parents et




FIGURE 7




FIGURE 6


Ces résultats sont globalement similaires à ceux des parents et des grands-parents de cette population, à quelques différences près observables à partir de la dixième année. À partir de la dixième année, les parents et les grands-parents affichent une portion de revenus provenant de sources privées inférieure de 10 à 15 %, une portion de revenus provenant de retraites contributives inférieure de 5 à 10 % et une portion de revenus provenant de retraites non contributives plus élevée d'environ 15 %.

Par contre, sur la même période, les requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés de cette population affichent une portion de revenus provenant de sources privées de 10 à 15 % plus élevée, une portion de revenus provenant de retraites contributives de 10 à 20 % plus élevée et une portion de revenus provenant de retraites non contributives de 20 à 30 % moins élevée. Les immigrants retraités de cette population affichent des revenus évoluant de manière similaire à ceux des requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés. Toutefois, ils affichent une portion légèrement moins élevée de revenus provenant de sources privées compensée par une portion plus élevée de revenus provenant de retraites contributives.

La figure 6 illustre l'évolution du revenu moyen de la population des âinés immédiats. Durant la première année qui suit l'arrivée des âinés immédiats, leurs revenus proviennent à 60 % environ du marché privé, proportion inférieure de 25 % à celle des âinés à court terme. Cette portion moins élevée de revenus provenant du marché privé est compensée par une proportion de 20 % plus élevée de revenus provenant du marché public. La proportion de revenus provenant du marché privé continue à décliner chaque année et, au bout de 15 ans, elle tombe à 17 %. Durant la même période, la portion de revenus provenant de retraites non contributives augmente de 40 %. Au bout de

FIGURE 5

Pourcentages des revenus moyens annuels provenant des secteurs public et privé et des retraites contributives et non contributives pour les aînés à court terme durant l'année fiscale 2000



5 à 10 % moins élevée. En dépit de ces différences, les résultats concernant la population des aînés immédiats dans son ensemble reflète bien celle des parents et des grands-parents dans ce groupe d'aînés.

Composition du revenu

Les figures 4 à 6 illustrent la composition du revenu moyen respectif des aînés immédiats, à court terme et à long terme. La présente analyse répartit le revenu moyen en quatre éléments : le revenu du marché privé ou public et le revenu de retraite contributif ou non. Le revenu du marché privé (M-Privé) comprend les revenus d'emploi salarié, les revenus d'emploi autonome et les revenus d'investissement. Le revenu du marché public (M-Public) comprend les revenus de l'assurance-emploi ou de l'aide sociale. Le revenu de retraite contributive (R-cont.) comprend les revenus des

RPC ou RRC, des REER et des plans de retraite privés. Le revenu de retraite non contributif (R-non cont.) comprend les revenus provenant du SRG et de la SV.

La figure 4 illustre l'évolution du revenu moyen des immigrants aînés à long terme. Durant les 15 premières années après leur arrivée, 80 % ou plus des revenus moyens des aînés à long terme proviennent de sources privées. À partir de la seizième année et jusqu'à la vingtième, cette proportion descend à 15 %, alors que les proportions de revenus provenant de retraites contributives et non contributives augmentent chacune de 5 %.

Ces résultats sont similaires à ceux des requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés de cette population. Les seules différences sont que chez les requérants principaux-travailleurs-qualifiés, la proportion de revenus provenant du marché privé est d'envi-

ron 5 à 10 % plus élevée durant la même période d'observation et que la proportion de revenus provenant d'une retraite non contributive est approximativement de 10 % inférieure.

Les parents et les grands-parents de cette population, une fois encore, affichent des résultats différents. Premièrement, la proportion de leurs revenus provenant du marché privé est nettement inférieure à celle de la totalité des aînés à long terme. Débutant à 70 %, elle décline rapidement à 46 % dans la quinzième année et 17 % dans la vingtième. Deuxièmement, la proportion de revenus provenant du marché public est d'environ 10 % plus élevée chaque année qu'elle ne l'est pour l'ensemble de la population des aînés à long terme. Enfin, la part de revenus de retraite non contributive est substantiellement plus élevée que dans le cas de la population totale des aînés à long terme. Au bout de 12 ans, elle représente 21 % du revenu moyen et augmente rapidement; après 20 ans, le revenu provenant d'une retraite non contributive représente 60 % des revenus que reçoivent les parents et grands-parents.

La figure 5 illustre l'évolution du revenu moyen des immigrants aînés à court terme. Au cours de la première année après leur arrivée, les aînés à court terme dépendent, à environ 85 %, de revenus provenant du marché privé. Toutefois, cette proportion décline régulièrement et au bout de 15 ans, elle tombe à 26 %, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est inférieure de 50 % à celle de la population des aînés à long terme. Durant la même période, les proportions de revenus provenant de retraites contributives et non contributives augmentent respectivement de 15 et 50 %. Cette tendance continue de s'affirmer au bout de 20 ans, la proportion de revenus provenant du marché privé est de 14 %, alors que les proportions provenant de retraites contributives et non contributives sont respectivement de 23 % et 60 %.

Pourcentages des revenus moyens annuels provenant des secteurs public et privé et des retraites contributives et non contributives pour les aînés à long terme durant l'année fiscale 2000



population dans son ensemble. On note toutefois quelques différences importantes. Premièrement, la proportion de population de requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés n'ayant aucun revenu durant les dix premières années après leur arrivée est de 10 à 20 % inférieure à celle des aînés à court terme dans son ensemble. Deuxièmement, après dix à douze années, la proportion de requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés possédant un revenu du marché est de 10 à 15 % plus élevée que celle des aînés à court terme dans son ensemble et la proportion ayant un revenu de retraite est de 10 % moins élevée.

Les aînés à court terme arrivés en tant qu'immigrants retraités (8 % de cette population) ont des sources de revenus très similaires à celles des requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés. La seule différence est qu'après dix années la proportion des immigrants retraités qui n'ont qu'un revenu de retraite est encore plus faible, avec une proportion de 20 % inférieure à celle de la population totale des aînés à court terme. Ces chiffres coïncident avec les 10 % supplémentaires d'immigrants retraités bénéficiant de deux sources de revenus.

La figure 3 présente les pourcentages de la population des aînés immédiats n'ayant aucun revenu, percevant un revenu du marché, un revenu de retraite ou encore un revenu du marché et un revenu de retraite. Durant les sept premières années après leur arrivée, environ la moitié des aînés immédiats perçoivent un revenu du marché. Cette proportion est la plus faible des trois groupes d'aînés. Après sept ans, ce pourcentage commence à diminuer parallèlement à l'augmentation du pourcentage d'aînés bénéficiant d'un revenu de retraite ou d'un revenu provenant des deux sources. À partir de la dixième année, seulement 10 % des aînés immédiats dépendent encore exclusivement d'un revenu du marché. Onze ans après leur arrivée, c'est-à-dire trois ans plus tôt que les aînés à court terme, plus de

90 % des aînés immédiats perçoivent un revenu provenant en partie ou totalement d'une retraite, 30 % de cette population environ dépendant exclusivement de cette source de revenus. Tout comme pour les aînés à court terme, la proportion d'aînés immédiats n'ayant aucune source de revenus durant les dix premières années après leur arrivée diminue exponentiellement. Toutefois, durant cette période, cette proportion s'établit entre 25 % et 40 %, c'est-à-dire environ 5 à 10 % de plus que la proportion des aînés à court terme sans aucune source de revenus.

Ces résultats sont identiques à ceux observés pour la population d'aînés immédiats qui sont arrivés dans la catégorie famille en tant que parents et grands-parents, résultats peu surprenants puisque les parents et les grands-parents représentent environ trois quarts de la population des aînés immédiats. Contrairement à ce qui se passe pour les aînés à court terme, les différences des sources de revenus des aînés immédiats ne sont pas suffisamment grandes pour modifier les résultats de l'ensemble de la population. Les aînés immédiats qui sont arrivés en tant qu'immigrants retraités représentent, par exemple, 11 % de cette population et affichent quelques différences quant à leurs revenus. Durant les dix premières années après leur arrivée, les immigrants retraités dépendant uniquement d'un revenu du marché représentent une proportion de 15 à 20 % plus élevée que celle de l'ensemble des aînés immédiats dans la même situation et la proportion n'ayant aucune source de revenus observée pour la population d'aînés immédiats qui sont arrivés dans la catégorie famille en tant que parents et grands-parents, résultats peu surprenants puisque les parents et les grands-parents représentent environ trois quarts de la population des aînés immédiats. Contrairement à ce qui se passe pour les aînés à court terme, les différences des sources de revenus des aînés immédiats ne sont pas suffisamment grandes pour modifier les résultats de l'ensemble de la population. Les aînés immédiats qui sont arrivés en tant qu'immigrants retraités représentent, par exemple, 11 % de cette population et affichent quelques différences quant à leurs revenus.

Durant les dix premières années après leur arrivée, les immigrants retraités dépendant uniquement d'un revenu du marché représentent une proportion de 15 à 20 % plus élevée que celle de l'ensemble des aînés immédiats dans la même situation et la proportion n'ayant aucune source de revenus observée pour la population d'aînés immédiats qui sont arrivés dans la catégorie famille en tant que parents et grands-parents, résultats peu surprenants puisque les parents et les grands-parents représentent environ trois quarts de la population des aînés immédiats. Contrairement à ce qui se passe pour les aînés à court terme, les

FIGURE 3

Pourcentages de la population des aînés immédiats n'ayant aucun revenu, percevant un revenu du marché, un revenu de retraite ou un revenu du marché et un revenu de retraite durant l'année fiscale 2000





FIGURE 2

Pourcentages de la population des aînés à court terme n'ayant aucun revenu, percevant un revenu du marché, un revenu de retraite ou un revenu du marché et un revenu de retraite durant l'année fiscale 2000



court terme dépendent exclusivement du revenu du marché. Après cinq ans, ce pourcentage commence à décliner parallèlement à l'augmentation du pourcentage de ceux qui reçoivent un revenu de retraite. Dix ans après leur arrivée, 35 % seulement des aînés à court terme dépendent uniquement du revenu du marché. Dès la dixième année, 50 % d'entre eux reçoivent une partie ou la totalité de leur revenu de sources de retraite et ce pourcentage continue à augmenter. Après 14 ans, plus de 90 % de la population des aînés à court terme reçoit un revenu de retraite sous une forme ou une autre, 30 % à 40 % d'entre eux dépendent uniquement du revenu de retraite. On remarquera aussi le déclin de la proportion d'aînés à court terme n'ayant aucune source de revenu. Durant les sept premières années après leur arrivée, cette proportion est située entre 20 % et 30 %. Après 11 ans, le pourcentage tombe à moins de 10 et après 20 ans, tous les aînés à court terme reçoivent un revenu provenant d'au moins une source⁷.

Ces résultats sont presque identiques à ceux des aînés qui sont arrivés sous la catégorie famille en tant que parents ou grands-parents (62 % de cette population). On notera une différence durant les dix premières années suivant l'arrivée : le pourcentage de la population des parents et grands-parents : 10 % de moins dépendent uniquement du revenu du marché et 10 % de plus dépendent d'un revenu de retraite. Ces différences s'expliquent partiellement par la provenance des revenus de la deuxième et de la troisième des principales catégories de la population des aînés à court terme. Les aînés à court terme qui sont arrivés en tant que requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés (9 % de cette population) présentent aussi des courbes équivalentes à celles de la

au Canada en tant que requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés (25 % de cette population). La population de requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés dépendant entièrement du revenu du marché présente un déclin similaire pour la période concernée, alors que la population dépendant d'un revenu de retraite ou des deux types de revenus augmente. Toutefois, si l'on considère la période entière, la proportion de requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés dépendant uniquement du revenu du marché reste plus élevée de 10 % que pour la totalité des aînés à long terme. Parallèlement, la proportion de requérants principaux-travailleurs qualifiés dépendant uniquement d'un revenu de retraite est plus faible de 10 %.

Les résultats présentés pour l'ensemble de la population des aînés à long terme sont nettement différents de ceux observés pour les aînés à long terme qui sont arrivés sous la catégorie famille, en tant que parents ou grands-parents (25 % de cette population). La proportion de parents ou de grands-parents dépendant uniquement du revenu de retraite, jusqu'à 15 ans après leur arrivée, les parents et grands-parents n'ayant aucune source de revenus représentent une proportion de 10 % plus élevée que la proportion de l'ensemble des aînés à long terme dans la même situation.

La figure 2 présente les pourcentages de la population des aînés à court terme n'ayant aucun revenu, dépendant du revenu du marché, d'un revenu de retraite ou encore du revenu du marché et d'un revenu de retraite. Durant les cinq premières années suivant leur arrivée, 70 % des aînés à

TABLEAU 1


Répartition des populations aînées par catégorie d'immigration

Catégorie	Aînés		
	Aînés à long-terme (%)	Aînés à court-terme (%)	Immédiats (%)
Économique – Requérant principal qualifié	24,6	9,2	3
Économique – Conjoint ou dépendant	8,9	2,2	0,4
Économique – Autre	12,2	6,2	1,2
Famille – Parent ou Grand-parent	25,3	61,7	76,6
Famille – Autre	10,9	5,5	3,4
Refugie	16,8	6,5	3,8
Retraite	1,2	8,1	11,3
Autre	0,1	0,6	0,3
Total	100	100	100

Source : BDIM⁵

FIGURE 1

Pourcentages de la population d'aînés à long terme n'ayant aucun revenu, dépendant du revenu du marché, d'un revenu de retraite ou à la fois du revenu du marché et d'un revenu de retraite durant l'année fiscale 2000⁶



Sources et composition des revenus des immigrants âgés

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Introduction

Le présent exposé examine la situation des revenus des immigrants âgés au Canada. Les résultats exposés ici proviennent d'une étude plus vaste actuellement menée par le service de recherche et statistiques stratégiques de Citoyenneté et Immigration Canada. Cette étude intégrale examine les données démographiques, les expériences sur le marché du travail et les revenus des immigrants âgés au Canada. Elle fait la distinction entre les immigrants qui sont arrivés au Canada à un âge déjà avancé et ceux qui parviennent à un âge avancé après avoir passé un certain temps au Canada. Les résultats présentés ci-après se concentrent sur les différences qui existent entre les sources et la composition des revenus de trois groupes d'immigrants âgés : ceux qui sont arrivés au Canada entre 40 et 49 ans, entre 50 et 59 ans, et entre 60 ans ou plus¹. Les résultats sont présentés pour chacun des groupes d'âinés ainsi que pour la catégorie d'immigration la plus importante dans chaque groupe.

Données et définitions

La présente analyse étudie deux grands types généraux de revenus. Le premier, défini comme le revenu du marché, représente le revenu accessible à la population active. Le revenu du marché comprend les revenus provenant d'un emploi salarié, d'un emploi autonome, des investissements, de l'assurance-emploi et de l'aide sociale. Le deuxième type de revenu, défini comme le revenu de retraite, représente le revenu accessible exclusivement aux personnes âgées. Il comprend les revenus provenant des Régime de pensions du Canada/Régime de rentes du Québec (RPC/RRQ)², de la sécurité vieillesse (SV), du supplément de revenu garanti (SRG) et de l'Alloca-tion, du régime enregistré d'épargne retraite (REER) et des plans d'épargne retraite privés. Il conviendra de décrire

Sources de revenu

quelques-unes des sources de revenus accessibles à la retraite, car certaines conditions s'appliquent qui peuvent déterminer si des immigrants y ont droit ou non.

Étant donné qu'il est peu pratique de présenter les résultats pour chaque catégorie d'immigrants dans chacun des trois groupes d'âinés, le présent exposé se limitera aux résultats concernant l'ensemble des groupes d'âinés et à ceux concernant les catégories d'immigrants qui représentent la plus grosse portion de chaque groupe d'âinés³. Le tableau 1 présente la composition des populations d'âinés examinées dans cette analyse, par catégorie d'immigrants.

La figure 1 présente les pourcentages respectifs de la population des âinés à long terme n'ayant aucun revenu, de celles jouissant du revenu du marché, d'un revenu de retraite, ou à la fois du revenu du marché et d'un revenu de retraite⁴. Bien que ce pourcentage décline au fur et à mesure que le temps passé au Canada augmente, la majorité des âinés à long terme dépend uniquement du revenu du marché jusqu'à 15 ans après son arrivée. Le déclin de la proportion dépendant uniquement du revenu du marché est proportionnel à l'augmentation simultanée de la proportion recevant soit un revenu de retraite, soit les deux types de revenu. Au cours de la période étudiée, le pourcentage de la population d'âinés à long terme dépendant du seul revenu du marché passe de 70 % à 30 %, alors que le pourcentage recevant une partie ou la totalité de son revenu d'une pension de retraite augmente de 20 % à 70 %, 20 % environ dépendant exclusive-ment d'un revenu de retraite à la vingtième année.

Ces résultats sont très semblables à ceux que l'on observe dans le cas d'âinés à long terme qui sont arrivés

La force vitale de la collectivité

Les organismes à but non lucratif et bénévoles (ENOB) exercent une forte présence économique et font appel à la participation de millions de Canadiens, qui s'y impliquent en tant que membres, en donnant temps et argent. Facette importante de la vie au Canada, ils sont le vecteur des efforts déployés par des millions de Canadiens pour répondre aux besoins de la communauté. Ceuvarant dans des secteurs très divers, ces organismes s'emploient souvent à assurer la prestation d'avantages publics. Qu'ils fonctionnent, comme bon nombre d'entre eux, avec un budget restreint et le seul travail des bénévoles, ou qu'ils bénéficient de ressources financières et humaines importantes pour mener à bien leur mission, ils ont tous en commun la volonté de servir le public ou leurs membres et une forme institutionnelle qui les empêche de réaliser des profits pour le compte de leurs propriétaires ou de leurs administrateurs.

L'enquête nationale sur les organismes à but non lucratif et bénévoles (ENOB) dresse pour la première fois un portrait de ces organismes au Canada et révèle la diversité de ces associations, qui touchent les Canadiens dans pratiquement toutes les facettes de leur vie.

Pour plus d'information, veuillez consulter le rapport de Statistique Canada intitulé *Force vitale de la collectivité : faits saillants de l'enquête nationale auprès des organismes à but non lucratif et bénévoles*. Ce rapport est disponible gratuitement en version électronique téléchargeable sur le site de Statistique Canada www.statcan.ca, numéro de catalogue : 61-533-WPE.

Analyses transversales : Les individus âgés de 18 à 64 ans, qui ne sont pas des étudiants à temps plein, qui ont travaillé contre rémunération un minimum de 910 heures et qui, avec leur revenu familial disponible, ne sont pas en mesure de se procurer les biens et services inclus dans le panier de consommation de la Mesure basée sur un panier de consommation (MPC) durant l'année de référence.

Analyses longitudinales : Les individus âgés de 18 à 64 ans, qui ne sont pas des étudiants à temps plein, qui ont travaillé contre rémunération un minimum de 910 heures et dont le revenu familial disponible ne dépasse pas le seuil de faible revenu après l'impôt de Statistique Canada (SFR-ral) durant l'année de référence.

Pour les besoins de l'analyse longitudinale, les auteurs ont dû changer de mesure de faible revenu pour identifier les travailleurs à faible revenu puisque les seuls de la MPC ne sont disponibles qu'à partir de 2000. Toutefois, elles ont effectuées des tests pour vérifier la robustesse des résultats obtenus pour l'année 2001 et ont trouvé que, quoique le nombre de travailleurs à faible revenu est plus élevé lorsque la MPC est utilisée, le profil des travailleurs à faible revenu est très similaire que l'on utilise la MPC ou les SFR-ral.

6 Dans cet article, les « autres travailleurs » font référence aux individus de 18-64 ans qui ne sont pas des étudiants à temps plein et qui ont effectué au moins 910 heures de travail rémunéré durant l'année mais qui n'ont pas un faible revenu familial.

7 Des recherches ont permis d'identifier un certain nombre de groupes particuliers-ment à risque de connaître de longues périodes de faible revenu, d'exclusion du marché du travail ou de marginalisation sociale au Canada. Ces groupes sont les parents seuls, les Canadiens d'origine autochtone, les personnes ayant immigré au Canada dans les dix années précédentes d'observation, les personnes souffrant depuis longtemps d'une maladie ou d'une condition physique ou mentale limitant leurs aptitudes au travail et les personnes de 45 à 64 ans vivant seules.

8 Le rapport des revenus disponibles moyens ((57,000/34,600)=1.6) demeure environ le même lorsqu'il est ajusté pour tenir compte de la taille de la famille ((33,000/20,000)=1.65).

important. Cependant leurs conditions de travail sont beaucoup plus précaires que celle des travailleurs n'ayant pas un faible revenu familial.

- La situation familiale compte pour beaucoup dans l'explication du faible revenu chez les travailleurs. Au Canada, les familles comptant un seul travailleur sont particulièrement à risque de pauvreté financière et ce risque augmente avec le nombre d'enfants dans la famille.
- Si le travail favorise la sortie de la pauvreté, pour la plupart des travailleurs à faible revenu, la situation dans laquelle ils se trouvent est plus que temporaire.


La présente étude nous a permis d'avoir une meilleure compréhension du phénomène des travailleurs à faible revenu au Canada et de faire la distinction avec celui des travailleurs à faibles gains. Il serait maintenant important de réfléchir aux types de politiques et de programmes qui pourraient être développées afin de favoriser davantage l'autosuffisance des travailleurs à faible revenu.

Notes

- 1 Le présent article résume les principaux résultats d'une vaste recherche en cours sur les travailleurs à faible revenu au Canada. Les résultats de cette plus vaste recherche n'ont pas encore été publiés. Toutefois, il est possible d'obtenir une ébauche d'un premier article intitulé "A Profile of the Working Poor in Canada" à l'adresse suivante : <http://cert.mcmaster.ca/conferences/june2004/fortin.pdf>.
- 2 Karabegovic, Amela (May 2003).
- 3 Tel que défini par *Réseaux canadiens de recherche en politiques publiques* un travailleur à faibles gains est un individu qui travaille à temps plein toute l'année mais dont les revenus de travail sont inférieurs à 20 000 \$.
- 4 Tous les résultats statistiques inclus dans cet article sont tirés des calculs des auteurs à partir des fichiers principaux de l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu, 2001.
- 5 Pour l'objet de la présente étude empirique, les auteurs ont choisi de définir les

FIGURE 3

Principales raisons liées à la première sortie de la pauvreté entre 1997 et 2001 des travailleurs à faible revenu identifiés en 1996



un changement dans la structure de leur famille (14 %) ou à une hausse des revenus d'autres membres de leur famille (32 %).

Enfin, même après être sortis du faible revenu, les « ex-travailleurs à faible revenu » avaient un revenu familial bien inférieur au reste de la population. Alors que sur la période 1996-2001, le revenu familial disponible moyen de l'ensemble des personnes qui n'avaient pas un faible revenu en 1996 se situait à 57 000 \$, il était près de 40 % moins élevé chez les travailleurs à faible revenu qui sont sortis de la pauvreté (34 600\$)⁸.

Utilisation de l'assistance sociale et de l'assurance-emploi par les travailleurs à faible revenu

Il est facile de s'imaginer que la frontière entre le statut de travailleur à faible revenu, d'assisté social ou de chômeur peut être parfois ténue. En effet, plus le travail est précaire, moins il procure d'avantages par rapport à l'inactivité et donc, plus il est probable que le travailleur quitte son emploi ou le perde. Il est donc intéressant de

vérifier la dynamique existant entre le statut de travailleur, d'assisté social ou de bénéficiaire d'assurance-emploi parmi les individus qu'on identifie à un moment donné comme travailleurs à faible revenu.

En fait, on observe que les travailleurs à faible revenu ont davantage tendance à avoir recours à l'assistance sociale que les autres travailleurs. À preuve, en 1996 comme en 2001, les travailleurs à faible revenu étaient beaucoup plus susceptibles que les autres travailleurs d'avoir eu recours à des prestations d'assistance sociale durant l'année (13,5 % vs 1,5 % en 1996 et 9,6 % vs 1,2 % en 2001). Par ailleurs, alors que seulement 6 % des travailleurs qui n'avaient pas un faible revenu en 2001 avaient eu recours à l'assistance sociale dans les années antérieures, chez les travailleurs à faible revenu cette proportion s'élève à 30 % et pour la plupart d'entre eux les prestations d'assistance sociale représentaient la grande majorité (80 % ou plus) de leur revenu familial. Les travailleurs à faible revenu identifiés en 1996 étaient également plus sujets à toucher des prestations d'assistance

sociale dans les cinq années suivantes que les autres travailleurs (18 % vs 3 %) quoique dans ce cas, très peu d'entre eux ont compté sur l'assistance sociale comme principale source de revenu. Les travailleurs à faible revenu n'étaient cependant pas de plus grands utilisateurs de l'assurance-emploi que les autres travailleurs. En effet, alors que 12 % des travailleurs à faible revenu en 2001 ont eu recours à des prestations d'assurance-emploi cette année-là, chez les autres travailleurs cette proportion était de 13 %.

Conclusion

Malgré les efforts visant à combattre le faible revenu et l'exclusion sociale, beaucoup de Canadiens/Canadiennes ont toujours de la difficulté à intégrer le marché du travail. Depuis plusieurs années, la politique sociale mise beaucoup sur l'emploi dans sa lutte contre le faible revenu. Or, si l'emploi continue un moyen efficace pour échapper au faible revenu, il n'est pas non plus une panacée. Il existe au Canada, comme dans d'autres pays, un certain nombre de personnes qui accèdent au marché du travail et qui font même un effort de travail considérable mais qui arrivent difficilement à joindre les deux bouts; ce sont les travailleurs à faible revenu.

Très peu de recherches se sont attachées à décrire et à comprendre la situation des travailleurs à faible revenu au Canada. La présente étude vise donc à faire la lumière sur certaines facettes de cet enjeu encore méconnu. Les points saillants de l'étude sont les suivants :

- En 2001, environ 50 % des Canadiens/Canadiennes à faible revenu comptaient au moins un travailleur dans leur famille.
- Entre 1996 et 2001, la situation de travailleur à faible revenu a touché une personne en état de travailler sur dix.
- Les travailleurs à faible revenu démontrent un effort de travail

TABEAU 4

Trajectoire sur le marché du travail (1997-2001) des travailleurs de 1996, selon leur statut de pauvreté cette même année

Travailleurs à faible revenu en 1996			
Travailleurs qui n'ont pas un faible revenu en 1996			
	#	%	#
Tous	513 700	100,0	8 895 200
Ont travaillé au moins 910 heures toutes les années	199 400	38,8	5 265 100
Ont toujours travaillé mais ont < 910 heures de travail	237 800	46,3	2 614 600
Ont connu au moins une année sans aucune heure de travail	76 600	14,7	1 015 500
			11,4

TABEAU 5

Statistiques descriptives sur le faible revenu de long-terme (1997-2001) selon l'effort de travail des personnes à faible revenu (FR) en 1996

FR en 1996	A travaillé	A travaillé	N'a pas travaillé
1996	1500+ heures	de 1 à 909 heures	de 0 à 909 heures
(910+ heures)	en 1996	en 1996	en 1996

Nb. de personnes faisant partie du groupe	513 700	358 200	227 600	708 500
% qui sont sortis du FR au moins une fois avant 2002	85,3 %	84,5 %	85,4 %	57,1 %
% qui sont demeurés à FR 1 seule année	26,1 %	25,7 %	29,4 %	7,9 %
% qui sont demeurés à FR 2 ou 3 années	38,3 %	37,7 %	34,1 %	20,6 %
% qui sont demeurés à FR 4 années ou plus	35,6 %	36,5 %	36,5 %	71,5 %
Nb. moyen d'années passées dans la situation de FR	2,99 ans	3,03 ans	2,98 ans	4,44 ans
Proportion ayant vécu de la pauvreté persistante*	39,3 %	40,3 %	38,4 %	73,6 %

Note :
* On dit qu'un individu a vécu de la pauvreté persistante si le cumul de ses revenus familiaux disponibles de 1996 à 2001 est inférieur au cumul des SFR-après impôt de Statistique Canada pour cette même période.

personnes à faible revenu qui ne travaillaient pas en 1996 (61 % vs 26 %). De plus, entre 1997 et 2001, 85 % des travailleurs à faible revenu identifiés en 1996 sont sortis de la pauvreté au moins temporairement. Il est intéressant de noter qu'entre 1996 et 2001, les taux de pauvreté persistante ainsi que les taux de sortie du faible revenu chez les travailleurs étaient fort similaires, qu'ils aient peu travaillé (entre 1 et 909 heures) ou beaucoup travaillé (910 et plus) en 1996. Ainsi, il semble qu'à long terme, le nombre d'heures de travail importe peu pour prédire la chance qu'un individu de se sortir du faible revenu. Ce qui importe davantage c'est le fait d'avoir ou non un lien avec le marché du travail.

Tout de même, ce ne sont pas tous les travailleurs qui réussissent à sortir du faible revenu à court terme. En effet, sur la période 1996-2001, les travailleurs à faible revenu identifiés au début de la période ont passé en moyenne trois ans sous le seuil de faible revenu, et près de 40 % d'entre eux y ont passé quatre ans ou plus. De plus, parmi ceux qui sont sortis du faible revenu rapidement (en 1997), plus du tiers (36 %) sont retombés dans une situation de faible revenu à court terme (entre 1998 et 2001). Bref, même si les travailleurs à faible revenu demeurent généralement moins longtemps dans une situation de faible revenu que les autres personnes à faible revenu, pour la majorité d'entre eux, la situation de vulnérabilité financière dans laquelle ils se trouvent est plus que temporaire.

De surcroît, près de la moitié des travailleurs à faible revenu qui ont réussi à sortir de la pauvreté l'ont fait grâce à leur environnement familial et non à leur progression sur le marché du travail (voir figure 3). En effet, alors que pour 54 % des travailleurs à faible revenu de 1996 ayant réussi à sortir du faible revenu avant 2002, la sortie était majoritairement due à une hausse de leurs propres gains, pour 46 % d'entre eux, la sortie était plutôt attribuable à

soient seuls gagne-pain dans la famille ou non. À preuve, tel que l'on peut le constater au graphique 2, la probabilité qu'un travailleur ait un faible revenu n'est que de 2 % s'il fait partie d'une famille sans enfant ou les deux conjoints travaillent. Cette probabilité s'élève à 26 % lorsque le travailleur est le seul gagne-pain du couple et a plus de deux enfants à charge.

D'autres caractéristiques (énumérées au tableau 3) font aussi en sorte d'augmenter de manière significative la probabilité qu'un travailleur connaisse une situation de faible revenu. Celles-ci sont, entre autres, le fait d'être travailleur autonome, d'être un immigrant récent ou un Autochtone vivant hors réserve, de ne pas travailler à temps plein toute l'année, d'être jeune, etc. Il est intéressant de noter que même chez les personnes qui travaillent un grand nombre d'heures (910 heures ou plus durant l'année), celles faisant partie de certains groupes à risque⁷ ont une probabilité d'avoir un faible revenu familial plus élevée que les personnes ne faisant pas partie de ces groupes.

La dynamique du faible revenu chez les travailleurs entre 1996 et 2001

Observer la dynamique du faible revenu chez les travailleurs sur plusieurs années consécutives est utile afin d'évaluer, entre autres, si la situation de faible revenu dans laquelle ils se trouvent est temporaire ou non ou de déterminer quelles sont les circonstances qui permettent aux travailleurs à faible revenu de sortir d'une situation de faible revenu.

Proportion d'individus qui connaît la situation de travailleurs à faible revenu

Si une petite proportion d'individus étaient considérés travailleurs à faible revenu en 2001 (4 %), une proportion beaucoup plus importante de Canadiens/Canadiennes a connu au moins un épisode de travail à faible

TABLEAU 3

Les caractéristiques, autres que familiales, qui augmentent la probabilité de faible revenu chez les travailleurs en 2001

Différence de probabilité prédite de faible revenu avec la catégorie pour laquelle cette probabilité est la plus faible*	
	%
Etre travailleur autonome	8,3
Etre un immigrant récent ou un Autochtone hors réserve	4,7
Ne pas travailler à temps plein toute l'année	4,5
Travailler pour une petite entreprise (< 20 employés)	3,8
Etre jeune (18-24)	3,6
Habiter une région où le taux de pauvreté est supérieur à la moyenne	3,5
Avoir moins d'un diplôme d'études secondaires	3,3
Travailler dans la vente ou les services	3,1
Avoir des limitations au travail	2,7
Avoir peu d'expérience sur le marché du travail (< 3ans)	1,8

Note :
* Par d'exemple, le fait qu'un travailleur ait eu au moins un épisode de travail autonome durant l'année augmentée de 8,3 points de pourcentage la probabilité qu'il ait un faible revenu familial cette même année par rapport à un travailleur n'ayant jamais été travailleur autonome.

Trajectoire sur le marché du travail des travailleurs à faible revenu

À priori, on pourrait penser que les travailleurs à faible revenu sont des individus dont l'effort de travail n'est pas très élevé et qu'ils ont tendance à alterner entre emploi, chômage et inactivité à leur gré ou parce qu'ils y sont contraints. Mais qu'en est-il réellement? En fait, on observe au tableau 4 que très peu des travailleurs à faible revenu identifiés en 1996 ont quitté le marché du travail dans les années subséquentes. Seulement 15 % des travailleurs à faible revenu de 1996 ont connu au moins une année sans aucune heure de travail durant la

Situation de faible revenu de long terme des travailleurs à faible revenu

Les travailleurs à faible revenu sortent peu du marché du travail mais réussissent-ils à sortir du faible revenu? Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, le travail est un facteur favorable à la sortie du faible revenu (voir tableau 5). En effet, malgré que 40 % des travailleurs à faible revenu aient connu la pauvreté persistante entre 1996 et 2001, ils y ont échappé plus souvent que les

Proportion de travailleurs ayant accès à des bénéfices liés à l'emploi, selon le statut de faible revenu des travailleurs en 2001

TABLEAU 1

Travailleurs à faible revenu n'ont pas un faible revenu en 2001 (%)		Travailleurs à faible revenu en 2001 (%)	
% ayant accès à une assurance-vie ou invalidité		17,9	
% faisant partie d'un syndicat		10,8	
% dont l'employeur offre un plan de pension		15,1	
		48,7	

les facteurs qui augmentent le risque de faible revenu chez les travailleurs. Plus que toute autre, la situation familiale du travailleur joue un rôle primordial afin d'expliquer la probabilité qu'il connaisse un épisode de faible revenu. En effet, les travailleurs qui sont le seul gagne-pain de la famille sont beaucoup plus sujets à avoir un faible revenu familial que les autres travailleurs. C'est donc chez les personnes seules, les parents seuls ainsi que chez les travailleurs faisant partie d'un couple dans lequel le conjoint ne travaille pas que l'on retrouve la probabilité de faible revenu la plus élevée parmi l'ensemble des travailleurs. De surcroît, plus les travailleurs ont d'enfants à leur charge, plus la probabilité qu'ils aient un faible revenu familial augmente et ce, qu'ils

Proportion de personnes faisant partie d'une famille ayant accès à des bénéfices liés à l'emploi*, selon le statut de faible revenu de la famille en 2001

Personnes vivant dans une famille comptant au moins un travailleur mais n'ayant pas un faible revenu en 2001 (%)		Personnes vivant dans une famille comptant au moins un travailleur mais n'ayant pas un faible revenu en 2001 (%)	
% ayant accès à un régime de soins dentaires		25,6	
% ayant accès à un régime d'assurance-maladie ou de soins médicaux		74,6	

Note : * On pose ici l'hypothèse que le plan dentaire et le régime d'assurance-maladie liés à l'emploi couvrent tous les membres de la famille du travailleur ayant accès à ces bénéfices.


qui n'avaient pas un faible revenu familial en 2001 (12 \$/h vs 19 \$/h). Il est tout de même important de mentionner que le salaire horaire moyen des travailleurs à faible revenu se situait largement au-dessus du salaire minimum en vigueur dans toutes les provinces en 2001, et qu'ainsi, une augmentation du salaire minimum devrait être considérable pour avoir un impact significatif sur la réduction du nombre de travailleurs à faible revenu au Canada.

Par ailleurs, il était beaucoup moins probable que les travailleurs à faible revenu aient accès à un filet de protection dans le cadre de leur emploi (voir tableaux 1 et 2). En effet, en 2001, les travailleurs à faible revenu étaient environ trois fois moins susceptibles que les autres travailleurs d'avoir accès à divers bénéfices reliés à leur emploi, tels être membre d'un syndicat, être couverts par une assurance invalidité, avoir accès (ainsi que les membres de leur famille) à un régime de soins dentaires, etc.

Les travailleurs à faible revenu étaient également beaucoup plus sujets à être des travailleurs autonomes ou à avoir un horaire de travail atypique. Pas moins de 41 % des 653 000 travailleurs à faible revenu observés en 2001 ont déclaré avoir effectué au moins un épisode de travail autonome durant l'année alors que seulement 13 % des travailleurs qui n'avaient pas un faible revenu cette année-là ont déclaré avoir été travailleurs autonomes. Enfin, parmi ceux ayant occupé un emploi salarié durant l'année, près de 40 % n'avaient pas un horaire de travail régulier de jour alors que cette proportion était significativement plus faible chez les autres travailleurs (25 %). La plus grande précarité des conditions de travail des travailleurs à faible revenu nous porte à nous interroger sur la capacité et l'efficacité des programmes actuels à leur venir en aide. Par exemple, étant donné la plus forte prévalence de travailleurs autonomes et d'emplois à horaire atypique chez les travailleurs à faible revenu, ces

Nombre de personnes à faible revenu et de travailleurs (personnes âgées de 18 à 64 ans qui ne sont pas des étudiants à temps plein)

FIGURE 1



Probabilité prédite* du faible revenu chez les travailleurs, selon le type de famille et le nombre de gagne-pain dans la famille 2001

FIGURE 2



Note :

* Les probabilités prédites sont tirées de résultats de régressions logistiques ayant des variables de probabilité de faible revenu chez les travailleurs.

Profil des travailleurs à faible revenu au Canada en 2001

En 2001, on comptait au Canada 653 000 travailleurs à faible revenu et 1,5 million de personnes touchées directement par ce phénomène, dont plus du tiers étaient des enfants de moins de 18 ans. Ces 1,5 millions de personnes représentaient plus de 50 % de l'ensemble des personnes à faible revenu au Canada.

Conditions sur le marché du travail des travailleurs à faible revenu

En 2001, la grande majorité des travailleurs à faible revenu démontrait un effort de travail considérable. En effet, 76 % d'entre eux ont déclaré avoir effectué 1500 heures de travail rémunérées ou plus durant l'année. C'est une proportion qui est un peu plus faible que celle observée chez les travailleurs qui ne vivaient pas dans une situation de faible revenu en 2001 (88 %). Cependant, la moyenne d'heures de travail effectuées par les travailleurs à faible revenu était très similaire à celle des autres travailleurs⁶, voire légèrement plus élevée (2090 heures vs 2050 heures en 2001).

Malgré un effort de travail similaire, les conditions de travail des travailleurs à faible revenu étaient, en moyenne, plus précaires que celles des autres travailleurs. Notamment, les travailleurs à faible revenu avaient un salaire horaire bien inférieur à celui des travailleurs

Les travailleurs à faible revenu au Canada

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Introduction

Dans les pays industrialisés, il est communément admis que toute personne occupant un travail rémunéré devrait être en mesure de vivre décemment et de faire vivre les membres de sa famille. Or, pour certains Canadiens/Canadiennes, compter au moins un travailleur dans sa famille ne constitue pas une garantie contre le faible revenu. En effet, déjà dans les années soixante, des études démontrent qu'une grande proportion des individus à faible revenu faisait partie de familles comptant au moins un travailleur offrant un effort de travail considérable. Depuis quelques années, plusieurs pays tels que les États-Unis et certains pays d'Europe tentent de mieux comprendre le phénomène des travailleurs à faible revenu au sein de leurs frontières. Or, au Canada, très peu d'études se sont penchées sur le sujet et celles l'ayant fait se sont davantage intéressées à l'enjeu des travailleurs à faibles gains ce qui a eu pour conséquence de mettre l'accent sur les caractéristiques du marché du travail. Cependant, avec la restructuring massive des régimes d'assistance sociale des années 1990 et la réduction du nombre d'assistés sociaux (en moyenne – 40,6 % entre 1994 et 2002²) on a constaté une recrudescence de l'intérêt pour l'enjeu des travailleurs à faible revenu. Cet article vise donc à offrir un portrait de la situation des travailleurs à faible revenu au Canada.

Les constatations les plus frappantes de cette étude sont que l'enjeu des travailleurs à faibles gains diffère considérablement de celui des travailleurs à faible revenu, et que les caractéristiques familiales contribuent davantage que les caractéristiques du marché du travail à expliquer le faible revenu chez les travailleurs. Par ailleurs, le faible revenu chez les travailleurs ne s'explique que généralement pas par le fait qu'ils travaillent peu (les travailleurs à faible

revenu travaillaient, en moyenne, environ le même nombre d'heures que les travailleurs qui n'avaient pas un faible revenu familial en 2001), mais plutôt par les caractéristiques de leur famille. Notamment, au Canada, un travailleur qui offre un grand effort de travail est particulièrement vulnérable au faible revenu s'il est seul à subvenir aux besoins financiers de sa famille et sa vulnérabilité s'accroît avec le nombre d'enfants à sa charge. Ainsi, les options de politiques à considérer pour venir en aide aux travailleurs à faible revenu pourraient être fort différentes de celles visant à venir en aide aux travailleurs à faibles gains.

Définition de « travailleur à faible revenu » et distinction avec « travailleur à faibles gains »

Une des principales difficultés qui survient lorsque l'on s'intéresse à l'enjeu des travailleurs à faible revenu concerne comment les définir. Qui sont les travailleurs à faible revenu? La question n'est pas simple puisqu'elle implique l'interaction de deux champs d'études habituellement distincts, soient le travail (qui s'observe au niveau de l'individu) et le faible revenu (qui s'observe au niveau de la famille). Une grande confusion subsiste entre l'enjeu des travailleurs à faibles gains et celui des travailleurs à faible revenu. Un travailleur à faibles gains se définit comme un individu qui démontre un effort de travail considérable mais dont le revenu de travail est faible. Cependant, ce travailleur n'est pas nécessairement un travailleur à faible revenu si l'on considère que ses besoins sont comblés non seulement à l'aide de son propre revenu mais aussi, à l'aide de celui des autres membres de sa famille. Notamment, une personne qui travaille à temps plein toute l'année au salaire minimum est considérée au Canada comme un travailleur à faibles gains³. Toutefois, si cette personne vit, par exemple, avec un conjoint gagnant cent mille dollars par année, elle n'est évidemment pas dans une situation de faible revenu et conséquemment, ne

Réseaux sociaux, capital social et exclusion sociale

« Les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques et les spécialistes ont pris conscience, avec les années, du fait que l'objet de leurs préoccupations n'est ni une personne isolée, ni un groupe présentant, en théorie, des liens, comme un ménage ou une collectivité. L'interdépendance et l'interconnectivité sont des thèmes qui ont fait surface au cours d'échanges récents entre chercheurs et responsables de l'élaboration des politiques, surtout dans la recherche sur l'exclusion sociale. Les trois expressions « réseau social », « capital social » et « exclusion sociale » (ainsi qu'« inclusion ») sont liées de plusieurs façons complexes et intéressantes, et tous les travaux rapportés ici sont axés, avec une insistance plus ou moins forte, sur ces relations. »

« Les chapitres de cet ouvrage comprennent :

- un aperçu de la documentation sur les réseaux sociaux, qui offre un résumé des principaux arguments et traditions sociologiques;
- une liste des phénomènes sociaux que les réseaux sociaux cherchent à expliquer;
- des exemples d'études quantitatives et qualitatives fondées sur une large approche axée sur des réseaux;
- une analyse des implications qu'aurait une perspective de réseaux sur les politiques sociales et gouvernementales. »

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Notes

- 1 Ce document s'intègre dans un projet de recherche plus vaste sur la pauvreté et l'éducation au centre-ville, mené par Ben Levin et Jane Gaskell, et financé par le CRSH. Pour plus de détails et de références sur ce sujet, contactez l'un ou l'autre des auteurs.
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Renvois

enfants. De plus, l'infrastructure existante, pour les très jeunes enfants, au Canada et dans bien d'autres pays, s'adresse aux enfants de trois à cinq ans, alors que les besoins en infrastructure et les incidences de celles-ci sont plus importants chez les enfants plus jeunes encore.

L'éducation des adultes est aussi un domaine prometteur pour les collectivités défavorisées, surtout chez les adultes qui ont un faible niveau d'instruction, car en améliorant les compétences des adultes, on améliore généralement la vie des enfants dont ils s'occupent. La mise sur pied d'un réseau de centres d'enseignement aux adultes au Manitoba montre à quel point la participation des adultes est liée à leur désir d'aider leurs enfants à mieux réussir à l'école. Bien que de nombreux systèmes scolaires au Canada disposent de programmes d'enseignement aux adultes, les provinces et les systèmes scolaires ne les appuient que modestement, et ces programmes ont souvent besoin d'une base politique solide pour en promouvoir une meilleure qualité et accessibilité.

Il est de plus en plus reconnu que la participation parentale est un élément important de la réussite scolaire. Les éducateurs ont tendance à rendre les parents responsables des problèmes de leurs enfants et, par conséquent, à chercher à contour leur influence sur les élèves. Or, l'échec de cette approche chez les Autochtones du Canada, montre bien qu'elle ne fonctionne pas du tout. Les pressions que vivent les enfants sont étroitement liées aux conditions de vie de leurs parents, ce

visant à améliorer le logement et à créer des emplois, par exemple.

qui donne à penser que les écoles n'ont pas d'autre choix que d'essayer d'établir des liens forts avec les parents. Nous en avons appris plus sur la façon de tisser ces liens ces dernières années, notamment sur la façon de travailler efficacement avec les parents qui sont eux-mêmes en difficulté. Cependant, à quelques exceptions près, le développement de la participation parentale dans les écoles au Canada est une activité mal financée, un effort supplémentaire qui figure bien bas sur la liste des priorités des écoles. La combinaison de l'éducation de la petite enfance et l'éducation des adultes mène à ce que l'on appelle des programmes bi-générationnels (Dunst et Trivette, 1997). La US National Governors' Association⁴, par exemple, promeut les programmes d'alphabétisation familiaux qui comprennent non seulement le soutien parental à l'alphabétisation des enfants, mais le soutien de l'école à l'éducation des parents également.

Si l'on veut aller encore plus loin, les écoles pourraient étudier les façons dont elles peuvent participer à de plus vastes efforts pour bâtir de fortes collectivités, en embauchant des personnes du quartier, en achetant des produits et des services locaux et en appuyant les efforts communautaires visant à améliorer le logement et à créer des emplois, par exemple. De telles stratégies sont fort prometteuses, mais elles sont souvent abandonnées pour toute une série de raisons.

L'intégration de divers services sociaux et éducatifs aux écoles afin de les rendre plus accessibles à ceux qui en ont besoin est une autre stratégie souvent

proposée. Les tentatives pour mettre en place des modèles de services intégrés remontent aux débuts de l'école publique. Si l'idée semble attrayante d'emblée, il se trouve que, comme c'est le cas de beaucoup de changements institutionnels, elle est très difficile à concrétiser efficacement et à maintenir au fil des ans (Volpe, 2000). Enfin, il faut éviter de tirer de tous ces renseignements des conclusions démesurément pessimistes. Plus précisément, les données examinées ne laissent pas entendre que d'investir de l'argent dans des efforts pour améliorer les écoles défavorisées soit une mauvaise stratégie. Comme le dit un groupe de chercheurs :

Conclusion

Tout ce que nous savons sur la pauvreté et l'éducation indique qu'il a été très difficile d'apporter des changements durables au lien entre les enfants défavorisés et les mauvais résultats scolaires. Malgré les efforts considérables de beaucoup de gens, dans les écoles, les enfants qui grandissent dans nos centres-villes sont toujours plus « à risque », d'avoir des résultats défavorables. Nous ne disposons pas de suffisamment de données pour savoir à quel point, ni dans quelle mesure les écoles peuvent contribuer à compenser ces inégalités. Cet article laisse entendre que les attentes actuelles vis-à-vis des écoles sont probablement irréalistes, et que nos stratégies ont besoin d'être réétudiées. Le moins qu'on puisse dire, c'est qu'une vaste discussion sur les étapes à suivre les plus utiles et les plus faisables nous profiterait grandement.

portent pas directement sur la réussite scolaire et donc, même si c'est probablement important, ils risquent peu d'avoir une incidence sur celle-ci.

Une autre façon courante dont les écoles répondent à la pauvreté a été de concevoir une panoplie de programmes spéciaux ou cibles. Nombre de ceux-ci créent des classes différentes ou des cours spéciaux pour les enfants et les jeunes perçus comme étant « à risque ». Ces approches sont adoptées surtout parce que ce sont celles qui dérangent le moins les pratiques existantes et, très souvent, elles sont financées par des programmes de financement précis.

Encore une fois, les données empiriques portant sur les résultats sont peu nombreuses, mais de manière générale, la recherche montre que les programmes auxiliaires d'entraînement et les programmes réservés aux élèves démunis ne sont pas des plus efficaces (Knapp et coll., 1995).

La réflexion actuelle sur les changements efficaces est généralement axée sur l'enseignement, l'apprentissage et la relation enseignant-élève. Certains chercheurs sont d'avis que la clé réside dans des changements aux pratiques habituelles en classe.

[traduction] [...] la réussite scolaire est plus probable lorsque : les professeurs enseignent en maîtrisant les unités d'apprentissage; les programmes d'études correspondent aux besoins futurs et actuels des élèves; les pratiques d'évaluation utilisées sont authentiques; l'on crée des salles de classes démocratiques, où les élèves contribuent à l'élaboration des règles et à la gouvernance; l'on gère les comportements de manière rationnelle, humaine et cohérente; les enseignants sont chaleureux, abordables, justes et encourageants; et lorsqu'il existe plusieurs façons de réussir pour les élèves (Howard et coll., 1999, p. 316).

Dans l'étude PISA de 2000, les élèves plus motivés ont mieux réussi, indépendamment de leur contexte ou de l'enseignement scolaire.

Les changements aux programmes généraux sont relativement récents.

Les changements les plus populaires comprennent la création de systèmes consultatifs d'enseignants dans les écoles secondaires, pour essayer d'assurer des liens adultes-élèves plus étroits, et l'utilisation de nouvelles approches à l'alphabétisation précoce dans les écoles primaires, notamment l'aide à la lecture et l'alphabétisation équilibrée. Les écoles ont peut-être aussi besoin de distribuer leurs ressources différemment dans les collectivités où les besoins sont les plus criants. Cependant, ces changements à la nature des activités quotidiennes des écoles et, surtout, aux travaux des enseignants, ne sont pas faciles à effectuer et peuvent nuire aux pratiques actuelles. Un nombre important d'études sur l'évaluation des efforts pour améliorer la scolarisation chez les élèves « à risque » montre à quel point il est difficile de mettre en place et de maintenir de tels changements.

Certains de ce que nous appelons les modèles de réforme scolaire intégrale offrent des exemples d'effets positifs, tels que *Success For All*³, le *School Development Program*, ou *Accelerated Schools*, mais ils sont encore controversés, en partie parce que les résultats aux tests sont leur principal critère d'évaluation et d'autre part parce que le nombre d'évaluations réellement indépendantes, pour la plupart des programmes, reste faible. En Angleterre, des efforts d'envergure ont été déployés, par le biais de la *National Literacy Strategy* et de la *National Numeracy Strategy*, qui comprenaient du financement supplémentaire, du soutien, des incitatifs et des exigences de reddition de compte. Les résultats aux examens se sont rapidement améliorés les premières années, mais depuis, ils sont restés stables, et en

Au-delà de l'école

2003a).

Presque toute la documentation sur la pauvreté dans le système d'éducation part du principe que le travail de lutte contre la pauvreté devrait d'abord se faire dans les écoles. Or, la discussion sur les limites de l'amélioration des écoles laisse penser que les écoles ne sont peut-être pas forcément l'endroit où concentrer les efforts pour améliorer et équilibrer les résultats scolaires. Peut-être que d'autres mesures auraient une meilleure incidence sur les résultats scolaires, telles que réduire l'empoisonnement par le plomb lié à l'habitat défectueux, réduire l'inclinaison du syndrome de l'alcoolisme foetal ou encore s'assurer que les enfants des collectivités isolées aient un régime alimentaire adéquat. Au moins, de nombreux centres-villes sont conscients du besoin d'adopter, comme cela a été démontré grâce à des efforts de longue haleine, une approche plus vaste qui comprenne la petite enfance, l'éducation des adultes, la participation des parents et le développement de la collectivité. Beaucoup de programmes d'intervention dans les centres-villes ont été axés sur les années préscolaires. Même si l'on croit fortement qu'une intervention précoce permettra d'améliorer les résultats, la recherche n'est pas aussi claire à ce sujet (Bradley et Whiteside-Mansell, 1997). La petite enfance semble être un domaine qui pourrait faire l'objet d'interventions, mais il n'est pas suffisamment important. Or, le Canada accuse du retard sur de nombreux pays en matière d'efforts et d'infrastructures pour aider les très jeunes enfants. Les écoles canadiennes reçoivent environ six fois plus de financement public, par enfant par an, que les programmes pour très jeunes

écoles?

Quel rôle peuvent jouer les

Les écoles sont souvent vues comme facteurs vitaux des efforts déployés pour réduire la pauvreté et les écarts de réussite. Certains font valoir qu'il est déraisonnable d'attendre des écoles qu'elles surmontent réellement les forces sociales et économiques puissantes qui créent et maintiennent l'inégalité. On peut également avancer que l'objectif et l'attente vis-à-vis des écoles devraient être qu'elles en fassent beaucoup plus que dans le passé pour que les enfants démunis aient les mêmes chances que les autres, et que toute autre position serait détatiste et permettrait aux écoles de trouver des excuses pour justifier leur médiocre performance. Les personnes en faveur des hautes attentes vis-à-vis des écoles signalent que les résultats scolaires varient énormément, même au sein de collectivités aux SES semblables, ce qui laisse croire que certaines écoles arrivent d'une façon ou l'autre à de meilleurs résultats.

Envisager des stratégies pour lutter contre la pauvreté dans les écoles

la réussite des élèves, l'utilisation de données pour guider la planification, des liens étroits avec la collectivité, etc. Pourtant, les écoles qui progressent le plus sont, par définition, atypiques. La documentation sur les différents types de méthodes délibérées pour améliorer les écoles montre que les améliorations des résultats scolaires sont assez modestes dans la plupart des écoles, même après des efforts intensifs sur plusieurs années. De plus, le processus d'amélioration sera souvent plus difficile dans les écoles aux contextes difficiles, car ces écoles sont souvent confrontées à un roulement du personnel plus important, au roulement des élèves également, à un soutien parental manifeste faible et à un historique de l'échec. Une étude américaine récente (Bracey, 2004) montre que des efforts soutenus de longue haleine dans des écoles démunies sont très rares, malgré ce que font miroiter les études des écoles exceptionnelles.

et d'enseignants, la possibilité de choisir son école, du financement supplémentaire, ou d'autres incitatifs financiers pour encourager la réussite scolaire. La troisième catégorie est constituée de mesures qui visent à élargir la portée de l'instruction à des domaines tels que la petite enfance, l'éducation des adultes et le développement économique des collectivités. Ce genre de catégorisation générale minimise l'importance du contexte local. La nature de la pauvreté et le genre de défis qu'elle impose aux écoles varient d'une collectivité à l'autre, partout au Canada. Ces différences laissent penser que les stratégies et approches adoptées par les écoles doivent refléter cette différence.

Que savons-nous des efforts déployés par les écoles?

Toutes catégories confondues, la plupart des efforts pour combler les besoins des écoles démunies, à tous niveaux, ont été déployés à court terme et en marge de l'entreprise de base de la scolarisation. Les mêmes propositions réapparaissent régulièrement, mais ne semblent pas avoir d'effet sur les procédés généraux de scolarisation. On milite encore aujourd'hui en faveur d'idées vieilles de 40 ans, telle que les services intégrés, le développement communautaire ou encore la participation parentale. Nous ne disposons pas de données probantes sur l'incidence de ces différentes mesures. Par exemple, il y a très peu d'information sur l'incidence d'initiatives comme celle de nourrir les élèves ou de leur fournir d'avantage d'orientation. Il semble raisonnable de penser que s'assurer que les enfants mangent correctement, qu'ils ont accès à des programmes qui tiennent compte, dans une certaine mesure, de leur langue ou de leur culture aurait forcément des répercussions. Ce qui limite ces programmes, c'est qu'ils ne

chômage ou stimuler la croissance économique de manière générale, notamment les réductions d'impôts, devraient être vues comme des leviers politiques privilégiés.

Le rôle de l'éducation dans la lutte contre la pauvreté

Bien que l'on associe clairement de meilleurs niveaux d'instruction à des résultats plus souhaitables dans la vie, ces derniers varient énormément, même parmi ceux qui ont des degrés

Au plan macro-politique, l'importance de l'éducation dans la croissance économique générale et la prospérité est devenue un article de foi parmi les gouvernements et autres organismes. Que les paroles se traduisent en politiques éducatives actives est une autre histoire. Beaucoup d'instances, notamment des provinces canadiennes, ont en réalité diminué le niveau et la part de ressources allouées aux écoles publiques et à l'éducation postsecondaire, alors que le développement de la petite enfance et l'éducation des

Certains font valoir qu'il est déraisonnable d'attendre des écoles qu'elles surmontent réellement les forces sociales et économiques puissantes qui créent et maintiennent l'inégalité.

de scolarisation semblables. Ces vingt dernières années ont montré que les pays pouvaient simultanément connaître des niveaux d'instructions à la hausse et des niveaux d'inégalités socio-économiques croissants.

Pourtant, dans les efforts déployés pour encourager les personnes démunies à améliorer leur situation, l'acquisition de meilleurs niveaux d'instruction est souvent fondamentale à l'ouverture d'autres portes (bien qu'en pratique, nombre de programmes d'aide aux démunis posent d'importants obstacles au retour à l'école). Les initiatives communautaires comprennent souvent également des efforts pour améliorer l'instruction, soit dans les écoles, soit par l'éducation des adultes ou le développement de la petite enfance. Cependant, certains partisans de ces initiatives communautaires voient les écoles comme faisant partie de l'établissement qui opprime les démunis, et doutent des efforts axés sur celles-ci, étant donné l'échec évident des méthodes éducatives à apporter des changements aux schémas des inégalités. D'autres recherches doivent comment les écoles maintiennent ou même renforcent parfois les inégalités sociales (p. ex., Natriello et coll., 1990).

Les inégalités à l'école : l'écart de réussite

adultes restent marginaux dans l'entre-prise éducative générale, en matière de politiques, de structures institutionnelles et des ressources.

Quelle est l'ampleur du problème de l'éducation urbaine au Canada? Les niveaux de pauvreté infantile au Canada restent très élevés par rapport aux normes internationales (Bradbury et Jantti, 2001). La Coalition Campaigne 2000 a rapporté que, malgré l'engagement du Parlement de mettre fin à la pauvreté infantile, le nombre d'enfants démunis au Canada a augmenté de 39 %, notamment dans les familles où un parent au moins occupe un travail à plein temps, entre 1989 et 1999. Dans une analyse des étudiants « à risque » au Canada, Levin (2004) conclut que de nombreuses mesures – de la pauvreté, de l'abandon des études secondaires et l'indice de vulnérabilité créée à partir de l'Enquête nationale longitudinale sur les jeunes et les enfants (ENLJE) – ont toutes mené à une conclusion semblable, soit qu'environ 25 % des élèves au Canada courent un certain degré de risque.

dont environ 10 à 15 % risquent d'être confrontés à de grandes difficultés. Cependant, il est manifeste que ces facteurs de risque ne sont pas répartis géographiquement de manière équitable. Dans des collectivités très défavorisées, les degrés de difficultés peuvent être beaucoup plus élevés. Par exemple, nous savons certainement que le pourcentage de personnes qui terminent leurs études est bien moins élevé chez les Autochtones que chez les autres Canadiens.

Les données sur les résultats scolaires montrent que les écarts de réussite restent énormes au Canada, et que le statut socio-économique est un facteur important de ces différences. L'analyse de Williams (2003) des données de l'ENLJE montre que le statut socio-économique a des conséquences significatives sur les compétences des enfants en matière d'éducation, et que ces conséquences sont plus importantes dans les collectivités plus démunies. L'étude du Programme international pour le suivi des acquis des élèves (PISA)² a également montré qu'il existait des écarts marqués entre les meilleurs et les plus faibles élèves de 15 ans au Canada. En outre, ces écarts se creusent avec le temps. Les données du Centre d'élaboration et d'évaluation de la politique des soins de santé du Manitoba ont fait état d'énormes disparités de résultats des élèves de 12e année aux examens provinciaux, chez les élèves qui viennent des régions les plus pauvres de Winnipeg (Brownell et coll., 2004). Il est fondamental de déterminer si, comme c'est le cas aux États-Unis, les écoles des quartiers défavorisés disposent systématiquement de moins bonnes installations, de professeurs moins qualifiés et, de manière générale, de moins de ressources. De nombreuses études donnent à penser que ce n'est pas le cas au Canada, parce que le financement tend à être plus équitable entre les districts scolaires.

Pauvreté et éducation au centre-ville

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De nombreuses études ont invariablement démontré que la valeur explicative la plus déterminante du niveau d'instruction et de la performance scolaire des élèves est le statut socio-économique (SSE) de leur famille. Par conséquent, les enfants des centres-villes, qui sont caractérisés par de faibles SSE, font face à des obstacles significatifs à la réussite scolaire, ainsi qu'à des menaces concomitantes à d'autres résultats importants tels que l'emploi, le revenu, la santé, l'espérance de vie et la participation communautaire.

Ces préoccupations vis-à-vis de l'éducation au centre-ville n'ont rien de nouveau, et pourtant elles cachent une vaste série d'idées quant à la nature, aux causes et aux solutions potentielles aux problèmes d'éducation dans nos villes.

Pauvreté : causes et solutions

La réflexion sur la nature et les causes de la pauvreté est généralement divisée en deux camps : le premier perçoit la pauvreté comme une faiblesse chez des personnes qui ne font pas ou ne peuvent pas faire le nécessaire pour mener une vie raisonnable. Sous cet angle, la pauvreté est souvent un manque de moral, et les mesures visant à fournir un soutien supplémentaire aux personnes démunies ont tendance à encourager la faiméantise et le manque d'initiative, ce qui ne fait qu'aggraver le problème. La deuxième école pense que la pauvreté découle principalement des inégalités systémiques de l'économie et de la société, et résulte surtout de forces sur lesquelles on ne peut exercer aucun contrôle, telles que le manque de travail, les faibles salaires ou la discrimination. Ainsi, le soulagement de la pauvreté exige, soit un soutien supplémentaire aux familles et aux personnes, soit des changements structurels à l'économie et à la société, soit les deux (il y a une divergence d'opinion à ce sujet). L'opinion publique et les politiques gouvernementales oscillent généralement entre ces deux positions.

Les idées de solutions ou de stratégies permettant de lutter contre la pauvreté sont largement façonnées par les idées que les gens se font des causes de ce problème. Ces solutions ou stratégies diverses semblent se diviser en quatre grandes catégories. Un type de politiques fournit un niveau de revenu de base et d'autres soutiens pour les personnes démunies – par le biais de l'aide sociale, de salaires minimums, de crédits d'impôts ou d'une série d'autres moyens. Nombre de ces politiques comportent peu voire pas d'éléments amélioratifs. Elles sont simplement conçues pour rendre supportable – ou du moins possible – la vie de personnes qui, sans elles, seraient de la part des personnes démunies. L'autre type de stratégies vise à favoriser un effort individuel plus important de la part des personnes démunies. Les incitatifs positifs (par exemple, le soutien à la formation et à l'éducation, les plans d'épargne, les programmes ciblés) et négatifs (refus de certaines prestations pour non-emploi), figurent parmi ces mesures. Ces stratégies reposent sur un modèle dans lequel la pauvreté est essentiellement considérée comme le résultat de problèmes ou d'incapacités individuels.

Une troisième catégorie de stratégies, moins fréquente, touche moins les personnes que les quartiers ou les collectivités. Les initiatives de ce type découlent de l'opinion selon laquelle la pauvreté résulte principalement de facteurs structurels plutôt que de choix individuels, et doit être résolue par des changements structurels, surtout au niveau local. Parmi ces stratégies, notons les initiatives de développement économique, les groupes d'action communautaire, l'amélioration des écoles, la création d'emplois, etc. Enfin, les méthodes de lutte contre la pauvreté peuvent être conçues au niveau macrosocial également. Si l'on part de la théorie selon laquelle la prospérité générale est la meilleure façon de réduire la pauvreté, une idée très puissante dans la pensée communie, alors les efforts pour réduire le

pour les femmes. De plus, si l'on décide également d'augmenter les taxes des services collectifs, les ménages disposent alors d'un revenu net inférieur pour consommer des services privés, ce qui fait diminuer le nombre d'emplois de mauvaise qualité du secteur tertiaire (Esping-Andersen, 2000; Pierson, 2001). Ce qui est étonnant, c'est qu'au Canada et aux États-Unis, un travailleur sur six en âge de travailler est employé dans les secteurs du détail, de la restauration et de l'hébergement, généralement peu rémunérés, par rapport à un travailleur sur dix en Suède et au Danemark (Scharpf et Schmidt, 2000, Annexe, vol. 1). Des salaires élevés nuiront sans doute aux services privés, mais pas forcément aux dépens du plein emploi. Cette constatation exige que nous revoyons nos politiques gouvernementales actuelles.

Conclusions et leçons à tirer pour le Canada

L'expérience de quelques pays européens, comme le Danemark, la Suède et les Pays-Bas, nous montre qu'il est possible d'obtenir des niveaux élevés d'emploi de qualité, et que la qualité n'empêche pas la quantité. Dans les pays scandinaves étudiés, un plancher salarial élevé et une faible incidence d'emplois sans issue et peu rémunérés n'ont pas empêché la forte croissance de l'emploi, même dans les services privés. Par conséquent, les groupes ouvriers et les groupes de lutte contre la pauvreté au Canada sont d'avis qu'un plancher salarial similaire au Canada doit faire partie de la solution contre la précarité des emplois, et qu'il permettrait d'améliorer la productivité et les compétences de la main-d'œuvre. Un tel plancher serait plus efficace s'il était combiné à des politiques publiques visant à rehausser les qualifications des travailleurs et à encourager les employeurs à poursuivre des stratégies de spécialisation. Enfin, des services sociaux adaptés, financés par l'impôt général, peuvent également contribuer positivement à un emploi « post-industriel » de qualité.

Le Canada est une société diversifiée et plutôt individualiste, mais les Canadiens se targuent aussi d'avoir créé une société plus inclusive que leur voisin du Sud. Nombre d'éléments des nouveaux modèles européens, tels que des syndicats forts, un secteur social important, et la participation d'intervenants sociaux à l'élaboration des politiques existent déjà au Québec, et, dans une moindre mesure, dans d'autres provinces canadiennes. Certes, le Canada est fortement intégré au marché du travail américain, très déréglementé, mais cela n'empêche pas des projets politiques qui reflètent les valeurs d'égalité, d'inclusion et de solidarité. Au bout du compte, le défi revient à montrer comment l'élimination de la précarité des emplois favorisera non seulement l'inclusion sociale, mais aussi l'édification d'une économie plus productive.

(Les arguments avancés dans cet article sont plus longuement développés dans Jackson A., 2005. *Work and Labour in Canada: Critical Issues*, à paraître au Canadian Scholars' Press au printemps).

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taux de chômage soient équivalents (Madsen, 2003). La formation destinée aux chômeurs et aux travailleurs aux emplois précaires permet de rendre plus équitable l'accès aux possibilités d'emploi et de créer une base pour des emplois de meilleure qualité. Si l'on permet aux employeurs de mettre sur pied des stratégies qui exigent d'avantages de compétences et aux travailleurs moins qualifiés de grimper à l'échelle professionnelle, la formation devient alors un réel atout pour trouver de meilleurs emplois dans le secteur des services privés, normale-ment peu rémunéré.

Au Canada, on s'est montré sceptique quant à l'efficacité de l'acquisition, non par les travailleurs vulnérables, de nouvelles compétences. Or, la recherche montre de plus en plus que le fait de concrétiser l'apprentissage continu en créant de vraies possibilités pour les travailleurs peu rémunérés engendre des avantages significatifs sur le plan de la qualité d'emploi (OIT, 2003; Madsen, 2003; OCDE, 2004). Apple-baum et coll. (2003) soutiennent ces postulats par des études de cas détaillées portant sur des emplois dans des secteurs traditionnellement mal rémunérés. Ces emplois se trouvent nettement améliorés par de meilleures qualifications et des stratégies de l'employeur tirant parti de celles-ci. En gardant ces résultats à l'esprit, les gouvernements du Canada devraient revoir leur position actuelle sur les avantages potentiels de la formation des travailleurs vulnérables.

Enfin, les différences entre les pays industriels relativement à la structure de l'emploi « post-industriel » sont entichissantes. Elles varient selon que les soins à l'enfance, les services aux aînés et autres services communau-taires sont assumés par le marché ou par l'état. Lorsque c'est la prestation par l'état et par des services sans but lucratif qui est retenue, par opposition à une prestation assumée par des intervenants du marché, il en découle généralement une création d'emplois spécialisés et bien rémunérés, surtout

retraites et les prestations d'assurance-maladie complémentaires sont principalement financées par les programmes gouvernementaux. Payer à même les impôts généraux, plutôt qu'à l'aide de cotisations sociales ou de régimes d'aide sociale prévus par les entreprises, permet de contrôler les coûts de la main-d'œuvre. Cette approche permet également d'atténuer les écarts entre les travailleurs qui occupent un bon emploi et qui ont accès à de bons avantages, et les travailleurs aux emplois précaires, qui n'en n'ont pas. Le Canada devrait à son tour élargir progressivement son régime d'assurance-maladie et la portée de ses régimes publics de santé et de pensions.

Depuis longtemps, les pays scandinaves mettent aussi l'accent sur la sécurité d'emploi plutôt que sur le maintien des travailleurs dans leur poste, ce que l'on appelle aujourd'hui la « flexsécurité ». Cela signifie que les entreprises peuvent embaucher et mettre à pied les travailleurs assez facilement, mais que les gouvernements ont la responsabilité de protéger les travailleurs du plein emploi. En outre, les gouvernements, les employeurs et les syndicats ont la responsabilité de lancer des politiques pertinentes et efficaces visant le marché du travail. Ainsi, on accepte les formes d'emploi atypiques, tant que les salaires et les possibilités de formation ne sont pas discriminatoires (tel que précisé dans la directive de l'Union européenne sur le travail à temps partiel).

Pour soutenir cette approche, les pays scandinaves investissent massivement non pas uniquement dans l'éducation publique, mais également dans la formation en milieu de travail et dans des politiques actives visant le marché du travail, pour promouvoir l'adaptation de la main-d'œuvre et l'apprentissage continu. Fait notable, le gouvernement danois dépense cinq fois plus en programmes de formation publics que son homologue canadien, bien que leurs

Au niveau micro-économique, les travailleurs individuels et les entreprises sont tous les deux gagnants. On pense généralement qu'en rémunérant convenablement les employés peu qualifiés, on élimine des emplois. Or, en réalité, des salaires plus élevés peuvent s'avérer positifs puisqu'ils permettent d'améliorer la productivité et la qualité de l'emploi. Si les employeurs sont obligés de mieux rémunérer leurs salariés, ils seront poussés à investir d'avantage en biens d'équipement et en formation. Des planchers salariaux peuvent limiter le roulement de la main-d'œuvre et renforcer l'expérience et les qualifications des travailleurs, ce qui, au bout du compte, fait diminuer les charges patronales. Un salaire normalisé commun peut également permettre de retirer les charges salariales de l'équation de la concurrence. En effet, si tous les employeurs versaient les mêmes salaires et les mêmes avantages sociaux, les entreprises devraient se faire concurrence entre elles sur un autre plan que le coût de la main-d'œuvre, p. ex., la qualité et le service à la clientèle, qui exigent des employés mieux qualifiés.

Pour toutes ces raisons, les responsables canadiens de l'élaboration des politiques devraient voir d'un bon œil une hausse du salaire minimum au Canada et les politiques menant à l'extension des négociations collectives aux travailleurs mal rémunés dans les services privés (où les taux de syndicalisation se situent bien en dessous de 10 %).

Les démocraties sociales, telles que la Suède et le Danemark, ont stimulé la création d'emplois par des méthodes qui ne dépendent pas des faibles salaires. On attend des employeurs qu'ils offrent des salaires, des conditions de travail et de la formation raisonnables à leurs employés, mais, contrairement à nombre de pays européens dont le taux de chômage est élevé (comme l'Allemagne), on n'attend pas d'eux qu'ils financent massivement programmes et avantages sociaux. À l'inverse du Canada, les

Du point de vue de l'inclusion sociale, il est perturbant de constater que l'inégalité du revenu après impôts et transferts ait encore progressé au Canada entre 1989 et 2001, après une période de stabilité au cours des cycles économiques précédents. On ne peut arriver à une réelle égalité des chances tant qu'il existe des différences marquées entre les contextes économiques des familles. Les résultats-cis, en santé par exemple, sont étroitement liés au revenu relatif et non seulement au revenu absolu. Dans des pays relativement égaux comme la Suède, les différences entre divers segments de la population, au plan de l'espérance de vie, de la santé, de l'alphabétisation, de l'éducation et d'autres indicateurs importants de bien-être, sont nettement moins importantes qu'elles ne le sont au Canada, où elles sont jusqu'ici plus faibles qu'aux États-Unis (Jackson, 2000). En effet, on dit toujours que les États-Unis sont le pays où tout est possible, mais les possibilités se mesurent par les chances qu'un enfant issu d'une famille à faible revenu d'améliorer son statut d'emploi, et celles-ci sont plus faibles aux États-Unis qu'au Canada, et plus élevées dans les pays scandinaves (Fortin et Lefebvre, 1998). C'est à ces pays que nous devrions porter davantage attention.

Limiter le travail précaire : apprendre des modèles sociaux démocratiques européens

L'expérience de démocratie sociale scandinave des années 1990 semble démontrer qu'il est possible d'avoir un fort taux d'emploi, de salaires relativement équitables et de réelles possibilités pour les travailleurs qui occupent des emplois traditionnellement mal payés et sans issue. L'Organisation internationale du travail et la Commission européenne ont toutes deux fait valoir récemment l'exemple du Danemark comme modèle de marché du travail qui promeut des niveaux élevés d'emploi « socialement inclusif », ce qui discrédite le sombre postulat de nombreux économistes orthodoxes, selon lequel il doit forcément y avoir un compromis entre la création d'emploi et des emplois de meilleure qualité (Auer, 2000; OIT, 2003; Commission européenne, 2002). Le Danemark, la Suède et les Pays-Bas ont tous de bons antécédents en matière de création d'emploi et de croissance économique au cours des années 1990, avec une faible incidence d'emplois peu rémunérés, par rapport à l'Amérique du Nord, ce qui laisse penser qu'un modèle différent est envisageable, même s'il n'est pas forcément facile à élaborer.

Le succès relatif de ces pays sur le plan de la création d'emplois de meilleure qualité et de taux d'emploi élevés est dû à :

- une réglementation du marché du travail permettant de créer un plancher salarial et d'atténuer les inégalités salariales;
- de faibles coûts d'emploi (hors salaire), maintenus grâce à une sécurité sociale et économiques principalement par des programmes publics financés par l'imposition générale;

La mesure où ce sont les grandes forces structurelles, telles que la concurrence internationale et les changements technologiques, qui façonnent les marchés du travail, mais les autorités responsables du marché du travail jouent encore un rôle déterminant dans les conséquences de celui-ci sur les travailleurs. (OCDE, 1996, 1997; Aidt et Tzannatos, 2003; Freeman et Katz, 1995).

Les responsables canadiens de l'élaboration des politiques devraient voir d'un bien meilleur œil une hausse du salaire minimum au Canada et les politiques menant à l'extension des négociations collectives aux travailleurs mal rémunérés dans les services privés.

- un investissement significatif dans des politiques actives visant le marché du travail, afin de mieux qualifier les travailleurs les plus susceptibles de tomber dans le cycle du travail précaire;
- la mise sur pied d'un type d'économie de services « post-industrielle » distinct, axé sur un secteur non

la pauvreté découle souvent de l'écarterment familial et de l'exclusion du marché du travail plutôt que de faibles gains. Cependant, l'emploi précaire est aujourd'hui une cause croissante et significative de pauvreté au Canada. Les travailleurs et les familles à faible revenu entrent et sortent du cycle de la pauvreté, en fonction du nombre de semaines de travail accumulées par an et de leur rémunération. Une personne seule qui vit dans un grand centre urbain doit travailler plus ou moins à plein temps durant une année complète et gagner environ 10 \$ l'heure pour échapper à la pauvreté (c'est-à-dire pour se situer au-dessus du seuil du faible revenu avant impôts). Ce seuil est évidemment plus haut lorsqu'un seul travailleur doit soutenir un enfant ou un conjoint qui ne travaille pas. Une famille de deux adultes avec enfants doit travailler environ 75 semaines par an à 10 \$ l'heure pour se maintenir au-dessus du seuil de pauvreté. Les salaires minimums sont beaucoup trop bas, dans toutes les provinces, pour maintenir les familles de travailleurs à faible revenu au-dessus du seuil de pauvreté, même celles dont un membre occupe un emploi à temps plein pendant une année complète. Même avec un emploi à temps plein, pendant une année complète, avec un salaire horaire de 10 \$, auquel s'ajoute un soutien au revenu du gouvernement, la plupart des familles des grandes villes sont à risque (Conseil national Les programmes sociaux, alliés à un système d'impôt progressif, permettent d'atténuer les différences de revenu familial qui découlent des gains. Cependant, le rôle de redistribution que doivent jouer les impôts et les transferts à la population en âge de travailler, a été érodé par des coupures dans l'assurance-emploi et les prestations de l'assistance sociale. En outre, il sera très difficile d'éviter que les inégalités du revenu ne se creusent et de promouvoir une société plus inclusive, si l'inégalité des salaires continue de s'accroître.

et une femme sur cinq en âge de travailler, est mal rémunérée. Les emplois à faible rémunération sont fréquents dans la vente, les services et les professions de manœuvre, même s'il s'agit d'emplois à temps plein. L'incidence élevée de faible rémunération pour les emplois à temps partiel, dans le domaine des services privés, a dominé la pauvreté, permet d'expliquer pourquoi les femmes sont plus à risque que les hommes.

Les emplois précaires fournissent un accès très limité, voire nul, à l'avancement professionnel progressif et à la formation en milieu de travail.

13,6 % entre 1990 et 2000. De manière générale, les gains obtenus depuis le début des années 1990 profitent largement aux plus hauts échelons de l'échelle des revenus, groupe qui a pourtant déjà profité d'une part disproportionnée des gains. L'augmentation de l'inégalité du revenu du marché parmi les familles est partiellement due aux changements des modèles familiaux, mais

Les données sur l'emploi précaire sont également préoccupantes : généralement, pour les emplois précaires, le salaire horaire est faible et le risque de cessation est élevé. Les périodes de chômage au Canada sont de quatre mois en moyenne, et, ces dernières années, près d'un travailleur sur huit a été au chômage au moins une fois au cours d'une année. Ce risque touche particulièrement les personnes dont le niveau d'éducation est plus faible, qui, lorsqu'ils travaillent, gagnent généralement moins que les salaires moyens. Les emplois précaires fournissent un accès très limité, voire nul, à l'avancement professionnel progressif et à la formation en milieu de travail. Les emplois sans issue qu'occupent nombre de femmes, de nouveaux immigrants, d'Autochtones et de personnes handicapées ne permettent pas de développer leurs compétences et capacités, alors qu'ils ont besoin d'avoir accès à de meilleurs emplois, de grimper les échelons professionnels et de mieux gérer les risques du marché du travail, tels que les mises à pieds permanentes liées aux changements économiques.

Au sujet de ces derniers phénomènes, les données de l'enquête sur la population active montrent qu'aujourd'hui, environ un travailleur canadien sur quatre – un sur cinq chez les hommes et une travailleuse sur trois chez les femmes – est peu rémunéré, c'est-à-dire qu'il gagne moins des deux tiers du salaire horaire national moyen, ou moins de 11 \$ l'heure, en dollars d'aujourd'hui. Ce qui est particulièrement inquiétant, c'est qu'un homme sur dix en âge de travailler (entre 25 et 54 ans) sur le marché du travail. Les familles qui se situent au bas de l'échelle des revenus sont plus susceptibles d'être constituées de personnes aux emplois peu rémunérés et d'être touchées par le chômage au cours d'une année. Des études récentes montrent que, pendant les années 1990, les écarts des revenus à long terme et des possibilités pour les Canadiens se sont fortement creusés (Beach et coll., 2003). En effet, une grande majorité de travailleurs occupe des emplois très instables et peu rémunérés, et beaucoup restent prisonniers de ces emplois pendant de longues périodes (Finnie, 2000; Janz, 2004). Il persiste, sur le marché du travail, de fortes inégalités entre les hommes et les femmes ainsi qu'entre les immigrants récents et les autres Canadiens.

Emplois précaires et exclusion sociale Enjeux clés et nouvelles orientations stratégiques

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On perçoit souvent l'exclusion sociale comme un problème lié avant tout au faible revenu, et il ne fait aucun doute que les emplois précaires – emplois peu rémunérés qui comportent un risque important de cessation – sont largement responsables des faibles revenus familiaux et de la pauvreté. Cependant, les bons emplois jouent également un rôle important dans l'inclusion sociale, dans la mesure où ils aident les personnes à développer pleinement leurs talents et capacités, à participer activement à la société et à jouir des mêmes chances que leurs concitoyens. Le travail précaire présente un défi de taille aux responsables canadiens de l'élaboration des politiques, car il condamne une grande proportion de citoyens à l'exclusion à vie de l'avancement professionnel progressif et des possibilités de développement des compétences. De plus, ces risques sont concentrés chez des groupes définis, tels que les immigrants récents ou les parents seuls, qui sont désavantagés de plusieurs façons. Le travail précaire est également un phénomène qui touche plus sévèrement les femmes, ce qui mine l'objectif d'égalité des sexes sur le marché du travail (Vosko et coll., 2003).

Dans cet article, nous avançons que l'emploi précaire est un facteur-clé de l'exclusion sociale et mettons en évidence certaines orientations politiques, fondées sur l'expérience européenne, qui pourraient améliorer la qualité des emplois au bas de l'échelle professionnelle. La première partie de cet article consiste en une description des principales caractéristiques du travail précaire au Canada aujourd'hui et des liens entre celui-ci et l'exclusion sociale. En deuxième partie, nous faisons ressortir certaines grandes leçons que les Canadiens pourraient tirer du modèle de marché du travail social démocratique de certains petits pays d'Europe. Ceux-ci ont réussi à atteindre des taux d'emploi élevés et de faibles taux d'emplois précaires. Dans la dernière partie de notre travail, nous proposons quelques observations de conclusion.

Selon certaines mesures, le Canada a eu une bonne feuille de route, sur le plan de l'emploi, au cours du cycle de récession et de la reprise, de 1989 à nos jours. La proportion de la population adulte occupant un emploi a atteint un sommet record en 2003 et figurait parmi les plus élevées du monde. Il serait exagéré de parler d'une nouvelle économie du savoir, mais l'on observe effectivement un virage vers des emplois exigeant de meilleurs niveaux de scolarisation et de compétences. De manière générale, ce genre d'emplois fournit à son tour une meilleure rémunération, une plus grande satisfaction professionnelle et a aussi créé d'avantage de possibilités pour les femmes. Pourtant, le marché professionnel dans son ensemble présente encore de nombreuses lacunes. L'exemple le plus évident est que le Canada connaît un taux d'emplois précaires élevé et croissant, et que ces faibles salaires et emplois instables ont contribué à une augmentation significative des inégalités, qui menacent l'inclusion sociale.

On remarque que ces dix dernières années, les salaires horaires réels et les revenus annuels moyens ont stagné, surtout chez les hommes. La rémunération, au bas et au centre de l'échelle de répartition des revenus, n'a que faiblement augmenté, et l'inégalité de la rémunération s'est fortement accentuée au cours du cycle économique. Les données de Statistique Canada (Le revenu au Canada, 2003), montrent que les 20 % des ménages de l'échelon le plus élevé, dont les revenus moyens du marché étaient de 145 580 \$ en 2001, disposaient de 45,6 % du revenu total du marché de cette même année, par rapport à 42,4 % en 1989. Ces chiffres reflètent la polarisation accrue des gains individuels. Comme le montrent Saez et Veall (2003), les gains de la tranche de 1 % des revenus les plus élevés sont ceux qui ont augmenté le plus rapidement. Leur part de tous les revenus individuels selon les déclarations de revenus est passée de 9,3 % à

Le travail précaire au Canada

destinés au Canada, celui-ci ne devrait bien évidemment pas les ratifier. Par principe, les tribunaux ont régulière-ment énoncé que l'adhésion à des outils internationaux témoigne de l'intention du Canada de s'y conformer. En pratique, l'adhésion à des normes dont le Canada a fait la promotion et qu'il a adoptées devrait constituer une caractéristique essentielle de l'élaboration de politiques portant sur les outils législatifs et non législatifs.

Renvois

Lois et règlements

Canada
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Notes

1 P. Eliadis tient à remercier Leah Spicer, étudiante en droit à l'Université de Windsor, qui a contribué à la réalisation d'un travail plus vaste, dont est tiré le présent article. Les opinions exprimées ici sont celles de l'auteur.
2 *Projet de Loi visant à lutter contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion sociale*, L.R.Q., ch. 61.
3 Aujourd'hui divisé en deux : le Transfert canadien en matière de santé et le Transfert canadien en matière de programmes sociaux.
4 Voir l'analyse sous SRSA (2002 en ES-5).
5 L'article 15(1) de la Charte, entre en vigueur en 1985, stipule :
15. (1) La loi ne fait acception de personnes et s'applique également à tous, et même bénéficie de la loi, indépendamment de toute discrimination, notamment des discriminations fondées sur la race, l'origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, le sexe, l'âge ou les déficiences mentales ou physiques.
6 36. (1) (1) Sous réserve des compétences législatives du Parlement et des législa-

7 La jurisprudence récente laisse entendre que l'obstacle principal au fait de conclure que la pauvreté est un motif analogue en vertu de l'article 15 de la Charte peut davantage résulter du fait que personne n'a présenté de dossier factuel et historique devant le tribunal, par opposition à une prohibition inhérente de la pauvreté en tant que motif justifiant les droits à l'égalité (se reporter à la décision récemment prise par l'Ontario dans l'affaire *Polewsky*).

Dans le cadre d'une stratégie nationale visant à lutter contre la pauvreté, les responsables canadiens de l'élaboration des politiques doivent tenir compte de l'intégration des normes internationales en matière de droits de la personne et des lois et politiques nationales. Une des approches proposées fait appel à un filtre juridique. Lorsqu'ils analysent les projets de politiques aux stades les plus précoces, les chercheurs ont bien sûr l'habitude de passer en revue les traités et pactes internationaux du Canada applicables et évaluent la conformité des projets par rapport au droit international. Ce processus s'appliquerait non seulement aux propositions de politiques mises en œuvre à l'aide d'outils législatifs

Aperçu de la jurisprudence pertinente

Dans le jugement *Corbière c. Canada* (ministère des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien), [1999] 2 L.R.C. 203, la Cour suprême du Canada s'est penchée sur l'exclusion des membres de bandes d'autochtones vivant hors réserve de la gouvernance des bandes.

Dans le jugement *Egan c. Canada*, [1995] 2 L.R.C. 513, la Cour suprême du Canada s'est penchée sur l'exclusion de personnes de la législation sur la sécurité sociale des personnes âgées en raison de leur orientation sexuelle.

Dans le jugement *Falkiner c. Ontario* (ministère des Services sociaux et communautaires, Direction du maintien du revenu) (2000), 49 O.R. (3^e) 564 (C.A.), [Autorisation d'interjeter appel à la C.S.C. accordée [2000] S.C.C.A. 297], la Cour d'appel de l'Ontario s'est penchée sur la constitutionnalité de la réglementation relative aux personnes touchant de l'aide sociale qui restreint l'accès aux avantages à une personne cohabitant avec une personne de sexe opposé.

Dans le jugement *Gosselin c. Québec* (procureur général), [2002] 4 L.R.C. 429, le tribunal s'est penché sur l'exclusion des prestations complémentaires dans le cadre d'un programme de bien-être en raison de l'âge.

Dans le jugement *Gwiner c. Alberta* (Human Resources and Employment), [2002] AJ 1045, la Cour d'appel de l'Alberta s'est penchée sur l'exclusion de femmes divorcées et séparées d'un programme d'aide sociale conçu à l'intention des veuves âgées.

Dans le jugement *Granovsky c. Canada* (ministère de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration), [2000] 1 L.R.C. 703, 2000 CSC 28, le tribunal a déclaré que « ce n'est généralement pas la personne ayant une déficience qui est à l'origine de l'exclusion et de la marginalisation, mais plutôt

ou implicitement acceptés ou intégrés au sein des cercles fédéraux de l'élabo-
ration des politiques. Et cela
même si, dans certains secteurs de
la recherche en politiques, dans des
ministères fonctionnant dans le
domaine du droit comme Justice
Canada, par exemple, certains aspects
d'un cadre analytique basé sur les
capacités sont implicites.
Il faudrait intégrer très tôt dans le
processus un cadre normatif à jour,
qui tient compte de l'élément poli-
tiques juridiques de l'équation,
permettant de s'assurer que l'on

tienne compte de l'évolution juri-
dique dans une recherche bien
pensée et pertinente pour les politi-
ques. Il convient de souligner que
cet examen ne devrait pas nécessaire-
ment prendre la forme d'un avis
juridique obtenu auprès de la direction
des services juridiques d'un ministère.
Pas plus qu'il ne devrait remplacer
l'évaluation juridique de la conformité
à la Charte qui survient à la fin du
processus d'élaboration des politiques.
Il s'agit plutôt d'intégrer, en début
de processus, des considérations de
politiques juridiques.

Normes liées à la Charte et aux droits de la personne

Le fait de tenir compte des normes
juridiques en début de processus ne
représente pas une entreprise aussi
vaste ni lourde qu'il n'y paraît au
premier abord. Le nombre de motifs
contenus dans la Charte et les lois rela-
tives aux droits de la personne est fini
(à un moment précis à tout le moins),
et l'on peut tenir compte des con-
séquences connues ou probables
d'une politique en fonction des
objectifs des politiques.

L'environnement socioéconomique et, malheureusement,
l'État lui-même. »
Dans le jugement *Halpern c. Canada* (2003), 225 D.L.R.
(4^e) 529 (C.A. ont.), le tribunal a soutenu que les con-
joints de même sexe étant exclus de l'institution du
mariage, cette exclusion perpétue l'opinion que les
relations entre conjoints de même sexe ne méritent pas
autant de reconnaissance que les unions entre conjoints
de sexe opposé.
Dans le jugement *Law c. Canada* (ministère de l'Emploi et
de l'Immigration), [1999] 1 L.R.C. 497, la Cour suprême
du Canada s'est penchée sur l'exclusion d'une personne
jeune du Régime de pensions du Canada.
M. v. H., [1999] 2 L.R.C. 3, portait sur l'exclusion des gays
et lesbiennes de l'application de la législation sur le droit
de la famille.
Dans le jugement *Polewsky c. Home Hardware Stores Limited*
(2003), 60 O.R. (3^e) 600 (Cour div.), le tribunal s'est
penché sur la légalité de l'obligation de payer un droit de
greffe pour déposer une requête devant la Cour de petites
créances du plaignant qui avait déclaré qu'il était pauvre.
Dans le jugement *Vancouver Society of Immigrant and
Visible Minority Women c. M.N.R.*, [1999] 1 L.R.C. 10, le
tribunal s'est demandé si le refus du statut d'organisme
caritatif à un organisme communautaire constituait une
« exclusion de l'appartenance et de la participation à la
société canadienne ».

Dans le jugement *Vriend c. Alberta*, [1998] 1 L.R.C. 493,
[1998] S.C.J. n° 29, le tribunal s'est penché sur l'exclusion
des gays et lesbiennes des protections de la loi provinciale
sur les droits de la personne en Alberta.

Le rôle joué par l'exclusion dans les droits à l'égalité semble donc assez bien établi dans la jurisprudence canadienne relative à l'article 15 de la *Charte*. Le lien avec la pauvreté constitue l'étape suivante. Un exemple canadien de la façon dont s'est faite la connexion entre pauvreté et exclusion dans une cause portant sur les droits à l'égalité en vertu de la *Charte* est particulièrement évocateur. La Cour d'appel de l'Alberta a annulé un programme d'assistance sociale destiné aux femmes pauvres, veuves et âgées dans le jugement *Gwinner c. Alberta (Ressources humaines et Emploi)*. Le tribunal a soutenu que le programme ne tenait pas compte des actifs des bénéficiaires dans son évaluation de leur besoin du programme. Ce dernier était considéré à la fois comme trop inclusif, puisqu'il bénéficiait à des femmes riches en actifs, et trop peu inclusif puisqu'en étaient exclues des femmes dans une situation semblable, c'est-à-dire âgées et ayant perdu le soutien financier d'un ex-conjoint. L'annulation du programme se justifiait du fait que le tribunal a estimé qu'il enfreignait les droits à l'égalité garantis par la Constitution en vertu de l'article 15 de la *Charte*.

Si les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques ne doivent pas faire la preuve d'une adaptation parfaite entre un programme et le groupe visé, le travail d'élaboration doit être rationnel et reposer sur des preuves. Les distinctions faites ne doivent pas atteindre à la dignité humaine. Dans le jugement *Falkiner*, les tribunaux ontariens ont annulé un règlement relatif au « conjoint à domicile » qui faisait du revenu une indication claire de pauvreté. Les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques étaient convaincus que le revenu réel des bénéficiaires de l'aide sociale était maintenu artificiellement bas en cas de cohabitation avec une autre personne, autre qu'un conjoint sur le plan technique, et dont on ne tenait donc pas compte du revenu. Dans ces circonstances, l'autre personne était considérée comme conjoint. Que cette hypothèse soit exacte

Il n'existe pas de cadre de politiques global permettant de régler les problèmes de pauvreté et d'exclusion à l'échelon fédéral. C'est un défi particulièrement difficile à relever pour le Canada en raison de notre structure fédérale. Résultat de la complexité juridique de la structure fédérale-provinciale en matière de pauvreté, une stratégie globale de lutte contre la pauvreté a plus de chances de réussir si elle s'inscrit dans le cadre du fédéralisme coopératif et de l'article 36 de la *Loi*

Les tribunaux ont rendu plusieurs décisions qui ont eu pour effet de modifier énormément notre compréhension de l'égalité et de son lien avec l'exclusion et les droits des personnes appartenant à des groupes vulnérables ou à risque.

Elaboration de la politique en fonction du lien entre la pauvreté et l'exclusion

L'intersection des concepts de pauvreté et d'exclusion est au cœur de cet article, ainsi que ses implications pour les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques. Bien que les mesures fondées sur le revenu conservent leur importance, il faut les replacer dans un contexte global ou un cadre reposant sur une définition de la pauvreté à la fois plus large et sensible au contexte. La première stratégie bien définie est une stratégie nationale de lutte contre la pauvreté.

Une stratégie nationale de lutte contre la pauvreté

Comme nous l'avons souligné plus haut, le cadre de politiques juridiques évolue avec le temps. De plus les concepts d'exclusion et de pauvreté sont perçus comme interdépendants et à l'égalité. Ces éléments sont essentiels à l'élaboration de politiques horizontales sans toutefois être généralement

que de la possibilité que les mesures prises (surtout celles qui ont pour effet d'éliminer ou de restreindre des avantages) peuvent créer des exclusions injustes, comme dans le jugement *Falkiner*. La recherche sur la pauvreté pertinente aux politiques et axée sur les groupes vulnérables en proie à l'exclusion doit donc aussi tenir compte des interactions des interventions (cumul) ainsi que d'indicateurs plus larges des ressources réelles (protection de l'accumulation d'actifs). Des mesures plus proactives permettraient notamment d'offrir de meilleurs outils financiers appropriés aux personnes à faible revenu et d'assurer l'accès à certaines prestations de soins de santé (p. ex., les médicaments et les soins dentaires) aux personnes faisant partie des travailleurs à faible revenu (St. Christopher House, 2004).

Intégration des normes juridiques

constitutionnelle⁶. Même si elle ne semble pas avoir rempli ses promesses dans le passé (surtout à la lumière de la création récente du Transfert canadien en matière de programmes sociaux), l'Entente cadre fédérale-provinciale sur l'union sociale est un bon modèle. Dans l'élaboration d'une stratégie nationale, les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques doivent tenir compte des impacts plus larges des interventions sur les choix et les circonstances de vie des pauvres, ainsi

besoins lorsque les gens sont dépourvus de gains suffisants. Concrètement, ces politiques et programmes, en place à divers paliers de gouvernement, ont connu beaucoup de succès et constituent un filet de sécurité sociale solide. Cela dit, l'aventir soulève des préoccupations.

La pauvreté comporte des liens directs avec l'exclusion, et ses aspects sociaux sont essentiels pour comprendre tant le concept que ses impacts sur la réalité des gens.

Exclusion de quoi? Le critère des droits à l'égalité

Il n'existe pas véritablement de droit à la liberté par rapport à la pauvreté au Canada. Mais lorsqu'on considère une définition plus large de la pauvreté, on remarque l'existence d'un groupe de droits associés qui, combinés à un test d'appartenance et d'exclusion de la société canadienne, peut transformer ces revendications en revendications justifiables devant les tribunaux en raison des droits protégés. Les personnes qui reçoivent de l'aide sociale, par exemple - un groupe important de personnes vivant dans la pauvreté au Canada - sont désormais couvertes par l'article 15 de la *Charte*, qui porte sur les droits à l'égalité (peu importe leur province de résidence)⁵.

Au cours de nos travaux de recherche en vue de la rédaction de cet article, nous avons étudié les décisions de la Cour suprême du Canada et des cours d'appel portant sur les droits à l'égalité afin de dévaluer si l'on tenait compte, sur le plan juridique, de la relation entre l'exclusion et l'égalité. Après analyse, dix de ces causes faisaient explicitement référence à l'exclusion en tant qu'indication claire de droits à l'égalité, et la moitié de ces causes s'inscrivaient dans le contexte de programmes d'aide sociale ou de sécurité sociale (voir l'encadré).

nécessaires pour acquérir et maintenir son autonomie économique ou pour favoriser son intégration et sa participation à la société. De la même manière, l'Organisation des Nations Unies et ses organismes abordent la pauvreté sous un angle plus intégrant, qui comporte des aspects sociaux autant qu'économiques.

[Une] condition humaine caractérisée par la privation permanente ou chronique des ressources, des capacités, des choix, de la sécurité et d'un niveau de vie adéquat et d'autres droits civils, culturels, économiques, politiques et sociaux (UNOHCHR, 2003, traduction libre, italiques ajoutées).

La définition de la pauvreté elle-même subit des changements fondamentaux, c'est-à-dire qu'on comprend de plus en plus son lien direct avec l'exclusion et que ces aspects sociaux sont essentiels pour comprendre tant le concept que ses impacts sur la réalité des gens. Une approche plus intégrée soussume également de nombreux autres indicateurs - l'analphabétisme, une dégradation de l'état de santé, l'inégalité des sexes, une dégradation de l'environnement et des impacts raciaux de l'état de pauvreté.

Évaluation de la politique du Canada

Comment qualifier le cadre politique du Canada en matière de pauvreté et d'exclusion lorsqu'on l'évalue en fonction de la base conceptuelle évolutive de la pauvreté comme nous l'avons décrite dans la section précédente? Une première observation : il n'existe pas de cadre politique global à l'échelon fédéral permettant d'aborder les questions de pauvreté et d'exclusion. Au lieu de cela, on perçoit généralement les objectifs comme suit : amener les gens au-dessus du seuil de faible revenu pour répondre aux

En 1996, quand on a mis en place le Transfert canadien en matière de santé et de programmes sociaux (TCSPS)³, les contributions du gouvernement fédéral ont été réduites, de sorte qu'elles étaient nettement inférieures à ce qu'elles auraient été dans l'ancien système. Ces réductions ont été transmises aux provinces puis aux citoyens par l'entremise de critères d'admissibilité plus stricts et de toute une panoplie de programmes, comme les programmes de transition de l'assistance sociale au marché du travail⁴. Le Canada ne se débrouille pas aussi bien que de nombreux pays de l'OCDE, et le bien-être économique de certains groupes vulnérables, comme les nouveaux immigrants, a reculé (CCDS, 2004). Des études récentes au niveau communautaire démontrent que les adultes à faible revenu en âge de travailler prennent du retard sur le plan de la sécurité du revenu et de la richesse nette, et que beaucoup sont incapables de se trouver un emploi stable ou d'accumuler suffisamment d'actifs pour se tenir à l'abri du bien-être social. De plus, beaucoup de Canadiens, tant dans le grand public que parmi les bénéficiaires de l'aide sociale, sont insatisfaits du système de sécurité du revenu (St. Christopher House, 2004).

L'image de ce qu'est la pauvreté, la façon dont elle est perçue et celle

Pauvreté et exclusion

Approches normatives de la recherche sur les politiques

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Selon un point de vue contemporain, les perspectives juridiques sur les politiques devraient être les éléments moteurs plutôt que les résultats de leur élaboration (Eliadis, 2004). Si ce n'est généralement pas le cas au Canada, c'est parce que les normes sous-jacentes aux projets de politiques horizontaux sont souvent implicites. Bon nombre de celles-ci ont toutefois été établies à une autre époque et sont reprises dans les législations nationales et internationales. C'est-à-dire que l'approche des normes selon l'angle des politiques juridiques change selon l'époque et qu'elle doit donc s'inscrire dans un processus permanent d'analyse et caractérisé par la concentration des efforts au début du processus d'élaboration des politiques publiques. Dans le présent article, nous adoptons cette approche et l'appliquons aux enjeux de politiques liés à la pauvreté et à l'exclusion.

Au début de l'année 2002, le gouvernement du Québec a déposé le projet de loi 112, *Projet de Loi visant à lutter contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion sociale*². Le projet de loi 112 était l'aboutissement de huit années d'activisme social à la suite de la marche de protestation du pain et des roses de la Fédération des femmes du Québec en 1995; il combine plusieurs projets anti-pauvreté dans un cadre législatif intégré.

Aucune autorité fédérale ou provinciale au Canada n'a jamais ciblée de manière directe et globale la pauvreté dans ses lois. L'approche traditionnelle a plutôt consisté à avoir recours à des projets distincts visant les composantes de la pauvreté, le faible revenu temporaire, la pénurie de logements et les aptitudes au travail, afin d'augmenter le revenu à un moment donné. Le projet de loi 112 a déclenché un examen de l'approche canadienne de la pauvreté et donné lieu au projet de recherche à l'origine du présent article. Initiative conjointe du Projet de recherche sur les politiques et de Justice Canada (bureau régional du Québec), ce projet porte sur les

Un paysage en transition

pauvreté et y répondre.

On décrit généralement la pauvreté en se référant à sa principale caractéristique, soit un revenu insuffisant. Toutefois, les chercheurs universitaires et les autres professionnels, tant au Canada qu'à l'étranger, sont en train de remanier cette perception en tenant compte des capacités et du pouvoir tout autant que du revenu et des ressources financières. Le projet de loi 112 définit la pauvreté de la façon suivante :

- Serait-il important d'aborder la pauvreté de façon plus intégrée?
 - Quelle est la pertinence des droits en matière de politiques axées sur la pauvreté?
 - Existe-t-il un lien pertinent aux politiques entre l'exclusion et la pauvreté?
 - Enfin, qu'apporte la politique juridique à l'équation?
- Dans la première partie de cet article, j'aborderai ces questions en me référant au soutien que les tribunaux et le droit international apportent aux responsables de l'élaboration des politiques. Dans la seconde, je ferai des suggestions pratiques en vue de concevoir les politiques à partir de la connexion entre pauvreté et exclusion. Cette partie comprend des recommandations à l'intention des responsables de l'élaboration des politiques pour les inciter à intégrer de manière plus explicite les politiques juridiques dans leur processus et veiller à ce que l'élaboration de politiques dans ce domaine prioritaire tienne compte des besoins des personnes vivant dans la pauvreté et y réponde.

Recherche sur le logement : Politiques et pratiques dans le contexte de la pauvreté et de l'exclusion

Une réflexion s'est amorcée, qui montre que, tout au long d'une vie, certaines conditions contribuent à la persistance d'un faible revenu chez certaines personnes ou les empêchent de participer pleinement à l'activité économique et sociale de leur communauté. Le logement, élément fondamental du capital matériel, occupe une place spécifique dans le modèle conceptuel de la pauvreté et de l'exclusion. Lié à un sentiment de sécurité matérielle et de stabilité matérielle et mentale, le logement offre la permanence nécessaire à l'acquisition de biens et au développement de relations indispensables pour éviter la marginalisation.

Du fait de ces caractéristiques, le logement est intrinsèquement lié à la pauvreté, en tant que facteur déterminant ou conséquence de cette situation, et mérite une attention toute particulière dans le cadre du projet du PRP.

Nouvelles approches pour lutter contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion. En collaboration avec le Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada, le PRP a organisé une table ronde de spécialistes en la matière pour réfléchir sur cette interdépendance entre le logement, la pauvreté et l'exclusion. Pour consigner et diffuser les principales conclusions de cette réflexion, le PRP prépare actuellement un document thématique qui réunira les divers exposés et les contributions apportées dans le cadre de la table ronde. Ce document sera disponible très prochainement.

Pour plus d'information sur les travaux du PRP sur l'interdépendance entre le logement, la pauvreté et l'exclusion, priez de communiquer avec Jeff Frank, directeur de projet, au 947.3905 ou à l'adresse électronique suivante : jfrank@prp.gc.ca.

Notes

- 1 Les répondants au recensement évaluent l'état de leur logement à l'aide des critères fournis avec le questionnaire du recensement.
- 2 Selon la Norme nationale d'occupation, le nombre maximum de personnes par chambre à coucher est de deux, les parents ont droit à une chambre séparée de celle de leurs enfants; les membres de la famille âgés de 18 ans et plus ont droit à une chambre individuelle sauf s'il s'agit de gens mariés ou de personnes vivant ensemble comme conjoints; et les personnes à charge âgées de cinq ans et plus peuvent être appelées à partager une chambre avec un frère ou une sœur du même âge et du même sexe.
- 3 Pour les locataires, les coûts de logement comprennent le loyer et tout paiement relatif à l'électricité, au carburant, à l'eau et autres services municipaux. Pour les propriétaires, les coûts de logement comprennent les paiements hypothécaires (capital et intérêts), les taxes foncières, et les paiements relatifs à l'électricité, ainsi que carburant, à l'eau et autres services municipaux.
- 4 Pour de plus amples renseignements sur le logement acceptable et sur le besoin impérieux de logement, consulter la série de la SCHL « Série sur le logement selon les données du recensement de 2001 – numéro 2 : La répartition géographique des besoins impérieux de logement et de la croissance des ménages, 1996-2001 » (Ottawa, Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement, 2004). Cette collection est disponible sur le site de la SCHL (www.cmhc.ca).
- 5 Les ménages ayant de faibles liens avec le marché du travail sont ceux dont les principaux soutiens ne font pas partie de la main-d'œuvre active, sont sans emploi ou occupent un emploi à temps partiel. Le principal soutien d'un ménage est la première personne nommée par les répondants au recensement comme étant responsable des principaux paiements du ménage (p. ex. le loyer ou l'hypothèque).
- 6 Les ménages d'âge actif sont ceux dont les principaux soutiens sont âgés de 15 à 64 ans.
- 7 La SCHL définit comme ménage autochtone toute famille dont au moins un des conjoints ou conjoints de fait, ou dont le parent seul s'identifie comme autochtone, ou dont au moins 50 % des membres s'identifient comme autochtones, ou tout ménage ne composant pas une famille et dont au moins la moitié des membres s'identifie comme autochtone.
- 8 La SCHL définit comme ménage de nouveaux immigrants tout ménage dont les principaux soutiens ont obtenu le statut de résident permanent au cours de la période entre 1996 et le 15 mai 2001 (date du recensement de 2001 du Canada).
- 9 L'enquête longitudinale auprès des immigrants du Canada a révélé que la présence de membres de la famille ou d'amis constitue la principale raison du choix des nouveaux immigrants de s'installer dans une RMR donnée. Les perspectives d'emploi constituent la deuxième raison en importance. Se reporter au document *Canada : le processus, les progrès et les perspectives*, Catalogue no. 89-611-XIE (Ottawa, Statistique Canada, 2003), pp. 13-15.
- 10 Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement, *La qualité du logement et la santé socioéconomique des enfants*. Le point en recherche, série socio-économique 63331 (Ottawa, Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement, 2003). L'étude évalue le comportement et la qualité de logement et du quartier où vivent un échantillon d'enfants des villes de Victoria et Québec.
- 11 Dans cet article, les quartiers « à besoin élevé » comprennent le dix pour cent des secteurs de recensement dans chaque RMR où l'on trouve la plus grande proportion de ménages en besoin impérieux de logement. Pour une présentation plus exhaustive de la distribution des besoins impérieux de logement dans les RMR, se reporter au chapitre 6 du document de John Engeland et Roger Lewis (coll. Steven Ehrlich et Janet Che) intitulé *Evolving Housing Conditions in Canada's Census Metropolitan Areas, 1991-2001* (Catalogue no. XXX (Ottawa, Statistique Canada, 2004).

prévalant représentent une part disproportionnée des besoins de logement dans les grandes villes canadiennes. Dans ces zones à besoin élevé, le pourcentage de ménages en situation de besoin impérieux de logement est habituellement plus du double de celui observé dans d'autres quartiers (se reporter au tableau 3). Le plus grand nombre de ces districts à besoin

Refletant la fréquence plus élevée de besoin impérieux de logement dans ces zones, les logements des quartiers à besoin élevé sont plus susceptibles d'être surpeuplés et de nécessiter des réparations majeures que dans d'autres parties des RMR au Canada. En 2001, un immeuble sur sept était surpeuplé, et un sur neuf nécessitait des réparations majeures. Outre les difficultés

Le fait que les quartiers où la fréquence de logement est relativement élevée soient situés dans des zones centrales se traduit par une densité de population qui est en moyenne deux fois plus élevée que dans d'autres quartiers.

Renvois

2001). Bien que cette liste soit loin d'être exhaustive et que certaines études soient encore préliminaires, les conclusions que nous en tirons portent à croire que les avantages perdus pour les ménages exclus d'un logement acceptable (c'est-à-dire qui sont en situation de besoin impérieux de logement) ne se limitent vraisemblablement pas aux services qu'offre le logement lui-même, mais couvrent également les avantages intrinsèques des types de quartiers où l'on trouve des concentrations élevées de logements acceptables.

posées par la taille ou autres conditions inadéquates de logement, les ménages de ces quartiers consacraient une proportion élevée de leur revenu avant impôt au logement, soit 28 % en moyenne, contre 21 % dans d'autres quartiers.

La part élevée du revenu affectée au logement reflète le revenu limité des ménages dans ces quartiers. En 2001, le revenu médian des ménages se fixait en moyenne à la moitié seulement de celui des ménages d'autres quartiers. Cette même année, le taux de chômage dans les quartiers à besoin élevé types était de près du double de celui enregistré dans d'autres quartiers, et la part du revenu tiré des paiements de transferts était le double de celle des autres quartiers.

Les quartiers où la fréquence de besoin impérieux de logement est relativement élevée affichent des caractéristiques particulières sur les plans physique, économique et démographique. Le fait que ces quartiers soient situés dans des zones centrales se traduit par une densité de population qui est en moyenne deux fois plus élevée que dans d'autres quartiers. Cette forte densité reflète à son tour une prédominance des immeubles résidentiels à logements multiples.

L'étendue des différences au chapitre de l'aménagement sur le plan physique des quartiers à besoin élevé et autres, n'est qu'une illustration parmi d'autres des différences qui les distinguent. Les résidents de ces quartiers sont issus, dans des proportions excessives, de groupes démographiques à risque de se trouver en situation de besoin impérieux de logement. Les Autochtones, les nouveaux immigrants, les personnes vivant seules et les familles monoparentales sont tous plus nombreuses dans les quartiers à besoin élevé types que dans d'autres quartiers.

Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement, 2003. *La qualité du logement et la santé socioéconomique des enfants*. Le point en recherche, série socio-économique 63331. Ottawa, Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement.

Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement, 2004. *Études spéciales sur les données du recensement de 1996 : le logement des enfants au Canada*. Le point en recherche, série socio-économique 62441. Ottawa, Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement.

Engelard, John et Roger Lewis, coll. Steven Ehrlich et Janet Che, 2004. *Evolving Housing Conditions in Canada's Census Metropolitan Areas, 1991-2001*. Trends and Conditions in Census Metropolitan Areas Series, Catalogue No. XXX, Ottawa, Statistique Canada.

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Pickett, K.E. et M. Pearl, 2001. « Multilevel analyses of neighbourhood socio-economic context and health outcomes: a critical review » *Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health*, 55:111-122.

TABLEAU 3

Caractéristiques moyennes¹ quartiers à besoin élevé² et autres quartiers
Toutes les régions métropolitaines de recensement (RMR), 2001

Caractéristique			
Tous les secteurs	Secteurs de recensement ³	à besoin élevé	recensement
Autres secteurs de			

Ménages dont le	% ménages à besoin impérieux	16,2	33,2	14,3
besoin impérieux	% surpeuplement (sous la norme de qualité)	7,1	14,1	6,4
de logement a été	% besoin de réparations majeures (selon la norme d'un logement adéquat)	7,2	10,8	6,8
estimé ⁴	Ratio moyen ⁵	22,0	28,4	21,3
	% de ménages à besoin élevé qui sont locataires	57,0	84,4	53,9

Tous les ménages	% des ménages locataires	36,6	71,6	32,7
	Loyer mensuel brut moyen (\$)	727	601	741
	Revenu médian des ménages (\$)	53 509	28 570	56 294
	Taux de chômage (%)	6,9	11,7	6,3
	% du revenu provenant des paiements de transferts	11,8	20,6	10,8
	% autochtones	1,8	3,9	1,6
	% nouveaux immigrants	4,3	8,4	3,9
	% ménages d'une personne	25,4	40,2	23,8
	% familles monoparentales	17,1	26,9	16,0
	% logements individuels isolés	50,7	17,9	54,4
	Densité – personnes/km ²	3 658	6 804	3 306

Notes :

1 Moyennes simples, non pondérées, calculées à partir des données sommaires relatives à chaque secteur de recensement. Ainsi, les moyennes représentent les valeurs d'un secteur de recensement type dans chacun des secteurs.

2 « à besoin élevé » se rapporte aux 10 pour cent des secteurs dans chaque RMR affichant l'incidence la plus élevée de besoin impérieux de logement.

3 Les données excluent les secteurs dont Statistique Canada a supprimé les données pour des raisons de confidentialité.
4 Les ménages dont le besoin impérieux de logement a été estimé ne comprennent pas les ménages occupant une ferme, les membres d'une collectivité ou d'une réserve autochtones ; les ménages avec un revenu de zéro ou moins ; les ménages dont les coûts de logement sont égaux ou supérieurs à leur revenu.

5 Ratio des coûts de logement au revenu = coûts de logement/revenu avant impôt du ménage.

Sources : SCHL (indicateurs et données sur le logement selon le recensement) et Statistique Canada (Recensement du Canada – données sur le Profil de la collectivité (95F0495XC801005)).

avaient dans des logements nécessitant des réparations majeures, le plus grand nombre se trouvant de nouveau dans les communautés autochtones. L'on peut démontrer de façon préliminaire que la qualité de l'habitation et du quartier dans lequel ces enfants grandiront pourrait jouer un rôle important dans leur développement. Les études ont démontré le lien entre les problèmes de comportement des enfants canadiens et les conditions

physiques et les quartiers dans lesquels ils vivent¹⁰. En outre, les études ont démontré que les enfants canadiens vivant dans des logements surpeuplés et nécessitant des réparations majeures se situent moins haut que les autres enfants sur les diverses échelles de développement, par exemple en ce qui touche aux résultats scolaires et à l'état de santé général (SCHL, non daté). Ces études sont bien sûr préliminaires, mais elles soutiennent l'hypothèse

voulant que l'exclusion de logement acceptable prive des Canadiens d'avantages importants. **Quartiers et besoin impérieux de logement**
La concentration de besoin impérieux de logement au sein de certains groupes trouve son parallèle au niveau des quartiers. En effet, les quartiers où le besoin impérieux de logement est

chances de se trouver de l'emploi'. En 2001, plus de 90 % des 225 000 ménages de nouveaux immigrants au Canada vivaient dans des RMR, dont 70 % dans les seules villes de Toronto, Montréal et Vancouver. À Toronto, 43,5 % des nouveaux immigrants constituant des ménages de locataires étaient en besoin de logement. Tous jours en 2001, ces ménages affectaient la moitié de leur revenu moyen avant impôt, de moins de 20 000 \$, au logement. Bien que pour ces ménages, le plus grand défi en matière d'habitation soit de trouver un logement abordable, les nouveaux immigrants, tout comme les Autochtones, sont beaucoup plus susceptibles que d'autres groupes de se trouver en situation de besoin, car ils vivent dans des logements surpeuplés ou nécessitant des réparations.

À l'instar des nouveaux immigrants locataires, les locataires autochtones vivant seuls sont particulièrement exposés au besoin de logement. Plus de la moitié des aînés et environ le tiers des non-aînés vivant seuls et ayant le statut de locataires en 2001 étaient en situation de besoin impérieux de logement (se reporter au tableau 2). Plus de quatre familles monoparentales locataires sur dix étaient également dans cette situation. Ces trois groupes de locataires non-autochtones en besoin de logement totalisaient plus de 750 000 ménages en 2001. En outre, non seulement un nombre élevé de ces ménages était-il en besoin de logement, mais nombre d'entre eux affectaient au logement au moins la moitié de leur revenu avant impôt. En 2001, par exemple, 26,5 % des ménages monoparentaux soutenus par des personnes de 15 à 24 ans étaient en besoin de logement et affectaient 50 % ou plus de leur revenu moyen, de tout juste moins de 12 000 \$, au logement. Par ailleurs,

bien plus de la moitié de tous les locataires d'âge actif vivant seuls et en besoin de logement, et des locataires d'âge actif chefs de famille monoparentales en besoin de logement, avaient de faibles liens avec le marché du travail. Enfin, au sein du groupe des aînés retraités, plus de 90 % tiraient la plus grande part de leur revenu du gouvernement.

Enfants en besoin de logement

La plupart de enfants canadiens vivent en familles de deux parents, dont moins d'une sur dix est en situation de besoin impérieux de logement. Cela étant, pas moins de 400 000 enfants vivant en familles de deux parents étaient en besoin de logement en 2001. Ajoutons à ce nombre quatre enfants sur dix de familles monoparentales en situation de besoin de logement, et l'on obtient un nombre total de plus 750 000 enfants canadiens

en besoin de logement en 2001. Au sein des populations autochtones, l'on dénombre un enfant sur trois en besoin impérieux de logement, ce qui représente une probabilité 2,3 fois plus élevée d'être en besoin de logement que dans les communautés non-autochtones, une situation qui découle vraisemblablement du plus faible revenu des ménages autochtones (se reporter à la figure 1).

Les ménages comptant des enfants en besoin de logement en 2001 déclaraient un revenu moyen avant impôt d'un peu moins de 22 000 \$, dont une part de 48 % était à elle seule affectée au logement. Or, malgré qu'ils devaient réserver près de la moitié de leur revenu au logement, 25,5 % de ces ménages vivaient dans des logements trop petits, soumettant ainsi leurs enfants, et ce particulièrement dans les communautés autochtones, à des conditions de surpeuplement. En outre, 17,4 % de ces ménages et leurs enfants en besoin de logement



Besoin impérieux de logement par type de ménage, Canada, 2001¹

Tous les ménages Ménages ayant un besoin impérieux de logement

Type de ménage	#	Nombre	En besoin	Revenu	Ratio
Tous les ménages	10 805 615	1 709 650	15,8	18 467	47,1
Autochtones	297 285	73 850	24,8	17 712	45,5
Propriétaires	148 170	17 510	11,8	21 518	41,6
Locataires	149 115	56 335	37,8	16 530	46,7
Non-autochtones	10 508 330	1 635 800	15,6	18 501	47,2
Locataires	3 426 835	1 030 800	30,1	16 721	47,9
Aînés vivant seuls	456 335	243 385	53,3	15 319	45,4
Non-aînés vivant seuls	1 003 495	326 785	32,6	13 572	51,0
Familles monoparentales	483 200	204 320	42,3	17 819	47,9
Nouveaux immigrants ³	225 055	75 025	33,3	21 503	51,1
Propriétaires	72 385	16 660	23,0	27 868	54,1
Locataires	152 675	58 360	38,2	19 686	50,2

Notes :

- 1 Les données ne tiennent pas compte des ménages occupant une ferme, des membres d'une collectivité ou d'une réserve autochtones; des ménages avec un revenu de zéro ou moins ; des ménages dont les coûts de logement sont égaux ou supérieurs à leur revenu.
- 2 Ratio des coûts de logement au revenu = coûts de logement/revenu avant impôt du ménage.
- 3 Les ménages de nouveaux immigrants sont ceux dont les principaux soutiens ont obtenu le statut de résident permanent au cours de la période de 1996 au 15 mai 2001 (date du recensement 2001 au Canada).

Source : SCHL (indicateurs et données sur le logement selon le recensement).

- Ménages autochtones⁷, particulière-
ment s'ils sont locataires;
- Trois groupes de locataires non
autochtones : nouveaux immi-
grants⁸, personnes vivant seules,
et familles monoparentales.

Les ménages autochtones sont en
besoin de logement 1,6 fois de plus de
que les ménages non autochtones (se
reporter au tableau 2) et, lorsqu'ils sont
en besoin de logement, sont environ
2,5 fois plus susceptibles que les
ménages non autochtones de vivre
dans des logements surpeuplés ou

nécessitant des rénovations majeures.
Le revenu des ménages autochtones
est par ailleurs inférieur à celui des
non-autochtones et sont 1,4 fois plus
susceptibles d'avoir de faibles liens
avec le marché du travail. En 2001,
près de la moitié des ménages autoch-
tones et, par conséquent, près de la
moitié des ménages en besoin de loge-
ment (soit environ 35 000 ménages)
résidaient dans les régions métropo-
litaines de recensement (RMR) du
Canada. Dans ces centres, c'est à
Regina que le pourcentage de loca-
taires autochtones en besoin impé-
rieux est le plus élevé, à 45,5 %, suivi

de trois autres centres RMR de l'Ouest,
soit Saskatoon, où le taux est de 44,5 %,
Vancouver, où il se fixe à 42,3 %, et
Winnipeg, qui affiche un taux de
40,1 %.

Les nouveaux immigrants, le premier
des trois groupes de locataires non
autochtones affichant des taux élevés
de besoin de logement, tentent en
général de se loger dans les grandes
villes canadiennes. Le plus grand
nombre d'immigrants s'installent
dans de grands centres urbains où
ils trouveront des communautés
d'immigrants établies, et plus de

Revenu des ménages et besoin impérieux de logement, Canada, 2001²

Locataires

Propriétaires

Avec besoin de logement	#	%	Avec besoin de logement	#	%	Sans besoin de logement	#	%	Sans besoin de logement	#	%

A) Ménages d'âge actif²

Tous les ménages	5 150 330	92,4	420 760	7,6	2 105 100	72,5	797 380	27,5
Revenu moyen	84 090 \$		22 812 \$		50 893 \$		16 835 \$	
Ratio moyen ³	15,9 %		48,9 %		18,9 %		49,0 %	
Ménages ayant de faibles liens avec le marché du travail ⁴	1 178 775	85,8	195 580	14,2	568 225	54,4	476 725	45,6
Revenu moyen	68 980 \$		18 720 \$		40 550 \$		14 432 \$	
Ratio moyen ³	15,2 %		48,2 %		21,2 %		51,0 %	

B) Ménages d'âinés

Tous les ménages	1 456 830	87,8	201 750	12,2	383 710	57,0	289 755	43,0
Revenu moyen	50 555 \$		18 866 \$		35 014 \$		16 371 \$	
Ratio moyen ³	13,2 %		39,8 %		22,6 %		44,7 %	
Principale source de revenu								
Gouvernement	698 620	79,5	180 630	20,5	233 645	46,4	270 380	53,6
Autre	758 205	97,3	21 120	2,7	150 075	88,6	19 380	11,4

Notes :

- 1 Les données ne tiennent pas compte des ménages occupant une ferme, des membres d'une collectivité ou d'une réserve autochtones; des ménages avec un revenu de zéro ou moins, des ménages dont les coûts de logement sont égaux ou supérieurs à leur revenu.
- 2 Les ménages d'âge actif sont ceux dont les principaux soutiens sont âgés de 15 à 64 ans.
- 3 Ratio des coûts de logement au revenu = coûts de logement/revenu avant impôt du ménage.
- 4 Les ménages ayant de faibles liens avec le marché du travail sont ceux dont les principaux soutiens ne font pas partie de la main-d'œuvre, ou en font partie mais sont sans emploi, ou occupent un emploi à temps partiel.

Source : SCHL (indicateurs et données sur le logement selon le recensement).

faibles liens avec le marché du travail se trouvaient en situation de besoin impérieux (se reporter au tableau 1)⁵. Ces ménages affectaient plus de la moitié de leur très faible revenu au logement.

Les ménages d'âge actif comptaient pour sept sur dix des ménages en situation de besoin impérieux de logement en 2001. Dans le cas des trois autres ménages en besoin impérieux, le soutien était un aîné. Les ménages d'âinés ne tirant pas leur principale

source de revenu du gouvernement sont beaucoup moins susceptibles de trouver en situation de besoin de logement que les ménages qui tirent l'essentiel de leur revenu du gouvernement. Plus de la moitié des ménages locataires d'âinés dont la principale source de revenu est le gouvernement était en situation de besoin de logement en 2001, contre 11,4 % seulement des personnes tirant l'essentiel de leur revenu d'autres sources (se reporter au tableau 1).

nautes suivantes :

Nombre de groupes précis de ménages canadiens sont exposés à un degré de risque élevé de se retrouver en situation de besoin impérieux de logement. Ces groupes comprennent les communes suivantes :

Ménages à risque élevé d'exclusion de logement acceptable

Exclusion d'un logement acceptable en situation de besoin impérieux de logement

John Engeland
Roger Lewis
Société canadienne
d'hypothèques et de logement

John Engeland et Roger Lewis sont chercheurs principaux, spécialisés dans le financement de l'habitation et abordabilité au sein de la Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement.

Le logement joue un rôle important et à plusieurs niveaux dans la vie des Canadiens. En effet, le logement est étroitement lié à notre capacité d'obtenir un emploi, d'élever nos enfants, et de construire des liens avec nos voisins et la collectivité. Or, des habitations bien entretenues et répondant aux besoins des occupants favorisent leur santé, leur bien-être et leur interaction sociale. Des habitations abordables permettent aux ménages de disposer de ressources financières pour participer pleinement à la collectivité. Les ménages incapables d'avoir accès à de bonnes conditions d'habitation sont potentiellement désavantagés à divers points de vue.

La Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de logement (SCHL) définit le *logement acceptable* comme celui dont l'état est adéquat, la taille appropriée, et le prix abordable.

- Le logement *adéquat* est défini par son occupant comme ne nécessitant pas de réparations majeures.
- Le logement *approprié* compte un nombre suffisant de chambres à coucher compte tenu de la taille et de la composition du ménage qui l'occupe, conformément à la Norme nationale d'occupation².
- Le logement *abordable* coûte moins de 30 pour cent du revenu avant impôt du ménage qui l'occupe.

La SCHL estime être en *besoin impérieux de logement* tout ménage dont le logement ne répond pas à l'un ou l'autre des trois critères énoncés ci-dessus, et dont le revenu ne permet pas de louer dans le marché local un autre logement qui serait jugé acceptable et qui coûterait moins de 30 pour cent de son revenu avant impôt. Ces ménages sont donc par définition exclus de logements acceptables et des avantages qui y sont associés. Le présent article s'inspire des données dérivées du Recensement de 2001 et s'intéresse à la nature des difficultés

auxquelles font face les Canadiens en besoin impérieux de logement⁴. Nous y dresserons le lien entre l'exclusion d'un logement acceptable et des faibles liens avec le marché du travail. En outre, nous y cernerons les groupes les plus à risque de se retrouver en besoin impérieux de logement et décrirons les caractéristiques des quartiers dans lesquels le besoin impérieux de logement est prévalant. La notion d'exclusion est à la base de l'exclusion de logement acceptable, de certains quartiers, et plus largement, d'une pleine participation à l'économie et à la société dans son ensemble.

Besoin impérieux de logement, liens avec le marché du travail, et revenu provenant du gouvernement

Contrairement aux achats quotidiens de nourriture, de vêtements et autres biens de première nécessité, l'accès au logement exige habituellement un engagement financier à long terme de la part des ménages. Or, pour tout ménage sauf celui qui dispose d'un avoir à partir duquel il peut effectuer un versement, il faut pour prendre un tel engagement disposer d'un revenu mensuel minimum stable. Les ménages traversant des périodes prolongées ou répétées de chômage auront vraisemblablement à accorder au logement une plus grande part du peu de revenu dont ils disposent.

Il y a de fait un lien étroit à faire entre le besoin impérieux de logement et le lien avec le marché du travail. Les ménages ayant des liens faibles avec le marché du travail ont un revenu inférieur, sont plus souvent locataires, et ont plus de risque de se retrouver en situation de besoin impérieux de logement que d'autres ménages⁵. En 2001, 15,8 % des ménages au Canada se trouvaient en situation de besoin impérieux. À titre de comparaison, 45,6 % des ménages locataires d'âge actif dont les soutiens avaient de

Combattre l'exclusion en améliorant la capacité financière

Ceux qui possèdent une bonne connaissance de l'économie et des finances peuvent prendre des décisions plus éclairées – dans leur intérêt et dans celui de toute l'économie. Non seulement peuvent-ils mieux gérer leurs affaires personnelles et celles de leur ménage, mais ils peuvent être des membres plus efficaces et productifs de la société. Ils peuvent également être de meilleurs citoyens, capables de prononcer des jugements raisonnés sur les enjeux politiques qui influent sur leurs perspectives personnelles et celles de la nation (David Dodge, Gouverneur de la Banque du Canada, 2003).

Il est largement prouvé que beaucoup de gens ont une faible capacité financière (ou une faible littératie financière). Pourtant, il n'existe pas encore au Canada de cadre exhaustif de politiques gouvernementales pour améliorer la capacité financière des Canadiens –

même si nous aurions beaucoup de raisons de faire d'un tel cadre une priorité. Pour une discussion exhaustive sur la littératie et la capacité financières, notamment un réexamen et une étude des activités permettant d'améliorer ces attributs au Royaume-Uni, aux États-Unis et au Canada, voir le document de discussion « Capacité financière et pauvreté » (2004), préparé pour le PRP par le Social and Entrepreneurial Development Innovations (SEDI). Ce document est accessible sur le site web du PRP au <www.policyresearch.ca>.

5 Le plus bas taux de faible revenu chez les personnes âgées comparativement à celui des autres groupes d'âges reflète en partie la générosité et la pertinence des programmes de pension gouvernementale du Canada.

6 Dans le même ordre d'idées, parmi les parents seuls, les mères de famille monoparentale connaissent des taux de faible revenu annuel et persistant plus élevés que les pères de cette même catégorie. Mais le risque d'avoir un faible revenu persistant est aussi beaucoup plus élevé chez les pères seuls.

7 Lors du recensement de 2001, quelque 73,4 % des immigrants récents (c'est-à-dire arrivés au Canada avant 1991) étaient membres d'un groupe minoritaire visible. Seulement 13,4 % de tous les Canadiens étaient membres d'un groupe minoritaire visible.

8 Dans leur étude, les taux de faible revenu sont calculés à partir des seuils de faible revenu (SFR) avant impôts de Statistique Canada.

9 Plus de 90 % des immigrants récents au Canada résident dans une RMR. Heisz et McLeod utilisent aussi les SFR avant impôts.

10 Ces études ont été réalisées entre novembre 2002 et mai 2004 et sont basées sur des données transversales de l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu (EDTR) de 1998 et sur les données résultant de l'analyse du panel longitudinal de cette enquête sur la période allant de 1993 à 1998.

11 On remarquera que seulement une personne sur cinq âgée ayant entre 16 et 64 ans présentant un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler en 1996 était toujours restreinte dans ses activités entre 1996 et 2001.

12 L'échantillon des autochtones hors réserve dans l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu était trop petit pour effectuer une analyse de régression pertinente des facteurs liés à la persistance d'un faible revenu dans ce groupe. 13 Un niveau d'instruction inférieur au niveau secondaire est aussi un facteur important qui limite la capacité de travailler d'une personne. Mais comme l'ont constaté Kapsalis et Tourigny, ceci n'est pas dû au fait que l'appartenance d'une

incapacité réduit les chances de réussir des études secondaires. Même parmi les personnes dont l'incapacité s'est déclarée à 30 ans et plus, celles qui ne détenaient pas de diplôme d'études secondaires avaient deux fois plus de risques d'être handicapées que le reste de la population. Ce phénomène peut s'expliquer de deux façons, la première étant que plus le niveau de scolarité est élevé, plus le style de vie des gens est sain et la deuxième, que les personnes n'ayant pas de diplôme de fin d'études secondaires sont plus susceptibles d'avoir à gagner leur vie dans des conditions plus difficiles.

14 On remarquera que la faiblesse du niveau de scolarité n'est pas liée à la faiblesse du revenu chez les Canadiens autochtones vivant hors réserve. Ces derniers parlent couramment une langue officielle au moins et ont passé toute leur vie au pays. Ils bénéficient de réseaux sociaux bien établis par l'entremise de leur famille et ne sont pas éloignés géographiquement des marchés du travail locaux. À l'égard de ces aspects au moins, leurs réseaux sociaux sont plus étendus et plus utiles que ceux des membres des autres groupes défavorisés. Il semble que ces facteurs compensent le faible niveau d'instruction pour trouver et conserver un emploi rémunéré stable.

15 Le revenu du marché est calculé en fonction des revenus d'une famille économique provenant du salaire et de sources de revenu autres que les paiements de transfert. 16 On notera que ces chiffres sont basés sur les seuils de faible revenu après impôts de Statistique Canada et que, de ce fait, ils ne sont pas comparables aux statistiques basées sur les seuils de faible revenu avant impôts mentionnés dans les études de Picot et Hou, et de Heisz et McLeod.

- 2 Pour tenter d'apporter une réponse à ces questions, le présent article s'appuie beaucoup sur des études récentes, et pour la plupart non publiées, réalisées par Constantine Kapsalis et Pierre Tourigny pour l'ancien ministère du Développement-Canada. Les conclusions avancées par l'auteur de l'article lui sont propres et ne reflètent pas nécessairement les opinions des auteurs des études citées ou réalisées par Développement social Canada.
- 3 L'article mentionne à plusieurs reprises différents groupes d'âges. Le principal groupe examiné est celui des moins de 65 ans. Toutefois, pour s'assurer que toutes les personnes appartenant à ce groupe avaient bien moins de 65 ans entre 1993 et 1996 et entre 2000, l'échantillon retenu pour l'analyse longitudinale devait être composé de personnes ayant entre 0 et 59 ans au cours de la première année de l'étude. Dans certains cas, l'article mentionne des données annuelles provenant d'autres auteurs qui examinent seulement la partie de la population entre 0 et 64 ans âgée de 16 à 59 ans ou de 16 à 64 ans.
- 4 On considère que les personnes font partie d'un de ces groupes si le principal soutien de leur famille économique est un membre du groupe. Dans le tableau, la rubrique « Seul » représente les personnes âgées de 45 à 59 ans vivant seules ou avec d'autres qui ne sont pas membres de leur famille. « Limite au travail » représente les personnes qui ont un problème physique ou mental limitant le type d'activités et le nombre d'heures de travail rémunéré qu'elles étaient capables d'effectuer. « Immigrants récents » représente les personnes venues vivre au Canada dans les dix années précédant l'année 1996. « Monoparental » couvre les personnes de 18 ans dans une résidence où aucun autre parent n'habite. « Autochtones hors réserve » couvre les Canadiens qui se sont déclarés membres d'un groupe autochtone (Indiens, Inuits, Métis inscrits ou Indiens sans statut) et qui ne vivaient pas dans une réserve en 1996. « Non à risque » représente tous les autres personnes ayant entre 0 et 59 ans en 1996 qui ne font pas partie d'un ménage dont le soutien économique principal est un membre d'un des cinq groupes définis ci-dessus.
- La définition de faible revenu persistant englobe à la fois l'incidence et l'intensité du faible revenu.
- Une famille économique peut être soit une personne vivant seule ou avec d'autres (avec qui elle n'est pas apparentée), soit un groupe de deux personnes (entre elles par le sang, le mariage, l'adoption ou l'union libre).
- Heisz, Andrew et Logan McLeod, avril 2004. « Groupes risquant fortement de toucher un faible revenu dans les régions métropolitaines de recensement, 1980-2000, Statistique Canada, n° 89-613 au catalogue. Kapsalis, Constantine et Pierre Tourigny, 2002. *Profils et transitions de groupes à risque d'exclusion sociale : les parents seuls*, Développement social Canada, Documents de travail SP-577-06-03E.
- 2003a. *Profils et transitions de groupes à risque d'exclusion sociale : Personnes ayant un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler*, Développement social Canada (non publié).
- 2003b. *Profils et transitions de groupes de 45 à 64 ans*, Développement social Canada (non publié).
- 2004a. *Profils et transitions de groupes à risque d'exclusion sociale : Immigrants récents*, Développement social Canada (non publié).
- 2004b. *Profils et transitions de groupes à risque d'exclusion sociale : Autochtones hors réserve*, Développement social Canada (non publié).
- René Monseigneur et Xuelin Zhang, 2001. « À faible revenu pendant plusieurs années », Statistique Canada, *L'emploi et le revenu en perspective*, p. 5-15.
- Garnett Picot et Feng Hou, 2003. *La hausse du taux de faible revenu chez les immigrants au Canada*, Statistique Canada, Direction des études analytiques, documents de recherche n° 198.

Notes

Il s'avère donc que les membres des groupes à risque élevé et les personnes qui sont à leur charge sont au cœur de la lutte contre le faible revenu annuel et persistent tant dans une perspective démographique que socioéconomique.

« Canada – Une étude sur les groupes à risque économique des autochtones hors réserve au Fleury, Dominique, 2002. « Performance d'exclusion sociale », Développement des ressources humaines Canada, Direction générale de la recherche appliquée, série de documents de travail W-02-1E.

en sens inverse, pour ce qui est des parents seuls et des immigrants récents. Chez les premiers, l'incidence de faible revenu a baissé de 39 % à 29,5 % au cours de cette période tandis qu'elle a augmenté chez les seconds. Pour ce qui est des Autochtones et des personnes présentant un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler, les changements apportés à la définition de ces deux groupes empêchent de faire des comparaisons soutenables. Par ailleurs, l'incidence de faible revenu chez les personnes seules de plus de 65 ans n'a pas changé beaucoup entre 1998 et 2000. Il en est probablement de même pour les personnes de ce groupe ayant entre 45 et 64 ans.

Ce qui a changé, c'est la proportion de personnes vivant dans des ménages dont le principal soutien économique est membre d'un de ces groupes. Dans le groupe des personnes de moins de 65 ans vivant dans des ménages où l'on a pu établir que le soutien de famille était dans une situation à risque, la proportion des ménages où le soutien était membre d'un groupe à risque élevé est passée de 25,2 % en 1996 à 29 % en 2000, ce qui semble indiquer que ces groupes croissent plus vite que les autres groupes de la population. Pendant la même période, la proportion de la population à faible revenu définie comme à risque élevé a augmenté de 57,6 % à 63,3 %.

Renvois

TABLEAU 3

Évolution de la situation des groupes à risque

Groupes à risque élevé	Incidence de faible revenu du marché ¹⁵ en 1996	Incidence de faible revenu après impôts en 2002	Incidence de faible revenu après impôts en 1996	Incidence de faible revenu après impôts en 2002
Parents seuls	59,6	48,6	45,8	31,4
Personnes seules	46,1	35,1	37,9	29,0
Immigrants récents	46,7	31,4	34,5	25,0
Personnes handicapées	52,0	36,7	34,2	21,4
Autochtones hors réserve	43,6	29,4	31,8	17,0
Personnes non à risque	12,9	8,6	8,5	5,2

Source : Fichier principal – Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu

Il appert que les réponses à ces deux questions sont étroitement liées à l'absence, à la perturbation ou à l'inefficacité des réseaux sociaux. Les personnes qui risquent le plus d'avoir un faible revenu persistant sont celles qui sont les plus susceptibles d'appartenir à un groupe dont le contexte même a restreint les possibilités de développer un réseau de relations sociales. Le simple fait de faire partie d'un groupe à risque induit déjà ce phénomène. Toutefois, dans chacun des groupes, certaines personnes ont plus de chances que d'autres de trouver un soutien qui leur permettra d'accéder à des revenus stables. Comme nous l'avons mentionné précédemment, le fait, par exemple, d'être marié ou en union libre permet à de nombreuses personnes présentant un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler de bénéficier d'un revenu grâce à leur conjoint. D'une manière ou d'une autre et, dans de nombreux cas, de plusieurs façons simultanément, de tels soutiens et réseaux sociaux font défaut aux membres des cinq groupes à risque.

À l'exclusion peut-être d'un faible niveau de scolarité, tous les facteurs

statistiquement associés à la persistance d'un faible revenu sont liés à l'absence, à la perturbation ou à l'inefficacité des réseaux sociaux¹⁴. Les personnes appartenant à plusieurs groupes à risque élevé, les personnes handicapées vivant seules, les personnes âgées seules ayant déjà vécu en couple, les parents seuls ayant eu leur premier enfant en dehors d'une relation conjugale, les Canadiens autochtones qui, parmi ceux qui vivent hors réserve, ont grandi dans une réserve et les immigrants récents de minorité visible ou de pays dont les cultures sont très différentes de la culture canadienne sont les plus sujets à connaître une situation de faible revenu persistant.

C'est également le cas des Canadiens autochtones hors réserve et des immigrants récents vivant dans des régions où le marché du travail est déprimé. Les personnes appartenant à des groupes à risque qui ne présentent pas ces caractéristiques et qui ont réussi à établir et à maintenir des réseaux familiaux et communautaires risquent moins de se trouver dans une situation de faible revenu, tant annuel que persistant.

Remarque finale – Situation récente de chacun des groupes à risque

Les ménages dans lesquels le principal soutien économique fait partie des groupes à risque élevé ont bénéficié de la conjoncture favorable du marché du travail depuis 1996 et affiché une baisse importante du taux annuel de faible revenu. Ces taux demeurent toutefois bien supérieurs à ceux qu'affichent les membres de 0 à 64 ans des ménages dans lesquels le principal soutien économique n'appartient pas à l'un de ces cinq groupes à risque.

Dans tous les groupes, sauf celui des parents seuls, la baisse de points de pourcentage du taux de faible revenu basé sur le revenu du marché est supérieure à la baisse enregistrée après la prise en compte des paiements de transfert et du régime fiscal. La baisse plus importante du taux de faible revenu après impôt chez les parents seuls au cours de cette période (14,4 points) que celle du faible revenu basé sur le revenu du marché (11 points)¹⁶ reflète l'impact de l'application et de la majoration du Supplément de la prestation nationale pour enfants après 1996.

L'écart des taux de faible revenu entre chacun des groupes à risque et le groupe non à risque a également diminué pendant cette période, une tendance à laquelle on s'attend lors d'une période de resserrement du marché du travail et de forte croissance économique. Il convient toutefois de souligner également que ces groupes sont beaucoup plus défavorisés pendant les périodes de récession et d'augmentation du chômage. Une question beaucoup plus importante, mais à laquelle il est malheureusement beaucoup plus difficile de répondre en raison du peu de données, est de savoir si ces groupes ont connu des améliorations structurelles entre les deux derniers sommets du cycle économique entre 1989 et 2000. La situation est des plus claires,

(c) Pouvoir compter sur le soutien d'un conjoint

Le fait qu'il y ait dans une famille deux soutiens économiques potentiels est de toute évidence un avantage pour éviter de connaître un faible revenu persistant. Par définition, les familles monoparentales et les personnes seules entre 45 et 64 ans ne répondent pas à ce critère. La présence d'un second soutien économique est particulièrement importante pour les personnes présentant un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler. À partir de données transversales recueillies en 1998, on constate que le taux de faible revenu des personnes présentant un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler était de 8 % si elles n'étaient pas le principal soutien de famille et de 43 % dans le cas contraire.

Chez les adultes ayant entre 16 et 64 ans et ne présentant aucune limitation au travail, le taux de faible revenu était de 10 %. Parmi les Autochtones vivant hors réserve, le risque de connaître une situation de faible revenu pour les personnes seules ou les familles monoparentales était, en 1998, de plus de 60 % comparative-ment à 24 % pour l'ensemble des personnes de ce groupe¹².

D'autres caractéristiques concernant le statut familial, liées à la perturbation ou à l'étendue limitée des réseaux familiaux, étaient associées à la persistance d'un faible revenu chez les personnes ne vivant pas avec un conjoint. Chez les parents seuls, ceux qui avaient un enfant à charge de moins de cinq ans ou qui n'étaient ni mariés ni en union libre lors de la naissance de leur premier enfant, étaient beaucoup plus susceptibles (respectivement 4,4 fois et 2,2 fois) de connaître un faible revenu persistant que les autres. Parmi les personnes seules entre 45 et 59 ans, celles ayant vécu en couple par le passé avaient 28 % plus de risque de se trouver dans une telle situation que celles qui n'avaient jamais été mariées ou en union libre.

TABLEAU 2

Pourcentage de population de 1996 restée dans le même groupe à risque entre 1996 et 2001

Groupe à risque élevé		Pourcentage
Autochtones vivant hors réserve	Personnes seules entre 45 et 64 ans	100
Immigrants récents		71,1
Parents seuls		48,0
Personnes ayant un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler		41,3
		20,4 ¹¹

Source : Dossier principal de l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu.

(d) N'appartenir qu'à un seul groupe à risque élevé

De toute évidence, les personnes appartenant à plusieurs groupes à risque élevé sont beaucoup plus susceptibles de connaître une situation de faible revenu annuel ou persistant. En 1998, par exemple, parmi les Autochtones vivant hors réserve, le pourcentage prévisible de faible revenu (tous les autres facteurs étant constants) était de 56 % si la personne présentait un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler et de 60 % si elle élevait seule ses enfants. Dans l'ensemble de ce groupe, ce pourcentage n'était que de 24 %. De la même façon, parmi les personnes seules ayant entre 45 et 59 ans en 1993, l'incidence de faible revenu persistant était de 66 % pour celles qui présentaient un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler cette année-là et de 23 % pour les autres.

(e) Détenir un diplôme de fin d'études secondaires

Dans tous les groupes à risque élevé (à l'exception des Canadiens autochtones vivant hors réserve), le fait de ne pas détenir de diplôme de fin d'études secondaires s'est révélé, dans le cadre d'une analyse de régression, étroitement lié à la persistance d'un faible revenu au cours de la période 1993-1998¹³. (Ces résultats sont constants

f) Vivre dans une région où le taux d'emploi est élevé

Le fait de vivre dans une région économique où le taux d'emploi moyen est plus bas que la moyenne s'avère un facteur important de persistance de faible revenu chez les parents seuls et les immigrants récents, mais non parmi les autres groupes.

Facteurs importants pour certains groupes à risque élevé

Il existe des facteurs importants liés à une situation de faible revenu annuel et persistant spécifiques à certains groupes. Ainsi, dans le groupe des personnes âgées seules, le fait d'être plus âgé, (d'avoir 55 ans et plus comparative-ment à 45 – 54 ans) est un facteur important lié au faible de revenu. En 1998, faire partie d'une minorité visible (notamment être d'origine arabe) d'immigrants récents et être un indien déclaré du groupe des autochtones vivant hors réserve étaient aussi des paramètres importants.

Conclusions

Quels éléments de réponse toutes ces observations nous permettent-elles d'apporter aux deux questions que nous posions au début de cet article?

TABLEAU 1

Facteurs associés au faible revenu

Groupe	Taux de faible revenu en 1998	Taux de faible revenu en 1998 – ensemble	Taux de faible revenu en 1998 – ensemble	Taux de faible revenu en 1998 – ensemble
Parents seuls	79	22	36	
Personnes ayant un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler	Non-disponible	Non-disponible	27	
Personnes seules entre 45-64	70	12	38	
Immigrants récents	49	16	28	
Autochtones vivant hors réserve	43	13	23	
Comparaison				
Tous les personnes de 16 à 64 ans	Non-disponible	Non-disponible	12	

* Travail rémunéré signifie au moins une heure de travail rémunéré dans l'année.
Source : Kapsalis et Tourigny, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b.

Un emploi rémunéré stable, principal facteur permettant aux Autochtones hors réserve d'échapper à la persistance d'un faible revenu

Dans son étude sur la performance économique des Autochtones vivant hors réserve, Fleury examine les raisons pour lesquelles ces derniers affichent le plus bas taux de faible revenu tant annuel que persistant parmi tous les groupes à risque. À partir des données résultant de l'analyse du panel longitudinal (1993-1998) de l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu, l'auteur propose quatre explications possibles à cette constatation. Trois des hypothèses expliquant la meilleure performance économique des Autochtones hors réserve, à savoir des niveaux d'éducation plus élevés, un pourcentage de chances de sortir de leur groupe à risque plus important et le fait de ne pas appartenir à plus d'un groupe à risque à la fois doivent cependant être rejetées dans la mesure où la performance des Autochtones vivant hors réserve n'est ni meilleure ni pire que celle des autres groupes à risque élevé dans ces domaines.

Moyens d'échapper à la persistance d'un faible revenu
a) Avoir un travail rémunéré stable

Fleury a toutefois constaté que les Autochtones vivant hors réserve étaient plus susceptibles que tous les autres groupes à risque d'avoir un travail rémunéré stable, un avantage qui explique qu'ils affichent un taux de faible revenu persistant moins élevé. L'analyse qui suit repose essentiellement sur une série d'études détaillées sur chacun des groupes à risque basées sur une analyse de régression réalisée par Constantine Kapsalis et Pierre Tourigny à la demande du groupe d'études sur la sécurité du revenu et le marché du travail de la Direction générale de la recherche appliquée de Développement des ressources humaines Canada (DRHC)¹⁰.

Comme l'indique le tableau 1, Kapsalis et Tourigny confirment la conclusion de Fleury selon laquelle le principal facteur permettant aux membres de tous les groupes à risque d'éviter

d'avoir un faible revenu est le fait d'avoir un travail rémunéré.

Comme on peut le constater, à l'exception des parents seuls, le taux de faible revenu des personnes appartenant à des groupes à risque élevé qui était voisin de celui de l'ensemble de la population de 16 à 64 ans. Même parmi les parents seuls, le taux de faible revenu des personnes ayant un travail rémunéré de 750 heures ou plus pendant l'année n'était que de 15 %.

Le faible salaire horaire du principal soutien du ménage est également un facteur important du faible revenu de nombreux ménages. Néanmoins, Kapsalis et Tourigny montrent que, dans le groupe des parents seuls, les taux élevés de faible revenu annuel s'expliquent principalement par le faible nombre ou l'absence d'heures de travail rémunéré effectuées dans l'année. Les salaires horaires bas et le faible nombre d'heures travaillées annuellement sont également en corrélation. La plupart des emplois peu rémunérés sont précaires, à temps partiel, de courte durée ou de moins d'une année. En règle générale, les membres des groupes à risque élevé ayant un travail rémunéré stable ne sont pas plus susceptibles de connaître une situation de faible revenu persistant que les autres Canadiens.

b) Sortir du groupe à risque

Un autre moyen de réduire les probabilités de connaître un faible revenu persistant est de quitter le groupe à risque dont on fait partie. Comme on peut le voir au tableau 2, ce phénomène était plus fréquent chez les membres de certains groupes entre 1996 et 2000 que chez certains autres.

Le phénomène d'exclusion et la persistance d'un faible revenu reflètent l'absence, l'inefficacité ou la perturbation des étroitement liés. Nombre des facteurs associés à la persistance d'un faible revenu

professionnelle des immigrants diplômés acquise à l'étranger. La seconde est que l'intégration sur le marché du travail d'un grand nombre de femmes canadiennes d'un niveau de scolarité élevé après 1980 a probablement réduit les possibilités de travail des immigrants récents. Picot et Hou soulignent que le niveau de scolarité des nouveaux immigrants a rapidement augmenté au cours des années 1990 et que, de plus en plus, ils entrent au Canada en tant que membres de la catégorie « économique ».

revenu dans les régions métropolitaines de recensement, 1980-2000 de Andrew Heisz et Logan McLeod (avril 2004). Une troisième étude, *Performance économique des autochtones hors réserve au Canada – Une étude sur les groupes à risque d'exclusion sociale*, réalisée par Dominique Fleury du Groupe de recherche sur les politiques sociales de Développement social Canada, a été publiée en 2002 dans une série de documents de travail réalisés sous l'égide de la Direction générale de la recherche appliquée.

réseaux sociaux.

Remise en question de certains mythes concernant la hausse du taux de faible revenu chez les immigrants récents

mique », c'est-à-dire du groupe d'immigrants qui habituellement réussissent mieux que les autres. On a enregistré pendant la période de reprise économique entre 1995 et 2000 une diminution importante des taux de faible revenu chez les sous-groupes d'immigrants récents, mais celle-ci ne compense que partiellement l'augmentation du taux de faible revenu dans l'ensemble des catégories d'immigrants récents entre 1990 et 1995.

Divergence des tendances chez les immigrants et les parents seuls dans les grands centres urbains

L'étude de Heisz-McLeod vient confirmer la hausse du taux de faible revenu chez les immigrants récents dans les 27 régions métropolitaines de recensement du Canada (c'est-à-dire les villes les plus importantes et leurs banlieues), qui est passé de 23,1 % en 1980 à 35 % en 2000, alors que ce taux a baissé, chez tous les autres résidents de ces régions, de 18 % à 16 %. Le taux de faible revenu chez les personnes vivant dans des familles monoparentales dans les grands centres urbains canadiens a suivi le chemin inverse en passant de 54,2 % en 1980 à 46,6 % en 2000.

Études récentes sur les groupes à risque élevé et principales conclusions

De nombreuses études concernant les membres des groupes à risque élevé ont été publiées et sont disponibles pour le grand public, d'autres non. L'un des objectifs du présent article est de révéler les principales conclusions de ces études, publiées ou non, et de les porter à la connaissance d'un public élargi.


Deux importantes études ont été publiées récemment sur ces groupes par des analystes de Statistique Canada : *La hausse du taux de faible revenu chez les immigrants au Canada*, de Garnett Picot et Feng Hou (juin, 2003), et « Groupes risquant fortement de toucher un faible revenu » dans *Faible*

d'une année donnée, la grande majorité d'entre eux voit ses revenus augmenter régulièrement et échappe bien vite à cette situation.

Les autres groupes n'ont pas connu non plus de taux de faible revenu disproportionné au cours de la période de 1996 à 2001, ou bien ont connu une telle situation parce qu'ils appartenaient aussi à l'une des catégories à risque élevé déjà définies. Par exemple, les personnes qui ne possèdent pas de diplôme d'études secondaires affichent des taux élevés de faible revenu persistant, mais ce n'est pas le cas des personnes les moins instruites parmi la population non âgée n'appartenant pas à un groupe à risque élevé⁶.

On ne relève pas de taux élevés de faible revenu persistant chez les 30 % de Canadiens de minorités visibles nés au Canada. Toutefois, ceux qui ont immigré récemment⁷ (33,7 % de l'ensemble des Canadiens de minorités visibles en 2001) sont beaucoup plus susceptibles que d'autres immigrants récents de se trouver dans cette situation. Dans le cadre de cet article, nous considérons plutôt cette catégorie comme un sous-groupe d'immigrants récents que comme des membres de minorités visibles.

Pourcentage de personnes ayant entre 0 et 64 ans à faible revenu en 1996 – Appartenance au groupe basé sur le statut du principal soutien économique



Source : Fichier principal – Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu.

En 1996, quelque 14,7 % de l'ensemble de la population de moins de 65 ans était considérée, selon les seuils de faible revenu après impôts et transferts de Statistique Canada, comme étant dans une situation de faible revenu. Toutefois, si l'on se base sur la définition du faible revenu persistant figurant dans la note 1, seulement 8 % de la population âgée entre 0 et 59 ans en 1996 était dans une situation de faible revenu entre 1996 et 2001⁴.

Le risque de toucher un faible revenu pendant un anneau ou de façon durable était beaucoup plus élevé pour certains groupes de la population non âgée. Comme l'indique la figure 1, les cinq groupes de la population non âgée les plus susceptibles de connaître une situation de faible revenu entre 1996 et 2001 étaient⁴ :

- les personnes seules âgées de 45 à 64 ans;
- les personnes présentant un handicap qui limite leur capacité de travailler;
- les immigrants récents;
- les parents seuls; et
- les Autochtones vivant hors réserve.

L'ensemble des personnes qui font partie d'au moins un de ces cinq groupes représentait 23,8 % de la population totale ayant entre 0 et 59 ans en 1996, mais 67,6 % de la population ayant connu une situation

de faible revenu persistant au cours des six années suivantes.

Au cours de cette période, les membres de ces groupes étaient 4,6 à 8,6 fois plus susceptibles d'avoir un faible revenu persistant que le reste de la population ayant entre 0 et 59 ans en 1996.

Comme l'indique la figure 2, ces cinq groupes affichaient aussi des taux annuels de faible revenu très élevés en 1996, mais ces taux n'étaient que 3,7 à 5,4 fois plus élevés que ceux du reste de la population non âgée et ces groupes ne représentaient que 57,6 % du total de la population à faible revenu non âgée. La proportion de faible revenu persistant était donc plus élevée chez ces cinq groupes que la proportion de faible revenu annuel.

Dans les paragraphes suivants, nous tenterons d'expliquer pourquoi les groupes à risque élevé sont définis comme tels.

Malheureusement, Statistique Canada n'évaluait pas les seuils de faible revenu dans les réserves et l'enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu, qui est la source des données sur le revenu utilisées dans le présent article, n'intégrant pas les Autochtones vivant dans des réserves, il n'est pas possible de faire une évaluation valable du taux de faible revenu de l'ensemble des Autochtones ou des Autochtones vivant dans les réserves. L'incidence de faible revenu est sans doute plus élevée

chez ces derniers que chez les Autochtones canadiens déclarés comme vivant hors réserve. Selon les données du recensement de 2001, le revenu individuel médian des Indiens enregistrés dans une réserve était inférieur de 20 % à celui des Indiens vivant hors réserve.

Les personnes âgées de plus de 65 ans ne sont pas non plus parmi les personnes les plus susceptibles d'avoir un faible revenu persistant. Le taux annuel de faible revenu chez l'ensemble des personnes âgées en 2002, soit la dernière année pour laquelle nous disposons de données, était plutôt faible (6,9 %, comparativement à 9,7 % chez les personnes âgées de 18 à 64 ans et à 10,2 % chez les enfants de moins de 18 ans)⁵. Même le sous-groupe qui s'en tire le moins bien, c'est-à-dire les personnes âgées seules, affichait en 1996 un taux de faible revenu de 13,9 points de pourcentage inférieur à celui des personnes seules ayant entre 45 et 64 ans (24 %).

On pourrait s'attendre aussi à voir figurer parmi les personnes à risque les jeunes gens, les femmes, les personnes n'ayant pas obtenu de diplôme de fin d'études secondaires ainsi que les personnes appartenant à un groupe minoritaire visible.

On remarque qu'une catégorie de jeunes, celle des étudiants de niveau postsecondaire à temps plein, affiche des taux de faible revenu persistant disproportionnés. Nous ne les considérons toutefois pas, dans le cadre de cet article, comme un groupe à risque élevé, car ces jeunes n'auront sans doute plus de faible revenu une fois leurs études terminées. Il y a, par ailleurs, de bonnes raisons de croire que ce problème est amplifié par le fait que deux de leurs principales sources de revenu, soit les prêts étudiants et la participation des parents, ne sont pas considérées comme des revenus dans l'enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu. Même s'il peut arriver que des jeunes ayant terminé leurs études secondaires connaissent un taux élevé de faible revenu au cours

Groupes à risque de persistance d'un faible revenu

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
Les personnes touchant un faible revenu pendant plusieurs années sont exposées à une exclusion de la participation à la vie de la communauté, à des risques de maladie physique et mentale à long terme ou encore à l'obligation de vivre dans des logements insalubres. Les enfants dont les parents font face à une insuffisance persistante de leurs revenus voient également leurs perspectives restreintes.

Comme l'indiquent les conclusions du présent article, le phénomène d'exclusion et la persistance d'un faible revenu sont étroitement liés¹. Nombre des facteurs associés à la persistance d'un faible revenu reflètent l'absence, l'inefficacité ou la perturbation des réseaux sociaux, plus particulièrement de ceux qui permettent d'accéder à des revenus provenant d'un emploi rémunéré stable.

Nous examinerons plus particulièrement dans cet article cinq grands groupes de la population non âgée qui, entre 1996 et 2000, présentaient des risques élevés de connaître une situation de faible revenu persistant. Nous commencerons par définir ce que nous entendons par faible revenu persistant ainsi que les cinq groupes fortement exposés. Nous présenterons ensuite une synthèse des principales conclusions des récentes recherches

FIGURE 1

Pourcentage de la population ayant entre 0 et 59 ans en 1996 et ayant connu une situation de faible revenu persistant entre 1996 et 2001



* Personnes ayant entre 45 et 64 ans entre 1996 et 2002.
Source : Fichier principal – Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu.

- Pourquoi les membres des groupes à risque sont-ils inégalement exposés à une situation de faible revenu persistant?
- Pourquoi la plupart des membres de ces groupes parviennent-ils à éviter cette situation alors que d'importantes minorités au sein de ces mêmes groupes connaissent un faible revenu pendant plusieurs années?

La persistance d'un faible revenu dans un contexte de faible revenu global

Le faible revenu se définit en fonction de trois paramètres : son incidence, son intensité et sa durée. Le taux de faible revenu pendant une période de temps donnée (p. ex. : une année). L'intensité mesure l'écart entre le seuil de faible revenu et le revenu d'un ménage économiquement faible. La persistance, qui fait l'objet de cet article, est le nombre d'années pendant lequel un certain pourcentage de la population fait face à une situation de faible revenu.

Le faible revenu dans les régions métropolitaines du Canada

Partout au pays, les entreprises, les responsables de l'élaboration des politiques et les Canadiens de tous les horizons manifestent une attention et un intérêt accrus à l'égard de la situation des régions métropolitaines et se montrent soucieux de contribuer au renouveau du tissu communautaire dans les grands centres urbains. Cela signifie, entre autres choses, lutter contre la pauvreté, développer l'éducation et l'emploi pour tous les Canadiens, y compris les nouveaux immigrants et les Autochtones, et stimuler le climat des affaires.

Récemment, Statistique Canada a publié le premier rapport d'une série qui examine les tendances et conditions dans les régions métropolitaines les plus importantes du pays. À l'aide des données du recensement, ce rapport, intitulé *Faible revenu dans les régions métropolitaines*, dresse un tableau du revenu et du faible revenu dans les 27 centres urbains canadiens de 1980 à 2000. Le rapport montre notamment que les taux de faible revenu n'ont pas augmenté dans la plupart des régions métropolitaines du pays au cours de cette période, mais que la composition démographique du faible revenu a considérablement changé.

Pour plus d'information, veuillez consulter le rapport de Statistique Canada, *Faible revenu dans les régions métropolitaines : 1980 à 2000*, par Andrew Heisz et Logan McLeod. Le rapport est disponible dans son intégralité sur le site www.statcan.ca, numéro de catalogue : 89-613-MIE, n° 001. D'autres rapports de cette même série, notamment sur la démographie, l'immigration, le logement, la santé, les marchés de l'emploi et la structure industrielle, le lieu de travail et le mode de transport quotidien, les Autochtones, et la culture sont actuellement disponibles ou le seront bientôt.

Notes

- 1 Pour être plus précis, les crêtes du cycle conjoncturel sont survenues en 1989 et 2000, mais on ne dispose pas de données de recensement pour l'année 1989.
- 2 Ce qui comprend tous les gains, le revenu de placement, le revenu provenant des transferts gouvernementaux, le revenu de retraite, le revenu d'autres sources en tenant compte des déductions pour impôts sur le revenu versés.
- 3 En 2000, selon l'EDTR, le ratio réel entre le haut et le bas de l'échelle était de 9,3. Toutefois, le passage des données de l'EFCT à celles de l'EDTR en 1996 a entraîné une hausse artificielle de 0,6 de ce ratio. Par conséquent, pour rendre le ratio de 2000 comparable à celui de 1990, nous avons estimé que le ratio de 2000 aurait été de 8,7 (9,3 - 0,6) s'il n'y avait pas eu de changement dans les sources de données.
- 4 C'est-à-dire, la différence de revenu entre le seuil de faible revenu et le revenu moyen parmi les familles à faible revenu.
- 5 Ces comparaisons ne servent toutefois qu'à mesurer les effets directs des transferts de revenu et ne tiennent pas compte de réactions comportementales, c.-à-d. indirectes, possibles. Par exemple, les réductions dans les prestations de transferts peuvent représenter un stimulant pour les personnes qui cherchent un emploi, ce qui relève le niveau des gains.
- 6 Corak et coll. (2003) se servent de données longitudinales pour étudier la dynamique du revenu, et l'étude de Smeeding (2003) repose sur des données transversales tirées de la Luxembourg Income Study, un organisme cherchant à obtenir des données comparables sur le revenu de plusieurs pays industrialisés occidentaux.
- 7 Pour demeurer cohérents avec le concept de faible revenu utilisé dans nos tableaux comparatifs, les chiffres donnés reposent sur le seuil de faible revenu de la mesure de faible revenu, c.-à-d., personnes vivant dans des familles dont le revenu ajusté est inférieur à 50 % du revenu moyen. Les résultats qui reposent sur les mesures basées sur le SFR, plus courantes, donnent toutefois une image identique.
- 8 Dans notre analyse, nous prenons comme seuil de faible revenu le SFR après impôts/transferts de Statistique Canada tout en le maintenant constant (à l'exception des rajustements tenant compte de l'inflation) pendant toute la période. Par conséquent, une augmentation de l'écart signifie que les revenus familiaux réels moyens ont baissé au sein des familles à faible revenu.
- 9 Le taux de faible revenu parmi les immigrants récents est passé de 4,7 à 35,8 % entre 1995 et 2000, mais cela est essentiellement attribuable à la forte amélioration des conditions économiques, qui a entraîné la baisse du taux de faible revenu de tous les groupes. Si l'on ne tient pas compte des effets du cycle conjoncturel (les taux augmentent durant les récessions et baissent lorsque la reprise se fait sentir), le taux de faible revenu parmi les immigrants récents a augmenté.
- 10 Comme dans d'autres comparaisons transnationales, le seuil de faible revenu correspond à la moitié du revenu moyen.
- 11 Nous ne disposons pas de données sur les Autochtones vivant dans les réserves.
- 12 À l'exclusion des autochtones auto-déclarés vivant hors des réserves, où la proportion a tendance à être plus faible. Si l'on tenait compte de la population vivant dans les réserves, cette proportion serait certainement plus élevée.

Les dernières recherches démontrent que cette tendance à commencer à se modifier à la fin des années 1990. Les avantages liés à l'expansion économique des années 1990 sont principalement allés aux familles bénéficiant d'un revenu plus élevé alors que les gains des familles plus pauvres stagnaient et que les transferts sociaux chutaient. Il en est résulté une hausse modérée de l'inégalité du revenu des familles.

À n'importe quel moment dans le temps, le faible revenu persistant se concentre dans cinq groupes. Si l'on s'attarde toutefois aux augmentations des taux de faible revenu, c'est manifestement les immigrants récents qui en ont fait les frais. Alors que les taux de faible revenu ont chuté au sein de la plupart des groupes de Canadiens de souche, ils ont connu une augmentation rapide chez les immigrants récents. Ce recul du bien-être des familles est lié à la baisse des gains des immigrants récents au cours des années 1980 et 1990 en dépit de leur niveau de scolarisation très élevé.

Contrairement à ces très mauvaises nouvelles, on peut trouver quelques aspects positifs. La chute spectaculaire des niveaux de faible revenu chez les Canadiens âgés depuis les années 1970, résultat de l'arrivée à maturité des changements législatifs apportés pendant les années 1960, a fait l'objet de nombreuses études depuis un certain temps. On comprend moins bien la baisse récente et importante des taux de faible revenu parmi les familles monoparentales. Elle semble résulter de taux plus élevés de participation au travail chez les chefs de famille monoparentale, ce qui pourrait refléter des changements dans le système de prestations familiales afin de renverser les puissants éléments de dissuasion à travailler inhérents aux modes traditionnels d'aide sociale. Pourquoi ce changement s'est-il produit et comment la situation évoluera-t-elle? Voilà deux questions qui

Renvois

- méritent beaucoup d'attention. D'autres bonnes nouvelles ont trait à la hausse des gains parmi les femmes (surtout les plus scolarisées), les travailleurs plus âgés et les familles à revenu (et degré de scolarisation) élevé.
- Sur un plan comparatif, on a souvent eu recours à la métaphore du milieu de l'Atlantique – quelque part entre les États-Unis et l'Europe – pour décrire les degrés canadiens d'inégalité du revenu, de faible revenu et de dépenses sociales. Dans les années 1970, cette métaphore était plutôt trompeuse puisque les degrés de faible revenu et d'inégalité au Canada rapprochaient beaucoup ces côtes américaines. En fait, avant le milieu des années 1970, les taux de faible revenu chez les enfants et les personnes âgées étaient plus élevés au Canada qu'aux États-Unis. Depuis lors, la métaphore fonctionne mieux, non pas tellement parce que le Canada s'est rapproché de l'Europe, mais plutôt parce que les États-Unis, et à présent le Royaume-Uni, se sont éloignés de l'Europe.
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TABLEAU 7

Taux de faible revenu parmi les cinq groupes : toutes les personnes et les faibles revenus persistants

% du groupe dans la catégorie du faible revenu	
2000	Persistant (1996-2000)

Chefs de famille monoparentale	30,2	25,6
Personnes seules de 45 à 64 ans	37,1	33,7
Immigrants récents (10 ans)	22,8	24,2
Incapacités de travail	22,8	23,3
Autochtone auto-déclaré (hors-réserve)	17,4	17,2
Autres	6,4	4,2

Source : Hatfield (2003), sur la base de l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu.

recherche sur les résultats atteints par ces groupes. Le fait d'entrer dans la catégorie du faible revenu ou d'en sortir ne se résume pas à obtenir un emploi ou à le perdre. Souvent, les profils des familles (divorce, séparation, mariage, union de fait) y jouent un rôle important. Et les obstacles sous-jacents à l'amélioration des résultats sur le plan de l'emploi peuvent varier énormément d'un groupe à l'autre. Ces obstacles et les causes sous-jacentes à de piètres résultats sur le plan de l'emploi sont presque certainement différents pour des immigrants récents, par exemple, que pour des chefs de famille monoparentale ou des personnes souffrant d'incapacités de travail.

Sur la base de l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu (EDTR), Michael Hatfield et ses collègues de l'ancien Développement des ressources humaines Canada ont cherché à déterminer les groupes constituant un pourcentage disproportionné de faible revenu persistant (Hatfield, 2003). Ils en sont venus à la conclusion que, tout en ne représentant que 26 % de la population, 62 % de toutes les personnes dans la catégorie du faible revenu persistant pendant la période 1996-2000 se retrouvaient

dans l'un des cinq groupes suivants (voir le tableau 6) : chefs de famille monoparentale, personnes seules de 45 à 64 ans, immigrants récents (au Canada depuis dix ans ou moins), personnes souffrant d'incapacités de travail et Autochtones vivant hors réserve¹¹. Les personnes souffrant d'incapacités de travail représentent le plus important (26 %) de personnes dans la catégorie du faible revenu persistant pendant la période, suivies des immigrants récents et des personnes seules âgées de 45 à 64 ans. Il serait inexact de croire que toutes les personnes faisant partie de ces cinq groupes se retrouvent au bas de l'échelle de distribution du revenu pendant de longues périodes. Même au sein de ces groupes, une minorité est exposée au faible revenu à long terme ou même de façon temporaire (se reporter au tableau 7). Entre un quart et un tiers des membres de ces groupes se retrouvent dans la catégorie du faible revenu persistant pendant une période de cinq ans¹². Bien que cela ne constitue pas une majorité, les personnes à faible revenu persistent tant dans ces populations sont environ huit fois plus nombreuses proportionnellement que la moyenne de 4,2 % que l'on retrouve dans le reste de la population.

Résumé et conclusion

de la population.

La conclusion standard des études sur le revenu au Canada pendant tout le milieu des années 1990 est que, en dépit de certains développements préoccupants, le Canada est essentiellement parvenu à éviter la forte hausse de l'inégalité du revenu manifeste tant aux États-Unis qu'au Royaume-Uni depuis le milieu des années 1970. Parmi les aspects préoccupants on note la baisse du revenu des jeunes adultes (de moins de 35 ans), surtout chez les hommes, et l'incidence que cela a eu sur les jeunes ménages, ainsi que la baisse des gains parmi les immigrants et les hommes peu scolarisés. L'évolution des gains, combinée aux changements liés à la participation au marché du travail et à la structure familiale, ont entraîné une forte hausse de l'inégalité des revenus du marché (les gains) des familles. Cependant, pendant le milieu des années 1990, cette évolution a été en grande partie, sinon en totalité, compensée par la hausse des transferts de revenu.

a. Dynamique du faible revenu en

contexte comparatif

Pour beaucoup, une situation de faible revenu est transitoire. Selon l'analyse de la dynamique du faible revenu au Canada, en Allemagne, au Royaume-Uni et aux États-Unis effectuée par Corak et coll., entre un tiers et la moitié de toutes les personnes entrant dans la catégorie du faible revenu ressortent au bout d'un an (voir le tableau 5)¹⁰. À l'autre extrême, de 20 à 30 % de toutes les personnes qui entrent dans la catégorie du faible revenu s'y trouvent encore au bout de cinq ans. Bien que la comparaison de Corak et coll. ne porte que sur quatre pays, les résultats de leur étude indiquent une corrélation entre les différences nationales concernant le faible revenu persistant et des niveaux élevés d'incapacité et de faible revenu. Parmi les personnes entrant dans la catégorie du faible revenu aux États-Unis, 31 % y demeureraient après cinq ans, comparativement à 24 % au Canada et à 18 % en Allemagne et au Royaume-Uni. Étant donné que le nombre de personnes ayant un faible revenu de façon persistante dépend non seulement de la durée de cette condition, mais aussi du nombre de personnes qui entrent dans cette catégorie, le pourcentage de la population totale tombant dans cette catégorie sur une longue période représente sans doute un meilleur indicateur d'exclusion à long terme. Sur la période étudiée par Corak et coll., 5,4 % de la population a fait partie de la catégorie du faible revenu pendant les six années aux États-Unis, 4,4 % au Royaume-Uni, 2,9 % au Canada et seulement 1,9 % en Allemagne.

b. Les plus vulnérables : concentration de faible revenu persistant au Canada

Si la concentration de faible revenu persistant n'est élevée que dans un nombre restreint de groupes, il sera utile d'effectuer des travaux de

TABLEAU 5

Statistiques portant sur la dynamique du faible revenu sur une période de six ans dans les années 1990^a

	Canada	Allemagne	Royaume-Uni	États-Unis
A. Pourcentage sortant de la catégorie du faible revenu après un an	38,4	46,6	41,1	36,4
B. Pourcentage demeurant la catégorie du faible revenu après cinq ans	24,4	17,8	18,1	31,1
C. Pourcentage de la population ayant fait partie au moins une fois de la catégorie du faible revenu	24,1	19,5	29,7	35,1
D. Pourcentage de la population ayant fait partie de la catégorie du faible revenu pendant les six années	2,9	1,9	4,4	5,4

Note :

a. Entre 1993 et 1998 (entre 1990 et 1996 aux États-Unis).

Source : Corak et coll. (2003), sur la base de l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu au Canada, de l'enquête par panel auprès des ménages britanniques, de l'enquête socio-économique de l'Allemagne et de l'enquête par panel de la dynamique du revenu aux États-Unis.

TABLEAU 6

Pourcentage de la population à faible revenu se retrouvant dans cinq groupes

	Pourcentage de la population 16-64	Faible revenu en 2000	Pourcentage de faible revenu (persistant) 1996-2000
%	%	%	%


Pourcentage de membres d'au

moins un des cinq groupes	25,9	56,2	62,1
Par groupe :			
Chefs de famille monoparentale	3,7	10,3	13,1
Personnes seules de 45 à 64 ans	5,5	19,0	16,6
Immigrants récents (10 ans)	5,5	11,7	16,6
Incapacité de travail	10,7	22,6	26,3
Autochtones hors réserve	3,1	5,1	5,5
Autre que ces cinq groupes	74,1	43,8	37,9

Source : Hatfield (2003), sur la base de l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu.

FIGURE 4

Taux de faible revenu des immigrants par rapport aux non-immigrants, par période de 5 ans d'immigration, 1980-2000



Source : Picot et Hou (2003).

représentaient une exception importante aux tendances observées pour toutes les familles à faible revenu décrits plus haut.

L'écart du faible revenu donne des renseignements supplémentaires sur le bien-être des familles à faible revenu. Parfois désigné sous le nom d'intensité du faible revenu, il s'agit de la différence entre le seuil de faible revenu et le revenu moyen des familles à faible revenu exprimé sous forme de ratio du seuil.

L'évolution de l'écart de faible revenu est illustrée à la figure 3, où l'indice de 100 correspond à l'année 1980. En dépit d'une baisse des gains parmi les familles à faible revenu pendant les années 1980, l'écart de faible revenu a chuté en raison de la hausse des transferts (Picot et coll., 2003). Par opposition, entre 1993 et 1998, le revenu réel

moyen des familles à faible revenu a connu une baisse, ce qui a entraîné une augmentation de l'écart de faible revenu⁸. Par conséquent, à l'encontre de la tendance observée dans le taux de faible revenu, l'écart de faible revenu n'est pas retourné aux niveaux observés à la fin des années 1980.

b. Tendances de faible revenu parmi les immigrants récents

Les tendances de faible revenu au sein de l'ensemble de la population masquent souvent un écart sous-jacent qui s'est creusé entre les Canadiens du revenu des groupes réussis et les immigrants arrivés au Canada dans les années 1980 et 1990 à fait l'objet de nombreuses études (Bloom et Gunderson, 1991; Reitz, 2001; Green et Worswick, 2002; Frenette et Monisette, 2003; Aydemir et Skuterud, 2004).

Dynamique du faible revenu

Depuis l'avènement des enquêtes longitudinales sur les ménages, les analystes sont en mesure d'établir non seulement les niveaux et les tendances du taux et de l'écart de faible revenu, mais aussi les profils des personnes qui entrent dans la catégorie du faible revenu ou en sortent, la durée des périodes de faible revenu et le mouvement des particuliers au sein de la distribution des revenus. L'analyse de la dynamique du revenu s'intéresse à la fluidité du mouvement parmi les différentes situations de revenu et les facteurs déterminants de ces mouvements.

Cet élargissement du fossé des gains entre les immigrants récents et les Canadiens de souche se reflète dans un écart croissant entre les taux de faible revenu. Pour la plupart des grands groupes de Canadiens de souche, les taux de faible revenu ont chuté pendant les années 1980 et 1990. Par opposition, les taux de faible revenu chez les immigrants (en tenant compte des effets du cycle conjoncturel) ont augmenté. Entre 1980 et 2000, deux années de crêtes dans le cycle conjoncturel, le taux de faible revenu parmi les immigrants récents est passé de 25 à 36 %, alors qu'il baissait chez les Canadiens de souche (passant de 17 à 14 %)⁹. Même au sein des groupes traditionnellement vulnérables parmi les Canadiens de souche, comme les personnes âgées, les chefs de famille monoparentale et les jeunes ménages, les taux de faible revenu ont soit baissé ou sont demeurés stables (Picot et Hou, 2003). Parmi les immigrants très récents (au Canada, depuis cinq ans ou moins), le taux de faible revenu était 1,5 fois supérieur à celui des Canadiens de souche en 1980, est passé à 2,7 fois supérieur en 1995 et a légèrement baissé en 2000 pour s'établir à 2,5 fois.

ment le taux de chômage. Les taux ont tendance à augmenter pendant les récessions et à retomber quand la reprise s'installe. Cependant, entre 1994 et 1997, le taux de faible revenu au Canada a augmenté en dépit de l'amélioration des conditions économiques. Deux études, celles de Osberg, (2000), et celle de Picot et coll. (2003), en viennent à la conclusion que cette divergence est liée au fait que, en dépit de la reprise, les gains n'ont pas augmenté dans une forte proportion parmi les familles pauvres, tandis que les transferts sociaux (l'aide sociale et les prestations de l'assurance-emploi) chutaient. En 2001, cependant, comme l'indique la figure 2, le taux de faible revenu et celui de chômage sont revenus à leur relation historique. Il est surprenant de constater qu'après des années de stabilité relative, les taux de faible emploi au sein des familles monoparentales ont nettement chuté vers la fin des années 1990. D'après les calculs effectués par Statistique Canada, ils ont baissé de dix points de pourcentage (de 42 à 32 %) entre 1997 et 2000⁷. Bien qu'il soit encore mal compris, ce changement résulte en partie de la hausse des gains. Le revenu moyen du marché au sein des familles monoparentales dont le chef est une femme a augmenté de 46 % entre 1996 et 2001, une tendance qui semble résulter principalement d'une plus grande participation au marché du travail. Environ 82 % des familles de ce genre avaient des gains du travail en 2001, alors que le pourcentage correspondant en 1993 s'établissait à 67 %. Cette hausse peut refléter des changements dans les prestations fiscales pour enfants (la Prestation nationale pour enfants), qui ont réduit les facteurs de dissuasion de l'emploi et certains « réinvestissements » des transferts de l'aide sociale en programmes d'aide en espèces ou en nature pour les enfants. En réalité, les tendances des gains du travail au sein des familles monoparentales

Taux de faible revenu^a et taux de chômage (axe de gauche), Canada, 1980 - 2002




FIGURE 3

Écart du faible revenu, 1980 - 2001 indice : 1980 = 100



a. L'écart se mesure comme suit : $(I-C)/C$
dans lequel I = revenu familial moyen des familles à faible revenu
C = valeur en dollars du seuil de faible revenu
(SFR de Statistique Canada après impôts/transferts).

TABLEAU 3

Taux relatifs de faible revenu dans huit pays

Pays (année)	Global	1 parent	2 parents	Sans enfants	Aînés
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États-Unis (00)	17,0	41,4	13,1	11,1	28,4
Royaume-Uni (99)	12,3	31,3	8,9	7,7	24,6
Canada (97)	11,9	38,9	9,5	12,1	5,2
Pays-Bas (99)	8,9	26,8	7,9	9,5	3,2
Allemagne (00)	8,2	31,6	2,8	9,0	12,2
Belgique (97)	7,9	12,5	6,6	7,3	13,1
Suède (00)	6,4	11,3	2,1	9,7	8,2
Finlande (00)	5,4	7,3	2,2	7,6	10,1

Source : Smeeding (2003).

TABLEAU 4

Pourcentage de réduction des taux de faible revenu, du revenu avant impôts et transferts, par rapport au revenu après impôts et transferts, pour toutes les personnes

Smeeding (2003)	Corak et al.	Pourcentage de réduction	Pourcentage de réduction
-----------------	--------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

États-Unis	28	28
Royaume-Uni	61	53
Canada	52	52
Pays-Bas	59	na
Allemagne	71	64
Belgique	75	n.d.
Suède	78	n.d.
Finlande	70	n.d.

élevés, que l'on trouve les taux les plus élevés. Si les taux globaux au Canada et au Royaume-Uni demeurent bien inférieurs à ceux des États-Unis, la position relative du Canada varie énormément parmi les sous-groupes. Le taux de faible revenu chez les aînés canadiens, qui se situe à 5 %, est désormais parmi les plus faibles de toutes les démocraties riches. Par opposition, jusqu'à la fin des années

1990, les taux de faible revenu parmi les familles monoparentales canadiennes (39 %) et les foyers sans enfants (12 %) étaient proches des niveaux aux É.-U. ou supérieurs à ceux-ci. Comme nous le soulignons plus bas, cependant, ces degrés historiquement élevés de faible revenu parmi les familles monoparentales canadiennes ont accusé une forte baisse après 1997.

a. Changements dans les niveaux de faible revenu au Canada au cours des années 1990

Taux de faible revenu au Canada


Le tableau 4 résume l'incidence des impôts et des transferts (y compris ceux des retraites) sur les niveaux de faible revenu en s'appuyant les travaux de Smeeding (2003) et Corak et coll. (2003). En dépit de la différence dans les sources de données, les résultats sont remarquablement conformes⁵. Parmi les huit pays, c'est le régime d'imposition/transfert au comptant des États-Unis qui a entraîné la moins grande réduction du faible revenu. Les réductions étaient légèrement plus fortes au Canada et au Royaume-Uni qu'aux États-Unis, mais moins fortes en général que dans les pays européens.

La mesure dans laquelle les transferts de revenu (et les impôts sur le revenu) redistribuent le revenu au bénéfice des moins favorisés varie énormément entre les économies avancées. Il est intéressant de noter qu'il y a des écarts entre les pays dans la prestation de services comme l'éducation ou les soins de santé par les secteurs public ou privé, de sorte que des évaluations comme celles qui sont présentées ci-dessous, c.-à-d., fondées sur les prestations en espèces uniquement, ne rendent pas compte de toute l'ampleur de la redistribution gouvernementale. L'approche standard pour mesurer l'effet des transferts et impôts, que nous utilisons ici, consiste à comparer le taux de faible revenu avant impôts/transferts (le revenu du marché) avec le taux de faible revenu après transferts et impôts (le revenu disponible)⁵.

b. Le rôle des transferts et des impôts

Dans la présente section, le taux de faible revenu correspond à la proportion de personnes se trouvant sous le seuil de faible revenu (SFR) après impôts et transferts de Statistique Canada. Comme le montre la figure 2, le taux de faible revenu suit générale-

FIGURE 1
Évolution (en %) du revenu total des familles par vingtile^a, 1990-2000, données du recensement



^a classement des familles en fonction de leur revenu total (après transferts et avant impôts) du vingtile inférieur (les 5 % des familles ayant le revenu total le plus faible) au vingtile supérieur.

Source : Statistique Canada, Recensement.

Faible revenu

nationales dans la section ci-dessous ne portent que sur les différences dans les taux de faible revenu.

Le faible revenu dans une perspective comparative

a. Degrés et tendances

À des fins de comparaison trans-nationale, nous suivons des méthodes traditionnelles et mesurons le faible revenu en tenant compte de toutes les personnes des familles dont le revenu est inférieur à 50 % de la médiane nationale (voir le tableau 3). Nos résultats sont basés sur ceux de Smeeding (2003).
Le taux de faible revenu pour toutes les personnes, en utilisant le seuil de 50 %, varie de 5,4 % en Finlande à 17 % aux États-Unis. C'est dans les pays anglophones, qui présentent aussi les degrés d'inégalité globale les plus

Les mesures de l'inégalité du revenu indiquent des changements dans la distribution relative des revenus dans l'ensemble de la population. Par contre, dans les statistiques sur le faible revenu, les changements observés dans la partie inférieure de la distribution du revenu sont beaucoup plus précis. Le taux de faible revenu mesure la proportion de personnes se trouvant sous un seuil de faible revenu tandis que l'écart de faible revenu est une mesure de l'intensité de faible revenu parmi les personnes tombant sous le seuil⁴. Les analystes préoccupés par le problème de l'exclusion économique se concentrent généralement sur ces deux mesures, et nous les imiterons lorsque nous examinerons les tendances propres au Canada. En raison des problèmes que posent les mesures, cependant, les comparaisons trans-

D'après les données des deux enquêtes (EFC et EDTR), le coefficient de Gini a accusé une hausse de 6 % entre 1990 et 2000, selon le revenu après impôts et transferts (c.-à-d., le revenu disponible²), qui constitue la mesure du revenu la mieux indiquée. Pour le recensement, on ne collecte cependant pas de données sur les impôts payés, de sorte qu'il faut nous en remettre à une définition légèrement différente du revenu familial, soit le revenu avant impôts et après les transferts gouvernementaux. Sur cette base, les données des enquêtes semblent indiquer une hausse de 6 % de l'indice de Gini entre 1990 et 2000, alors que les données du recensement témoignent d'une hausse de 5 %. Ces deux sources indiquent donc une hausse modérée de l'inégalité du revenu par rapport aux années 1990. En utilisant les ratios entre le haut et le bas de l'échelle, on obtient peut-être une interprétation plus intuitive de cette hausse. Sur la base des données des enquêtes (EFC et EDTR), le revenu après impôts et transferts des familles dans le décile supérieur (les 10 % des familles ayant les revenus les plus élevés) était 7,5 fois plus élevé que celui des familles dans le décile inférieur en 1990. En 2000, on estimait que ce ratio était passé à 8,73, soit une hausse de 15 %. Les données du recensement laissent entrevoir une hausse similaire de 14 % de ce ratio (sur la base du revenu avant impôts et après transferts).
Le graphique 1 indique que la hausse de l'inégalité résultait essentiellement d'une hausse plus rapide du revenu dans la tranche supérieure de la distribution du revenu. Selon les données du recensement, il y a eu peu de changements dans les revenus des familles dont les revenus sont les plus faibles entre 1990 et 2000, alors que les familles aux revenus les plus élevés ont connu des hausses comprises entre 7 et 16 %.

TABLEAU 2

Inégalité du revenu (Gini) entre la fin des années 1970 et la fin des années 1990 dans huit pays

Fin des années 1970 Milieu des années 1980 Fin des années 1990 Données les plus récentes

États-Unis	0,30	0,34	0,36	0,37
Canada	0,29	0,28	0,28	0,29
Royaume-Uni	0,27	0,30	0,34	0,35
Allemagne	0,26	0,25	0,26	0,25
Pays-Bas	n.d.	0,26	0,25	0,25
Belgique	n.d.	0,23	0,22	0,25
Finlande	n.d.	0,21	0,22	0,25
Suède	0,22	0,22	0,22	0,25

Source : Luxembourg Income Study - chiffres clés.

présente une similitude remarquable à la fin du siècle entre les pays d'Europe centrale et les pays nordiques. Le Canada (indice de Gini de 0,29) témoigne d'une plus grande égalité qu'aux États-Unis (indice de 0,37) et qu'au Royaume-Uni (indice de 0,35) mais d'une égalité moindre que dans les pays d'Europe centrale et du Nord de l'Europe, ce qui vient répéter un modèle familial dans de nombreuses comparaisons trans-nationales antérieures. La comparaison des ratios en percentile permet de saisir ces écarts de manière plus intuitive. Aux États-Unis, les revenus des familles vers le sommet de la distribution (le 90^e percentile) sont plus de cinq fois supérieurs aux revenus des familles se situant près du bas de la distribution (le 10^e percentile). Au Canada, ce ratio est d'environ quatre à un, tandis qu'il est de trois à un en Suède et en Finlande. En ce qui a trait aux familles se trouvant vers le milieu de la distribution (au 50^e percentile), les personnes à faible revenu des pays nordiques ont des revenus équivalant à 57 % du revenu médian, comparativement à 47 % au Canada et au Royaume-Uni, et à 39 % aux États-Unis.

Dans le tableau 2, nous présentons l'évolution de l'inégalité dans ces pays depuis la fin des années 1970. Sans doute l'aspect le plus remarquable de ces résultats est-il la stabilité dans la place occupée par ces pays en dépit des changements. Les pays qui présentaient les degrés les plus élevés d'inégalité entre les revenus familiaux (dont le Canada) au début de la période des années 1970 ont conservé leur position au Canada par rapport aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni, cependant, a nettement changé depuis les années 1970. Au début de la période, l'écart entre le Canada et les États-Unis était relativement modeste, et le degré d'inégalité au Canada était plus élevé qu'au Royaume-Uni. À la fin de la période, cependant, le degré d'inégalité au Canada était nettement inférieur aux degrés observés aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni, en raison de la stabilité relative de la distribution au Canada en comparaison avec une hausse séculaire à

long terme de l'inégalité tant aux États-Unis qu'au Royaume-Uni. La stabilité relative de la distribution du revenu au Canada pendant toutes les années 1980 et le début des années 1990 a fait l'objet de plusieurs études (Beach et Slotve, 1996; Wolfson, 1998; Gottschalk et Smeeding, 1997) et reflète le fait que, tout au long des années 1980 et au début des années 1990, les hausses d'inégalité sur le plan du revenu du marché ont été compensées par la hausse des transferts sociaux. Comme nous le démontrons dans la section suivante, cependant, de nouvelles données tirées d'études plus récentes indiquent que l'inégalité du revenu au Canada s'est écartée de cette tendance stable depuis longtemps et a augmenté pendant la fin des années 1990.

L'inégalité du revenu des familles est-elle en hausse au Canada?

Les chiffres présentés au tableau 2 montrent que l'inégalité du revenu, mesurée à l'aide du coefficient de Gini (qui croît avec le degré d'inégalité), a peu changé entre la fin des années 1970 et la fin des années 1990. Ces résultats sont fondés sur une enquête à laquelle on a mis un terme en 1997 pour en entreprendre une nouvelle. Cependant, pour évaluer les tendances récentes, il faut véritablement analyser des points comparables du cycle conjoncturel et se servir de données plus récentes. Pour cela, nous nous fions à deux sources : le recensement et une série qui représente une combinaison de l'enquête sur les finances des consommateurs (EFC), à laquelle on a mis un terme, et celle qui l'a remplacée, soit l'enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu (EDTR). Nous concentrons notre attention sur les années 1990 et 2000, soit, en gros, les deux dernières crêtes du cycle conjoncturel.

Inégalité du revenu et population à faible revenu au Canada

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Une tendance du niveau de faible revenu et celle de l'inégalité du revenu au Canada sont deux des indicateurs de bien-être économique les plus surveillés. Dans cet article, nous passons en revue les données les plus récentes concernant ces tendances au Canada.

L'inégalité du revenu des familles dans une perspective comparative

À des fins de comparaison transnationale, notre choix de pays repose sur un corpus de recherche comparative désormais bien établi. Reflets de dif-

férences institutionnelles et politiques de longue date, ces regroupements comprennent les pays scandinaves/nordiques, qui sont représentés ici par la Finlande et la Suède, les pays de l'Europe continentale (la Belgique, l'Allemagne et les Pays-Bas) et les pays principalement anglophones (le Canada, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis). Le tableau 1 résume les résultats récents (1997-2000) des écarts transnationaux sur le plan de l'inégalité du revenu dans ces huit pays. Mesurée à l'aide de l'indice d'inégalité de Gini (qui croît avec le degré d'inégalité), l'inégalité du revenu des familles

TABLEAU 1

Mesures de l'inégalité du revenu des familles : comparaison internationale^a

Revenu (disponible) après impôts/transferts ajusté par équivalence « membres adultes »^b

	Cini	Ratio du revenu élevé à faible (P90/P10)	Ratio du revenu faible à moyen (P10/P50)	Ratio du revenu élevé à moyen (P90/P50)
E.-U. (2000)	0,37	5,43	0,39	2,10
R.-U. (1999)	0,35	4,54	0,47	2,14
Canada (1997)	0,29	3,99	0,47	1,86
Pays-Bas (1999)	0,25	3,27	0,53	1,75
Allemagne (2000)	0,25	3,17	0,55	1,73
Belgique (1997)	0,25	3,19	0,53	1,70
Suède (2000)	0,25	2,95	0,57	1,68
Finlande (2000)	0,25	2,90	0,57	1,64

Notes :

- a Le coefficient de Gini varie entre 0 et 1,0 : plus l'indice de Gini est élevé, plus le degré d'inégalité est élevé. Les résultats donnés au tableau 1 sont fondés sur le revenu disponible (après impôts et transferts) des familles, l'unité d'analyse étant l'individu et à chaque individu étant attribué le revenu familial « ajusté par équivalence « membres adultes » ».
- b Le revenu ajusté par équivalence « membres adultes » est une mesure de revenu par personne tenant compte des économies d'échelle associées aux familles nombreuses. On le calcule en divisant le revenu familial par le nombre d'« équivalents adultes » dans la famille. Une famille de quatre personnes peut compter deux équivalents adultes, selon l'hypothèse que les quatre personnes composant le foyer équivalent à deux personnes vivant seules.

Source : Smeeding (2003).

Tables rondes du PRP-CRSH

Afin de s'attaquer efficacement aux problèmes multidimensionnels de la société contemporaine, les gouvernements doivent de plus en plus s'en remettre à la connaissance et à l'expertise que l'on retrouve dans les travaux universitaires, établissements de recherche et autres sources crédibles.

Cependant, l'intégration de la recherche, de l'analyse et des données empiriques disponibles au processus d'élaboration des politiques reste un défi de taille. Comment nous assurer que les producteurs de savoir communiquent efficacement avec ceux qui, dans leurs efforts pour promouvoir le bien-être des Canadiens, peuvent au mieux utiliser leurs connaissances?

Les tables rondes du PRP-CRSH en recherche sur les politiques représentent un effort conjoint du Conseil de recherches en sciences humaines du Canada et du Projet de recherche sur les politiques dont l'objectif est d'améliorer la qualité du transfert de savoir entre experts universitaires et ceux qui sont responsables de la conception et de l'élaboration des programmes et des politiques fédérales.

Ces tables rondes fournissent une occasion unique de tenir des discussions éclairées sur les priorités émergentes des politiques et les questions de recherche sur les politiques. En outre, cela contribuera à la création et au maintien de réseaux entre les chercheurs et les hauts responsables de politiques.

Ce numéro d'*Horizons* comprend plusieurs rapports sur la saison d'automne 2004 des tables rondes, maintenant terminée. L'information sur les prochaines activités prévues pour les tables rondes sera affichée sur le site web du PRP, au www.policyresearch.gc.ca, des qu'elle sera disponible.

et de diagnostic qui jettent les bases requises pour l'évaluation de nouvelles approches pour lutter contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion. Le présent numéro d'*Horizons* donne une excellente indication des orientations de l'ensemble des travaux.

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Notes

- 1 Se reporter au <<http://193.194.138.190/development/poverty-02.html>>.
- 2 Rapport mondial sur le développement humain des Nations Unies. Se reporter au <<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/indicator.cfm?File=index-indicators.htm>>.

de difficulté. Le soutien indéfectible de la famille est de première importance pour qu'un enfant grandisse dans un climat d'amour et un environnement stimulant. Le soutien intergénérationnel comprend l'apport financier et autres types d'aide.

La conjoncture du marché joue bien sûr un rôle important. Les bouleversements économiques ont une incidence sur les perspectives d'emploi, de même que sur les revenus et l'accumulation de richesse. En qualité de travailleur, de consommateur et d'investisseur, l'individu voit son destin étroitement lié au marché, que ce soit en termes de rendement sur le capital humain, de possibilités d'emploi ou de la proportion de son revenu et actif qu'il peut théoriser. En période de ralentissement économique, les emplois sont plus difficiles à trouver, et la valeur des économies et de l'actif personnels a tendance à baisser. Pourtant, même lorsqu'une reprise économique se précise, tous n'en tirent pas avantage. Par exemple, le logement devient parfois bien cher pour les travailleurs à faible revenu, particulièrement lorsque l'économie locale traverse une période de croissance marquée.

Nous avons démontré que la lutte contre la pauvreté est digne des travaux d'Hercule, et que même ce héros légendaire n'a pas pu éliminer définitivement le monstre dont une des têtes était immortelle. Or, force est de reconnaître que la pauvreté et l'exclusion continueront probablement de faire partie de toutes les sociétés, riches et pauvres. Mais les diverses faces de la pauvreté et les manifestations d'exclusion, elles, peuvent être modifiées. Pour gérer les risques sociaux associés et tirer parti des nouvelles possibilités, l'innovation et la collaboration sont essentielles. Dans le cadre du projet Nouvelles approches pour lutter contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion (voir l'encadré), le PRP a effectué des travaux conceptuels

Le projet du PRR

« Nouvelles approches pour lutter contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion »

An printemps 2003, le PRR a lancé un projet inter-ministériel intitulé Nouvelles approches pour lutter contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion (voir Horizons, volume 6, numéro 2). Et depuis, nous avons réalisé des progrès considérables et réussi à nous faire une meilleure idée des dynamiques de la pauvreté et de ses liens avec d'autres formes d'exclusion sociale.

Rapidement, le projet a établi un cadre conceptuel décrivant les liens entre le revenu, la pauvreté, et l'exclusion. Ensuite, nous avons travaillé avec nos partenaires ministériels à cerner les aspects de la vie dont les personnes à faible revenu sont souvent exclues. À l'automne, un recueil de textes comprenant les recherches les plus récentes effectuées par les ministères fédéraux participant au projet ainsi que les chercheurs à l'extérieur du gouvernement du Canada a été constitué. De ces travaux, l'équipe chargée du projet a établi un diagnostic permettant d'examiner la pauvreté et l'exclusion sous différents angles, et d'évaluer les approches actuelles, et nouvelles à l'échelon mondial. Ces activités ont fait l'objet de discussion lors de la table ronde du PRR-CRSH de novembre 2003 portant sur les conséquences sur l'élaboration des politiques de la recherche en cours sur la pauvreté et l'exclusion. Lors de cette table ronde, les représentants ministériels et les experts nous ont suggéré d'étudier la pauvreté et l'exclusion sous l'angle du parcours de vie, et d'accorder davantage d'attention aux travailleurs à faible revenu qui sont plus à risque d'exclusion.

En décembre 2003, le PRR a organisé une conférence portant sur les approches fondées sur les actifs pour contre la pauvreté. Plus de 150 experts, chercheurs et praticiens

de la Fondation Laidlaw et du Conseil canadien de développement social). Quant aux employeurs, ils jouent un rôle prépondérant, par l'embauche et leurs pratiques commerciales, dans l'intégration des travailleurs au marché du travail. Les chances d'une personne de trouver et conserver un emploi intéressant et de jouir d'une certaine sécurité d'emploi reposent évidemment sur l'éducation et les compétences. Il n'est pas facile pour les jeunes intégrant le marché du travail,

ni pour ceux qui repartent à zéro dans un nouveau pays, de prendre pied solidement dans le milieu du travail. Ce sont les employeurs qui déterminent la valeur de l'éducation et de l'expérience des demandeurs d'emploi et des travailleurs. Comme intervenants actifs, les personnes traversent les étapes de la vie en se servant des ressources sociales et économiques dont elles disposent. Le parcours de la vie est fluide et multidimensionnel, et se situe au-delà du

sexe, de l'origine ethnique et de l'état civil et de santé, du statut d'immigrant et des ressources économiques. Ces jalons ont une incidence sur le type et la somme des ressources qu'une même personne cumulera au fil des années et des trajectoires de sa vie. L'analyse que fait Dempsy des immigrants âgés, dans le présent numéro, démontre l'impact sur le revenu de la migration à un âge plus avancé. La famille, les amis et les connaissances offrent du soutien en période

provenant de divers secteurs du Canada et de l'étranger ont assisté à cette rencontre. Les échanges et discussions leur ont permis de comprendre et de cerner les mérites et les limites de cette nouvelle approche. Une perspective fondée sur le parcours de vie pourra se révéler utile dans nos divers investissements sociaux destinés à lutter contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion sociale. Pour ce faire, le PRR a proposé d'adopter un cadre de travail axé sur le parcours de vie pour l'analyse de la politique sociale, et qui permettra de cibler nos efforts de manière plus efficace. Présenté pour la première fois en août 2004 au Queen's International Institute on Social Policy, le cadre en question vise à identifier les types de ressources auxquelles les gens peuvent avoir recours afin d'obtenir diverses formes de soutien (p. ex., les marchés, les gouvernements, les institutions indépendantes, les collectivités, les familles, et les réseaux sociaux); et la possibilité de remplacer ces ressources et leurs sources. En plus d'examiner les trajectoires des étapes et des principaux événements survenus tout au long de la vie d'une personne, le cadre insiste également sur l'importance des transitions marquées et parfois multiples qui constituent des moments cruciaux où les personnes peuvent avoir besoin de recourir à diverses formes de soutien. Ce cadre axé sur le parcours de vie sert de contexte pratique pour la majorité des travaux menés par le PRR dans ses projets sur la politique sociale.

Combattre la pauvreté, l'affaire de tous

Hercule lui-même n'a pu vaincre l'hydre à lui seul, et a dû faire appel à son neveu Iolaus pour empêcher que ne repoussent au fur et à mesure les têtes de la bête. C'est dans un esprit semblable que tous les secteurs de la société – gouvernements, collectivités et familles – doivent, en plus de l'individu, assumer un rôle dans la lutte contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion (Maxwell, 2003).

Le gouvernement peut fournir un soutien du revenu et des programmes visant à aider les gens traversant des périodes de crise ou de transition importantes. Une bonne instruction et l'accès à des mesures favorisant le développement assurent aux enfants un bon départ dans la vie. Les prêts aux étudiants et les bourses d'étude, ainsi que la formation à distance, peuvent rendre l'instruction post-secondaire plus abordable et accessible. Quant aux programmes d'assurance-emploi, de transition de l'assistance sociale au marché du travail et de formation en cours d'emploi, ils visent tous à aider des sans-emploi à retomber plus rapidement sur leurs pieds. Enfin, une réglementation est en place pour veiller à des normes équitables sur le marché du travail et à une égalité d'accès à l'emploi.

Les secteurs non gouvernementaux, comme les organismes communautaires, contribuent également au bien-être des personnes. Les entreprises d'économie sociale proposent des moyens de combattre la pauvreté et de s'attaquer aux quartiers défavorisés. Le travail communautaire bénévole apporte un soutien essentiel aux efforts de lutte contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion. Le présent numéro d'*Horizons* présente deux exemples de moyens pour les organismes non gouvernementaux de soutenir et mobiliser des collectivités afin de favoriser une plus grande inclusion (voir les articles

Les gouvernements doivent assurer l'équilibre, c'est-à-dire apprendre aux gens à pêcher, mais leur donner du poisson lorsqu'ils sont incapables de le pêcher eux-mêmes.

Pauvreté dans la perspective du parcours de vie

mais un faible réseau relationnel (Perré, 1997). Or, si les liens étroits cernent et analysent les moments critiques où l'exclusion est susceptible de survenir.

Quel est le rôle des gouvernements en matière de lutte contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion? Nous répondrons par la question suivante : vaut-il mieux donner un poisson à celui qui a faim ou lui apprendre à pêcher? Les gou-

Trouver l'équilibre entre l'égalité des chances et l'égalité de fait

vernements doivent assurer l'équilibre, c'est-à-dire apprendre aux gens à pêcher, mais leur donner du poisson lorsqu'ils sont incapables de le pêcher eux-mêmes.

Par contre, le gouvernement peut donner aux personnes la capacité de participer pleinement à l'activité sociale et économique de leur communauté, en leur donnant prise sur la vie sociale et économique. Ceci inclut leur offrir les possibilités qui leur permettent d'accumuler des actifs, comme la capacité d'épargner en vue de l'avenir, la capacité d'apprendre, et la possibilité d'avoir sa propre maison.

Bien sûr, l'égalité des chances ne garantit en rien l'égalité de fait. Des gens perdront leur emploi en période de ralentissement économique, d'autres ne pourront pas occuper un emploi à plein temps en raison de leur santé ou de leur situation familiale, et d'autres encore travailleront d'arrache-pied sans pour autant réussir à joindre les deux bouts. Ce sont les travailleurs économiquement faible dont traitent les articles de Jackson et de Fortin et Fleury.

aspects de la vie d'une personne (Giddens, 2000). Aussi l'élaboration de politiques doit-elle prendre en compte l'évolution du parcours d'une vie, car toute personne est appelée à assumer des rôles différents au cours de sa vie. En gros, l'on peut résumer le parcours d'une vie en quatre trajectoires : la famille, l'apprentissage, l'emploi et la collectivité. Les événements et les périodes de transition qui jalonnent chacune de ces trajectoires modifient le profil des rôles qu'assumera l'individu. Il y a aura inévitablement des échecs et des réussites. Tout être humain dispose d'un ensemble de ressources, incluant des qualités individuelles, ses relations avec autrui, des ressources financières, et un soutien du gouvernement. En période d'échec, comme l'éclatement de la famille, des problèmes de santé ou la perte d'un emploi, ces ressources entrent en jeu pour permettre de mieux absorber le choc (Room, 2000). Si l'effet de tampon n'est pas assez fort pour permettre à la personne de surmonter les crises de la vie, elle risque de se retrouver en position de marginalité. C'est en tenant en compte de l'ensemble du

sont souvent coïncés dans des emplois précaires et mal payés. En raison de cette précarité, ces individus ont moins de chances de recevoir de la formation en cours d'emploi, et ils n'ont en général pas les moyens de se payer des cours de perfectionnement qui les aideraient à s'en sortir.

Le faible revenu n'est qu'un élément parmi d'autres de l'exclusion sociale, et les personnes à faible revenu sont souvent exclus de nombreux aspects de la vie.

la perspective de l'élaboration de politiques. Comme nous l'avons mentionné plus tôt, les nombreuses faces de la pauvreté appellent l'hydre de Lerne, qui sema la terreur avant d'être vaincue par Hercule. Les personnes et les familles à faible revenu sont souvent exclues de nombreux aspects de la vie, notamment de l'accès à un niveau adéquat de biens et services, à des pos-

certaines personnes se retrouveront de nouveau en état de pauvreté tandis que d'autres s'en sortiront définitivement. Ce va-et-vient est souvent associé aux événements et périodes de transition qui marquent le parcours d'une vie, par exemple une nouvelle situation familiale ou professionnelle, ou encore un déménagement.

Cela étant dit, il demeure un faible pourcentage de personnes et de familles qui sont particulièrement à risque d'être pauvres à long terme.

Comme le démontre Hatfield dans le présent numéro, cinq groupes de personnes sont plus vulnérables que l'ensemble de la population à la pauvreté prolongée : les familles monoparentales, les personnes âgées vivant seules, les personnes ayant une incapacité limitant leur capacité de travailler, les Autochtones vivant en dehors des réserves et les nouveaux immigrants. Ces groupes partagent un certain nombre de choses, et chacun se distingue par un événement précis, que ce soit un changement de la situation familiale ou l'absence même de telle situation, un problème de santé, ou un déménagement. Les personnes vivant de nombreux changements dans leur vie sont plus à risque encore ; c'est le cas des personnes âgées handicapées vivant seules et des Autochtones chefs de famille monoparentale vivant hors réserve. Inversement, plus une personne s'écarte de ces traits distinctifs, plus elle réduit les risques de vivre en situation de pauvreté prolongée.

pauvreté

Les multiples faces de la

Le faible revenu n'est qu'un élément parmi d'autres de l'exclusion sociale. Comme l'expose Sen, [traduction] « le revenu est peut-être le principal moyen d'éviter les privations, mais il n'est pas le seul facteur déterminant de nos vies » (2003 : 3). De fait, c'est le lien entre la pauvreté et l'exclusion qui, ainsi que le mentionne Eliadis dans ce numéro, est intéressant dans

sibilités d'emploi intéressantes, à un logement abordable, à des quartiers offrant de bons services, ainsi qu'à la possibilité de participer à la vie civile, sociale et politique.

Les personnes et les familles à faible revenu sont souvent privées de la possibilité de développer leurs capacités. Le manque de ressources financières force l'individu à faire des choix en ce qui touche à ses besoins. Les enfants de familles à faible revenu sont moins susceptibles de disposer d'un ordonnateur à la maison ou de participer à des activités parascolaires (Ross et Roberts, 1999). Les femmes à faible revenu ont un accès moindre aux services de garde et non subventionnés que les femmes dont le revenu est plus élevé. Les dépenses les plus élevées, particulièrement pour une famille à faible revenu, sont le logement et la nourriture.

Les personnes à faible revenu sont marginalisées dans le monde du travail. Les liens au marché du travail sont habituellement faibles au sein de la population défavorisée. Les personnes en état de pauvreté persistante sont souvent sans emploi ou occupent un emploi à temps partiel (se reporter, de nouveau, à l'article de Hatfield dans le présent numéro). Cela peut être attribuable au niveau moins élevé de scolarité et (ou) de possibilités d'emploi. En outre, ceux qui travaillent

Les personnes à faible revenu ne disposent souvent pas du capital social ou des réseaux qui leur permettent d'avancer. Les réseaux sont en effet indispensables pour s'en sortir dans la vie. Il y a deux types de réseaux : le réseau affectif, qui soutient l'individu dans un cadre personnel et que constituent la famille et les amis proches, du même milieu social et économique, et le réseau plus vaste des relations, qui sert à progresser sur le plan social. Certains ont avancé que les personnes défavorisées et les exclus ont de forts réseaux affectifs,

qualité du logement est reliée jusqu'à un certain point à la qualité des services offerts dans le quartier où il est situé. Les logements de piètre qualité se trouvent en règle générale dans les quartiers défavorisés. Dans un quartier plus favorisé, la qualité des services communautaires, des écoles, des infra-structures et de la santé économique se paie plus cher. Les personnes défavorisées sont moins susceptibles d'avoir les moyens de se payer un logement de qualité, et n'ont par conséquent pas accès à des services de qualité. Engeland et Lewis démontrent dans le présent numéro que les ménages ayant de faibles liens avec le marché du travail et ayant un faible revenu sont nettement plus susceptibles de se trouver en situation de besoin impérieux de logement.

L'hydre de la pauvreté

Jean Lock Kunz et
Jeff Frank
Projet de recherche
sur les politiques

Jean Lock Kunz est directrice adjointe de projet et Jeff Frank, directeur de projet, au Projet de recherche sur les politiques.

Les pays développés tout comme les pays en développement ont réalisé des progrès considérables en matière de lutte contre la pauvreté et de son triste corollaire qu'est la souffrance humaine. Au cours de la dernière décennie, une réflexion nouvelle a fait son chemin dans les domaines de la recherche et des politiques touchant à la pauvreté. Ainsi, dans les pays de l'OCDE la recherche s'est-elle attachée non plus à définir ce qu'est un pauvre, mais bien à comprendre le processus d'appauvrissement et les conséquences de la pauvreté (Øyen, 2003). De nombreux ouvrages ont été consacrés à l'évaluation de la pauvreté, à la sécurité du revenu et, plus récemment, à la dynamique de la pauvreté.

L'on s'est longtemps satisfait de relier la pauvreté au seul manque de ressources financières, ponctuel ou persistant. Des études récentes ont jeté un nouvel éclairage sur les voies qui mènent à la pauvreté, et sur celles qui aident à s'en sortir. Les chercheurs et spécialistes en matière de politiques en sont venus à ne plus concevoir la pauvreté comme le seul manque de ressources financières, mais bien comme la cause, et l'effet, de l'exclusion sociale. Autrement dit, le manque d'argent empêche les personnes touchées de participer pleinement à l'activité sociale et économique de leur communauté. Des interprétations élargies de la pauvreté intègrent les concepts de dignité et de possibilité de développer ses capacités.

Cette perception nouvelle a mené à définir la pauvreté de manière plus large afin d'y inclure d'autres éléments que le seul revenu. Les Nations Unies, par exemple, définissent la pauvreté comme une condition humaine marquée par la privation soutenue ou chronique des ressources ainsi que des capacité, choix, sécurité et pouvoir nécessaires pour bénéficier d'un niveau de vie adéquat et des autres droits civils, culturels, économiques,

transitoire

Pour la plupart des gens, la pauvreté est un état

politiques et sociaux¹. Par suite de l'adoption de cette définition, l'Indice de pauvreté humaine des Nations Unies (IPH) s'est enrichi d'un éventail plus large d'indicateurs. Outre le faible revenu, calculé selon la proportion de la population affaissant moins de 50 % du revenu médian, l'IPH des Nations Unies comprend des éléments de mesure tels que l'espérance de vie, le taux d'alphabétisation et le chômage à long terme². De cette approche naissent les nombreuses faces de la pauvreté, qui apparaît telle l'hydre de la mythologie.

Au Canada, évaluée à l'aune de l'IPH des Nations Unies, la situation n'est pas très reluisante, surtout lorsqu'on la compare à celle des autres pays développés. En 2004, par exemple, le Canada se classe au 12^e rang sur les 17 pays développés de l'IPH, devant d'autres pays principalement anglophones comme les États-Unis, l'Irlande, le Royaume-Uni et l'Australie, mais loin derrière des nations non anglophones, particulièrement la Suède, la Norvège et les Pays-Bas. Picot et Myles dressent dans le présent numéro d'*Horizons* un portrait semblable en matière d'inégalité du revenu. En outre, comme l'ont démontré ces auteurs, l'inégalité du revenu s'est accentuée au Canada, et ce, même en période de prospérité.


intérêt envers les solutions à trouver aux problèmes de l'exclusion économique et sociale.

La publication de ce numéro coïncide avec la conférence du PRR, Exploration de nouvelles approches en matière de politiques sociales, qui se tiendra à Ottawa du 13 au 15 décembre. Nous espérons que cette publication constituera un complément utile aux exposés et débats dans le cadre de cette conférence et que, combinée aux résultats de cette dernière, elle contribuera à cerner des approches et politiques permettant de mieux comprendre et régler les questions de pauvreté et d'exclusion.

Jean-Pierre Voyer
Directeur exécutif


Notes

- 1 Rapport mondial sur le développement humain des Nations Unies, 2002, <<http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/fr>>.
- 2 Coulombe, S., J.F. Tremblay et S. Marchand, 2004, *Literacy Scores, Human Capital and Growth Across Fourteen OECD Countries*, Statistique Canada, no 89-552-XPE au catalogue, no 11. Voir aussi « Counting Heads: A Breakthrough in Measuring the Knowledge Economy », *The Economist*, le 28 août 2004, vol. 372, numéro 8390, p. 70.




Pauvreté et exclusion : Approches normatives de la recherche sur les politiques

La compréhension des enjeux liés à l'égalité de nos politiques sociales est antérieure à la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. La jurisprudence en matière de droits de la personne, de droits à l'égalité et de droits internationaux relatifs aux droits de la personne ne se reflète généralement pas dans la législation canadienne ni dans l'élaboration des politiques nationales. Ce rapport étudie ces revirements normatifs et défend l'idée d'une intégration systématique des normes juridiques au début du processus d'élaboration de politiques horizontales.



Coopération canado-américaine en matière de réglementation : tracer la voie à suivre

Le rapport intérimaire du PRR expose la recherche effectuée jusqu'à ce jour sur les retombées potentielles d'une coopération réglementaire entre le Canada et les États-Unis ainsi que les options qui s'offrent au Canada. Le rapport présente les options axées sur des efforts plus stratégiques et concertés visant à accroître la coopération réglementaire avec les États-Unis pour obtenir de meilleures retombées économiques, tout en sauvegardant, voire en améliorant l'intégrité du système réglementaire canadien.



Atelier d'experts sur la mesure du capital social pour des fins de politiques publiques

Le rapport de synthèse de l'Atelier d'experts sur la mesure du capital social à des fins de politiques publiques reprend les grandes lignes des présentations et des discussions d'experts, réunis à Ottawa le 8 juin 2004, afin d'examiner différentes stratégies de mesure utilisées dans la recherche sur le capital social. L'exercice visait à identifier les éléments essentiels d'une « boîte à outils » permettant de mesurer le capital social pour des fins d'élaboration et d'évaluation de politiques et de programmes gouvernementaux.

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fédéral. L'objectif premier du PRR est

d'approfondir, de rassembler et d'intégrer

les connaissances sur des questions de

la planification des politiques à moyen terme

du Gouvernement du Canada. *Horizons*

présente les travaux de chercheurs de

ministères fédéraux et d'experts externes

sur des sujets liés aux activités de recherche

du PRR. Pour de plus amples informations

sur le Projet ou pour consulter les anciens

numéros d'*Horizons*, veuillez visiter

www.recherchehopolitique.gc.ca.

Au 15 novembre 2004, l'existence des

sites web cités dans le présent numéro a

été confirmée.

Pour les commentaires, les questions, les

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Les opinions exprimées n'engagent
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nécessairement celles de tout orga-
nisme lié à l'auteur ou à *Horizons*.

INTRODUCTION (suite)

De nouvelles bases conceptuelles quant

à notre façon de percevoir la pauvreté

viennent changer la perspective de ce

débat. L'idée de pauvreté n'est plus

confinée à une vision étroite fondée

sur le revenu à un moment précis. On

a adopté une définition plus générale

centrée sur l'intersection entre le faible

revenu et d'autres dimensions de l'ex-

clusion sociale, dont l'accès à des biens

et services essentiels, un logement

adéquat et de bien-être satisfaisant et

une participation aux réseaux sociaux.

Certains interprètent plus larges de

la pauvreté comprennent les notions

de dignité et les capacités d'atteindre

son potentiel. D'autres personnes

encore parlent de droits des citoyens à

la participation sociale et économique.

Sur le plan économique, il est aussi

logique d'améliorer la situation des

moins favorisés de la société. Étant

donné que les Canadiens les plus

démunis en matière de compétences

sont les plus susceptibles de connaître

la pauvreté, le fait de leur fournir les

compétences qui leur permettraient

une plus grande participation entrai-

nerait des avantages non seulement

pour eux-mêmes, mais pour l'ensemble

de la société. Des travaux récents

démontrent, par exemple, que les

écarts dans les niveaux de compétences

parmi les pays membres de l'OCDE

expliquent les écarts importants sur le

plan de la croissance économique².

Plus particulièrement, hausser le taux

d'alphabétisation des adultes présen-

tant les niveaux de compétences les

plus bas a une grande incidence sur la

productivité de la main-d'œuvre et la

performance économique des pays.

Notre manière d'aborder la pauvreté et

l'exclusion n'est plus uniquement une

question de valeurs, telles qu'elles se

reflètent dans nos lois, nos politiques

et nos programmes, mais influe sur la

façon dont nous pouvons accélérer

la croissance économique et améliorer

le bien-être en général de nos citoyens.

Nous en savons davantage aujourd'hui

sur les réalités économiques et sociales

liées à la pauvreté. Les résultats d'en-

quêtes longitudinales jettent un nou-

veau éclairage sur la pauvreté, sa profon-

deur et ses conséquences. Ainsi, le parcours

de vie des personnes pauvres varie

énormément. Et bien que la pauvreté

ne constitue souvent qu'un état transi-

toire, certains groupes démographiques

semblent présenter en permanence une

incidence élevée de faible revenu.

Comment adapter les politiques

socio-économiques à ces nouvelles per-

spectives et réalités? Quelles approches

émergentes semblent les plus promet-

teuses et méritent toute l'attention

des responsables de l'élaboration des

politiques? Apporter réponse à ces

questions exigera une collaboration

efficace entre les ministères fédéraux,

les autres paliers gouvernementaux et

les intervenants clés. Il y a maintenant

plus d'un an que le PRR mène un pro-

jet interministériel intitulé Nouvelles

approches pour lutter contre la pau-

vrete et l'exclusion. Son objectif

consiste à évaluer le rôle potentiel de

nouvelles approches politiques aux

problèmes de la pauvreté croissante

dans le monde, en mettant l'accent

sur les implications à moyen terme

éventuelles pour les politiques fédérales

canadiennes.

Le présent numéro de *Horizons* ren-

ferme plusieurs articles de nos parte-

naires ministériels et du personnel de

recherche sur les politiques du PRR

prenant part à ce projet. Ces articles

vont de descriptions de l'évolution de

la pauvreté et des groupes visés à des

surveys des études et des analyses des

outils et politiques en cette matière.

Les gouvernements ne sont pas les

seuls responsables de réduire la pau-

vrete et l'exclusion. Les organismes à

but non lucratif jouent également un

rôle important, de sorte que ce numéro

contient des articles d'universitaires et

de représentants d'organisations non

gouvernementales qui partagent notre

HORIZONS

PROJET DE RECHERCHE SUR LES POLITIQUES

AUTRES ARTICLES

RÉSUMÉS DE RECHERCHE

- 51 Les travailleurs à faible revenu au Canada

- 58 Les immigrants âgés

COMMENTAIRES

- 66 Itinérance et éducation, emploi et soutien du revenu

- 72 Ré-évaluation de la Stratégie de l'emploi de l'OCDE

- 75 Politiques d'inclusion sociale

TÉMOINS

- 78 Un logement convenable et abordable pour tous

- 80 Besoins en matière de recherche sur les politiques pour soutenir l'économie sociale

- 82 Une approche de la politique sociale basée sur le parcours de vie

- 85 Les instruments reposant sur les mécanismes du marché dans la gestion de la demande d'eau

DONNÉES ET OUTILS POUR LA RECHERCHE SUR LES POLITIQUES

- 88 Stratégie d'accès communautaire aux statistiques sociales

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Canada

Pauvreté et exclusion Nouvelles perspectives, nouvelles approches

Àu Canada, les taux de pauvreté ont connu une amélioration sensible au cours des quelques dernières années. Néanmoins, l'amélioration sur l'ensemble des vingt dernières années est très mince. Sur le plan international, en matière de pauvreté, les pays nordiques, comme la Suède, la Norvège et la Finlande, de même que plusieurs autres pays européens, dont les Pays-Bas, la France et l'Allemagne, surclassent le Canada. Selon l'Indice de pauvreté humaine des Nations Unies¹, le Canada se classait 12^e dans ce domaine parmi les 17 pays riches en 2004.

Il existe beaucoup de bonnes raisons pour élaborer des politiques afin de résoudre efficacement les problèmes liés à la pauvreté et à l'exclusion sociale. Cet enjeu a une incidence directe sur le type de société que nous recherchons et les degrés d'inégalité que nous sommes prêts à tolérer. Même si c'est moins évident, il concerne aussi la production de richesse économique pour tous les Canadiens.

PAUVRETÉ ET EXCLUSION

- 4 L'hydre de la pauvreté

- 9 Jean Lock Kunz et Jeff Frank, Projet de recherche sur les politiques

- 9 Inégalité du revenu et population à faible revenu au Canada

- Garnett Picot, Statistique Canada

- John Myles, Université de Toronto et Statistique Canada

- 19 Groupes à risque de persistance d'un faible revenu

- Michael Hatfield, Développement social Canada

- 27 Exclusion d'un logement acceptable : Les Canadiens en situation de

- besoin impérieux de logement

- John Engeland et Roger Lewis, Société canadienne d'hypothèques et de

- logement

- 34 Pauvreté et exclusion : approches normatives de la recherche sur

- les politiques

- F. Pearl Eliadis, The J.W. McConnell Family Foundation

- 40 Emplois précaires et exclusion sociale : enjeux clés et nouvelles

- orientations stratégiques

- Andrew Jackson, Congrès du travail du Canada

- 45 Pauvreté et éducation au centre-ville

- Ben Levin, Université du Manitoba

